New York Law Review

Tag: juror bias

  • People v. Thompson, 21 N.Y.3d 557 (2013): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Peremptory Challenges

    People v. Thompson, 21 N.Y.3d 557 (2013)

    A defense attorney’s failure to use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror who had a long-standing friendship with the prosecuting attorney does not automatically constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, especially if the overall fairness of the trial was not demonstrably impaired.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of manslaughter after a trial where a juror was seated who had a 40-year friendship with the District Attorney. Defense counsel challenged the juror for cause, but the challenge was denied. Despite having peremptory challenges available, counsel did not use one to remove the juror. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defense counsel’s failure to use a peremptory challenge, while questionable, did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because the defendant failed to show that the fairness of the trial was impaired. The Court emphasized that a single error by otherwise competent counsel must be egregious and prejudicial to warrant reversal.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with murder. During jury selection, a prospective juror, William Peters, disclosed that he had been friends with the District Attorney for over 40 years, knew his wife, and socialized with him occasionally. Peters stated that the friendship would not affect his ability to be a fair and impartial juror. Defense counsel questioned Peters, who stated he had known the District Attorney to be wrong before.

    Procedural History

    The defense challenged Peters for cause, which the trial court denied. The defense did not use a peremptory challenge to remove Peters, who then sat on the jury. The jury acquitted the defendant of second-degree murder but convicted him of manslaughter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether defense counsel’s failure to exercise a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror who had a long-standing friendship with the prosecuting attorney constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, thus depriving the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the fairness of the trial was impaired by the juror’s presence, and the attorney’s decision, while potentially questionable, did not constitute an egregious and prejudicial error that deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the defense counsel’s decision not to use a peremptory challenge was questionable, especially considering the potential for bias or the lost opportunity to preserve the for-cause challenge for appeal. However, the Court reasoned that defense counsel may have had strategic reasons for keeping Peters on the jury, such as believing Peters would be favorable to the defense or would bend over backwards to be fair. The Court emphasized that to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a single error, the defendant must show that the error was so serious that it deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Citing People v. Turner, the Court stated that such error must be “a defense as clear-cut and completely dispositive as a statute of limitations.” Here, the Court held that the relationship between the juror and the prosecutor, while raising concerns, did not reach that level of egregiousness. While it might have been wiser for the trial judge to excuse Peters, the Court found it debatable whether the court committed reversible error. The Court highlighted the lack of evidence showing the juror’s presence prejudiced the defendant. Thus, the Court concluded that the defense counsel’s representation, taken as a whole, was not ineffective.

  • People v. Hedrick, 99 N.Y.2d 445 (2003): Excusing Jurors for Cause Based on Potential Bias

    99 N.Y.2d 445 (2003)

    Prospective jurors who indicate potential bias but do not provide an unequivocal assurance of impartiality must be excused for cause.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court erred by not excusing prospective jurors for cause who indicated a potential bias in favor of police officer testimony without providing unequivocal assurances of impartiality. The defense challenged these jurors for cause, but the challenges were denied, forcing the defense to use peremptory challenges. Because the defense exhausted its peremptory challenges, the error was reversible.

    Facts

    During voir dire, prospective jurors indicated, through raised hands and affirmative nods, that they might be inclined to believe a police officer’s account simply because of their position. Defense counsel specifically asked if anyone felt they would have a tendency to believe a police officer’s account, and several jurors responded affirmatively. The defense later clarified whether those jurors would be “leaning towards accepting a police officer just because of the title or the uniform,” to which the jurors nodded affirmatively.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court erred in denying the defense’s challenges for cause. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, reversing the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s challenges for cause against prospective jurors who indicated a potential bias in favor of police testimony but did not provide unequivocal assurances of impartiality.

