New York Law Review

Tag: Jury Deadlock

  • People v. Marte, 97 N.Y.2d 82 (2001): Implied Consent to Mistrial Based on Silence at O’Rama Conference

    People v. Marte, 97 N.Y.2d 82 (2001)

    A defendant’s consent to a mistrial can be implied from the circumstances, particularly their silence and lack of objection at an O’Rama conference when the trial judge indicates the intention to declare a mistrial.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a defendant impliedly consented to a mistrial. During jury deliberations, the jury sent a note indicating they reached a verdict on some counts but were deadlocked on others. At an O’Rama conference, the trial judge stated his intent to take a partial verdict and declare a mistrial on the remaining counts. Defense counsel did not object when asked for their input. After the jury was discharged, the defendant objected. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant impliedly consented to the mistrial by remaining silent during the O’Rama conference when the judge announced his intentions, precluding a later objection. The court emphasized the importance of active participation in O’Rama conferences to avoid misleading the court.

    Facts

    The jury deliberated and sent a note stating it reached a verdict on two counts but was deadlocked on others.

    At an O’Rama conference, the trial judge indicated his intent to take a partial verdict and declare a mistrial on the undecided charges.

    The judge asked defense counsel if they wanted to be heard; counsel for one defendant responded “no,” and counsel for the co-defendant remained silent.

    After the partial verdict but before discharging the jury, the judge again inquired if there was anything defense counsel wanted to put on the record; neither attorney responded.

    After the jury was discharged, the defendant objected to the mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court declared a mistrial on the undecided charges.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, finding implied consent to the mistrial.

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant impliedly consented to a mistrial by remaining silent during the O’Rama conference when the trial judge indicated his intention to declare a mistrial.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was record support for the lower court’s finding of implied consent based on the defendant’s silence and lack of objection at the O’Rama conference when the trial judge indicated his intention to declare a mistrial. The purpose of the O’Rama conference is for attorneys to advise the court, and the defense cannot remain silent, giving the false impression of acquiescence, and then object later.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on People v. Ferguson, which states that consent to a mistrial can be implied from the circumstances. The court found that the defense counsels’ silence during the O’Rama conference, when the judge announced his intention to declare a mistrial on the undecided charges, constituted implied consent. The court emphasized the purpose of an O’Rama conference, which is for attorneys to assist the court in averting error by advising the court concerning the appropriate response to a jury note. Allowing attorneys to remain silent during the conference and then object later would undermine the purpose of the O’Rama procedure. The court reasoned that if the defense believed the court should have taken a different course of action, such as giving an Allen charge, they should have suggested it at the O’Rama conference. By remaining silent, they allowed the court to proceed under the impression that the defense agreed with the proposed course of action. The Court stated, “If this were permissible, attorneys could—by their silence—lull the court into taking actions that could not later be undone.” The court concluded that focusing on the circumstances leading up to the dismissal of the jury, rather than post-discharge statements, is appropriate when determining implied consent. The court noted the defense’s silence prevented the creation of a record that would facilitate appellate review of whether manifest necessity existed for the mistrial.

  • Rivera v. Firetog, 11 N.Y.3d 501 (2008): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Based on Jury Deadlock

    Rivera v. Firetog, 11 N.Y.3d 501 (2008)

    A trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial based on jury deadlock is entitled to great deference and will not bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds unless the court abused its discretion by failing to explore appropriate alternatives or if the jury clearly indicated it had reached a partial verdict.

    Summary

    Rivera was tried for second-degree murder and criminal possession of a weapon, with lesser included manslaughter offenses submitted to the jury. After nearly six days of deliberation and multiple deadlock notes, the trial court declared a mistrial without inquiring whether the jury had reached a partial verdict, despite a request from defense counsel. Rivera sought to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial because the jury never declared it had reached a partial verdict and the trial court reasonably determined further deliberation would be futile.

