New York Law Review

Tag: Judiciary Law

  • Matter of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct v. Doe, 61 N.Y.2d 56 (1984): Confidentiality of Judicial Conduct Records

    Matter of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct v. Doe, 61 N.Y.2d 56 (1984)

    Confidential records of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct are exempt from Grand Jury subpoena power because the Legislature has established a statutory scheme to ensure the confidentiality of Commission records, balancing the need for confidentiality in judicial disciplinary proceedings against the Grand Jury’s investigative powers.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a Grand Jury could subpoena confidential records from the State Commission on Judicial Conduct during an investigation into two judges. The District Attorney sought the Commission’s files, but the Commission refused. The Court of Appeals held that the Legislature has the power to exempt certain records from Grand Jury scrutiny, as it did with the Commission’s records under Judiciary Law § 44. The Court reasoned that while the Grand Jury has broad investigative powers, these powers are not unlimited and must yield to valid privileges and legislative mandates protecting confidentiality, particularly when safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary.

    Facts

    A Grand Jury in New York County convened in 1983 to investigate potential bribery and conspiracy related to a civil action. The District Attorney learned that the State Commission on Judicial Conduct was also investigating the matter. He requested the Commission’s files, providing a summary of evidence to assist the Commission in assessing his request. The Commission denied the request, finding no reasonable basis to warrant criminal proceedings. The District Attorney then issued a subpoena to the Commission’s Administrator, demanding all complaints, correspondence, investigative reports, and transcripts related to the investigation.

    Procedural History

    The Administrator of the Commission moved to quash the District Attorney’s subpoena. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed the decision without opinion. The Administrator then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Grand Jury, acting in furtherance of a lawful investigation involving two Judges, may subpoena confidential records of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct developed during an investigation into the conduct of the Judges, or whether the Judiciary Law provides a privilege protecting those records.

    Holding

    No, because the Legislature has established a statutory scheme to ensure the confidentiality of Commission records, and this scheme implicitly prohibits disclosure to the Grand Jury, balancing the Grand Jury’s investigative powers with the need for confidentiality to maintain the integrity of the judiciary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized the importance of both the Grand Jury’s investigative powers and the Commission’s role in maintaining the integrity of the judiciary. The Court acknowledged the constitutional provision stating that the power of grand juries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of public officers shall never be suspended or impaired by law (NY Const, art I, § 6). However, it emphasized that this power is not unlimited and may be subject to legislative restrictions that do not directly curtail the Grand Jury’s right to inquire, but rather regulate access to certain evidence.

    The Court relied on the Judiciary Law, particularly sections 44, 45, and 46, which establish a comprehensive scheme to ensure the confidentiality of Commission records. Section 45 broadly states that “all complaints, correspondence, commission proceedings and transcripts thereof, other papers and data and records of the commission shall be confidential.” The Court noted that while the statute allows for certain exceptions to this confidentiality, such as disclosure to specific staff or with the consent of the judge under investigation, it does not provide for release of Commission files to the Grand Jury.

    The Court highlighted Judiciary Law § 44(10), which empowers the Commission to refer evidence warranting criminal prosecution to a District Attorney, but not directly to the Grand Jury. This distinction suggests a legislative intent to allow the District Attorney to develop evidence without necessarily making the confidential Commission records public through a Grand Jury report, indictment, or trial.

    The Court emphasized that the Commission’s responsibility transcends criminal prosecution, focusing on the institutional integrity of the judiciary and public confidence in the courts. “Experience teaches that the effective performance of that function necessarily requires the free flow of information to the Commission and the confidentiality of its proceedings until wrongdoing is established.” It concluded that the Legislature, through the provisions of the Judiciary Law, has implicitly subordinated the traditional powers of the Grand Jury to these critical concerns.

    Referencing People v. Di Napoli, 27 N.Y.2d 229, 235, the Court noted the importance of confidentiality to protect members of the investigative body from outside pressures, protect against subornation and perjury by witnesses, protect the reputations of innocent defendants, and assure the confidentiality of witnesses.

