New York Law Review

Tag: jury deliberations

  • People v. Mays, 19 N.Y.3d 970 (2012): Clarifying the Scope of O’Rama and Ministerial Communication with Jurors

    19 N.Y.3d 970 (2012)

    Communications between a prosecutor and jury are considered ministerial, and do not violate People v. O’Rama, when they concern logistical aspects of a readback and are unrelated to substantive legal or factual issues.

    Summary

    Defendant Calvin Mays was convicted of robbery. During jury deliberations, the jury requested to re-watch a surveillance video entered as evidence. The prosecutor played the video, and during this process, jurors made requests related to the viewing conditions (e.g., dimming lights, freezing the frame). The defense argued that this interaction violated People v. O’Rama because the judge did not give counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard before the prosecutor responded to the jury’s requests. The New York Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor’s communications were ministerial, did not implicate O’Rama, and the conviction was affirmed.

    Facts

    Calvin Mays was charged with robbery and related offenses arising from two armed robberies. A surveillance video of one robbery was admitted as evidence during his trial. The jury requested to see the video again during deliberations. The prosecutor replayed the video, slowing it down and projecting it onto a screen. Jurors made requests such as reducing glare, replaying the video, and freezing the view, which the prosecutor accommodated.

    Procedural History

    The jury acquitted Mays of charges related to the videotaped robbery but convicted him of robbery for the other crime. He was sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender. The Appellate Division rejected Mays’s argument that the interaction with the jury violated People v. O’Rama. A dissenting Justice granted Mays leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial judge committed an O’Rama error by allowing the prosecutor to interact directly with the jury while replaying the surveillance video, without prior notice to defense counsel, when the interactions concerned logistical requests about the viewing of the evidence.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecutor’s communications with the jury were ministerial and did not concern substantive legal or factual issues related to the trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court reasoned that although defense counsel was aware of the jurors’ comments, made aloud in court, they did not object to the judge’s or prosecutor’s responses. The Court emphasized that the prosecutor’s communications were merely ministerial, such as adjusting the lights or attempting to stop the video at a specific point requested by the jury. These actions did not constitute the kind of substantive response that triggers O’Rama. The court stated that “Asking that the lights be dimmed because a juror was bothered by the glare, playing the video again once they were, or attempting to stop the video at the place the jurors wished is not the kind of substantive response that implicates O’Rama.” Preservation was required because the error was not considered an O’Rama violation. The Court also rejected the argument that the trial judge improperly delegated judicial responsibility, noting the judge was present and participating throughout the video replay. The Court added the defendant was acquitted of all charges stemming from the videotaped robbery, further diminishing the impact of the alleged error.

  • People v. Herring, 17 N.Y.3d 1084 (2011): Inquiry Into Juror Competency During Deliberations

    People v. Herring, 17 N.Y.3d 1084 (2011)

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion when, after a report that a juror was sleeping during deliberations, the court questions the juror, receives assurances of attentiveness and willingness to serve, and declines to further investigate the specifics of jury participation.

    Summary

    Carlos Herring was convicted of murder, assault, and weapons possession. During deliberations, another juror reported that one juror was sleeping. The trial judge questioned the allegedly sleeping juror, who denied sleeping and affirmed her willingness to serve. The judge declined to investigate further into the jury’s deliberation process and denied a motion for mistrial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in determining that the juror was fit to serve, given the juror’s assurances and the potential for intrusion into the jury’s private deliberations.

    Facts

    Carlos Herring shot and killed one man and wounded another in a crowded parking lot outside a nightclub. He was charged with murder, assault, weapon possession, and menacing. At trial, Herring argued he acted in self-defense. During the trial, the jury acquitted him of menacing, but convicted him of the other crimes.

    Procedural History

    Herring was convicted in Rockland County and sentenced to an aggregate term of 32 years to life in prison, plus five years of post-release supervision. On appeal to the Appellate Division, Herring argued that the trial judge mishandled a report that a juror was sleeping during deliberations. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to discharge a juror or for a mistrial based on the alleged inattentiveness of that juror, after making an inquiry of that juror.

