New York Law Review

Tag: Jury Charge

  • People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105 (1976): Scope of Permissible Summation Arguments

    People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105 (1976)

    Counsel’s privilege to comment in summation is not a license to state facts not in evidence or argue theories with no evidentiary support.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for assault, attempted coercion, and weapons possession. The defendant challenged the trial court’s preclusion of a summation argument suggesting the shooting victim initially displayed the gun. The Court of Appeals held that allowing such an argument would be improper because it lacked evidentiary support. The Court emphasized that summations must be based on reasonable inferences from the evidence presented, and counsel cannot introduce unsupported factual claims or theories. The court also found that a challenged portion of the jury charge, when viewed in its entirety, did not mislead the jury regarding the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of shooting a friend during a dispute. At trial, the defendant sought to argue during summation that the victim of the shooting was the first person to display the gun. There was testimony from a police officer that the victim described the gun as “heavier” (meaning larger) than a comparison gun shown to her. The trial court precluded the defendant from making this argument.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court of assault in the first degree, attempted coercion in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in precluding the defendant from arguing in summation that the shooting victim was the first person to display the gun.

    2. Whether a challenged portion of the jury charge, regarding the victim’s testimony satisfying proof beyond a reasonable doubt, constituted reversible error.

    Holding

    1. No, because the requested summation argument called on the jury to reach conclusions that were “not fairly inferrable from the evidence.”

    2. No, because the jury charge, when read as a whole, did not likely confuse the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the summation argument, the Court of Appeals emphasized that “the privilege of counsel to comment in summation on any matters of fact pertinent to questions that the jury must decide is not absolute.” The Court cited Williams v. Brooklyn El. R.R. Co., 126 N.Y. 96, 103 (1891), stating that the privilege “can never operate as a license to state to a jury facts not in evidence” or to argue unsupported theories.

    The Court found no evidentiary basis for the argument that the victim first displayed the gun. The police officer’s testimony regarding the victim’s description of the gun’s size did not support the theory. Therefore, the trial court correctly precluded the argument.

    Regarding the jury charge, the Court applied the principle that a challenged sentence should not be considered in isolation but rather in the context of the entire charge. The Court cited People v. Fields, 87 N.Y.2d 821, 823 (1995). While the challenged sentence, standing alone, was inaccurate, the Court found that the trial court immediately corrected itself by stating the principle correctly. Additionally, the court repeatedly emphasized the jury’s duty to determine whether the charged crimes had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, no reasonable juror would have been misled.

    The court emphasized that the central duty of the jury was to decide whether the charged crimes had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the charge as a whole, no reasonable juror would have concluded that if he or she found the victim’s testimony credible, then he or she had to find defendant guilty, without assessing whether all of the evidence was sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty.

  • People v. Tankleff, 4 N.Y.3d 874 (2005): Preservation of Error and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    People v. Tankleff, 4 N.Y.3d 874 (2005)

    A defendant must preserve an argument that a jury verdict is inconsistent by objecting to the charge or challenging the verdict as repugnant; failure to do so waives the argument on appeal, and counsel’s failure to preserve such an argument does not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Summary

    The defendant, Martin Tankleff, was convicted of assault in the first and second degrees. He argued on appeal that the convictions were inconsistent because the charges required different mental states (recklessness and intent, respectively) and should have been submitted to the jury as alternatives. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that Tankleff failed to preserve his argument by not objecting to the jury charge or challenging the verdict as repugnant. Furthermore, the court found that his trial counsel’s failure to preserve the issue did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Facts

    Martin Tankleff was convicted of assault in the first degree (recklessly creating a grave risk of death) and assault in the second degree (intentionally causing serious physical injury). The specific factual details of the assault itself are not detailed in this decision, as the focus is on procedural errors during the trial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. He then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, finding that the defendant’s arguments were either unpreserved or without merit.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant preserved his argument that the jury should have been instructed to consider the assault charges as alternatives due to their inconsistent mental state requirements.

    2. Whether the defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the jury charge or challenge the verdict as repugnant.

    3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant neither objected to the jury charge nor challenged the verdict as repugnant.

    2. No, because the argument that the charges were inconsistent was not so compelling that failure to raise it amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.

