New York Law Review

Tag: Judicial Removal

  • Matter of Doyle, 23 N.Y.3d 653 (2014): Standard for Removing a Judge for Appearance of Impropriety

    Matter of Doyle, 23 N.Y.3d 653 (2014)

    Removal of a judge is warranted even in the absence of actual impropriety when the conduct creates a strong appearance of impropriety that undermines public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, especially when coupled with a prior disciplinary history.

    Summary

    This case concerns the removal of Surrogate Judge Cathryn M. Doyle from office based on allegations of creating an appearance of impropriety. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination that Judge Doyle’s actions, specifically involving her dealings with a court employee and a potential litigant, warranted removal, despite the absence of proven actual impropriety. The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining public confidence in the judiciary and considered Judge Doyle’s prior disciplinary history in reaching its decision. A dissenting opinion argued for a lesser sanction of censure, citing the referee’s finding that Judge Doyle was a credible witness.

    Facts

    Judge Doyle was the Surrogate of Albany County. An attorney, Gary DiNardo, sought appointment as a court evaluator. DiNardo also represented clients in matters before Judge Doyle. Judge Doyle had a close relationship with a court employee, Lisa Circe, who was also DiNardo’s girlfriend. Judge Doyle attended social events with DiNardo and Circe. Judge Doyle appointed DiNardo as a court evaluator and made other favorable decisions regarding him. These actions created the appearance that DiNardo received preferential treatment because of his relationship with Circe and Judge Doyle. A separate incident involved Judge Doyle intervening in a landlord-tenant dispute on behalf of Circe, which further suggested an abuse of her judicial position.

    Procedural History

    The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Judge Doyle’s conduct. The Commission determined that Judge Doyle violated judicial ethics rules by creating an appearance of impropriety. The Commission recommended Judge Doyle’s removal from office. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination and the recommended sanction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision and ordered Judge Doyle’s removal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Commission on Judicial Conduct abused its discretion when it determined that Judge Doyle should be removed from her position as Surrogate Judge.

    Holding

    No, because Judge Doyle’s conduct created a strong appearance of impropriety and undermined public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, particularly in light of her prior disciplinary history.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that even the appearance of impropriety can be as damaging to the judiciary’s reputation as actual misconduct. The court stated, “The appearance of impropriety is ‘as damaging to public confidence in the courts as actual impropriety’” (quoting Matter of харченко, 20 N.Y.3d 388, 396 [2013]). The Court found that Judge Doyle’s actions, specifically her relationship with the court employee and the attorney, and her intervention in the landlord-tenant dispute, created a situation where it appeared she was using her position to benefit her friends and associates. The Court also considered Judge Doyle’s prior disciplinary history, which included a prior admonishment for improper conduct, as an aggravating factor. The court reasoned that while removal is a severe sanction, it was necessary to maintain public trust in the judiciary. The dissenting judge argued that censure would have been a more appropriate sanction. The dissent highlighted that the referee found Judge Doyle credible and candid and that the prior disciplinary action was unrelated to the current misconduct. The dissent further argued that the misconduct did not rise to the level of “truly egregious circumstances” necessary for removal. The majority, however, disagreed, finding that the appearance of impropriety, coupled with the prior discipline, warranted removal.

  • In re Marshall, 8 N.Y.3d 742 (2007): Judicial Removal for Ex Parte Communication and False Testimony

    In re Marshall, 8 N.Y.3d 742 (2007)

    A judge may be removed from office for engaging in improper ex parte communications with defendants and subsequently providing false testimony to the State Commission on Judicial Conduct regarding those communications.

    Summary

    This case concerns the removal of a Town Justice, Jean Marshall, for engaging in improper ex parte communications with defendants in building code violation cases and subsequently lying about these communications to the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. The Commission brought two charges against Marshall: improper communication and dismissal of cases without proper notice, and false testimony and alteration of court records. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission’s findings that Marshall violated the standards of integrity required of the judiciary and upheld her removal from office, emphasizing the seriousness of her lack of candor and the existence of objective proof contradicting her statements.

    Facts

    Jean Marshall, Justice of the Cuyler Town Court, engaged in ex parte conversations with three defendants in building code violation cases, informing them they did not need to appear in court as scheduled. At the scheduled court session, Marshall told the town’s attorney and code enforcement officer that the cases would be adjourned to January 26, 2004, and noted the date in her calendar. Prior to that date, Marshall dismissed the cases sua sponte without notifying the town’s attorney or code enforcement officer. When questioned by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Marshall falsely testified that she had not adjourned the cases and altered her court calendar to conceal the original adjourned date.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct filed a formal complaint against Justice Marshall. A Referee was designated to hear the case and reported that Marshall failed to properly perform her duties regarding the ex parte communications but found insufficient evidence to support the false testimony and record alteration charges. The Commission upheld both charges and determined Marshall should be removed. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Justice Marshall engaged in judicial misconduct by engaging in improper ex parte communications and dismissing cases without proper notice to the prosecutor?