    Holding

    Yes, because potential jurors who express possible bias must be excused unless they provide “unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of ensuring an impartial jury. CPL 270.20 (1) (b) allows a prospective juror to be challenged for cause if they evince “a state of mind that is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial.” The Court relied on precedent, stating that potential jurors who express possible bias must be excused unless they provide “unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence.” The Court noted that although the record could have been more definitive, the jurors’ demonstrative responses sufficiently indicated possible bias. The trial court should have obtained unequivocal assurances of impartiality but failed to do so. Because the defense exhausted its peremptory challenges after the trial court denied the challenges for cause, the error was reversible. The court referenced CPL 270.20 [2] to reinforce the ruling on reversible error.

  • People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600 (2000): Obtaining Unequivocal Assurance of Juror Impartiality

    People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600 (2000)

    When potential jurors express doubts about their ability to be impartial, trial judges must obtain an unequivocal assurance of their impartiality or excuse them for cause.

    Summary

    This case consolidates appeals concerning jury selection. The central issue is whether a challenge for cause should be denied when a prospective juror expresses doubt about their impartiality, absent an unequivocal indication of their ability to set aside predispositions and fairly evaluate evidence. The Court of Appeals held that in such circumstances, the challenge for cause must be granted. The Court reasoned that the right to an impartial jury is fundamental, and when a juror expresses doubt, an explicit assurance of impartiality is required. Failure to obtain such assurance constitutes reversible error.

    Facts

    In People v. Johnson and Sharper, the defendants were tried for robbery. A prospective juror stated he had a friend in the DA’s office, dealt with prisoners and police officers, and had a great deal of trust and respect for police officers. He admitted he would favor police testimony more than civilian testimony. In People v. Reyes, the defendant was tried for selling heroin. A prospective juror expressed concern about drug activity near her son’s park, stating her emotional feelings might color her views and that she might have difficulty being open-minded due to the defendant’s prior convictions.

    Procedural History

    In Johnson and Sharper, the trial court denied the challenge for cause, the defendants used a peremptory challenge, exhausted all challenges, and were convicted. The Appellate Division reversed. In Reyes, the trial court denied challenges for cause and the defendant again used peremptory challenges, exhausted them, and was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a challenge for cause may properly be denied when a prospective juror expresses doubt as to their impartiality in the case.
    2. Whether an unequivocal indication of a prospective juror’s ability to set aside any predisposition and fairly appraise the evidence is necessary before denying a challenge for cause.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when potential jurors reveal knowledge or opinions reflecting a state of mind likely to preclude impartial service, they must give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence.
    2. Yes, because in cases of “actual bias,” an unambiguous assurance of impartiality is required before a challenge for cause may be denied.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that an accused’s right to trial by an impartial jury is a fundamental constitutional right. When potential jurors reveal knowledge or opinions reflecting a state of mind likely to preclude impartial service, they must in some form give unequivocal assurance that they can set aside any bias and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence. The Court emphasized that the elimination of the “talismanic expurgatory oath” requirement in the Criminal Procedure Law gave trial judges both “greater flexibility and a greater responsibility” in determining which venirepersons should be excused for cause.

    The Court distinguished People v. Blyden, where a juror’s statement was deemed insufficient, and People v. Williams, where the jurors never expressed doubt that they could serve impartially. The Court quoted People v. Torpey, stating that “the prospective juror should be dismissed if there appears to be any possibility that his impressions might influence his verdict.” (People v Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361). The Court held that a bright-line standard exists: “a prospective juror who expresses partiality towards [one side] and cannot unequivocally promise to set aside this bias should be removed for cause.”

    In the cases at bar, the Court found that the potential jurors had openly acknowledged doubt that they could be fair in the case. The Court also noted that despite the Trial Judge stating that the jurors had expressed that they could be fair, the record did not support this statement. Therefore, the judges erred in failing to obtain unequivocal assurances, or excusing potential jurors for cause, when they openly acknowledged doubt that they could be fair in the case.