    3. The court did not reach this issue because it was unpreserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s argument regarding the inconsistent charges was unpreserved because he did not object to the jury charge or challenge the verdict as repugnant at trial. The Court emphasized that the asserted error did not affect the fundamental organization of the court or the mode of proceedings prescribed by law, thus requiring preservation. The court cited People v. Alfaro, 66 NY2d 985 (1985), to highlight the principle that some errors, unlike the one alleged here, are so fundamental that they need not be preserved.

    Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court acknowledged that trial counsel could have argued based on People v. Robinson, 145 AD2d 184 (1989), affd 75 NY2d 879 (1990). However, in light of the later decision in People v. Trappier, 87 NY2d 55 (1995), the court concluded that the argument was not so strong that failure to make it constituted ineffective assistance. The court cited People v. Turner, 5 NY3d 476 (2005), for the standard of ineffective assistance. The court explicitly stated, “[T]hat argument was not so compelling that a failure to make it amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.”

    The court declined to address the sufficiency of the evidence argument because it was also unpreserved.

  • People v. Cooper, 88 N.Y.2d 1057 (1996): Appellate Division’s Interest of Justice Review

    People v. Cooper, 88 N.Y.2d 1057 (1996)

    The New York Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division’s exercise of its interest of justice jurisdiction is beyond the review power of the Court of Appeals.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree. The Appellate Division initially modified the conviction, reducing it to the seventh degree due to a lack of proof that the defendant knew she possessed 500 milligrams of cocaine. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted, noting the defendant hadn’t preserved her claim but could request the Appellate Division to apply its ‘interest of justice’ jurisdiction. Upon remittitur, the Appellate Division affirmed the fifth-degree conviction, declining to exercise its interest of justice authority. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division’s exercise of its interest of justice jurisdiction is unreviewable.

    Facts

    Defendant was found to be in possession of cocaine. She was subsequently convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, requiring possession of 500 milligrams or more. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence of possession but arguably not of the defendant’s knowledge of the weight of the drugs. The defendant did not object to the jury charge regarding the elements of the crime.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division modified the conviction, reducing it to criminal possession in the seventh degree. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted for consideration of the facts, because the defendant had failed to preserve the argument about knowledge of the drug weight. On remittitur, the Appellate Division affirmed the original conviction. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s final decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division’s decision to affirm the conviction after remittitur, based on lack of preservation and declining to exercise its interest of justice jurisdiction, is reviewable by the Court of Appeals; and whether the Appellate Division failed to conduct a proper weight of the evidence review.

    Holding

    1. No, because the exercise by the Appellate Division of its interest of justice jurisdiction is beyond the review power of the Court of Appeals.

    2. No, because the Appellate Division is constrained to weigh the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged without objection by defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that its power to review decisions of the Appellate Division is limited by statute and precedent. Specifically, CPL 450.90(2) and the Court’s holding in People v. Cona, 49 N.Y.2d 26 (1979), establish that the Court of Appeals cannot review the Appellate Division’s discretionary exercise of its interest of justice jurisdiction under CPL 470.15(3). The Court further reasoned that because the defendant did not object to the trial court’s jury charge, the Appellate Division was correct to weigh the evidence in light of the elements as charged, which did not include knowledge of the specific quantity as an element. The Court quoted People v. Noble, 86 N.Y.2d 814, 815 (1995), stating “[T]he Appellate Division is constrained to weigh the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged without objection by defendant.” Because the jury charge, presented without objection, did not convey that knowledge of the precise quantity of cocaine was a specific element, the Appellate Division’s affirmance was appropriate. This case clarifies the limited scope of review available to the Court of Appeals regarding Appellate Division decisions based on interest of justice considerations and the importance of objecting to jury charges to preserve arguments on appeal.

  • People v. Lockwood, 73 N.Y.2d 758 (1988): Entitlement to Affirmative Defense Charge in Robbery Cases

    People v. Lockwood, 73 N.Y.2d 758 (1988)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on the affirmative defense to first-degree robbery if sufficient evidence is presented for a jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the object displayed was not a loaded weapon capable of producing death or serious physical injury.