    2. Whether Justice Marshall engaged in further judicial misconduct by providing false testimony to the State Commission on Judicial Conduct and altering court records to conceal her actions?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Justice Marshall failed to properly perform the duties of her office by engaging in ex parte communications and dismissing cases without providing the prosecutor notice or an opportunity to be heard.

    2. Yes, because Justice Marshall provided patently false explanations to the Commission despite contrary objective proof, and attempted to conceal her misconduct by altering official court records.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that neither the Commission nor the Court is bound by the Referee’s findings, possessing the authority to review findings of fact and determine the appropriate sanction in judicial misconduct cases. The Court found that the record clearly demonstrated Marshall’s improper ex parte communications and subsequent dismissal of cases without proper notification. Critically, the Court highlighted Marshall’s false testimony to the Commission and her alteration of the court calendar as egregious violations of judicial ethics. The court quoted Matter of Kiley, 74 N.Y.2d 364, 371, 370 (1989), stating that while caution should be exercised in using a judge’s lack of candor as an aggravating circumstance, removal is appropriate “where the Judge who was to be sanctioned gave patently false explanations to the Commission despite contrary objective proof.” The Court concluded that Marshall’s actions violated the high standards of integrity required of the judiciary, warranting her removal from office. The Court emphasized the seriousness of providing false explanations to the Commission when confronted with objective proof of misconduct.

  • In re Washington, 1 N.Y.3d 873 (2004): Judicial Removal for Undue Delays and Reporting Misconduct

    In re Washington, 1 N.Y.3d 873 (2004)

    A judge may be removed from office for persistent failure to render timely decisions, submitting inaccurate reports, and failing to cooperate with administrative directives, especially when these actions undermine the integrity of the judicial process.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination to remove a part-time City Court Judge, Washington, from office. The removal was based on her failure to render timely decisions in numerous cases, submission of inaccurate quarterly reports regarding undecided cases, and failure to respond promptly to the Commission’s inquiries. Despite repeated warnings and administrative efforts to assist her, Washington maintained a backlog of cases and submitted false reports. The Court of Appeals found her conduct demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to discharge her judicial duties, thus warranting removal.

    Facts

    Roseanna H. Washington was a part-time City Court Judge in White Plains, appointed in January 1997. Her duties involved presiding over small claims cases and substituting for the full-time judge. Despite a relatively small caseload, she accumulated a significant backlog of undecided cases. Sixty-seven cases were not decided promptly, with some pending for over two years. Washington submitted quarterly reports that falsely stated that none of her cases remained undecided for 60 days or longer, despite the existence of such cases. She ignored multiple requests from the Administrative Judge to resolve the pending cases and provide accurate reports.

    Procedural History

    The Commission on Judicial Conduct initiated an inquiry based on Washington’s 16-month delay in rendering a decision. After a hearing, the Commission sustained two charges of misconduct and determined that removal was the appropriate sanction. Washington sought reconsideration based on new evidence suggesting her conduct was affected by alcohol use and possible depression, but the Commission adhered to its original determination. Washington then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination to remove Judge Washington from office was appropriate given her failure to render timely decisions, submission of inaccurate reports, and failure to cooperate with administrative directives.

    Holding

    Yes, because Judge Washington filed late, incomplete, and false quarterly reports and maintained a persistent backlog of undecided cases, despite repeated administrative efforts to assist her. This conduct demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to discharge her judicial duties, warranting removal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that delays in deciding pending cases should generally be addressed administratively. However, more severe sanctions are appropriate when a judge defies administrative directives or attempts to subvert the system. The court cited Matter of Greenfield, 76 NY2d 293, 298 (1990), noting that severe sanctions are warranted “when the Judge has defied administrative directives or has attempted to subvert the system by, for instance, falsifying, concealing or persistently refusing to file records indicating delays.” The court found that Washington’s actions fell into this category. She filed late, incomplete, and false quarterly reports and maintained a persistent backlog, with some delays exceeding two years, despite repeated administrative efforts to assist her. The court considered the evidence submitted during the motion for reconsideration, finding that since the Commission reviewed the evidence and adhered to its original determination, the evidence became part of the record. The Court concluded that Washington’s conduct demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to discharge her judicial duties, justifying the Commission’s sanction of removal. The Court emphasized that judges must handle cases efficiently and expeditiously and cooperate with supervisors in handling judicial responsibilities. Washington’s failure to do so warranted the sanction imposed.

