New York Law Review

Tag: Juror Misconduct

  • People v. Samandarov, 13 N.Y.3d 433 (2009): Hearing Requirements for Juror Misconduct and Rosario Violations

    13 N.Y.3d 433 (2009)

    A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a hearing on post-trial motions alleging juror misconduct or a Rosario violation when the defendant’s claims are based on hearsay or contradicted by substantial evidence.

    Summary

    Simon Samandarov was convicted of attempted murder and related charges. After the verdict, he moved to set it aside, alleging juror misconduct based on a newspaper article and hearsay information suggesting the jury improperly considered his alleged ties to the Russian Mob. He later moved to vacate his conviction based on a Rosario violation, claiming the prosecution failed to disclose police notes from interviews with a key witness, Jose Ramirez. The trial court denied both motions without a hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the hearings because Samandarov’s claims were not sufficiently supported and were contradicted by substantial evidence.

    Facts

    Alik Pinhasov was shot, and Jose Ramirez witnessed the aftermath, identifying Samandarov as potentially the shooter. Samandarov was arrested with the gun used in the shooting. Following the conviction, a newspaper article suggested jurors were aware of possible links between the shooting and a related murder, implying Russian Mob involvement. Samandarov’s counsel also claimed a neighbor, coworker to the jury foreperson, said the jury discussed Samandarov’s alleged mob ties. Later, Ramirez provided an affidavit claiming police detectives took notes during multiple interviews, which were not disclosed to the defense. He later recanted this affidavit.

    Procedural History

    Samandarov was convicted in Supreme Court. He moved to set aside the verdict (CPL 330.30) based on juror misconduct, which was denied without a hearing. He then moved to vacate the conviction (CPL 440.10) alleging a Rosario violation, also denied without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a hearing on the motion to set aside the verdict based on alleged juror misconduct.
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a hearing on the motion to vacate the conviction based on an alleged Rosario violation.

    Holding

    1. No, because Samandarov failed to provide sufficient proof that the jurors were subject to any outside influence, and the claims were based on hearsay and speculation.
    2. No, because the People presented substantial evidence contradicting Ramirez’s initial affidavit claiming undisclosed police notes existed, and the trial court reasonably found this evidence strong enough to make a hearing unnecessary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that to impeach a jury verdict, there must be proof of an “outside influence” on the jurors. Here, the evidence suggested the jurors may have speculated about the case’s connection to the Russian Mob, but there was no evidence they received information from outside the courtroom. The defense itself raised the issue of possible stereotypes related to Russian-Americans during voir dire. Regarding the Rosario violation, the Court noted that while conflicting affidavits usually necessitate a hearing, the People submitted detailed proof that Ramirez’s initial affidavit was mistaken. This proof included affidavits from the ADA and other District Attorney’s office employees who were present at the interviews, stating that no police officers were present and no notes were taken. The Court emphasized a contemporaneous record showed the police closed the case the day of the crime, making later police interviews unlikely. The Court concluded it was theoretically possible a hearing could show otherwise, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding this possibility too slim to justify the burden and expense of a hearing. The dissent argued an evidentiary hearing was required because Ramirez’s initial affidavit raised a triable issue of fact regarding the existence of undisclosed Rosario material and its potential impact on the trial’s outcome.

  • People v. Pizarro, 7 N.Y.3d 830 (2006): Extrinsic Juror Knowledge and Appellate Deference

    People v. Pizarro, 7 N.Y.3d 830 (2006)

    A trial court’s credibility findings regarding juror impartiality, made after a hearing and based on observations of the jurors, are entitled to great deference on appeal, provided they are supported by the record.

    Summary

    Defendant Pizarro appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge should have declared a mistrial because a juror allegedly concealed knowledge about the case during jury selection, attempted to share outside information during deliberations, and lied to the court about it. The trial court conducted a hearing, interviewing the juror and other jurors. The court concluded that the juror did not possess outside knowledge and had not tried to convey such information. The Appellate Division affirmed, deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s findings were supported by the record and deserved deference.

    Facts

    Pizarro was convicted on four counts of second-degree murder. During jury deliberations, the jury foreperson reported that another juror had attempted to share information about the case that was not part of the evidence presented at trial. Pizarro argued this warranted a mistrial.