    Holding

    No, because the trial judge appropriately inquired into the juror’s attentiveness and received assurances of her willingness and ability to serve, and further investigation could have improperly intruded into the jury’s deliberation process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the trial judge acted within her discretion. When juror 7 reported that juror 11 was sleeping, the judge first repeated the deliberation charge to the entire jury. Before deliberations resumed, the judge questioned juror 11 directly, who denied sleeping and affirmed her willingness and ability to perform her duties. The judge noted that juror 7 indicated the concerning conduct was not continuing. The court reasoned it would not further inquire into the specifics of jury participation, stating that it would “invade[] the privacy and the province of that jury.”

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the trial judge’s opportunity to observe juror 11’s demeanor and assess her credibility. The court distinguished this situation from cases where a juror’s behavior definitively renders them “grossly unqualified.” The court affirmed the principle that a trial judge must balance the need to ensure juror competence with the need to protect the confidentiality of jury deliberations. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court acted reasonably in determining that Juror 11 was fit to serve based on her responses and the limited inquiry conducted, and that the judge had “recharged [the jury] on deliberations and how to conduct themselves during deliberations.”

  • People v. Rivera, 15 N.Y.3d 208 (2010): Trial Court Error in Rejecting Partial Verdict and Ordering Further Deliberation

    People v. Rivera, 15 N.Y.3d 208 (2010)

    A trial court commits reversible error when, after a jury announces a partial verdict in open court, the court refuses to accept that verdict and orders the jury to resume deliberations on all counts, including those already decided.

    Summary

    Rivera was convicted of multiple offenses. During deliberations, the jury indicated they had reached a verdict on some counts but were deadlocked on others. The trial court directed the jury to announce its partial verdict, which included acquittals on some counts. The court then refused to accept the partial verdict and ordered the jury to continue deliberating on all counts. The next day, the jury convicted Rivera on nearly all counts. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court violated Criminal Procedure Law § 310.70 and impinged on Rivera’s right to a jury trial by rejecting the partial verdict and ordering further deliberations. This action created a coercive environment, potentially influencing the jury to alter its prior decisions.

    Facts

    Defendant and his brother allegedly broke into an apartment, terrorized the occupants, and stole money and property. The victims called the police, who apprehended the defendant and his brother near a delicatessen. At trial, the jury was presented with 11 counts, including robbery, weapons possession, burglary, larceny, and unlawful imprisonment.

    Procedural History

    The jury initially returned a partial verdict, acquitting Rivera on some counts and convicting him on one. The trial court refused to accept this verdict and ordered further deliberations. The next day, the jury convicted Rivera on almost all counts. The Appellate Division modified the judgment regarding sentencing but affirmed the trial court’s refusal to accept the partial verdict. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated Criminal Procedure Law § 310.70 and impinged on the defendant’s right to a trial by jury when it refused to accept the jury’s partial verdict, which had been announced in open court, and ordered the jury to continue deliberations on all counts.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court’s actions contravened CPL 310.70 and potentially coerced the jury, infringing on the defendant’s fundamental right to a trial by jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the language of CPL 310.70, which provides two options when a jury reports reaching a verdict on some but not all counts: accept the partial verdict and continue deliberations on the remaining counts, or refuse to accept a partial verdict and order deliberations on the entire case. Here, the trial court initially chose the first option by directing the jury to announce their partial verdict. However, by then refusing to accept that announced verdict, the court implicitly signaled that the verdict was incorrect, potentially influencing the jury’s subsequent deliberations. The court reasoned that this created a coercive environment, undermining the secrecy and independence of jury deliberations, which are critical to a fair trial. The Court emphasized, “If the trial court finds out where the jury stands on a particular count and then orders the jury to deliberate further on that count, the trial court effectively, even though inadvertently, inserts itself into the jury’s deliberations.” The court emphasized the importance of ensuring that “jury deliberations should be confidential and free from outside interference, and has the potential to render a defendant’s right to a trial by jury meaningless.” The court noted that a trial court can only reject an announced verdict if it is legally defective or repugnant, neither of which applied in this case. By vacating the convictions on counts that were part of the initial partial verdict of acquittal, the Court reinforced the importance of respecting the jury’s initial findings and preventing judicial interference in the deliberation process.