  • In re която, 89 N.Y.2d 252 (1996): Judicial Removal for Deceptive Conduct During Investigation

    In re Spargo, 89 N.Y.2d 252 (1996)

    A judge may be removed from office for engaging in a pattern of deceptive and untruthful behavior during a judicial conduct investigation, even if the initial misconduct that triggered the investigation might not, on its own, warrant such a severe sanction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the removal of a Civil Court Judge and Acting Supreme Court Justice, Spargo, based on findings by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. The Commission determined Spargo made inappropriate remarks to a female law intern and then engaged in deceptive behavior during the ensuing investigation, including providing false information during a screening process for a potential Supreme Court appointment. The court held that while the initial inappropriate remarks might not have warranted removal, Spargo’s subsequent dishonesty and lack of candor demonstrated a lack of fitness for judicial office, justifying the sanction.

    Facts

    A complaint was filed against Judge Spargo concerning a note he passed to his court attorney regarding the physical attributes of a female law intern. The complaint also alleged that Spargo jokingly suggested to the intern that she remove an article of clothing in his presence. During the investigation, while seeking an interim appointment to the Supreme Court, Spargo answered “no” to a question on the Governor’s Judicial Screening Committee questionnaire asking if he had ever been the subject of any inquiry or investigation by a federal, state, or local agency. He also delayed returning a waiver of confidentiality regarding Judicial Conduct Commission records to the State Senate Judiciary Committee and falsely told staff counsel for the committee that he was not the subject of any complaints before the Commission.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct determined that Judge Spargo violated rules requiring judges to uphold high standards of conduct and promote public confidence in the judiciary, recommending his removal from office. A Referee conducted a full evidentiary hearing. The Commission’s determination was based on the Referee’s findings and the Commission’s own review. Judge Spargo then sought review of the Commission’s determination in the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination that Judge Spargo should be removed from office is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and whether the sanction of removal is appropriate given Spargo’s conduct.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Commission’s determination was supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and the sanction of removal was appropriate, considering Judge Spargo’s pattern of evasive, deceitful, and untruthful behavior, which evidenced a lack of fitness to hold judicial office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court deferred to the credibility determinations of the Referee and the Commission, finding no reason to disturb their findings that Spargo’s testimony was not credible. The court found that Spargo’s inappropriate note and suggestion to the intern, while deserving of sanction, would not, standing alone, justify removal. However, the court emphasized that Spargo engaged in a pattern of evasive, deceitful, and untruthful behavior, particularly in his attempts to conceal the pending investigation while seeking a Supreme Court appointment. The court rejected Spargo’s explanations for his false statements on the questionnaire and to the Senate Judiciary Committee staff. The court reasoned that “deception is antithetical to the role of a Judge who is sworn to uphold the law and seek the truth,” quoting Matter of Myers, 67 NY2d 550, 554. The court distinguished Spargo’s conduct from instances of mere poor judgment, emphasizing that Spargo was motivated by personal gain to dissimulate. The court acknowledged that removal is reserved for truly egregious conduct, but held that judges must be held to a higher standard, and Spargo’s actions warranted the sanction of removal.

  • In re Petrie, 91 N.Y.2d 142 (1997): Judicial Censure vs. Removal for Isolated Incidents of Misconduct

    In re Petrie, 91 N.Y.2d 142 (1997)

    The sanction of removal of a judge is excessive where the misconduct amounts solely to poor judgment, even extremely poor judgment, especially when considering a long and otherwise unblemished judicial career.

    Summary

    This case involves a Justice of the Columbia Town Court facing disciplinary charges for misconduct in handling two criminal matters. The Commission on Judicial Conduct determined that the judge should be removed from office, but the Court of Appeals reviewed this determination. The Court of Appeals held that while the judge committed serious misconduct, the sanction of removal was too severe. The Court considered the judge’s long, unblemished career, the absence of personal gain or ill will, and the ambiguous nature of discrepancies in his testimony. Instead, the Court imposed the lesser sanction of censure.

    Facts

    The judge faced two charges of misconduct. First, he dismissed a sexual abuse case without informing the District Attorney or having the complainant present, seemingly showing favoritism to the accused, an acquaintance. Second, he failed to advise a defendant in a bad check case of his right to assigned counsel, instead imposing a jail sentence when the defendant couldn’t immediately pay the full amount owed.

