New York Law Review

Tag: Judiciary Law § 90(4)

  • Matter of Levy, 48 N.Y.2d 860 (1979): Automatic Disbarment for Federal Felony Conviction

    48 N.Y.2d 860 (1979)

    An attorney is automatically disbarred in New York upon conviction of a federal felony, even if that felony lacks a direct analogue in New York law, regardless of whether the conviction resulted from an admission of guilt or a plea entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford.

    Summary

    This case concerns the automatic disbarment of an attorney following a federal felony conviction. Levy was convicted of a federal felony under 15 U.S.C. § 645. The Appellate Division subsequently struck his name from the roll of attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Section 90(4) of the Judiciary Law mandates automatic disbarment upon felony conviction, irrespective of whether the federal felony has a direct counterpart in New York law or whether the plea was entered without admitting guilt under North Carolina v. Alford. The court clarified that while the recent amendment to Section 90 does not apply, Levy could seek relief from the Appellate Division under the amended statute.

    Facts

    Appellant Levy, an attorney, was convicted of a felony under Section 645 of Title 15 of the United States Code. Levy entered his plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, meaning he did not explicitly admit guilt but acknowledged that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to convict him.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division struck Levy’s name from the roll of attorneys following his federal felony conviction. Levy appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an attorney is subject to automatic disbarment in New York State pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4) upon conviction of a federal felony, regardless of whether the federal felony has a direct analogue in New York law or whether the plea was entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford.

    Holding

    Yes, because Subdivision 4 of section 90 of the Judiciary Law mandates automatic disbarment upon conviction of a felony, and this applies to federal felonies even without a New York analogue, and regardless of whether the plea was entered pursuant to North Carolina v Alford.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the clear mandate of Judiciary Law § 90(4), which requires automatic disbarment upon conviction of a felony. The court emphasized that prior interpretations of this section established that an attorney is disbarred upon conviction of a federal felony, even if that felony does not have a direct equivalent under New York law. The court cited Matter of Thies, 45 NY2d 865 and Matter of Chu, 42 NY2d 490 to support this interpretation.

    The court rejected Levy’s argument that the North Carolina v. Alford plea should preclude automatic disbarment. The court reasoned that, regardless of whether Levy admitted guilt, the conviction itself triggered the statutory sanction. The court stated: “Although appellant did not admit his guilt, nonetheless he stood convicted of a felony.”

    While the court acknowledged a recent amendment to Section 90, it clarified that the amendment did not apply to this specific appeal. However, the court noted that Levy could petition the Appellate Division for relief under the amended statute if he so chose.

    The court explicitly declined to address the issue of whether the federal offense had a New York counterpart, deeming it unnecessary to the disposition of the case and suggesting the Appellate Division should consider the question anew if a proper application were made.

  • Matter of Ginsberg, 43 N.Y.2d 260 (1977): Mandatory Disbarment for Attorneys Convicted of Federal Felonies

    Matter of Ginsberg, 43 N.Y.2d 260 (1977)

    A New York attorney’s conviction of a federal felony mandates automatic disbarment, regardless of whether the equivalent conduct would constitute a felony under New York law.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a New York attorney’s conviction for a federal felony automatically triggers disbarment under New York Judiciary Law, even if the underlying conduct wouldn’t be a felony under New York law. The Court of Appeals held that it does, extending the automatic disbarment rule to all federal felony convictions. The majority reasoned that prior case law interpreting the statute mandates this result, while the dissent argued for a more nuanced approach that considers the gravity of the offense and mitigating circumstances.

    Facts

    Ginsberg, an attorney admitted to practice in New York, was convicted of a federal felony. The specific nature of the federal felony is not detailed in this opinion. The issue before the court was solely whether this federal felony conviction automatically required his disbarment in New York.

    Procedural History

    The case reached the New York Court of Appeals to determine the proper application of Judiciary Law § 90(4) regarding the disbarment of attorneys convicted of felonies.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a conviction for any federal felony mandates automatic disbarment of a New York attorney, irrespective of whether the conduct would constitute a felony under New York law.

    Holding

    Yes, because prior interpretations of Judiciary Law § 90(4) mandate automatic disbarment for any felony conviction, including federal felonies, without regard to whether the equivalent conduct is a felony under New York law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court majority based their decision on the precedent set by Matter of Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, which interpreted Judiciary Law § 90(4) to require automatic disbarment upon felony conviction. They extended this rule to all federal felony convictions, stating that the statute’s language and prior judicial interpretations left no room for considering whether the underlying conduct would constitute a felony under New York law. The Court emphasized the need for a clear and consistently applied rule. The dissenting judges argued that the majority’s decision was an unwarranted extension of the disbarment rule and a direct overruling of the spirit, if not the letter, of Donegan. They contended that the gravity of the offense and mitigating circumstances should be considered before imposing such a severe penalty as disbarment, stating that a rigid, per se rule is needlessly harsh. The dissent argued for a more flexible approach that allows for consideration of individual circumstances, quoting the concurring opinion in Matter of Chu, 42 N.Y.2d 490, 495, which advocated for firm discipline without sacrificing fairness and reason. The dissent predicted that the majority’s inflexible rule would lead to aberrant results that could only be avoided by legislative action.

