New York Law Review

Tag: jury instruction

  • People v. Taylor, 26 N.Y.3d 18 (2015): Jury Must Decide Accomplice Status When Evidence is Disputed

    People v. Taylor, 26 N.Y.3d 18 (2015)

    When evidence presents a factual dispute as to whether a witness participated in the crime, the jury must decide if the witness is an accomplice and whether their testimony needs corroboration.

    Summary

    Taylor was convicted of manslaughter based largely on the testimony of Mogavero, who claimed to witness Taylor beat the victim. Taylor argued that Mogavero was an accomplice, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The Court of Appeals held that because evidence presented a factual question about Mogavero’s involvement, the trial court erred in not instructing the jury to determine if Mogavero was an accomplice. The error was not harmless because Mogavero’s testimony was crucial, and the corroborating evidence was not overwhelming. The Court reversed the conviction, allowing the People to resubmit the manslaughter charge to a grand jury.

    Facts

    Defendant Taylor was charged with second-degree murder for the beating death of Merced. The prosecution’s key witness, Mogavero, testified that he witnessed Taylor, Clarke, and Velez beat Merced after a night of drinking. Mogavero admitted to punching Merced twice at the beginning of the altercation. Mogavero stated that Taylor later struck Merced with a mop handle while Merced lay on a porch. Mogavero admitted to helping move Merced to the porch. Taylor, in a statement to police, admitted to being present and poking Merced with a mop handle but denied beating him.

    Procedural History

    The Monroe County Court denied Taylor’s request for an “accomplice as a question of fact” jury instruction. The jury acquitted Taylor of murder but convicted him of first-degree manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred by failing to submit to the jury the question of whether Mogavero was an accomplice in fact, and if so, whether his testimony was sufficiently corroborated.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence presented a factual question as to Mogavero’s participation in the crime; therefore, the trial court should have instructed the jury on accomplice-in-fact.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Under CPL 60.22, a defendant cannot be convicted solely on an accomplice’s testimony without corroborating evidence. The court determines if a witness is an accomplice as a matter of law. However, if a factual dispute exists regarding the witness’s role, the jury must decide if the witness is an accomplice in fact. Here, evidence suggested Mogavero participated in the crime. He admitted to punching Merced, which could have contributed to the death, according to the forensic pathologist. Mogavero helped move the body, potentially to cover up the crime. The Court noted, “different inferences may reasonably be drawn from Mogavero’s testimony and the forensic evidence, as to Mogavero’s role as an accomplice.”

    The Court reasoned that the failure to provide the instruction was not harmless because Mogavero was the key eyewitness, and the corroborating evidence was not overwhelming. The defendant’s statement to police contradicted Mogavero’s testimony, and the jury could have reasonably discounted Mogavero’s testimony. As the Court noted, “Where the jury could have chosen to discount the testimony of the People’s eyewitness and the proof of defendant’s guilt was not overwhelming, it cannot be said that the failure to properly charge the jury was harmless error.” Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.

  • People v. Wallace, 7 N.Y.3d 886 (2006): Jury Instruction on Lesser Included Offense

    7 N.Y.3d 886 (2006)

    A court is not required to submit a charge to the jury on a lesser included offense unless there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support a conviction for the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    Wallace was convicted of robbery in the first and second degrees. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by not submitting a charge to the jury on the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was no reasonable view of the evidence to support a conviction for robbery in the third degree. The victim’s testimony indicated the defendant had a gun, and no other evidence reasonably contradicted this testimony. The court emphasized that even though a witness claimed not to see a gun, he overheard a statement indicating the defendant possessed one. Thus, the court properly declined to charge the jury on the lesser included offense.

    Facts

    The victim was approached by Wallace and three companions as he left school. Two companions acted as lookouts while Wallace and another individual surrounded the victim. Wallace pressed his hip into the victim’s waist, revealing what appeared to be a gun. The victim testified he saw the barrel and handle of a black gun. Wallace and his accomplice then took the victim’s money and iPod.

    Procedural History

    Wallace was tried jointly with his accomplices. He requested the trial court to charge the jury on robbery in the third degree as a lesser included offense of robbery in the first degree. The trial court denied the request. Wallace was convicted of robbery in the first and second degrees. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in declining to submit a charge to the jury on the lesser included offense of robbery in the third degree.