    Summary

    Lockwood was convicted of first-degree robbery. The victim claimed Lockwood motioned as if he had a gun while demanding money on a subway train. Lockwood never removed his hand from his pocket, and the victim never saw a gun. After Lockwood exited the train, the victim alerted police, who apprehended him nearby with dollar bills but no weapon. The trial court denied Lockwood’s request to charge the jury on the affirmative defense that the displayed object was not a loaded weapon. The Appellate Division reversed, reducing the conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence presented a factual question for the jury regarding whether the object displayed was a firearm, and therefore, the affirmative defense charge should have been given.

    Facts

    The complainant was riding alone on a subway train when Lockwood approached her. Lockwood motioned with his hand in his pocket as if he had a gun and demanded money. Believing Lockwood had a gun, the complainant surrendered money. Lockwood never removed his hand from his pocket, and the complainant never saw a gun. Lockwood exited the train and walked to an underpass. The complainant immediately told police she had been robbed. Police apprehended Lockwood nearby with dollar bills, but no weapon was found on his person or along his route.

    Procedural History

    Lockwood was convicted of first-degree robbery in the trial court. The trial court refused to charge the jury on the affirmative defense that the object displayed was not a loaded weapon. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and reduced it to second-degree robbery, holding that the failure to give the requested charge was error. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree, specifically, that the object displayed was not a loaded weapon capable of producing death or other serious physical injury.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, was sufficient to present a factual question for the jury as to whether the object displayed was a firearm capable of causing death or serious physical injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 160.15(4), which provides an affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree if the object displayed was not a loaded weapon capable of causing death or serious physical injury. The court cited prior cases, including People v. Moye and People v. Baskerville, to emphasize that a defendant is entitled to a charge on this affirmative defense when there is sufficient evidence to support it.

    The court noted that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Lockwood, created a factual question for the jury. The police officer retraced Lockwood’s path but found no weapon. The complainant never saw a gun or its outline, and no gun was ever recovered. The Court stated, “Given these undisputed facts, the jury could have concluded that the object displayed in the course of the robbery was not a loaded weapon capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, and defendant’s request to so charge should therefore have been granted.” The court emphasized that it is the jury’s role to weigh the evidence and determine whether the affirmative defense is established by a preponderance of the evidence.

  • People v. Walker, 64 N.Y.2d 741 (1984): Entitlement to Extreme Emotional Disturbance Defense

    64 N.Y.2d 741 (1984)

    A defendant is entitled to a jury charge on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance only when sufficient evidence is presented for a jury to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the elements of the defense are established.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court was not obligated to charge the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in a second-degree murder trial. The defendant shot and killed the victim after an argument over money and the victim touching the defendant’s food. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the evidence presented at trial, at most, indicated anger or embarrassment, which are not equivalent to the loss of self-control associated with extreme emotional disturbance. Without such evidence, charging the defense would invite impermissible jury speculation.

    Facts

    The defendant shot and killed the victim in a bar. This act was the culmination of a long-standing disagreement between the two men. The shooting occurred after an argument about money that the victim claimed the defendant owed him. Immediately before the shooting, the victim placed his hand on the defendant’s plate of food.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried for murder in the second degree. At trial, the defendant requested that the court charge the jury on the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court declined to give the requested charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court was obligated to charge the affirmative defense to murder in the second degree that the defendant “acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance” (Penal Law, § 125.25, subd 1, par [a]).

    Holding

    No, because there was no evidence presented which suggested the presence of “extreme emotional disturbance”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant is entitled to a charge on extreme emotional disturbance only when there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the elements of this affirmative defense were established by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court found that the evidence presented only showed that the defendant acted out of anger or embarrassment. While these emotions might sometimes serve as the “reasonable explanation” for the presence of extreme emotional disturbance, they are not equivalent to the loss of self-control generally associated with that defense and are not necessarily indicative of the “mental infirmity”, not rising to the level of insanity.

    The court emphasized that charging the affirmative defense without sufficient evidence would invite the jury to impermissibly speculate about the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the shooting. The court cited People v Patterson, noting that extreme emotional disturbance involves a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity and People v Casassa.

    The court observed that the evidence failed to demonstrate the type of significant loss of control associated with the extreme emotional disturbance defense, thus making the charge inappropriate in this case.