  • New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct v. Doe, 61 N.Y.2d 56 (1984): Scope of Subpoena Power in Judicial Investigations

    New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct v. Doe, 61 N.Y.2d 56 (1984)

    The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct has broad subpoena power to investigate judicial impropriety, but that power is limited to matters reasonably related to the subject of the investigation initiated by a complaint.

    Summary

    The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated a Family Court Judge (Doe) based on complaints about a loan and business activities. The Commission issued a subpoena duces tecum, which Doe partially refused to comply with, arguing it was overbroad. The Court of Appeals held that the Commission has broad investigatory powers, but its subpoena power is not unlimited. The subpoena must seek information reasonably related to the matters under investigation initiated by the complaint. The Court modified the subpoena to narrow its scope, compelling compliance only with demands related to the judge’s loans, debts from clients, litigants and attorneys and business-for-profit activities.

    Facts

    Leon and Maude Mead filed a complaint alleging Judge Doe borrowed $32,000 from them at 10% interest and failed to repay it as promised. They also alleged the Judge failed to provide a mortgage to secure the loan and issued a check for accrued interest they couldn’t cash.

    The Commission, based on the Mead’s complaint and its own investigation, filed an administrator’s complaint alleging that Judge Doe (1) participated in Fort Ann Properties, a profit-making business; (2) borrowed $11,000 from Marjorie Baker, resulting in a judgment against him; and (3) acted as executor of an estate.

    The Commission served Judge Doe with a subpoena duces tecum seeking various financial documents. Judge Doe complied with some demands but refused to comply with demands Nos. 3 through 7.

    Procedural History

    The Commission moved to compel Judge Doe to comply with the subpoena duces tecum. Judge Doe cross-moved to quash, arguing the subpoena was overbroad and sought material beyond the investigation’s scope. Special Term granted the Commission’s motion to compel and denied Judge Doe’s cross-motion.

    The Appellate Division modified, granting Judge Doe’s cross-motion to quash demands Nos. 3 through 7, reasoning the subpoena was too broad and not limited to matters specifically alleged in the complaint.

    The Commission appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the subpoena duces tecum issued by the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct seeks information directly related to the specific allegations contained in the complaints against Judge Doe, concerning indebtedness, payments, or business activities, or whether it improperly seeks documents of transactions not specifically identified in the complaints.

    Holding

    No, but the subpoena need not be quashed in its entirety. The order of the Appellate Division is modified and respondent directed to comply with the requirements of the subpoena duces tecum as modified in accordance with the opinion, because the Commission’s subpoena power extends to information reasonably related to the subject matter of the investigation, not strictly limited to the specific allegations, but cannot be impermissibly overbroad.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized the Commission’s broad investigatory and enforcement powers under the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law, intended to maintain the quality of the judiciary. However, the Court emphasized that “no agency of government may conduct an unlimited and general inquisition into the affairs of persons within its jurisdiction solely on the prospect of possible violations of law being discovered.”

    The Court stated that the Commission need only make a preliminary showing that the information sought is reasonably related to a proper subject of inquiry. The Commission must exercise its subpoena power within reasonable bounds circumscribed by the subject matter under investigation.

    The Court found that demands relating to loans received by Judge Doe, his business-for-profit activities, and financial statements of Fort Ann Properties were reasonably related to the investigation. However, demands seeking all writings relating to Judge Doe’s past and present indebtedness and all canceled checks and bank statements reflecting all his indebtedness were impermissibly overbroad.

    The Court modified the subpoena to require production of materials relating to loans and other debts from clients, litigants, and attorneys since January 1, 1974, and Judge Doe’s business-for-profit activities during that period. The Court also sustained the demand for canceled checks and bank statements insofar as they related to Judge Doe’s loans, repayments, business-for-profit activities, and other debts reasonably related to his loan and business activities.