    Holding

    No, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence to support a conviction of robbery in the third degree and not robbery in the first degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    To establish entitlement to a charge on a lesser included offense, a defendant must show that the greater crime cannot be committed without also committing the lesser crime, and that a reasonable view of the evidence would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense. The court stated, “Although robbery in the third degree is a lesser included crime of robbery in the first degree, here there is no reasonable view of the evidence to support a jury finding that defendant committed robbery in the third degree and not robbery in the first degree.” The victim testified that the defendant had a gun. While a witness claimed not to have seen the gun, he overheard another accomplice tell the victim that the defendant had a gun. The court concluded that based on the evidence presented, no reasonable jury could find the defendant committed robbery in the third degree but not robbery in the first degree, and therefore, the trial court did not err in declining to submit the charge to the jury. The decision emphasizes the importance of the trial court’s assessment of the evidence in determining whether a lesser included offense instruction is warranted.

  • People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282 (2008): Preservation of Error for Affirmative Defenses

    People v. Jenkins, 11 N.Y.3d 282 (2008)

    A defendant must specifically request a jury instruction on an affirmative defense to preserve the issue for appellate review; a general discussion during a charge conference is insufficient.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of burglary, assault, and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division reversed the assault convictions due to the trial court’s failure to provide a self-defense charge, reduced the burglary conviction to second degree due to an indictment deficiency, but rejected the defendant’s claim that he was entitled to a new trial on the burglary charge based on the lack of a “choice of evils” instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant failed to properly preserve the “choice of evils” defense for appellate review because he did not specifically request the instruction. The Court further held that the Appellate Division properly declined to reverse the burglary conviction after reversing the assault convictions.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with burglary in the first degree, two counts of assault in the third degree, and endangering the welfare of a child. The charges stemmed from an incident involving an altercation. At trial, the defendant requested a self-defense charge. After his conviction, the defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to give a “choice of evils” instruction regarding the burglary charge.

    Procedural History

    Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed the assault convictions and reduced the burglary conviction. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that he was entitled to a “choice of evils” instruction for the burglary offense, and that reversal of the assault convictions should have led to reversal of the burglary conviction as well. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant preserved the argument that he was entitled to a Penal Law § 35.05 “choice of evils” charge for the burglary offense.

    2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in failing to reverse the burglary conviction after reversing the assault convictions based on a charging error.

    3. Whether the trial court erred in precluding the admission of photographs of an injury suffered by a person not present during the altercation.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to alert the trial court that he was seeking a “choice of evils” instruction in addition to the self-defense instruction.

    2. No, because the burglary conviction was not “contaminated” by the charging error associated with the assault counts.

    3. No, because the court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the proffered evidence was collateral and that its prejudicial effect would outweigh any potential probative value.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to preserve the “choice of evils” defense because he did not specifically request a jury instruction on that defense. The Court noted that a general discussion during the charge conference regarding self-defense was insufficient to preserve the distinct “choice of evils” defense. The Court cited People v. Craig, 78 NY2d 616 (1991). The Court emphasized that the defendant needed to alert the trial court that he was seeking the choice of evils instruction in addition to the self-defense instruction. Failing to do so forfeited the argument on appeal. As for the argument that the reversal of the assault convictions should have led to reversal of the burglary conviction, the Court summarily rejected this claim. Regarding the exclusion of photographs, the Court held that the trial court has discretion to exclude evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value, citing People v. Pavao, 59 NY2d 282 (1983), and found no abuse of discretion here.

  • People v. Devonish, 6 N.Y.3d 727 (2005): Entitlement to Lesser Included Offense Instruction

    6 N.Y.3d 727 (2005)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    James Devonish was convicted of second-degree burglary. At trial, the defense requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of second-degree criminal trespass, which the trial court denied. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant was entitled to the lesser included offense instruction because a reasonable view of the evidence suggested he may have committed criminal trespass (entering unlawfully) without the intent to commit a crime therein, as required for burglary. The evidence showed he was found in a locked church with tools that might have belonged to someone else who stored them there, thus creating a question as to whether he possessed the tools (and criminal intent) upon entry.

    Facts

    Defendant James Devonish was found inside a locked church building. He had a bag containing tools commonly used by burglars.

    A witness, a general contractor for the church, testified that he stored his tools in the church basement.

    The contractor identified one of the tools found in Devonish’s possession as his “for sure,” and indicated the others might have been his as well.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree in the trial court.

    He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the second degree.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing the defendant’s request to charge the jury with the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the second degree.

    Holding

    Yes, because a reasonable view of the evidence would permit the jury to conclude that the defendant committed the lesser offense (criminal trespass) but not the greater offense (burglary).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, the jury could have inferred that the defendant did not bring the tools with him into the church.

    The court noted that the contractor’s testimony indicated the tools could have already been in the church. Thus, the evidence could have failed to establish that the defendant had the requisite criminal intent (to commit a crime inside) at the time of entry, a necessary element of burglary.