  • People v. Cruz, 12 N.Y.3d 815 (2009): Rebutting the Presumption of Regularity in Jury Deliberations

    People v. Cruz, 12 N.Y.3d 815 (2009)

    A defendant can rebut the presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings by presenting substantial evidence of a significant, unexplained irregularity, such as a jury receiving an exhibit not admitted into evidence without the knowledge or consent of the court or parties.

    Summary

    Cruz was convicted of assault. During deliberations, the jury requested a written statement made by Cruz to the police, which, although marked as a court exhibit, was not admitted into evidence. The trial judge had no recollection of the note and did not inform counsel. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Cruz rebutted the presumption of regularity because the jury requested and may have received an exhibit not in evidence, a fact not brought to the judge’s attention. The error was not harmless because the statement contradicted Cruz’s defense.

    Facts

    Cruz was charged with assault for stabbing two men. His defense was misidentification. During the trial, a police officer referred to a written statement signed by Cruz. The statement was marked as an exhibit but was only intended to refresh the officer’s recollection and was not admitted as evidence. During deliberations, the jury requested to see the statement, believing it was in evidence. The trial judge later stated that he had no recollection of the jury’s request.

    Procedural History

    Cruz was convicted of assault. He appealed, arguing a violation of CPL 310.30 and People v. O’Rama. The Appellate Division initially reserved decision and remitted the case for a reconstruction hearing to determine if a jury note existed and what action was taken. After the reconstruction hearing, the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, applying the presumption of regularity. Cruz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant met his burden of rebutting the presumption of regularity in judicial proceedings by presenting substantial evidence that the jury requested and potentially received an exhibit that was not admitted into evidence, without the knowledge of the judge or counsel.

    Holding

    Yes, because the record showed a significant, unexplained irregularity: the jury requested an exhibit not in evidence, and the request was never brought to the judge’s attention. Furthermore, it was reasonable for the jury to believe the exhibit was in evidence since it was initially received by the court, but the jury was not privy to the court’s subsequent reversal of that ruling.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that while a “presumption of regularity attaches to judicial proceedings” (People v. Velasquez, 1 NY3d 44, 48 [2003]), the Appellate Division erred in holding that the presumption had not been overcome. The court reasoned that Cruz established a significant, unexplained irregularity: the jury requested an exhibit not in evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to believe it was in evidence, and the request was never brought to the judge’s attention. The court emphasized the trial judge’s statement at the reconstruction hearing that he never saw the note, did not reconvene with counsel, and did not know if the exhibit was ever shown to the jury. The court also disagreed with the Appellate Division’s determination that the error was harmless, noting that the exhibit contradicted Cruz’s misidentification defense. The court cited People v Bouton, 50 NY2d 130, 137 in stating the error was not harmless. The key point is that the defendant presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a deviation from standard procedure occurred and that it prejudiced the defendant’s case.

  • People v. Simms, 13 N.Y.3d 867 (2009): Inquiry When a Juror Expresses Doubt During Polling

    13 N.Y.3d 867 (2009)

    When a juror expresses uncertainty or reservations during a jury poll, the trial court must conduct a sufficient inquiry to ensure the verdict is voluntary and not the result of coercion or duress, without improperly delving into the deliberative process.