    The court reasoned that a contrary holding would “sharply curtail the commission’s investigatory capabilities and render it ineffective as the instrument through which the State seeks to insure the integrity of its judiciary.”

  • Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 30 N.Y.2d 130 (1972): Determining Appointing Authority Under Court Unification

    Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 30 N.Y.2d 130 (1972)

    Under New York’s court unification provisions, the power to appoint and control court personnel generally shifted from local boards of justices to the Appellate Divisions, except where specifically reserved by statute, such as for personal assistants to judges.

    Summary

    Kleinman, a clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, challenged the Appellate Division’s authority to withhold pay raises previously granted. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division, under the court unification provisions of the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law, possessed the authority to withhold these raises. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Gilligan v. Procaccino, emphasizing that the power to appoint personal assistants to judges was specifically reserved, unlike the general administrative powers over court staff that devolved upon the Appellate Divisions.

    Facts

    Kleinman was appointed clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, in 1954. Legislation in 1961 and 1962 provided pay raises for nonjudicial court personnel, but allowed the appointing authority to withhold increases if unwarranted. In 1964, the Presiding Justices of the Appellate Division in the First and Second Judicial Departments withheld Kleinman’s pay raises, citing their authority under the court unification provisions effective September 1, 1962.

    Procedural History

    Kleinman initiated a proceeding claiming he was underpaid because the Appellate Division lacked the authority to withhold his pay raises. Special Term denied the application and dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the determination, with one Justice dissenting. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under the court unification provisions of the New York Constitution and Judiciary Law, the Appellate Division in the Second Judicial Department was the “appropriate appointing authority” empowered to withhold pay raises from the clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County.

    Holding

    Yes, because the court unification provisions vested administrative powers, including the authority to withhold pay raises, in the Appellate Divisions, except where specific statutes reserved such powers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Board of Justices of the Supreme Court, Kings County, was initially the appropriate appointing authority under Section 168 of the Judiciary Law, the court unification provisions of the State Constitution (Article VI) and the Judiciary Law (Article 7-A), effective September 1, 1962, transferred this power to the Appellate Division. Section 28 of Article VI of the Constitution grants broad supervisory power to the Appellate Divisions over the administration of courts within their departments. Section 214 of Article 7-A of the Judiciary Law implements this authority, stating that each Appellate Division is vested with “all administrative powers and duties vested pursuant to any provision of law in any judicial or non-judicial personnel of the courts in its department.”

    The court distinguished Matter of Gilligan v. Procaccino, where it held that the Presiding Justices were not the appropriate appointing authorities for nonlawyer “law secretaries” to Supreme Court Justices. The court emphasized that in Gilligan, Section 222 of the Judiciary Law specifically reserved the power of individual judges or justices to appoint their personal assistants. As the court stated, “the power of an individual Judge or Justice to appoint his personal assistants was expressly reserved and continued. It did not devolve upon the Appellate Divisions.” In Kleinman’s case, no such specific reservation existed, thus the Appellate Division’s power was valid. The court effectively demonstrated how the general rule of unified administrative control yields to specific statutory exceptions.

  • Bach v. Board of Estimate, 21 N.Y.2d 164 (1967): Authority to Withhold Salary Increases for Court Employees

    Bach v. Board of Estimate, 21 N.Y.2d 164 (1967)

    The power to withhold salary increases from nonjudicial employees of the Supreme Court, such as law secretaries, rests with the individual Supreme Court Justices who appointed them, not the Appellate Division.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether the Appellate Division had the authority to withhold salary increases from Supreme Court Law Secretaries. The Court of Appeals held that the power to withhold salary increases rested with the individual Supreme Court Justices who appointed the law secretaries, not the Appellate Division. The legislative appropriations for salary increases contained a provision allowing increases to be withheld by the “appropriate appointing authority.” The Court found that the Judiciary Law specifically grants the power to appoint law secretaries to the individual Supreme Court Justices, and this power was preserved even after court reorganization. Thus, the Appellate Division’s attempt to withhold these increases was unlawful.