    Procedural History

    Following the jury foreperson’s report, the trial court held a hearing. The trial judge interviewed the allegedly errant juror three times and also questioned the other jurors. The trial court found that the juror did not possess outside knowledge and did not attempt to share any such knowledge with the other jurors. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, deferring to the trial court’s findings. The New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial based on the allegation that a juror concealed personal knowledge about the case, attempted to share outside-the-record information with other jurors, and then lied to the trial court about these actions.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court’s credibility findings, made after hearing and viewing the jurors, are entitled to great deference, and the record supported the court’s determination that there was no juror misconduct warranting a mistrial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the deference owed to the trial court’s credibility determinations, stating that such findings are “entitled to great deference.” The Court found that the juror repeatedly denied having extrinsic knowledge, and the trial judge credited these denials. The Court noted that the Appellate Division had also deferred to the trial court’s findings, observing that there was merely a “misunderstanding” between the juror and some of the other jurors. The Court of Appeals further explained that it must accept the affirmed factual determinations of the lower courts if they are supported by the record, which they were in this case. The court found no basis to overturn the trial court’s assessment of the juror’s credibility, particularly since the juror’s denials were not, as a matter of law, contradicted by the other jurors’ accounts. The court implied that absent clear and convincing evidence of juror misconduct or bias, deference should be given to the trial court’s first-hand observations and findings.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 100 N.Y.2d 30 (2003): Juror Misconduct and Prejudice to Defendant

    People v. Rodriguez, 100 N.Y.2d 30 (2003)

    A defendant is not entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct unless the misconduct prejudiced a substantial right of the defendant.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of selling cocaine to an undercover officer. After the verdict, a juror contacted an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) and revealed that he intentionally concealed their friendship during voir dire. The defendant moved to set aside the verdict, arguing that the concealment deprived him of a fair jury selection. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing, finding no prejudice to the defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right, juror misconduct does not automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial. The Court also addressed a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during summation, finding any error harmless due to overwhelming evidence of guilt.

    Facts

    An undercover officer asked the defendant for cocaine. The defendant sold the officer cocaine for $20 of prerecorded money. Another undercover officer followed them, transmitting their location to a field team. The field team arrested the defendant and found the prerecorded money in his pocket. After the verdict, a juror, Steven Cohen, contacted Andrew Carey, an ADA, and admitted that he intentionally concealed their friendship during voir dire.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. The defendant moved to set aside the verdict based on juror misconduct. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a juror’s concealment of information during voir dire automatically warrants a new trial.
    2. Whether the prosecutor’s comments during summation regarding the defense witnesses’ lack of outrage constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

    Holding

    1. No, because absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right of the defendant, proof of juror misconduct does not automatically entitle a defendant to a new trial.
    2. No, because although the prosecutor’s comment was uncalled for, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 330.30(2) authorizes a court to set aside a verdict if “improper conduct by a juror…may have affected a substantial right of the defendant.” The Court cited People v. Irizarry, 83 N.Y.2d 557, 561 (1994), stating that “absent a showing of prejudice to a substantial right, proof of juror misconduct does not entitle a defendant to a new trial.” The court emphasized that each case must be examined on its unique facts to determine the nature of the misconduct and the likelihood that prejudice was engendered. The Court found that the trial court’s findings, made after a hearing, were supported by the record. The Court stated, “not every misstep by a juror rises to the inherently prejudicial level at which reversal is required automatically” People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 388, 394 (1979). The Court further stated “due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).

    Regarding the prosecutor’s comment, the Court acknowledged it was uncalled for because it made an oblique reference to the defendant’s character, which was not in evidence. However, the Court deemed the error harmless, citing People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241-242 (1975), due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The Court emphasized that this was “part and parcel of his argument that nothing in the testimony of the defense witnesses showed that defendant ‘couldn’t’ have committed the crime.”

  • People v. Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d 569 (2000): Juror’s Professional Expertise as Improper Influence

    People v. Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d 569 (2000)

    A jury verdict can be overturned when jurors use their professional expertise to evaluate evidence, reach conclusions outside of the presented evidence, and share those conclusions with other jurors, thereby becoming unsworn witnesses.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminally negligent homicide. During deliberations, two nurse-jurors shared their professional opinions about the volume of blood loss necessary to cause ventricular fibrillation, contradicting expert testimony presented at trial. The trial court set aside the verdict, finding juror misconduct. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the nurse-jurors’ actions constituted improper influence because they injected non-record evidence into deliberations, undermining the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The court emphasized that jurors can use everyday experiences but not specialized knowledge to contradict trial evidence.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with manslaughter after his girlfriend died. The prosecution argued the cause of death was blunt force trauma, while the defense contended it was a venous air embolism or a cardiac event possibly related to improperly administered CPR. Expert witnesses for both sides presented conflicting medical evidence, particularly regarding the amount of blood loss and its potential effects. After the jury convicted the defendant of criminally negligent homicide, it was revealed that two jurors, both nurses, used their professional knowledge to assess the victim’s blood loss, sharing their opinions on whether it could have caused ventricular fibrillation.