    Summary

    In People v. Simms, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the adequacy of a trial court’s inquiry when a juror expressed feeling pressured during a jury poll. After deliberating, the jury found the defendant guilty. During the polling, one juror stated the verdict was hers, but she felt pressured. The trial judge inquired about the pressure, but limited the scope to external factors. The Court of Appeals held that the judge’s inquiry was insufficient to ensure the verdict’s voluntariness, as it didn’t adequately address potential duress arising within the jury room. The Court emphasized that while the secrecy of jury deliberations must be protected, the court must ensure the verdict isn’t the product of coercion. A new trial was ordered.

    Facts

    The jury found Everton Simms guilty of first-degree robbery. During the polling of the jury, the tenth juror stated, “Well, it is my verdict, although I feel like I was pressured to make that decision.” The juror then volunteered, “It is my verdict.” The trial judge confirmed, “That is your verdict; is that correct?” and the juror replied, “Yes.” Defense counsel moved for a mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, accepted the guilty verdict, and subsequently denied a motion to set aside the verdict. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge’s inquiry was insufficient to establish that the juror agreed with the verdict. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court conducted a sufficient inquiry to ensure that a juror’s guilty verdict was voluntary when the juror initially stated she felt pressured to reach that decision during the jury poll.

    Holding

    No, because while the trial judge established that there was no pressure exerted on juror number 10 emanating from outside the jury room, he did not clear up whether there was duress arising out of matters extraneous to the jury’s deliberations or not properly within their scope, although perhaps occurring within the jury room.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals cited CPL 310.80, which requires the court to refuse the verdict and direct the jury to resume deliberations if a juror dissents during polling. It acknowledged the trial judge’s duty to resolve uncertainties arising from a juror’s response, citing People v. Mercado, 91 NY2d 960, 963 (1998). The Court distinguished between permissible inquiry and violating the secrecy of jury deliberations, citing People v. Pickett, 61 NY2d 773, 774 (1984). The court stated, “Trial judges may not violat[e] the secrecy of the jury deliberations, but they must insure that a verdict is not the product of actual or threatened physical harm.” The court noted the trial judge never dispelled the ambiguity by asking whether the juror found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence. Judge Smith concurred, stating the juror made it perfectly clear that what she meant by pressure was no more than vigorous argument: “[E]veryone is standing up, yelling at me, why can’t you see it that way, why can’t you see it that way?”

  • People v. Sala, 95 N.Y.2d 85 (2000): Waiver of Right to Object to Jury Deliberations

    People v. Sala, 95 N.Y.2d 85 (2000)

    A defendant can forfeit the right to object to a jury’s continued deliberations and subsequent verdict on a higher charge when defense counsel affirmatively encourages the court to accept a partial verdict on a lesser charge and fails to object to further deliberations.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder after a jury initially found him guilty of second-degree murder on the same charges. The defense argued that the initial partial verdict on the lesser charge should have precluded further deliberation on the greater charge. However, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defense counsel’s explicit encouragement of the partial verdict and failure to object to continued deliberations constituted a forfeiture of the right to challenge the subsequent first-degree murder conviction. This case emphasizes the importance of timely objections and strategic decisions made by defense counsel during jury deliberations.

    Facts

    The defendant entered the apartment of two people he knew seeking drugs. He stabbed both victims multiple times, resulting in their deaths. He was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of second-degree murder for each victim. The defense argued a lack of criminal intent due to drug and alcohol intoxication. The jury sent a note indicating unanimity on two counts but did not specify which ones. The defense counsel advocated for taking a partial verdict.

    Procedural History

    The trial court accepted a partial verdict of guilty on two counts of second-degree murder. The jury then continued deliberations and returned a guilty verdict on first-degree murder. The defendant appealed, arguing that the partial verdict on the lesser charge precluded further deliberation on the greater charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can challenge a jury’s verdict on a greater charge after defense counsel explicitly encouraged the court to accept a partial verdict on a lesser-included charge and failed to object to the jury’s continued deliberations.