    Facts

    The petitioners were non-lawyer Law Secretaries to Justices of the Supreme Court in the First and Second Departments. In 1961 and 1962, the legislature appropriated funds for increased salaries for certain judicial officers and employees. These appropriations allowed the “appropriate appointing authority” to withhold these increases. In 1964, the Presiding Justices of the Appellate Divisions, First and Second Departments, sent a letter to the Mayor of New York City stating that the Justices of the two Departments would be withholding salary increases from certain nonjudicial personnel, including the petitioners. The petitioners challenged this action, arguing that the Appellate Division Justices were not the “appropriate appointing authority.”

    Procedural History

    Petitioners brought proceedings challenging the Appellate Division’s authority to withhold their salary increases. Special Term agreed with the petitioners in two proceedings, ruling in their favor. However, in the third proceeding, Special Term sided with the respondents and dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed these decisions, holding that all three petitions should have been dismissed. The case then went to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Justices of the Appellate Division, First and Second Departments, were the “appropriate appointing authority” with the power to withhold salary increases from Law Secretaries to Justices of the Supreme Court.

    Holding

    No, because the individual Justices of the Supreme Court, not the Appellate Division, have the power to appoint Law Secretaries and, therefore, the authority to withhold salary increases.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the identity of the “appropriate appointing authority” was the central issue. The Court examined the Judiciary Law and determined that Section 157 grants individual Justices of the Supreme Court the power to appoint their Law Secretaries. Section 222 of the Judiciary Law further clarifies that this power continues even after court reorganization, “notwithstanding the provisions of section two hundred fourteen of this chapter,” which deals with the general administrative powers of the Appellate Divisions. The Court emphasized that while the Appellate Divisions have administrative powers, including budget supervision, these powers do not extend to appointing law secretaries. The court stated that the pre-existing power of Supreme Court Justices to appoint their staff “was thus expressly preserved at the time of court reorganization and continues, subject to the standards and policies adopted by the Judicial Conference.” The Court also noted that the letter from the Appellate Division Justices to the Mayor only claimed that they were “exercising the prerogative of the appropriate appointing authority,” implying they were not the authority itself. Therefore, the Court concluded that the Appellate Division Justices lacked the authority to withhold the salary increases. As such, the orders of the Appellate Division were reversed, and the petitions of Bach, Mariconda and Serra were granted.

  • Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 19 N.Y.2d 292 (1967): Upholding Delegation of Collective Bargaining Authority in Court System

    Matter of Kleinman v. McCoy, 19 N.Y.2d 292 (1967)

    The Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference can delegate authority for collective bargaining with court personnel to a local government entity when that entity bears the financial responsibility for the employees’ salaries.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent of the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference’s authority over collective bargaining with nonjudicial employees of the court system, particularly when those employees’ salaries are paid by a local government. The Court of Appeals held that the Board could delegate collective bargaining authority to the City of New York’s Department of Labor because the city bore the financial burden of any negotiated agreements. This delegation was deemed a reasonable and effective way to manage the shared responsibilities between the Board and the city, ensuring both administrative oversight and fiscal accountability.

    Facts

    Following the unification of the New York court system, the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference conducted a personnel classification survey of nonjudicial employees. Based on this survey, the Board adopted a “Title Structure, Unified Court System” defining job titles, duties, and qualifications. The Board and the City of New York then entered into an agreement establishing procedures for joint collective bargaining with these employees, with the City Labor Department designated to certify unions representing a majority of employees in a given class. The City Labor Department certified the appellant Association as the collective bargaining representative for probation officers and trainees in New York City courts.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner-respondent initiated a proceeding to annul the collective bargaining certificate issued to the appellant Association and to restrain collective bargaining. Special Term dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the Administrative Board had sole authority to establish appropriate collective bargaining units and could not delegate this authority. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference, possessing constitutional authority for administrative supervision of the court system, can delegate the authority to determine appropriate collective bargaining units for court employees to the New York City Department of Labor.