    The court cited People v. Scarborough, 49 N.Y.2d 364, 373 (1980), emphasizing that if “some reasonable view of the evidence would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser offense but did not commit the greater, it is error to refuse to submit such lesser offense.”

    Because the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant entered the church unlawfully (trespass) but without the intent to commit a crime therein (burglary), the defendant was entitled to the lesser included offense instruction.

    The Court stated that “the jury was entitled to infer that defendant did not bring the tools with him to the church, and thus that the evidence failed to show that he had criminal intent at the time of entry”.

  • People v. Smith, 98 N.Y.2d 325 (2002): Harmless Error Doctrine and Jury Exposure to Hearsay

    People v. Smith, 98 N.Y.2d 325 (2002)

    When a jury is inadvertently exposed to inadmissible evidence, such as a non-testifying witness’s statement, a conviction will not be overturned if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to a strong curative instruction and overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Summary

    Robert Smith was convicted of second-degree murder, attempted murder, and criminal possession of a weapon. During deliberations, the jury inadvertently received a statement from a non-testifying witness, Michelle Fudge, which contradicted Smith’s testimony. Smith moved for a mistrial, which was denied. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed again, holding that the error was harmless due to the trial court’s curative instruction and the overwhelming evidence against Smith, including his confession and eyewitness testimony. The court emphasized that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one.

    Facts

    On August 30, 1998, Robert Drummond was killed, and Malik Robertson was wounded in a shooting. Smith confessed to the crime in a signed statement, admitting that he rode a black mountain bike to the scene, shot Robertson with a 9mm gun, and later disposed of the weapon in Onondaga Lake. At trial, Smith recanted his confession, claiming he was coerced by detectives and providing an alibi that he was with friends, Abraham Whaley and Michelle Fudge, at the time of the shooting. However, Fudge’s statement to police, which was mistakenly included as an exhibit, contradicted Smith’s alibi, stating she had not given him a ride on the night of the shooting. Robert Hunt, an eyewitness, identified Smith as the shooter based on his size and mannerisms.

    Procedural History

    Smith was indicted in Onondaga County. His motion to suppress his confession was denied after a Huntley hearing. At trial, the jury convicted Smith. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the inclusion of Fudge’s statement violated Smith’s right to confrontation and was not harmless error. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the conviction and remitting the case to the Appellate Division for consideration of other issues.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial after a non-testifying witness’s statement was inadvertently included on the back of a trial exhibit provided to the jury, and whether such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Holding

    Yes, the error was harmless because the trial court gave a strong curative instruction, and there was overwhelming proof of the defendant’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the harmless error doctrine, stating that a constitutional error requires reversal unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, meaning “there is no reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to defendant’s conviction.” The Court emphasized that the Constitution guarantees a fair trial, not a perfect one. Despite the jury’s exposure to Fudge’s statement, the court found overwhelming evidence of Smith’s guilt, including his detailed confession, eyewitness testimony, and the fact that he led detectives to the location where he disposed of the gun. The court highlighted the strength of the curative instruction given by the trial judge, which directed the jury to disregard the statement entirely. The court observed, “The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence… and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.” Furthermore, the court noted that Fudge’s statement, even if believed, did not provide Smith with a complete alibi, as it only contradicted his claim of being with her at 2:00 a.m., while the shooting occurred at 4:30 a.m. Ultimately, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.

  • People v. Grossman, 85 N.Y.2d 144 (1995): Jury Cannot Decide Constitutionality of Religious Freedom Restriction

    People v. Grossman, 85 N.Y.2d 144 (1995)

    The determination of whether state action unconstitutionally infringes upon religious freedom is a question of law to be decided by the court, not a question of fact for the jury.

    Summary

    Grossman was convicted in Town Court for violating a zoning ordinance. He argued his religion required him to violate the ordinance and requested the court include the Free Exercise of Religion Clause from the New York Constitution in its jury charge. The Town Court refused. The County Court reversed, finding Grossman presented enough evidence to warrant the instruction. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s decision, holding that determining whether state action unconstitutionally abridged religious freedom is a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury. The case was remitted to County Court for factual determinations.

    Facts

    Grossman claimed his religious beliefs required him to violate a town zoning ordinance. During his trial in Town Court, Grossman requested the court include the language of the Free Exercise of Religion Clause from the New York Constitution in the jury charge. The Town Court refused to give the requested instruction.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court convicted Grossman of the zoning violation. Grossman appealed to the County Court. The County Court reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that Grossman had presented a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury instruction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a jury should determine if state action unconstitutionally abridges a defendant’s religious freedom.