    Holding

    No, because the defense counsel’s actions constituted a forfeiture of the right to object. By affirmatively requesting the partial verdict and not objecting to further deliberations, the defendant waived the right to argue that the initial verdict barred subsequent deliberations on the higher charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the trial court did not instruct the jury to consider the charges in any particular order, as would be required under People v. Boettcher, 69 NY2d 174 (1987), where lesser included counts are submitted in the alternative. More importantly, defense counsel affirmatively requested the partial verdict, stating that People v. Fuller, 96 NY2d 881 (2001) (holding retrial barred on a higher offense after a jury finds the defendant guilty of a lesser included offense) was not directly applicable. The court noted that while a defendant cannot waive protections against multiple prosecutions after an acquittal, defense counsel’s actions occurred *before* the partial verdict. The court concluded that defense counsel made a strategic decision, and the defendant could not later challenge that choice. As the court stated, “Counsel weighed the options and, rather than asking for a mistrial, made the strategic decision to go for a partial verdict and further deliberations by the same jury.”

  • People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 118 (1995): Unauthorized Jury Room Demonstration and Preservation of Error

    People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 118 (1995)

    When a court officer’s unauthorized conduct in a jury room does not usurp the court’s authority and the court takes corrective action, a defendant must object to preserve any error for appeal; absent a timely objection, the error is considered curable and cured.

    Summary

    Starling was convicted of second-degree murder. During jury deliberations, a court officer, at the jury’s request, demonstrated how the murder weapon (a bayonet) fit into its sheath, without the court’s authorization. The trial court informed both sides and, with the defendant’s consent, instructed the jury to disregard the demonstration. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s failure to object to the demonstration, instead agreeing to a curative instruction, meant the issue was not preserved for appeal. The court distinguished this case from instances where a judge delegates essential judicial functions, emphasizing that the trial court retained control and addressed the impropriety.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with murdering his ex-girlfriend’s father by stabbing him with a bayonet.

    Conflicting accounts were presented at trial: the prosecution argued the stabbing was deliberate, while the defendant claimed self-defense, stating the deceased seized the bayonet first.

    During deliberations, the jury requested the bayonet and its sheath.

    A court officer allowed the jury to handle the bayonet, and demonstrated how it could be drawn from the sheath while it was in his waistband, but the court officer refused to allow the jurors to experiment with the bayonet themselves.

    The court officer told the court about the demonstration, and the court informed both sides.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Defendant’s CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the judgment, finding the defense waived any issue by agreeing to a curative instruction, and rejecting the argument that a mode of proceedings error occurred.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction and the order denying CPL 440.10 relief, determining the court officer’s conduct was ministerial and did not usurp the trial court’s authority.

    The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the court officer’s unauthorized demonstration in the jury room constituted a “mode of proceedings” error that need not be preserved for appellate review.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court took appropriate action to address the unauthorized demonstration and the defendant consented to a curative instruction instead of objecting or moving for a mistrial, the issue was not preserved for appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished the case from People v. Ahmed, where a judge improperly delegated judicial functions. In this case, the trial court retained control of the proceedings and addressed the court officer’s impropriety by informing both sides and offering a curative instruction.

    The Court relied on People v. Bonaparte, where a court officer’s communication with the jury was deemed ministerial and any error was unpreserved because of the failure to object. The court found the present case even stronger for affirmance because the court officer’s actions were unauthorized.

    The Court emphasized that the defendant had the opportunity to object to the demonstration but instead agreed to the curative instruction. The court stated, “[I]n all, the impropriety was protestable but unprotested, curable and cured.”

    The Court found that the court officer’s actions did not usurp the court’s authority, distinguishing this case from People v. Khalek, where a court officer improperly instructed the jury leading them to change their verdict. The Court emphasized the trial court retained control of the trial.

    The Court reiterated that preservation is essential for appellate review, unless the error goes to the essential validity of the trial.

  • People v. Martinez, 83 N.Y.2d 781 (1994): Permissible Jury Access to Exhibit Lists Correlated to Indictment Counts

    People v. Martinez, 83 N.Y.2d 781 (1994)

    A trial court may provide a deliberating jury with a list of exhibits correlated to specific counts of an indictment, in response to a jury request, without the defendant’s consent, provided the list contains no statutory references or legal instructions, and the instruments were specifically identified in the indictment.