  • Cool v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 1004 (1984): Effect of Jury Charge on Sufficiency of Evidence

    63 N.Y.2d 1004 (1984)

    Failure to object to a jury charge renders the charge the law of the case, and the sufficiency of the evidence is then judged by the standards articulated in that charge.

    Summary

    This case addresses the consequences of failing to object to a jury charge. The Court of Appeals held that when no exception is taken to the jury charge, the charge becomes the law applicable to the case. Consequently, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict must be assessed in light of the charge as given. The court found that because the defendants were treated as a single unit in the jury charge, the evidence against all defendants must be considered collectively to determine the sufficiency of the evidence against each, thus it was error to set aside the verdict against the estate of Lessie Cool.

    Facts

    The executors of Lessie Cool’s estate appealed a decision setting aside a jury verdict and dismissing the complaint against them. The basis of the appeal was that the trial court’s decision to set aside the jury verdict was proper and that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jurors.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially set aside the jury’s verdict and dismissed the complaint against the executors of Lessie Cool’s estate. The Appellate Division reversed this decision. William Cool’s appeal was dismissed, and a motion for reconsideration was denied. The executors of Lessie Cool’s estate then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in its instructions to the jurors.
    2. Whether the trial court properly set aside the jury verdict against the executors.

    Holding

    1. No, because the assertion of error in the trial court’s charge to the jury was not preserved for appellate review as no exceptions or requests to charge were made by trial counsel for the executors.
    2. No, because the failure to object to the jury charge made that charge the law of the case, and the sufficiency of the evidence must be judged by the standards articulated in that charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the failure to object to the jury charge had significant consequences. It cited Up-Front Inds. v U. S. Inds., stating that the law as stated in the charge becomes the law applicable to the determination of the parties’ rights. The Court stated that the sufficiency of the evidence must be determined considering all the evidence against all defendants, as the charge treated them collectively. Because the trial court found sufficient evidence to establish liability against William Cool, it was necessarily sufficient to support the verdict against Lessie Cool’s estate, given the jury charge. Therefore, it was an error to set aside the verdict against the estate based on the evidence against her alone. The court emphasized that discrete correlation of the evidence should not be used to establish liability of each defendant separately when the charge treated them collectively. The court, in essence, held the executors to the consequences of their trial counsel’s inaction.

  • People v. Ready, 61 N.Y.2d 790 (1984): Retroactive Application of Right to Counsel and Jury Charge on Voluntariness

    61 N.Y.2d 790 (1984)

    When a suspect in custody requests counsel, they cannot be questioned without an attorney present, and this principle applies retroactively; furthermore, a defendant is entitled to a jury charge instructing them to consider evidence that the defendant requested counsel when determining the voluntariness of a confession.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order for a new trial. The court held that the principle established in People v. Cunningham, stating that a suspect who requests counsel cannot be questioned without an attorney present, applies retroactively. Since the defendant had made a suppression motion, he could assert his Cunningham argument on appeal from his retrial. Additionally, the court found that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury that they could consider testimony about the defendant’s requests for counsel when determining the voluntariness of his confession.

    Facts

    The defendant, Ready, made incriminating statements that the prosecution sought to admit at trial. Prior to trial, Ready made a suppression motion. Two witnesses testified that Ready had requested counsel. The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that they could consider the testimony of the two witnesses regarding Ready’s request for counsel in determining whether Ready’s confession was voluntary.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried and convicted. He appealed, arguing that his right to counsel had been violated and that the trial court erred in refusing his requested jury charge. The Appellate Division ordered a new trial. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the principle established in People v. Cunningham, that a suspect in custody who requests counsel cannot be questioned without an attorney present, applies retroactively to cases on appeal?

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing the defendant’s request to charge the jury that they could consider testimony regarding the defendant’s request for counsel when determining the voluntariness of the defendant’s confession?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court had already determined in People v. Pepper that the Cunningham principle must be applied retroactively.