    Holding

    No, because determining whether state action unconstitutionally abridges religious freedom is a question of law for the court to resolve, not a question of fact for the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the jury’s role is to resolve factual disputes by assessing evidence and witness credibility, citing Dominguez v Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 46 NY2d 528, 534, and Wragge v Lizza Asphalt Constr. Co., 17 NY2d 313, 319. The court reasoned that Grossman’s proposed instruction would require the jury to determine the constitutionality of state action regarding religious freedom, a question of law reserved for the court.

    The court affirmed the Town Court’s role in balancing “the interest of the individual right of religious worship against the interest of the State which is sought to be enforced” (People v Woodruff, 26 AD2d 236, 238, affd no opn 21 NY2d 848). Therefore, the Town Court acted appropriately in refusing the requested jury instruction. The court did not elaborate further on the specific facts of the case or the zoning ordinance in question, focusing instead on the fundamental principle of separation of powers between judge and jury.

  • People v. Roche, 88 N.Y.2d 974 (1996): Agency Defense in Criminal Sale of Controlled Substance

    People v. Roche, 88 N.Y.2d 974 (1996)

    A jury instruction on the agency defense in a criminal sale of a controlled substance case is sufficient when it accurately conveys that the jury can consider any benefit received from the buyer as supportive of the defense.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree for selling crack cocaine to an undercover officer. At trial, she argued an agency defense, claiming she bought the drugs on the officer’s behalf. She appealed, arguing the trial court’s charge to the jury on the agency defense was insufficient under People v. Andujas. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury instruction was adequate because it correctly stated that the jury could consider any benefit received from the buyer when deciding if the defendant acted as the buyer’s agent.

    Facts

    The defendant sold two vials of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer.

    At trial, the defendant claimed the officer asked her to get crack for him and offered to “get her high.”

    She testified she bought four vials, kept two for herself, and expected to barter sex later for the officer providing her with crack.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

    She appealed, arguing the trial court’s jury charge on the agency defense was insufficient.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding the agency defense, specifically whether the instruction failed to adequately convey that any benefit received from the buyer could support the defense.

    Holding

    No, because the jury charge, taken as a whole, accurately instructed the jury that it could consider any benefit received from the buyer as supportive of the agency defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found no merit in the defendant’s argument that the trial court should have expanded its charge on the agency defense under People v. Andujas, 79 N.Y.2d 113.

    The court correctly instructed the jury that it could consider any benefit received from the buyer as supportive of an agency defense.

    The Court determined that, “in that context, the charge as a whole accurately provided the jury with the proper instruction (see, e.g., People v Fields, 87 N.Y.2d 821; People v Warren, 76 N.Y.2d 773).”

    The Court emphasized that the key is that the charge as a whole conveys the proper understanding of the law. It did not require a specific formulation beyond ensuring the jury understood that benefits from the buyer could support the defense.

  • People v. Wosu, 84 N.Y.2d 936 (1994): Preservation of Error Required for Appellate Review

    People v. Wosu, 84 N.Y.2d 936 (1994)

    To preserve a claim for appellate review, a party must specifically and adequately raise the issue before the trial court.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of rape and sexual abuse of twin seven-year-old girls. The indictment alleged the crimes occurred between November 1 and November 30, 1991, later narrowed to “around Thanksgiving.” During deliberations, the jury asked for the “actual date” of the crimes. The trial judge instructed them that the date was a question of fact. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant’s appellate claims were not properly preserved at trial because his counsel did not specifically object to the supplemental jury instruction.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of raping and sexually abusing twin seven-year-old girls. The alleged incidents occurred between November 1 and November 30, 1991. The prosecution narrowed the timeframe to “around Thanksgiving” in a bill of particulars. The child victims’ memories were linked to a Thanksgiving dinner at their father’s house.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial judge’s supplemental instruction should have informed the jury that the incident occurred on or near Thanksgiving Day, consistent with the evidence presented at trial.

    Whether it was error to instruct the jury that the date of the incident was a question of fact for their determination.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s trial counsel did not specifically and adequately preserve the issue for appellate review.

    No, because the defendant’s trial counsel did not specifically and adequately preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division majority that the defendant’s trial counsel failed to specifically and adequately preserve the appellate claims. The court emphasized that defense counsel did not properly object to the trial judge’s supplemental instruction. Because the issues were not properly preserved, the Court of Appeals lacked the power to review them. The court noted that “[b]ecause the issues are beyond this Court’s power to review in these circumstances and defendant’s remaining claims are without merit, we affirm the order of the Appellate Division.” The court effectively reinforced the fundamental principle of appellate law that objections must be raised at the trial level to be considered on appeal. This encourages parties to address issues promptly and allows the trial court to correct any errors, preventing unnecessary appeals. It underscores the importance of making specific and timely objections to preserve legal arguments for appellate review. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to raise those arguments on appeal.