    Procedural History

    The jury found the defendant guilty of criminally negligent homicide. The defendant moved to set aside the verdict under CPL 330.30, alleging juror misconduct. The trial court granted the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the guilty verdict. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the use of personal professional expertise by jurors, communicated to the entire jury during deliberations, constitutes juror misconduct that warrants a new trial?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the jurors became unsworn witnesses, injecting non-record evidence into the jury’s deliberative process, thereby prejudicing the defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while jurors are expected to use their everyday experiences, they cannot inject professional expertise to contradict trial evidence. The Court emphasized the potential prejudice when jurors with specialized knowledge share their opinions, as other jurors are likely to defer to this expertise. The Court distinguished between permissible application of everyday experience and impermissible injection of professional expertise which serves as non-record evidence that the defendant cannot test or refute. Quoting People v. Stanley, 87 N.Y.2d 1000, 1001, the court stated jurors cannot become “unsworn witnesses, incapable of being confronted by defendant,” by injecting expertise and nonrecord evidence into deliberations. The court also noted the importance of a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community, but stressed that even professional jurors must decide cases based only on presented evidence. The Court suggested trial courts modify standard jury instructions to differentiate between ordinary and professional opinions, explicitly directing jurors not to introduce facts and evidence from outside the record based on their professional expertise.

  • People v. Barone, 83 N.Y.2d 967 (1994): Juror Misconduct and Prejudice Standard

    People v. Barone, 83 N.Y.2d 967 (1994)

    To warrant setting aside a verdict based on juror misconduct, the misconduct must affect a substantial right of the defendant.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of grand larceny. He moved to set aside the verdict, alleging juror misconduct. During voir dire, a juror stated he was not familiar with members of the victimized Toccolana Club, but it was later revealed he had been a nominal member decades earlier and had relatives who were members. The trial court found no improper conduct and that the juror’s conduct did not affect a substantial right of the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the trial court’s factual finding was supported by the record and thus beyond appellate review.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a forged instrument and grand larceny for stealing $3,500 from the Toccolana Club. During jury selection, a juror, a resident of Rome, New York (where the club was located), was asked if he was familiar with members of the Toccolana Club. The juror stated, “I just know where it is, not really, no.” It was later discovered that the juror had been a nominal member of the club decades earlier, and two of his relatives were or had been members.

    Procedural History

    Following his conviction for grand larceny in the fourth degree, the defendant moved to set aside the verdict based on the alleged juror misconduct. The trial court denied the motion, finding no improper conduct and no impact on the defendant’s substantial rights. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the juror’s failure to disclose his past nominal membership in the victimized club and his relatives’ membership constituted misconduct that affected a substantial right of the defendant, warranting the setting aside of the verdict.

    Holding

    No, because the trial court’s undisturbed factual finding had support in the record and was thus beyond the scope of appellate review. The Court of Appeals deferred to the lower court’s factual determination that the juror’s conduct did not affect a substantial right of the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the limited scope of its review, stating that the trial court’s factual finding regarding the juror’s conduct and its impact on the defendant’s rights was supported by the record. The Court deferred to the trial court’s assessment. The court implicitly applied the standard set forth in CPL 330.30(2), which requires a showing that juror misconduct affected a substantial right of the defendant to warrant setting aside a verdict. The Court’s decision underscores the deference appellate courts give to trial courts’ findings of fact, especially concerning juror impartiality. The Court chose not to elaborate further than acknowledging the finding of fact at the trial level. This implies that absent clear evidence of prejudice or a violation of a substantial right, a juror’s minor misstatements or omissions during voir dire will not automatically invalidate a verdict.