  • Matter of Gutman, 43 N.Y.2d 467 (1977): Defining ‘Felony’ for Attorney Disbarment Purposes

    Matter of Gutman, 43 N.Y.2d 467 (1977)

    An attorney’s conviction for criminal conduct deemed a felony by Congress warrants automatic disbarment in New York, even if the corresponding state law doesn’t precisely mirror the federal statute.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an attorney’s federal felony conviction mandated automatic disbarment under New York Judiciary Law. Gutman was convicted in federal court for making false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Bar Association sought his disbarment, arguing the federal crime was equivalent to a New York felony. The Appellate Division denied automatic disbarment, finding the state crime required ‘intent to defraud the state,’ absent in the federal offense. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a federal felony conviction, particularly when a substantially similar state felony exists, is sufficient grounds for automatic disbarment to protect the public.

    Facts

    Respondent Gutman, an attorney, was indicted on 14 counts of federal felonies related to procuring permanent residency for aliens through arranged marriages. He was convicted on 10 counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for making false statements and submitting fraudulent documents to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He received a suspended sentence, probation, and a fine.

    Procedural History

    The Bar Association petitioned for Gutman’s disbarment based on the felony conviction. The Appellate Division denied the petition for automatic disbarment, appointing a referee for disciplinary proceedings. The Bar Association appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether conviction of an attorney for a federal felony, specifically violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001, mandates automatic disbarment under New York Judiciary Law § 90(4), even if the elements of the federal crime and a comparable New York state felony (offering a false instrument for filing) are not identical.

    Holding

    Yes, because conviction of an attorney for criminal conduct judged by Congress to be a felony is sufficient ground to invoke automatic disbarment, especially when there is a New York State felony of substantially the same elements. The court determined that the purpose of attorney discipline is to protect the public.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the focus of attorney disciplinary proceedings is protecting the public, unlike criminal sentencing which is focused on individual punishment. While acknowledging past reliance on comparisons between federal and state felonies in disbarment cases, the court moved away from requiring an exact mirror image between the federal and state crimes. The Court stated, “When it is the underlying conduct of the attorney which calls for disciplinary response, it makes little sense to say that although that conduct has been defined as felonious throughout the Nation under Federal law, the attorney is not to be automatically disbarred unless our State Legislature has enacted a precisely matching felony statute. To accord determinative significance to such statutory discrepancy would be to elevate insignificance.”

    The court found a close parallelism between the federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 1001) and the New York State felony of offering a false instrument for filing (Penal Law § 175.35). Although the state law requires ‘intent to defraud the state,’ the court held that the core of both offenses is the willful filing of a false statement in a governmental office, knowing it to be false. The court effectively lowered the bar, stating: “[W]hatever may have been the proper evaluation of a felony conviction in courts other than those of our own State in 1940 when Donegan was decided, we now perceive little or no reason for distinguishing between conviction of a Federal felony and conviction of a New York State felony as a predicate for professional discipline.”

  • Matter of Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153 (1976): Disbarment Based on Felony Conviction Pending Appeal

    Matter of Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153 (1976)

    An attorney may be disbarred upon conviction of a felony, even while an appeal of that conviction is pending, without violating due process rights.

    Summary

    John N. Mitchell, a former Attorney General of the United States and an attorney admitted to practice in New York, appealed an order from the Appellate Division disbarring him following his conviction on multiple felony counts in federal court. Mitchell argued that disbarment based on a conviction not yet reviewed on appeal violated his due process rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the disbarment, holding that immediate disbarment upon felony conviction, even pending appeal, is permissible and does not violate due process, as the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the legal profession outweighs the attorney’s interest in continuing to practice.

    Facts

    John N. Mitchell, an attorney, was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and perjury. Mitchell conceded that his federal perjury conviction was equivalent to a class D felony under New York law. The Appellate Division struck Mitchell’s name from the roll of attorneys based on the felony conviction, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4).
    Mitchell appealed, arguing his disbarment was premature as his criminal conviction was still under appellate review.

    Procedural History

    The United States District Court for the District of Columbia convicted John Mitchell of federal felonies. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court disbarred Mitchell based on the felony conviction. Mitchell appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the disbarment was premature pending the outcome of his federal appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether it is constitutionally permissible to disbar an attorney when the sole basis for the disbarment is a felony conviction that is currently subject to appellate review.

    Holding

    No, because due process does not require that a conviction be affirmed by an appellate court before it can serve as the basis for disbarment, and the public interest in protecting the integrity of the legal profession outweighs the attorney’s interest in continuing to practice while the appeal is pending.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Judiciary Law § 90(4), which mandates disbarment upon felony conviction. Citing Matter of Ginsberg and Matter of Barash, the court emphasized that disbarment is ipso facto upon conviction. The Court weighed the attorney’s due process rights against the public interest. The Court stated that the primary concern in disbarment is “the protection of the public interest”. The court reasoned that allowing a convicted felon to continue practicing law would undermine the integrity of the legal system. Quoting People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, the court emphasized that attorneys are “an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.” The Court also cited Matter of Wall, stating, “Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws…”. The court held that due process does not require appellate review before disbarment, citing Griffin v. Illinois. The court emphasized that the conviction is presumed valid unless reversed on appeal, stating, “A strong presumption of regularity attaches to that judgment of conviction”. The court analogized the situation to a convicted person’s lack of constitutional right to be at liberty pending appeal. The Court also noted, quoting Matter of Rouss, that “Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with many conditions.”