  • People v. DeFreitas, 88 N.Y.2d 824 (1996): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Failure to Request Affirmative Defense Instruction

    People v. DeFreitas, 88 N.Y.2d 824 (1996)

    A defense counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on an affirmative defense does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel; the determination depends on the totality of the circumstances.

    Summary

    DeFreitas was convicted of felony murder for his role in a robbery where two employees were killed. His appeal centered on his lawyer’s failure to request a jury instruction on the affirmative defense to felony murder. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the failure to request the instruction, in itself, did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. The court emphasized that the determination of ineffective assistance is based on the entire context of the case, not on a single error or omission. The court also found the defendant’s claims regarding sentencing unpreserved.

    Facts

    DeFreitas participated in a robbery during which another individual shot and killed two shop employees. He was subsequently convicted of two counts of felony murder. During the trial, his defense counsel did not explicitly request a jury instruction regarding the affirmative defense to felony murder, as outlined in Penal Law § 125.25[3].

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted DeFreitas. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel based on his lawyer’s failure to request the affirmative defense instruction. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction, rejecting the ineffective assistance claim. DeFreitas then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether defense counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on the affirmative defense to felony murder, in and of itself, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel under the totality of the circumstances.

    Holding

    No, because under the entire circumstances of the case, the defense counsel’s failure to request the affirmative defense instruction does not, in itself, constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on prior precedent, citing People v. Hobot, People v. Flores, and People v. Baldi, to support its decision that ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances. The court explicitly stated, “We agree with the Appellate Division that defense counsel’s failure to request the affirmative defense instruction does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, in and of itself, under the entire circumstances of this case.” The court explicitly stated it was only assuming, but not deciding, whether the defendant would have been entitled to the instruction even if it had been requested. This suggests the court considered the strength of a potential affirmative defense in its analysis, even without directly ruling on its applicability. The court also found that DeFreitas’s arguments regarding the sentencing court’s actions were not properly preserved for appellate review, meaning he didn’t raise them appropriately in the lower courts. This highlights the importance of raising objections and arguments at the trial level to preserve them for appeal.

  • People v. Montalvo, 86 N.Y.2d 826 (1995): Duty to Charge Lesser Included Offense

    People v. Montalvo, 86 N.Y.2d 826 (1995)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on a lesser included offense if (1) the additional offense is a lesser included offense and (2) there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser included offense but not the greater offense.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree. The court reasoned that while the defendant intentionally stabbed the victim, a reasonable view of the evidence could suggest he was unaware that the stabbing would result in death, thus supporting a finding of criminal negligence rather than intentional manslaughter. The court also held that the defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct during summation was unpreserved for review.

    Facts

    The defendant, Montalvo, stabbed the victim, Golofit. He was charged with manslaughter in the second degree. At trial, Montalvo requested that the judge also instruct the jury on criminally negligent homicide as a lesser included offense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Montalvo’s request for a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide. Montalvo was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree.
    2. Whether there was a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed criminally negligent homicide but not manslaughter in the second degree.
    3. Whether the prosecutor’s remarks during summation were so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because it is undisputed that criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree.
    2. Yes, because a reasonable view of the record evidence supports a finding that defendant was not aware that stabbing Golofit would result in his death.
    3. No, because the issue was not properly preserved for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, agreeing that Montalvo was entitled to a jury instruction on criminally negligent homicide. The court reiterated the two-pronged test for entitlement to a lesser included offense charge: (1) the additional offense must be a lesser included offense, and (2) there must be a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser included offense but not the greater offense. The court found that both prongs were satisfied. First, it was undisputed that criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the second degree (citing People v. Stanfield, 36 NY2d 467). Second, the court emphasized that the intentional nature of the stabbing did not preclude a finding of criminal negligence. The court stated, “In criminal negligence, a person acts with the requisite culpable mental state when such person fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the act in question will cause the statutorily described result (Penal Law § 15.05 [4]).” The court further clarified that “criminal negligence analysis focuses on the actor’s awareness of the risk that death will result from the act, not whether the underlying act is intentional.” Because a reasonable view of the evidence could suggest that Montalvo was unaware that stabbing Golofit would result in death, the instruction should have been given. Finally, the court held that Montalvo’s claim regarding the prosecutor’s summation was unpreserved because defense counsel did not object further or request a mistrial after the trial judge issued curative instructions. The court cited People v. Williams, 46 NY2d 1070, 1071, stating that under these circumstances, “the curative instructions must be deemed to have corrected the error to the defendant’s satisfaction”.