    Summary

    Martinez was convicted of defrauding church members. During deliberations, the jury requested a list of specific items related to certain counts of the indictment. Over the defendant’s objection, the trial court provided a table listing each count number, corresponding exhibit number, and a brief description of the exhibit. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that providing the exhibit list was permissible because it was devoid of statutory references, answered the jury’s specific request, and the instruments were specifically identified in the indictment and the court’s initial charge. The Court emphasized that this did not present the dangers associated with submitting prohibited jury documents like statutes or excerpts from the jury charge.

    Facts

    Defendant and his wife were charged with defrauding ministers and members of Pentecostal churches by posing as officers of a “detective chaplains” organization. They offered memberships, badges resembling police shields, fake IDs, and bogus diplomas for a fee. The indictment included 31 counts, with 29 specifically identifying forged instruments (e.g., “a gold shield bearing the seal of the City of New York in blue and the number 0102”). These instruments were introduced as exhibits at trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Martinez on 30 counts. The Appellate Division modified the sentence but otherwise affirmed the conviction. Martinez appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in providing the jury with a list of exhibits correlated to the indictment counts without his consent. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court is required to obtain a defendant’s consent before providing a deliberating jury with a list of exhibits correlated to specific counts of the indictment, when the jury requests such a list?

    Holding

    No, because the list provided was devoid of any statutory references, simply answered the jury’s request, and the instruments were specifically identified in the indictment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from prior holdings that prohibited providing juries with written material containing statutory elements or terms of the charged offenses without the defendant’s consent. The Court reasoned that the “Table” in question here was “devoid of any statutory references and simply answered the jury’s request.” The court cited People v. Moore, where it held that the text of two counts of the indictment was properly given to the deliberating jury over defendant’s objection, reasoning that the submission was justified on the basis of the court’s statutory obligation to comply with a jury request. Here, each instrument was specifically identified in the indictment, and for most of the counts exhibit numbers were included in the court’s charge. The court noted, “Even without the disputed list, the jury could have linked the counts to the exhibits by asking the trial court for the text of counts 2 through 30 of the indictment and either readbacks of the court’s charge on each of these counts or separate requests for each exhibit count-by-count. There is no meaningful distinction between those laborious procedures and what actually took place here.” The Court also emphasized that unlike statutes, which pose a risk of misapplication, there was no danger that providing the jurors with this exhibit list would encourage them to take “on the role of Judges of the law as well as Judges of the facts” (People v Moore, 71 NY2d at 688). The Court cautioned that trial courts should exercise “extreme care” when submitting materials to a deliberating jury over a defendant’s objection, but found no prejudice to the defendant under these specific circumstances.

  • People v. Lewis, 80 N.Y.2d 1007 (1992): Discharging Juror After Partial Verdict

    People v. Lewis, 80 N.Y.2d 1007 (1992)

    A juror may be discharged even after deliberations have begun if the court finds the juror is grossly unqualified based on facts unknown during jury selection, but this determination must be based on concrete evidence, not speculation.

    Summary

    Lewis was convicted of robbery and attempted robbery. On the second day of deliberations, a juror expressed fear for her family’s safety after recognizing someone in the courtroom. The court questioned the juror and, learning the jury had reached a verdict on some counts the previous day, took a partial verdict on those counts and discharged the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the juror’s disqualification arose only after the first day of deliberations, making the partial verdict valid. The court emphasized that a juror’s disqualification must be based on concrete evidence, not speculation.