    Facts

    Rivera was indicted for second-degree murder and weapon possession for a fatal stabbing. The trial court instructed the jury to consider first-degree manslaughter only if it acquitted Rivera of murder, and second-degree manslaughter only if it acquitted him of first-degree manslaughter. The jury sent multiple notes indicating deadlock. After the jury requested clarification of the manslaughter charges, it repeatedly asked for copies of all three charges. Defense counsel requested the court ask about a partial verdict before adjourning for the weekend. Ultimately, the jury sent another deadlock note stating they could not reach a unanimous decision after extensive deliberations.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court declared a mistrial after the jury indicated they were deadlocked. Rivera moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, which the Supreme Court denied. Rivera then commenced an Article 78 proceeding to prevent retrial. The Appellate Division granted the petition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, dismissing the petition and allowing retrial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial based on jury deadlock without first inquiring whether the jury had reached a partial verdict, thereby barring retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court reasonably determined that there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial and the jury never clearly declared that it had reached a partial verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that double jeopardy protects a defendant’s right to have their trial completed by a particular tribunal. However, this right is subordinate to the public interest in seeing a criminal prosecution proceed to verdict. A mistrial may be declared when there is a manifest necessity, such as a genuinely deadlocked jury. The determination of jury deadlock is within the trial court’s discretion, which is entitled to great deference. The court must consider factors such as the length of trial and deliberations, communications between court and jury, and potential effects of further deliberation. Here, the jury deliberated longer than the trial lasted, sent three deadlock notes, and requested reinstruction on all three charges multiple times, suggesting it had not reached a verdict on any count. The court distinguished Matter of Robles v. Bamberger, where there was “overwhelming evidence” the jury had reached agreement on at least one count. The Court also rejected the argument that Matter of Oliver v. Justices of N.Y. Supreme Ct. of N.Y. County compelled a different result because, unlike in Oliver, the jury here never explicitly declared it had reached a partial verdict. The Court declined to create a per se rule requiring inquiry into a partial verdict whenever requested, stating, “no per se rules or mechanical formulas apply to mistrial determinations.” The Court concluded that the trial court reasonably determined there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial, and retrial does not violate double jeopardy principles.

  • People v. Dawkins, 82 N.Y.2d 226 (1993): Rescinding Mistrials Before Jury Discharge

    82 N.Y.2d 226 (1993)

    A trial court retains the power to rescind a declaration of a mistrial, particularly one based on a perceived jury deadlock, until the jury is actually discharged.

    Summary

    Lamonte Dawkins was convicted of attempted murder. During jury polling, one juror disagreed with the verdict, leading to a mistrial declaration. However, the jury then claimed to have reached a verdict. The trial court rescinded the mistrial, accepted the verdict, and Dawkins was convicted. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mistrial was not final until the jury’s discharge. Because the jury had not been discharged, the trial court retained the power to reconsider its decision and accept the verdict. This case highlights the importance of the jury’s actual discharge in finalizing a mistrial ruling based on deadlock.

    Facts

    Dawkins was tried for attempted murder, assault, and weapons possession. After deliberations, the jury announced a guilty verdict on the attempted murder count but not guilty on the others. During polling, juror number 4 initially disagreed with the verdict after Dawkins protested. The court sent the jury back for further deliberation. Later, the jury sent a note stating they couldn’t reach a verdict. The defense requested a mistrial, opposing an Allen charge. The court initially granted the mistrial. Approximately 40 minutes later, the jury sent another note claiming they reached a verdict. The court then set aside the mistrial ruling and accepted the new verdict.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Dawkins. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in rescinding its declaration of a mistrial and accepting the jury’s verdict after initially declaring a mistrial based on the jury’s indication of deadlock but before the jury was formally discharged.

    Holding

    Yes, the trial court did not err because the declaration of a mistrial is not final until the jury is discharged; therefore, the court retained the power to rescind its declaration and accept the jury’s subsequent verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 280.10, concerning mistrials, did not apply because the mistrial was declared due to perceived jury deadlock, not an error or defect in the proceedings. For jury deadlock, CPL 310.60(1)(a) governs, requiring the jury’s actual discharge to terminate the trial. Because the jury had not been discharged, the mistrial declaration was considered “inchoate” and subject to rescission. The court distinguished People v. Catten, where the mistrial was granted due to a prejudicial error, making CPL 280.10 applicable. The court also rejected the argument that rescinding the mistrial was an abuse of discretion, noting that the trial judge was in the best position to assess whether a fair verdict could be reached, particularly given the initial concern about pressuring the dissenting juror which was alleviated by the second verdict without any further instruction. The dissent argued the mistrial was granted due to the prejudicial effect of pressuring a dissenting juror, making it a CPL 280.10 issue and thus not rescindable.

  • People v. Batts, 69 N.Y.2d 363 (1987): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Declared Without Manifest Necessity

    People v. Batts, 69 N.Y.2d 363 (1987)

    A trial court’s declaration of a mistrial sua sponte, without manifest necessity and over the defendant’s objection, bars a retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Summary

    Batts was convicted of sexual abuse after a retrial, his first trial ending in a mistrial declared sua sponte by the judge due to a perceived jury deadlock. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the mistrial was improperly declared because there was no manifest necessity. The court emphasized that the trial judge prematurely determined the jury was deadlocked without sufficient inquiry, violating the defendant’s right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.

    Facts

    Batts and a co-defendant were tried for assault, sexual misconduct, and sexual abuse. The jury began deliberations on April 4th, requested readbacks of testimony, and recessed for dinner. Later that evening, the jury requested another readback. The judge, without consulting counsel, stated his intent to declare a mistrial if a verdict wasn’t reached by 11:30 p.m. At 12:25 a.m., the judge, over the defendant’s objection, declared a mistrial after a brief colloquy with the foreperson indicated possible discrepancies in opinions but also “movement” in voting. The judge did not poll the jury.