  • People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 914 (1983): Distinguishing Juror Misconduct from Everyday Experience

    59 N.Y.2d 914 (1983)

    A juror’s observation of everyday occurrences is not considered misconduct unless it rises to the level of a conscious, contrived experiment designed to introduce new evidence into deliberations.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that a juror’s observations about visibility through a car window did not constitute misconduct. The juror made these observations while walking to dinner with other jurors and riding a bus. The court distinguished this behavior from a ‘conscious, contrived experimentation’ designed to introduce new evidence. The court emphasized that the juror’s actions were akin to an everyday experience and thus not grounds for overturning the conviction. The Court suggested that the better practice would be for trial judges to hold a hearing to ascertain the extent of a juror’s actions rather than to rely solely on attorney affidavits.

    Facts

    During the trial, a juror, while walking to dinner with fellow jurors, evaluated the ability to observe the interior of an automobile through its rear window. He repeated a similar evaluation while riding a bus with jurors to the hotel after being sequestered. These observations were later revealed and challenged as potential juror misconduct.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The defendant appealed, arguing juror misconduct. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a juror’s casual observations during everyday activities constitute misconduct that warrants overturning a conviction.

    Holding

    No, because the juror’s actions were considered everyday experiences and did not amount to a ‘conscious, contrived experimentation’ intended to introduce new evidence outside of the presented trial evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the juror’s observations were akin to ordinary, everyday experiences and did not constitute the type of deliberate, contrived experimentation that would warrant a finding of misconduct. The court distinguished the case from People v. Brown, where the juror’s conduct was a ‘conscious, contrived experimentation.’ The court quoted United States ex rel. Owen v McMann, noting the difference between casual observations and intentional misconduct. The court suggested a hearing is the best practice for trial judges to determine what occurred in such situations. The court stated, “Rather, the juror’s evaluation of the ability to observe the interior of an automobile through its rear window, made while walking to dinner between deliberations and again while riding in a bus with jurors to the hotel after being sequestered, is properly classified as an everyday experience and, therefore, not misconduct.”

  • People v. Friedgood, 58 N.Y.2d 467 (1983): Standards for Vacating a Judgment Based on Misconduct

    People v. Friedgood, 58 N.Y.2d 467 (1983)

    A trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate a judgment of conviction without a hearing will only be reversed if the court abused its discretion; a defendant must demonstrate due diligence in uncovering the facts supporting the motion and show that the alleged misconduct prejudiced their defense.

    Summary

    Friedgood was convicted of murdering his wife and grand larceny. More than three years after the trial, he moved to vacate the judgment, alleging prosecutorial misconduct, juror misconduct, and misrepresentation by a prosecution witness. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Friedgood failed to demonstrate due diligence in presenting his claims and failed to sufficiently allege prejudice from the alleged misconduct, thus failing to meet the requirements for either vacating the conviction or ordering an evidentiary hearing.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of murdering his wife by injecting her with Demerol and stealing from her estate. After his conviction and unsuccessful appeal, he filed a motion to vacate the judgment based on: (1) prosecutorial misconduct related to coercing a witness, Binnie Lazarus; (2) juror misconduct; and (3) misrepresentation by a medical expert, Dr. Helpern, who testified for the prosecution. Binnie Lazarus initially stated she spoke to the victim on the day of her death, but later signed a contradictory statement after being interviewed by the District Attorney.

    Procedural History

    The Nassau County Court denied Friedgood’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine whether the denial of the motion without an evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction without holding an evidentiary hearing on the claims of prosecutorial misconduct?

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction without holding an evidentiary hearing on the claims of juror misconduct?

    3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction based on the claim that a prosecution witness misrepresented facts critical to his opinion?

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate due diligence in adducing facts related to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct and failed to sufficiently allege prejudice resulting from that misconduct.

    2. No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate due diligence in investigating and reporting the alleged juror misconduct, and the claims were largely supported by inadmissible hearsay.

    3. No, because the defendant’s claim regarding the prosecution witness’s misrepresentation was essentially a claim of newly discovered evidence, and the review of the trial court’s denial on this ground is beyond the power of the Court of Appeals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a trial court’s denial of a motion to vacate without a hearing can only be reversed if the court abused its discretion. Regarding prosecutorial misconduct, the court emphasized the defendant’s failure to explain his three-year delay in bringing the motion and his failure to show due diligence in uncovering the facts. The court found that the defendant was aware of the witness’s contradictory statements but did not call her as a witness or promptly investigate the circumstances. The Court stated that the defendant had to allege and prove that the prosecutor’s allegedly coercive tactics prejudiced his defense. As the Court noted, “Finding himself on the horns of this dilemma, defendant not only failed to make the requisite showing of due diligence (CPL 440.10, subd 3, par [a]), but he also failed to sufficiently allege that he was prejudiced by the alleged misconduct which, because it would have to be proven for defendant to succeed in having his conviction vacated, must be alleged. (CPL 440.30, subd 4, par [b].)”

