New York Law Review

Tag: Judiciary Law § 487

  • Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 23 N.Y.3d 10 (2014): Statute of Limitations for Attorney Deceit Claims

    Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 23 N.Y.3d 10 (2014)

    An action for attorney deceit under Judiciary Law § 487 is governed by the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213(1), not the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214(2), because the cause of action existed at common law prior to statutory enactment, even if it originated in English statute.

    Summary

    Plaintiff Melcher sued defendants, a law firm and one of its attorneys, for attorney deceit under Judiciary Law § 487. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214(2). Melcher argued for the six-year “catch-all” statute of limitations in CPLR 213(1). The Court of Appeals held that the six-year statute of limitations applies because the cause of action for attorney deceit existed at New York common law before the first New York statute governing attorney deceit was enacted in 1787, even if the claim originated in the first Statute of Westminster.

    Facts

    Melcher brought an action against Greenberg Traurig, LLP and Leslie Corwin for attorney deceit under Judiciary Law § 487. The defendants allegedly engaged in deceitful conduct during prior litigation involving Melcher.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding the defendants were equitably estopped from asserting the statute-of-limitations defense, though agreeing that CPLR 214(2) applied. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motion to dismiss, finding equitable estoppel inapplicable and the claim time-barred. Two justices dissented, disagreeing on the timeliness of the claim but not addressing equitable estoppel. Melcher appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an action for attorney deceit under Judiciary Law § 487 is governed by the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214(2) or the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213(1).

    Holding

    No, an action for attorney deceit is governed by the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213(1) because liability for attorney deceit existed at New York common law prior to 1787, even if the claim originated in the first Statute of Westminster.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while Amalfitano v. Rosenberg (12 N.Y.3d 8 (2009)) established that Judiciary Law § 487 did not derive from common-law fraud but rather from the first Statute of Westminster, this did not automatically mean that the three-year statute of limitations in CPLR 214(2) applied. The Court emphasized that English statutory and common law became New York common law through the Colonial-era incorporation of English law. The Court quoted Bogardus v. Trinity Church, 4 Paige Ch. 178, 198 (1833), stating that statutes in force at the time of colonization become part of the common law of the colony if applicable. The Court noted that a cause of action for attorney deceit existed as part of New York’s common law before the 1787 statute, which merely enhanced penalties by adding treble damages. Citing State of New York v. Cortelle Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 83, 85 (1975), the Court stated that statutes providing only additional remedies do not create new obligations within the meaning of CPLR 214(2). Therefore, even if attorney deceit originated in the Statute of Westminster, liability existed at New York common law prior to 1787, making the six-year statute of limitations in CPLR 213(1) applicable. As the court stated, “Statutory provisions which provide only additional remedies or standing do not create or impose new obligations.” Because of this ruling, the court did not address Melcher’s other arguments.

  • Patterson v. Leahey & Johnson, P.C., 80 N.Y.2d 167 (1992): Liability for Attorney Misconduct Despite Validation of Notarized Documents

    Patterson v. Leahey & Johnson, P.C., 80 N.Y.2d 167 (1992)

    Executive Law § 142-a, which validates the official acts of a notary public whose commission has expired, does not bar a fraud action against a notary-attorney under Judiciary Law § 487 and Executive Law § 135 for knowingly submitting defective documents to a court, but the plaintiff must still adequately plead and prove damages resulting from the misconduct.

    Summary

    Patterson sued Leahey & Johnson under Judiciary Law § 487, alleging the firm committed fraud by submitting affidavits notarized by Lynch, whose notary commission had expired, in a prior negligence suit. This resulted in the dismissal of Patterson’s negligence claim. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Law § 142-a does not automatically bar such a fraud action, as it primarily validates notarial acts to protect public reliance. However, the Court affirmed the dismissal because Patterson’s complaint failed to sufficiently plead damages. Sanctions against Patterson were reversed, as his claim had a legal basis, even if it ultimately failed on the merits.

    Facts

    In a prior negligence suit brought by Patterson, the defendant law firm, Leahey & Johnson, submitted affidavits notarized by Lynch. At the time of notarization, Lynch’s notary public commission had expired. Based on these affidavits, the Supreme Court dismissed Patterson’s negligence action on summary judgment. Patterson’s motions to vacate the judgment were denied, based on Executive Law § 142-a.

    Procedural History

    Patterson then commenced an action against Leahey & Johnson under Judiciary Law § 487, alleging fraud. The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint and imposed sanctions on Patterson. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal but reduced the amount of sanctions. Patterson appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Executive Law § 142-a bars a fraud action against a notary-attorney under Judiciary Law § 487 and Executive Law § 135 for knowingly submitting defective documents to a court.

    2. Whether Patterson adequately pleaded damages in his fraud action.

    3. Whether the imposition of sanctions against Patterson was proper.

    Holding

    1. No, because Executive Law § 142-a primarily validates notarial acts to protect public reliance and does not provide an impenetrable shield against actions predicated on deceitful conduct by an attorney-notary.

    2. No, because Patterson’s allegations on the issue of damages were merely conclusory and did not support the conclusion that he would have been successful in the underlying negligence case absent the alleged fraud.

    3. No, because Patterson’s claim that Executive Law § 142-a does not bar a suit for a notary-attorney’s misconduct under Judiciary Law § 487 and Executive Law § 135 has a legal basis, even though the claim ultimately fails on the merits.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Executive Law § 142-a was intended to allow the public to rely on the presumption of validity attached to a notary’s certificate. The statute does not expressly preclude suits for damages predicated on a notary-attorney’s misconduct in knowingly submitting defective documents to a court. The legislative history indicated that section 142-a was not intended to relieve notaries public from criminal liability for official misconduct. However, the Court found that Patterson’s fraud action was properly dismissed because his allegations on the issue of damages were merely conclusory, violating CPLR 3016(b). The pleadings and affidavits did not support the conclusion that Patterson would have been successful in the negligence case absent Lynch’s alleged fraud. The court stated, “[S]ection 142-a validated those defectively notarized documents, and Supreme Court’s reliance upon them in dismissing the earlier action was proper.” Regarding sanctions, the Court held that Patterson’s claim had a legal basis, and bringing the claim was not an abuse of judicial process approaching sanctionable conduct.