    Holding

    No, because the Constitution does not prevent the Administrative Board from delegating the task to some official or agency. Since the Board has only a partial and shared responsibility for the approval of the result of bargaining, and the local government, which will pay the bill, be authorized by the Board to carry on the detailed bargaining process.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Administrative Board has constitutional authority for administrative supervision of the court system, this does not preclude it from delegating certain tasks, particularly in the context of collective bargaining where a local government bears the financial responsibility. The court emphasized that the Constitution grants broad powers for “administrative supervision” to the board, but it does not require the Chief Judge and Presiding Justices to personally conduct all bargaining discussions. The court stated, “Delegation of the task to some official or agency would be expected”. The agreement between the Board and the City of New York was viewed as a reasonable way to carry out shared responsibilities. The court acknowledged that both the Board and the city were jointly concerned in any negotiation where the City of New York would pay the cost of the agreements. The court noted that the “final determination” of the fiscal needs of the courts is expressly left to normal fiscal authorities, either State or local. The Court reasoned that the Board retained the power to consider the budget and make recommendations, while the local governing body made the final fiscal determination. Therefore, delegating the detailed bargaining process to the city, which ultimately pays the bill, did not constitute an invalid delegation of the Board’s constitutional authority.

  • Matter of Klein v. McCoy, 19 N.Y.2d 512 (1967): Self-Executing Transfer of Non-Judicial Personnel in Court Reorganization

    Matter of Klein v. McCoy, 19 N.Y.2d 512 (1967)

    In the context of court reorganization, legislation providing for the transfer of non-judicial personnel to courts exercising the jurisdiction of their former courts is self-executing, entitling transferred employees to the compensation associated with their new roles from the effective date of the reorganization.

    Summary

    This case concerns a petitioner who was a Secretary to a Bronx County Court Judge before court reorganization. After reorganization, the County Court was abolished, and the judge became a Supreme Court Justice. The petitioner continued working for the same judge, performing the duties of a Clerk to a Supreme Court Justice. The petitioner sought the difference in salary between a County Court Secretary and a Supreme Court Clerk for the period between the reorganization and when he began receiving the higher salary. The Court of Appeals held that the legislation mandating the transfer of non-judicial personnel was self-executing, entitling the petitioner to the higher Supreme Court Clerk salary from the date of reorganization.

    Facts

    Prior to September 1, 1962, the petitioner was the Secretary to a Judge of the Bronx County Court.
    With court reorganization on September 1, 1962, the Bronx County Court was abolished, and the Judge became a Justice of the Supreme Court.
    The petitioner continued in employment, performing the duties of a Clerk to a Justice of the Supreme Court.
    He was not paid the salary of a Supreme Court Clerk until July 1, 1963.
    The petitioner sought the difference in salary for the 10-month period from September 1, 1962, to July 1, 1963.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner initiated a proceeding to recover the salary difference.
    The lower courts’ decisions are not explicitly stated, but the Court of Appeals reversed the order appealed from, implying a prior unfavorable ruling.
    The Court of Appeals remitted the case to the Supreme Court, New York County, for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether section 223 of the Judiciary Law, concerning the transfer of non-judicial personnel during court reorganization, is self-executing.
    Whether the petitioner was entitled to be compensated at the rate of pay for a Supreme Court Clerk from September 1, 1962, the date of the court reorganization.

