People v. Rosenberg, 45 N.Y.2d 251 (1978)

A Special Prosecutor’s jurisdiction extends to schemes that create the appearance of corruption within the criminal justice system, even if the charged crime doesn’t directly involve the corruption of a public official.

Summary

The People appealed an Appellate Division order prohibiting the Special Prosecutor from prosecuting Rosenberg for attempted grand larceny. Rosenberg, an attorney, was accused of falsely promising his client that money would be used to “fix” his case, involving a law secretary to a Supreme Court Justice as a conduit. The Appellate Division believed the Special Prosecutor lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Special Prosecutor did have jurisdiction. The scheme reeked of the type of corruption the Special Prosecutor was appointed to address, and the involvement of the law secretary sufficiently connected the act to the administration of criminal justice, even if the attorney was not explicitly charged with corruption. The court emphasized that delayed prosecutions should be expedited.

Facts

The Special Prosecutor received information about a woman claiming she could improperly influence the criminal justice system. Investigators obtained evidence and convinced her to become an informant. The informant implicated a Supreme Court Justice’s law secretary, who then cooperated with the investigation.
Rosenberg, an attorney, was indicted for attempted bribery, conspiracy to commit bribery, and attempted grand larceny. The charges stemmed from allegations he attempted to bribe a judge to fix a client’s case or, alternatively, that he falsely claimed he would use the money to fix the case, but had no intention of doing so. The initial indictment was dismissed due to irregularities.
The Special Prosecutor presented the matter to a second Grand Jury, which indicted Rosenberg for attempted grand larceny in the second degree based on the false promise of a “fix”.

Procedural History

Rosenberg obtained permission to move in the Appellate Division to prohibit the Special Prosecutor from prosecuting the indictment, arguing a lack of jurisdiction under Judiciary Law § 149(2).
The Appellate Division granted the order prohibiting the Special Prosecutor, but did not dismiss the indictment, leaving further action to the local District Attorney.
The People appealed to the Court of Appeals by permission.

Issue(s)

Whether the People may appeal to the Court of Appeals from an order of the Appellate Division dismissing an indictment pursuant to a motion made in accordance with subdivision 2 of section 149 of the Judiciary Law.
Whether the Special Prosecutor had jurisdiction to prosecute Rosenberg for attempted grand larceny based on allegations of a scheme to falsely promise a “fix” involving a law secretary to a Supreme Court Justice.

Holding

Yes, because such an appeal would be permissible from an order of the Appellate Division affirming a dismissal of an indictment by the Supreme Court.
Yes, because the scheme, involving a law secretary, was sufficiently connected to the administration of criminal justice, even if Rosenberg was not explicitly charged with corrupting a public official.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court addressed the appealability of the Appellate Division’s order, clarifying that the People’s right to appeal a dismissal of an indictment should not be thwarted by initially bringing the motion to dismiss in the Appellate Division, rather than the Supreme Court.
The court emphasized that Judiciary Law § 149(2) was enacted to address the abuse of challenging indictments at any regular term of the Supreme Court, and that it required such motions to be made either at the Extraordinary Trial or Special Term from whence the indictment issued or directly in the Appellate Division.
The court characterized the Appellate Division’s grant of prohibition as an improper remedy, as prohibition is a civil remedy not available through a Judiciary Law § 149(2) motion in a criminal proceeding.
Regarding the Special Prosecutor’s jurisdiction, the court referenced Executive Order No. 58 (9 NYCRR 1.58), which grants jurisdiction over acts connected with corrupt acts by a public servant relating to the enforcement of law or administration of criminal justice in New York City.
The court distinguished this case from Matter of Dondi v Jones, where the Special Prosecutor lacked jurisdiction because the act of bribery was connected to a civil trial, not the administration of criminal justice.
Here, the court found that the scheme involving a law secretary to a Judge to collect money supposedly intended to corrupt the administration of criminal justice was “an act * * * connected with corrupt acts * * * by a public servant * * * arising out of, relating to or in any way connected with the enforcement of law or administration of criminal justice”. The court clarified that the crime charged did not need to constitute a corruption of the public official involved.
The court concluded by stating that the prosecution of the indictment should be expedited, highlighting the delays caused by the defendant’s procedural maneuvers.