    Regarding juror misconduct, the court again cited the lack of due diligence in investigating and reporting the alleged incidents. Most of the claims were supported only by hearsay allegations, and the defendant failed to provide explanations for not obtaining affidavits from the jurors involved. The court emphasized the policy against undermining jury verdicts through post-trial questioning of jurors. “[E]fforts to undermine a jury’s verdict by systematically questioning the individual jurors long after they have been dismissed in hopes of discovering some form of misconduct should not be encouraged.”

    Finally, the court determined that the defendant’s claim regarding the medical expert’s misrepresentation was based on newly discovered evidence, making the trial court’s decision unreviewable.

  • People v. Tinsley, 52 N.Y.2d 1042 (1981): Double Jeopardy and Mistrials Based on Manifest Necessity

    People v. Tinsley, 52 N.Y.2d 1042 (1981)

    A trial court may declare a mistrial based on manifest necessity without violating double jeopardy protections when a juror’s conduct indicates an inability to fairly and impartially deliberate.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that declaring a mistrial in Tinsley’s first trial due to a juror’s misconduct did not violate double jeopardy principles. After jury deliberations began, a juror disappeared overnight and expressed doubts about his ability to be fair. The trial court, after interviewing the juror and consulting with counsel, declared a mistrial. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court acted within its discretion, as there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial. The court also rejected Tinsley’s claims regarding pretrial identification and jury instructions.

    Facts

    During Tinsley’s first trial, after the jury was charged and sequestered, a juror disappeared overnight and returned the following morning. The juror stated that the deliberations had caused him distress and he doubted the jury’s ability to resolve the issues fairly without legal expertise. He expressed that he could not be fair to the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The trial court, after interviewing the juror and discussing potential remedies with counsel (who declined to move for a mistrial), declared a mistrial. Tinsley was retried and convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Tinsley appealed, arguing that the mistrial declaration violated double jeopardy principles and that there were errors in the pretrial identification procedure and jury instructions. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order and judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in declaring a mistrial sua sponte, thus unconstitutionally exposing the defendant to double jeopardy?

    2. Whether the pretrial identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive, tainting the in-court identification?

    3. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to charge the jury regarding the presumption of correctness of the date on a check?

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court was warranted in declaring a mistrial based on manifest necessity given the juror’s misconduct and expressed inability to be fair.

    2. No, because the suppression court made dual findings that the pre-trial identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive and that there was an independent source for the in-court identification.

    3. No, because in the prosecution of a crime of violence the trial court was within its discretion to reject a jury instruction regarding the presumption of correctness applicable to commercial paper.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court acted within its discretion in declaring a mistrial due to the “unusual circumstances” presented by the juror’s behavior and statements. The court cited People v. Michael, 48 NY2d 1, 9, emphasizing the principle of manifest necessity as the standard for justifying a mistrial without violating double jeopardy. The court found the juror’s overnight absence and subsequent admission of bias created a situation where a fair trial was impossible. The failure of the trial court to consult further with counsel prior to the declaration of mistrial did not vitiate the propriety of such declaration; the trial court was justified in concluding that there was no acceptable alternative to a mistrial. The court deferred to the suppression court’s findings regarding the pretrial identification procedure, noting evidence supported those findings, referencing People v. Dickerson, 50 NY2d 937. Regarding the jury instruction on the check’s date, the court found no error, implicitly stating that rules applicable to commercial paper generally do not apply in a case involving violent crime, especially where the factual issue involves violence not commercial transactions.