  • People v. Rodriguez, 71 N.Y.2d 214 (1988): When a Juror’s Racial Bias Requires Dismissal

    People v. Rodriguez, 71 N.Y.2d 214 (1988)

    A juror must be dismissed as grossly unqualified if, during trial, they express racial or other invidious bias against the defendant, unless the court determines, after a probing inquiry, that the juror can render an impartial verdict unaffected by such bias and the juror provides unequivocal assurance of impartiality.

    Summary

    During deliberations in a criminal trial for drug offenses, a juror informed the court that she was biased against dark-skinned Hispanics due to a recent negative experience. The trial judge, after questioning the juror, urged her to continue deliberating, emphasizing the consequences of a mistrial. The defendant was convicted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the juror should have been dismissed as grossly unqualified. The Court emphasized that the juror’s expressed bias, coupled with her inability to provide unequivocal assurance of impartiality, mandated her dismissal under CPL 270.35.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. During jury deliberations, one juror stated she wished to be excused because, after being selected, she was “bothered, touched, handled by a dark Hispanic man on the subway” and was holding that against the defendant, stating, “At the moment, yes, sir, I am [condemning the whole Hispanic race because a Hispanic touched me on the subway].” Despite the juror’s expressed bias, the trial judge urged her to continue deliberating, emphasizing the potential mistrial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial and to set aside the verdict, based on the juror’s bias. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss a juror who expressed racial bias against the defendant during jury deliberations, thereby violating the defendant’s right to an impartial jury.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a juror expresses racial or other invidious bias against the defendant during trial, the juror must be dismissed as “grossly unqualified” unless the trial court determines, after a probing inquiry, that the juror can render an impartial verdict and the juror provides unequivocal assurance of impartiality.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a fair trial, including the right to an impartial jury. CPL 270.35 mandates the dismissal of a juror who is “grossly unqualified to serve.” The Court distinguished this case from People v. Buford, where the jurors’ concerns were minor and they gave unambiguous assurances of fairness. In this case, the juror explicitly stated her racial bias against Hispanics and did not provide unequivocal assurance that she could set aside this bias. The Court stated, “where, during the course of a trial, the court learns that a juror is racially or otherwise invidiously biased against the defendant due to an incident occurring after voir dire, the juror must be discharged as ‘grossly unqualified’ unless (1) the trial court makes a determination on the record, following a probing and tactful inquiry with the juror, that the juror can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence and that her verdict will not be influenced by such bias; and (2) the trial court’s determination is supported in the record by the juror’s answers to the court’s questions including unequivocal assurance from the juror that he or she will decide the case solely on the evidence and free from any effect of the bias.” The Court also noted that the trial court erred in overemphasizing the consequences of a mistrial to the individual juror. The juror’s statement that she would “try” to deliberate impartially was deemed insufficient to overcome the expressed bias.

  • People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882 (1984): When Juror’s Bias Requires Removal for Cause

    People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882 (1984)

    A juror’s expression of abstract feelings about a defendant’s circumstances does not automatically require removal for cause if the juror expresses confidence in their ability to be fair and impartial.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which a prospective juror’s biases require dismissal for cause. During jury selection for a case involving a Black defendant who had a child with a white girlfriend, two jurors expressed discomfort with interracial relationships but affirmed their ability to render a fair verdict. The defense’s challenge for cause was denied. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that abstract biases, without concrete evidence of an inability to be impartial, do not warrant removal for cause, especially when jurors affirm their capacity to be fair. The court emphasized the trial judge’s role in evaluating juror impartiality.

    Facts

    The defendant, a Black man, was on trial. During jury selection, two prospective jurors stated they did not associate with Black people and disapproved of interracial marriages. The defendant had a white girlfriend, and they had a child together, although they were unmarried. The jurors stated that these circumstances would not interfere with their ability to render a fair and impartial verdict. Defense counsel did not pursue further questioning of the jurors after being given the opportunity.