    Facts

    Defendant Lewis was tried with two codefendants and convicted of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree.
    During the second day of jury deliberations, the court learned that at least one juror was experiencing a personal problem. A juror then sent a note expressing concern for her family’s safety because she recognized someone in the courtroom. The juror feared reprisal if the verdict was unfavorable to the defendants. The juror stated that her fear arose after the first day of deliberations ended. The defendant moved for a mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court, after determining that the jury had reached a verdict on some counts at the end of the first day, took a partial verdict finding Lewis guilty of one count of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree. The jury did not reach a verdict on the remaining count of robbery in the first degree. The trial court then discharged the jury and denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in taking a partial verdict and discharging the jury after a juror expressed fear for her family’s safety, claiming she recognized someone in the courtroom, and stating her fear arose after the first day of deliberations.

    Holding

    No, because the juror’s disqualification arose only after the first day of deliberations, making the partial verdict valid, and the trial court properly terminated deliberations after determining the jury could not reach a verdict on all counts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The court cited CPL 270.35, which allows a juror to be discharged even after deliberations have begun if the court finds the juror is grossly unqualified based on facts unknown during jury selection. However, the court emphasized that under People v. Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299, “In concluding that a juror is grossly unqualified, the court may not speculate as to possible partiality of the juror based on her equivocal responses. Instead, it must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict”. The court reasoned that because the juror stated she did not feel unable to continue deliberating until after the jury had been discharged on the first day, she was not grossly unqualified to participate in the first day’s deliberations. Therefore, the partial verdict was reached by a qualified and competent jury. Further, the court noted that having determined that the jury would be unable to reach a verdict on all counts, the trial court properly terminated the deliberations and ordered the jury to render a partial verdict under CPL 310.70 [1] [a].

  • People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995): Upholding Defendant’s Right to Counsel During Jury Deliberations

    People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995)

    CPL 310.30 requires that counsel be given meaningful notice of jury inquiries and an opportunity to be heard before the response is given, especially when the inquiries are substantive and deviate from the original written questions.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery, drug possession, and weapons possession. During jury deliberations, the trial judge held oral colloquies with the jury beyond their initial written inquiries, discussing reasonable doubt and possession without allowing defense counsel meaningful participation. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the lack of meaningful participation by defense counsel in formulating responses to the jury’s substantive follow-up questions violated CPL 310.30. The court emphasized that counsel must have the opportunity to be heard before the response is given, ensuring a fair trial.

    Facts

    Defendant was arrested during a narcotics buy-and-bust operation where an undercover officer was held at gunpoint. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of multiple charges, including robbery in the first degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance, criminal sale of a controlled substance, and criminal possession of a weapon. During jury deliberations, the trial court engaged in several oral exchanges with the jury, addressing questions beyond the scope of the jury’s initial written inquiries.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial, finding a violation of CPL 310.30 regarding communication with the jury.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court violated CPL 310.30 by engaging in substantive oral exchanges with the jury during deliberations, concerning matters not included in the original written inquiries, without allowing defense counsel meaningful participation in formulating the responses?

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 310.30 requires that counsel be given meaningful notice of jury inquiries and an opportunity to be heard before the response is given, and this opportunity was not provided with respect to the substantive follow-up questions posed by the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 310.30, as interpreted by People v. O’Rama, mandates that counsel receive meaningful notice of jury inquiries and have the opportunity to be heard before the court responds. The court emphasized that the oral exchanges between the judge and the jury included substantive discussions regarding reasonable doubt and constructive and actual possession, which were not part of the original written queries. Since the defense counsel was not given a meaningful opportunity to participate in formulating the responses to these follow-up questions, the statute was violated.

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Lykes, where the jury was given mere clarifying inquiries. In this case, the jury received additional instructions on crucial, distinct, substantive issues. The court stated that “an important purpose of the statute ‘is to ensure that counsel has the opportunity to be heard before the response is given’” (quoting People v O’Rama, 78 NY2d 270, 277). The court found that the initial opportunity to participate in responses to written notes did not satisfy the statute regarding the subsequent oral exchanges, as the follow-up questions changed the substantive scope of the inquiries. The court also noted that the identification by the undercover officer was merely confirmatory, and a Wade hearing was not required, citing People v. Polanco, 80 NY2d 1012 and People v. Wharton, 74 NY2d 921.