    2. Yes, because the requested charge was relevant to an issue before the jury, and the court perceived no valid reason for its denial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decisions in People v. Pepper and People v. Cunningham. In People v. Pepper (53 NY2d 213), the court determined that the rule in Cunningham must be applied retroactively. The court reasoned that, because the defendant had made a suppression motion, he could now assert his Cunningham argument on the appeal from his retrial, citing People v. Sanders (56 NY2d 51, 66). The court emphasized the importance of allowing the jury to consider all relevant evidence when determining the voluntariness of a confession. The court stated, “The charge was relevant to an issue before the jury and we perceive no valid reason for its denial.” By denying the requested charge, the trial court prevented the jury from fully considering the circumstances surrounding the confession, potentially impacting their assessment of its voluntariness. This case highlights the importance of providing a jury charge when it is relevant to the issues being presented.

  • People v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 1 (1981): Addressing Repugnant Jury Verdicts Based on Elements as Charged

    People v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 1 (1981)

    When evaluating a claim of repugnant jury verdicts in a multiple-count indictment, a verdict on a particular count should be set aside only if it is inherently inconsistent when viewed in light of the elements of each crime as charged to the jury, without reviewing the entire record to speculate on the jury’s deliberative process.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery and one count of possessing a loaded handgun but acquitted of two other robbery counts. He argued the verdicts were inconsistent and sought to vacate the robbery convictions. The Court of Appeals held that a verdict should only be set aside if inherently inconsistent based on the elements of each crime as charged. The court rejected reviewing the entire record to interpret the jury’s thought process, emphasizing the risk of undermining the jury’s role and potential exercise of leniency. The focus should be on the jury charge to determine inconsistencies.

    Facts

    Ann Johnson was robbed at gunpoint in her home by the defendant, his brother Willie, and another man. Johnson identified the defendant as the gunman. Police Officer Lauchlan saw three men fleeing Johnson’s house after hearing her cries for help. Lauchlan arrested Willie, who had a loaded revolver in his pocket. Willie stated the defendant put the gun in his pocket. The defendant was arrested at home and stated, “You ain’t got nothing on me, you got the gun from Willie.” The revolver was tested and found to be operable. The defendant presented evidence suggesting the third man displayed the gun and placed it in Willie’s pocket.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted on six counts as a principal and accomplice. The jury convicted him on counts 3, 4, and 6 (Robbery First Degree (displaying what appeared to be a handgun), Robbery Second Degree (aided by another), and Criminal Possession of a Weapon Third Degree), and acquitted him on counts 1 and 2 (Robbery First Degree (armed with a deadly weapon), and Robbery First Degree (used or threatened use of dangerous instrument)). The Supreme Court found repugnancy between the guilty verdict on count 6 and the acquittals on counts 1 and 2, setting aside the verdict on count 6 only. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the jury’s acquittal on the first two counts, combined with the conviction on the sixth count, indicated a determination that no “forcible stealing” occurred, thus requiring rejection of the verdicts on counts 3 and 4.
    2. Whether, in evaluating a claim of repugnant jury verdicts, the court should review the entire record or restrict its review to the jury charge.

    Holding

    1. No, because the elements of each crime are distinct and the jury could have found the presence of some elements and the absence of others.
    2. The court should restrict its review to the jury charge, because this prevents the court from speculating on the jury’s deliberative process and avoids undermining the jury’s role and potential exercise of leniency.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the issue of repugnant verdicts, noting the historical debate and the importance of ensuring a defendant is not convicted on a charge where the jury found an essential element lacking. The Court adopted a limited approach, reviewing only the jury charge to ascertain the essential elements described by the trial court. This approach avoids speculation on the jury’s deliberative process and respects the jury’s role, including the possibility of leniency. The Court emphasized that a conviction should be reversed only when an acquittal on one crime, as charged, conclusively negates a necessary element of another crime for which a guilty verdict was rendered. The court noted, “The critical concern is that an individual not be convicted for a crime on which the jury has actually found that the defendant did not commit an essential element, whether it be one element or all. Allowing such a verdict to stand is not merely inconsistent with justice, but is repugnant to it.” The Court found that the jury could have distinguished among the weaponry elements of counts 1, 2, 3, and 6. The instructions to the jury closely matched the definitions of these elements, with the material discrepancy that the court did not adequately instruct the jury that the capability to fire is an essential element of the possession charge.