    Procedural History

    The defense counsel’s application to excuse the two prospective jurors for cause was denied by the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s application to excuse two prospective jurors for cause, given their expressed disapproval of interracial relationships and the fact that the defendant had a child with a white girlfriend.

    Holding

    No, because the jurors expressed confidence in their ability to be fair and impartial, and there was no concrete indication that their feelings would affect their ability to serve on the jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Blyden, where a juror volunteered a specific, individualized opposition to minorities and expressed uncertainty about his ability to be impartial. In this case, the jurors only expressed abstract feelings and affirmed their ability to be fair. The court stated, “It is only when it is shown that there is a substantial risk that such predispositions will affect the ability of the particular juror to discharge his responsibilities… that his excuse is warranted.” The court deferred to the trial judge’s judgment, emphasizing the judge’s opportunity to evaluate the jurors’ demeanor and sincerity. The court recognized that jurors bring predispositions to the jury box, but not every predisposition warrants removal for cause. A potential juror who discloses anything but total absence of prejudice with respect to racial differences should not be removed if he demonstrates a readiness to lay his feelings aside in the discharge of his duties as a juror.

  • People v. Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304 (1970): Duty to Investigate Potential Juror Bias from Extraneous Information

    People v. Rivera, 26 N.Y.2d 304 (1970)

    When potentially prejudicial information comes to the attention of jurors outside of the courtroom, the trial judge is required to take appropriate steps to ensure that the jurors have not been exposed to or prejudiced by such accounts.

    Summary

    Jose Rivera was convicted of selling and possessing marijuana. He appealed, arguing that jurors were improperly exposed to information about another pending indictment against him for a similar crime due to a courtroom calendar posted outside the door. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial judge erred by failing to investigate whether the jurors had been prejudiced by the information on the calendar after the defense attorney brought it to the court’s attention. The court emphasized the importance of ensuring that jurors base their verdicts solely on evidence presented at trial.

    Facts

    Jose Rivera was on trial for selling and possessing marijuana. A calendar was posted on the courtroom door listing six cases scheduled for trial. The calendar included two entries concerning Rivera, indicating he had another indictment pending against him for violating the same sections of the Penal Law. Jurors had to pass by this calendar to enter the courtroom. The defendant’s attorney informed the court that the defendant and a witness observed jurors looking at the calendar and overheard them discussing Rivera’s name in connection with the listed charges.

    Procedural History

    Rivera was convicted at trial. His attorney moved for a mistrial based on the jury’s potential exposure to the information on the courtroom calendar, but the trial court denied the motion without further inquiry. Rivera appealed his conviction to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial without conducting an inquiry into whether the jurors were prejudiced by seeing a court calendar that indicated the defendant was facing another, similar charge.

    Holding

    Yes, because when prejudicial material comes to the attention of jurors outside of the courtroom, the trial judge is required to take appropriate steps to ensure the jurors have not been exposed to or prejudiced by such accounts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court had a duty to investigate the potential prejudice to the defendant when it was brought to the court’s attention that jurors may have seen the calendar indicating a pending, similar charge against Rivera. The court noted that it would have been gross error to admit evidence of the other indictment during the trial itself. The court stated that, “when, as in the present case, prejudicial material has come to the attention of jurors outside of the courtroom, the harm to the defendant is at least as great, and it has been uniformly held that the trial judge ‘is required to take appropriate steps to insure that the jurors [have] not been exposed to or prejudiced by such accounts.’” The court distinguished this case from others where convictions were upheld despite jurors potentially discovering inadmissible facts, noting that in those cases, the trial judge had questioned the jurors and determined their impartiality. The court emphasized that the trial judge in Rivera’s case did nothing to ascertain whether the jurors could rely solely on the evidence presented at trial. The court found that the failure to investigate and admonish the jury was serious error and warranted a new trial. The court also addressed another argument raised by the defendant regarding the admissibility of his address given to police, finding that asking a suspect for their name and address is a reasonable inquiry and not subject to Miranda warnings.