  • People v. Legister, 75 N.Y.2d 832 (1990): Juror’s Independent Investigation and Prejudice

    People v. Legister, 75 N.Y.2d 832 (1990)

    A jury verdict should be set aside when a juror conducts an independent investigation into a fact in issue and shares the results with other jurors, creating a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction due to juror misconduct. During deliberations in a robbery case involving the issue of visibility from a vehicle, a juror conducted an independent investigation by observing the scene from her own car and shared her findings with the other jurors. The court held that this unauthorized investigation and communication of its results created a substantial risk of prejudice, thus warranting a new trial. The concurring opinion emphasized the importance of jurors using their background experience but distinguished it from actively seeking new evidence outside the trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery. A key issue at trial was whether a witness could have clearly seen the events from a certain vantage point inside a vehicle. During jury deliberations, one of the jurors, without authorization, drove her own vehicle to the location in question to assess the visibility. She then reported her observations to the other jurors.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, finding no prejudice resulting from the juror’s actions. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a juror’s unauthorized independent investigation into a material fact and communication of the findings to other jurors warrants setting aside the jury verdict.

    Holding

    Yes, because the juror’s independent investigation and communication of her findings created a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the juror’s conduct constituted improper and prejudicial behavior. The court emphasized that jurors must base their verdicts solely on the evidence presented at trial. An independent investigation by a juror introduces evidence that the defendant has no opportunity to confront or cross-examine. The court reasoned that “[t]o allow a jury to consider evidence which was not introduced at trial is a violation of a defendant’s fundamental right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.” The court found that the juror’s experiment, which involved specific observations about visibility from a car, was directly related to a central issue in the case. Because the juror shared her findings with the other jurors, the court concluded that there was a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant. The concurring opinion argued that jurors inevitably draw upon their own experiences, but distinguished that from actively seeking new evidence related to the specific facts of the case. Judge Fuchsberg stated, “In persuading one another to their respective viewpoints, and indeed in resolving their own doubts, jurors, like other people, employ the products of their education and experience…That is essentially all that happened in this case.” However, the majority found the juror’s actions exceeded the permissible use of background experience and created a prejudicial situation requiring a new trial.

  • People v. De Lucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275 (1967): Admissibility of Juror Statements Regarding Unauthorized Site Visits

    People v. De Lucia, 20 N.Y.2d 275 (1967)

    Juror statements regarding unauthorized visits to the crime scene are admissible to demonstrate prejudice to the defendant, as such outside influences violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.

    Summary

    Defendants De Lucia and Montella were convicted of attempted burglary and possession of burglar’s instruments. After the initial conviction was upheld, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Parker v. Gladden, prompting reconsideration. The key issue was whether juror statements about an unauthorized visit to the crime scene were admissible to challenge the verdict. The New York Court of Appeals held that such statements were admissible, as unauthorized visits constitute inherently prejudicial “outside influences” violating the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. The court balanced the policy against juror harassment with the defendant’s right to a fair trial. The case was remitted for a hearing to substantiate the allegations.

    Facts

    De Lucia and Montella were convicted of attempted burglary and possession of burglar’s instruments. After the verdict, information surfaced suggesting that several jurors had visited the scene of the alleged crime without authorization and even re-enacted the crime.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division affirmed the initial conviction. The New York Court of Appeals initially upheld the conviction. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Subsequently, after the Parker v. Gladden decision, the Second Circuit vacated the District Court’s dismissal of a habeas corpus petition and remanded the case to the New York courts for reconsideration in light of Parker v. Gladden.

    Issue(s)

    Whether juror statements concerning an unauthorized visit to the scene of the crime are admissible to impeach their verdict and demonstrate prejudice to the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because in cases involving inherently prejudicial “outside influences” on a jury, such as an unauthorized visit to the crime scene, the violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights outweighs the policy reasons for the rule against jurors impeaching their own verdicts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the traditional rule against jurors impeaching their own verdicts, which aims to prevent post-trial harassment of jurors and maintain the integrity of jury deliberations. However, the court also recognized the defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Citing Parker v. Gladden, the court emphasized that a defendant has the right to confront witnesses against them. The court distinguished between statements regarding juryroom deliberations, which are generally inadmissible, and statements concerning “outside influences,” which are more susceptible to proof and less likely to undermine the jury system. The court reasoned that the unauthorized visit transformed the jurors into unsworn witnesses against the defendants, violating their Sixth Amendment rights. As the court stated, “in the case of such inherently prejudicial ‘outside influences’ on a jury as were here present, the violation of the defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights outweighs the policy reasons for the rule.” The court held that proof of the unauthorized visit is sufficient to warrant a new trial without demonstrating how the visit influenced individual jurors. The court remitted the case for a hearing to determine if the allegations were substantiated, and if so, to vacate the convictions and order a new trial.