    Procedural History

    The first trial ended in a mistrial declared by the trial court. Batts was retried and convicted. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. Batts appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the retrial violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. and New York Constitutions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by declaring a mistrial sua sponte, over the defendant’s objection, and without manifest necessity, thereby barring a retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and New York Constitutions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the record did not demonstrate a manifest necessity for terminating the trial. The trial judge raised the issue of a mistrial prematurely and the colloquy with the foreperson did not sufficiently establish that the jury was hopelessly deadlocked.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while a trial court’s determination of deadlock is entitled to deference, the defendant’s right to obtain a verdict from the first jury should not be foreclosed unless the jury is hopelessly deadlocked and there is no reasonable probability of agreement. Citing United States v. Perez, the court stated that the power to declare a mistrial must be exercised with the “greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes,” limited to situations where “there is a manifest necessity for the act.” Here, the impetus for the mistrial came solely from the judge, who acted prematurely and without adequately determining the jury’s deadlock. The foreperson’s statement indicated “movement” in the voting, suggesting the jury was not hopelessly deadlocked. The court noted that the judge should have sought confirmation from other jurors before declaring a mistrial. The Court found there was no support in the record for the court’s determination that the jury had found the problem insoluble or believed itself hopelessly deadlocked. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion, and the retrial was barred by double jeopardy.

  • Oliver v. Justices of N.Y. Supreme Court, 36 N.Y.2d 53 (1974): Double Jeopardy and Ambiguous Jury Deadlocks

    36 N.Y.2d 53 (1974)

    A defendant cannot claim double jeopardy based on an improperly declared mistrial if the defense failed to clarify an ambiguous jury deadlock situation, thus implicitly consenting to the mistrial.

    Summary

    Charles Oliver was tried for murder, but the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, leading to a mistrial. Oliver then sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a retrial, arguing that the jury had actually acquitted him on the murder charge and that the mistrial was improperly declared, thus violating double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the defense had failed to clarify the ambiguous situation regarding the jury’s deadlock at trial, it could not later challenge the mistrial declaration based on double jeopardy grounds. The court emphasized the importance of clarifying jury verdicts, especially when a partial verdict has been indicated.

    Facts

    Oliver was charged with murder. At the close of evidence, the trial court submitted the murder charge and the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree to the jury. After several hours of deliberation, the jury informed the court that they had reached a partial verdict but did not specify which charge they had decided upon or whether the result was guilty or not guilty. The court sent the jury back for further deliberations. Later, the jury declared itself hopelessly deadlocked. The court declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. Post-trial, Oliver claimed the jury had acquitted him of murder, supported by juror affidavits.

    Procedural History

    The trial court declared a mistrial after the jury announced it was deadlocked. Oliver moved to dismiss the murder count, arguing that the jury had acquitted him of that charge. The trial court denied the motion. Oliver then initiated an Article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent a retrial. The Appellate Division denied Oliver’s application. Oliver appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the jury’s initial indication of a “partial verdict” constituted an actual verdict of acquittal on the murder charge, thus barring retrial on double jeopardy grounds?

    2. Whether the trial court improperly discharged the jury, thereby negating the “deadlocked-jury” exception to double jeopardy?

    Holding

    1. No, because the nature of the jury’s partial verdict was unascertainable from the record without considering juror affidavits, and the defense was estopped from using these affidavits due to their conduct at trial.

    2. No, because the defense failed to clarify the ambiguity surrounding the jury’s deadlock, effectively acquiescing to the mistrial declaration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the jury’s initial announcement of a partial verdict was ambiguous. The verdict could have been an acquittal on the murder count, a guilty verdict on the manslaughter count, or an acquittal on the manslaughter count. The court emphasized that whatever the substance of the jury’s partial verdict, the decision was not announced in court, nor was it recorded, which meant legally there was no “verdict”.

    The court noted the difficulty created by the trial court’s failure to properly instruct the jury when further deliberations were contemplated. The jury may or may not have understood that it could properly reopen consideration of the verdict already reached. The court stated, “Following a court’s refusal to accept a partial verdict pursuant to CPL 310.70 (subd. 1, par. [b], cl. [ii]), the jury should be clearly instructed that its further deliberations may be upon the entire case, including that portion upon which they had previously agreed.”

    Critically, the court emphasized that defense counsel had the opportunity to clarify the ambiguity at trial but failed to do so. By not requesting clarification of the jury’s ambiguous statements, the defense impliedly assumed the jury was deadlocked on the entire case. The court held the defendant to that assumption, precluding him from later claiming double jeopardy. The court reasoned that “Having displayed no enthusiasm for the rendering of a partial verdict while the jury was still impaneled, and a guilty verdict still possible, the defense may not seek to overturn the court’s order of mistrial after discharge of the jury”.