    Holding

    Yes, section 223 of the Judiciary Law is self-executing because it mandates the transfer and appointment of non-judicial personnel to positions in the reorganized courts where their skills can be utilized.
    Yes, the petitioner was entitled to be compensated as a Supreme Court Clerk from September 1, 1962, because the transfer provision was self-executing and he was, in effect, “appointed” to the analogous position of Clerk to a Supreme Court Justice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the abolition of the Secretary position in the County Court coincided with the court’s abolishment, indicating the Legislature’s intent for a seamless transition during reorganization.
    The court relied on the New York Constitution, Article VI, § 35, subd. 1, which directs that nonjudicial personnel be assigned to like functions in the reorganized courts “to the extent practicable” and “as may be provided by law.”
    The court interpreted section 223 of the Judiciary Law as implementing this constitutional directive by mandating the transfer of personnel to positions where their skills could be fully utilized.
    The court found section 223 to be self-executing, meaning it took effect immediately without requiring further legislative action to define the specific terms of employment.
    The court analogized the petitioner’s situation to its decision in Matter of Rein v. Wagner, 18 N.Y.2d 989 (1967), where former County Court employees were deemed Supreme Court employees for salary increase purposes after reorganization. The court stated, “Manifestly, if the Legislature intended to treat former County Court employees as Supreme Court employees after September 1, 1962, for purposes of giving them a salary increase, it must necessarily have intended that they be similarly treated for purposes of their salary base.”
    The dissenting judges, Burke and Scileppi, voted to affirm the lower court’s decision, but their reasoning is not detailed in the majority opinion.

  • In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285 (1940): Defining ‘Felony’ for Attorney Disbarment Purposes

    In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285 (1940)

    For the purposes of automatic disbarment under New York Judiciary Law, the term “felony” only includes federal felonies that are also felonies under New York law, not federal felonies that would only be misdemeanors under New York law.

    Summary

    An attorney was convicted in federal court of conspiracy to use the mails to defraud, a felony under federal law. New York law, however, generally treats conspiracy as a misdemeanor. The Appellate Division disbarred the attorney, interpreting New York Judiciary Law to require automatic disbarment upon conviction of any federal felony. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the term “felony” in the Judiciary Law refers only to those federal felonies that would also be felonies under New York law. This interpretation avoids the severe consequence of automatic disbarment for conduct that New York considers a less serious offense. The court emphasized that while disbarment isn’t technically punishment, it carries severe consequences and thus the statute must be strictly construed.

    Facts

    The appellant, an attorney, was convicted in federal court for conspiracy to use the mails to defraud, a violation of federal law. Under federal law, this crime is classified as a felony. However, under New York law, conspiracy is generally classified as a misdemeanor, unless specific provisions dictate otherwise. The Appellate Division, relying on its interpretation of the Judiciary Law, automatically disbarred the appellant based solely on the federal felony conviction.

    Procedural History

    The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York convicted the appellant. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari, and the President of the United States denied a petition for pardon. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First Department, then disbarred the appellant based on the federal conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the term “felony,” as used in the New York Judiciary Law sections mandating automatic disbarment upon conviction of a felony, includes an offense defined as a felony by federal statute, but which would only be a misdemeanor under New York law.

    Holding

    No, because the term “felony” in the context of Judiciary Law sections 88 and 477 only includes those federal felonies that are also considered felonies under New York law. Strict construction of the statute requires this interpretation, especially considering the severe consequences of automatic disbarment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the term “felony” lacks a universal definition and varies across jurisdictions. While the Judiciary Law references presidential pardons (suggesting inclusion of some federal crimes), it doesn’t explicitly define “felony.” The court noted that historically, New York courts have interpreted similar statutes (e.g., those concerning witness disqualification and fiduciary appointments) to apply only to crimes classified as felonies under New York law. In Sims v. Sims, the court held that disqualification as a witness only applied to convictions within New York State. The court also emphasized that while disbarment isn’t strictly a punishment, it carries significant consequences akin to punishment, requiring strict construction of the statute. The court stated, “Strict construction of section 88, subdivision 3, and section 477 of the Judiciary Law requires that the term ‘felony’ include only those Federal felonies which are also felonies under the laws of this State, and exclude such Federal felonies as are ‘cognizable by our laws as a misdemeanor or not at all.’” Finally, the court clarified that its decision doesn’t limit the Appellate Division’s discretion to discipline attorneys under other provisions of the Judiciary Law, and that the federal conviction serves as prima facie evidence of guilt.