    Procedural History

    The Commission on Judicial Conduct found that the judge had engaged in misconduct and determined that he should be removed from office. The judge then requested review of the Commission’s determination by the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the misconduct committed by the judge warranted the extreme sanction of removal from office, or whether a lesser sanction such as censure was more appropriate.

    Holding

    No, because removal is excessive where the misconduct amounts solely to poor judgment, especially considering the judge’s long and otherwise unblemished judicial career, the absence of personal gain or ill will, and the ambiguity surrounding discrepancies in the judge’s testimony before the Commission.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the judge’s behavior constituted serious misconduct. However, the Court emphasized that removal is an extreme sanction reserved for cases of egregious misconduct. The court considered several factors mitigating against removal. First, the judge had served as Town Justice for nearly 40 years with no prior complaints. Second, there was no evidence of personal profit, vindictiveness, or ill will motivating the judge’s actions. Finally, the court noted that the discrepancies in the judge’s testimony before the Commission were not necessarily indicative of dishonesty. Quoting *Matter of Kiley, 74 NY2d at 370-371*, the court emphasized that using lack of candor as an aggravating element “should be approached cautiously.” The court distinguished this case from *Matter of Roberts, 91 NY2d 93*, decided the same day, and concluded that the two isolated incidents warranted censure rather than removal. The court reasoned that the purpose of judicial disciplinary proceedings is not solely to punish the judge, but also to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Censure, in this case, was deemed sufficient to achieve that goal, while removal would be unduly harsh given the circumstances. The court stated, “Removal is excessive where the misconduct amounts solely to poor judgment, even extremely poor judgment.” This highlights the importance of considering the totality of the circumstances and the judge’s overall record when determining the appropriate sanction for judicial misconduct.

  • In re Vincent, 70 N.Y.2d 208 (1987): Judicial Removal for Neglect of Duties

    In re Vincent, 70 N.Y.2d 208 (1987)

    A judge’s persistent failure to make timely deposits of court funds and the arbitrary dismissal of cases warrants removal from judicial office.

    Summary

    This case concerns the removal of a Town Justice, Lee Vincent, for gross neglect of his duties. From 1980 to 1984, Vincent repeatedly failed to make timely deposits and remittals of court moneys to the State Comptroller and neglected the timely disposal of his caseload. Instead of properly collecting fines, he often dismissed cases or issued unconditional discharges after extended periods of nonpayment. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination that Vincent’s negligence in handling public funds, court records, and case dispositions constituted misconduct justifying removal.

    Facts

    Lee Vincent served as the Town Justice of Burke from 1980 to 1984.

    During his tenure, Vincent repeatedly failed to make timely deposits and remittals of court moneys to the State Comptroller.

    Vincent also neglected to dispose of his caseload promptly.

    Instead of taking steps to collect fines, Vincent often dismissed cases or issued unconditional discharges after long periods of non-payment.

    Vincent did not contest the factual findings of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct regarding his mishandling of funds and cases but argued against the sanction of removal.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct determined that Vincent’s actions constituted misconduct.

    The Commission recommended that Vincent be removed from his position as Town Justice.

    Vincent appealed the sanction of removal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s determination and ordered Vincent’s removal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Town Justice’s persistent failure to make timely deposits of court funds and the arbitrary dismissal of cases warrants removal from judicial office.

    Holding

    Yes, because a judge’s persistent failure to make timely deposits and the arbitrary dismissal of cases erodes public confidence in the judiciary and justifies removal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that Vincent’s repeated failures to make timely deposits and remittals of court funds were sufficient grounds for removal, citing Matter of Rater, 69 NY2d 208, 209 and Matter of Petrie v State Commn. on Judicial Conduct, 54 NY2d 807. While Vincent argued mitigating factors, the court found his arbitrary dismissal and unconditional discharge of cases to be an aggravating factor. The court reasoned that such actions erode public confidence in the judiciary, thus justifying the sanction of removal. The decision underscores the importance of judges diligently managing court funds and processing cases fairly and efficiently. As the court implied, failure to do so compromises the integrity of the judicial system. The per curiam opinion provided a clear message that mismanagement of funds and arbitrary case handling would not be tolerated.

  • Matter of Reedy, 64 N.Y.2d 309 (1985): Ticket-Fixing as Grounds for Judicial Removal

    Matter of Reedy, 64 N.Y.2d 309 (1985)

    Ticket-fixing by a judge, especially when compounded by prior disciplinary actions, constitutes serious judicial misconduct warranting removal from office.

    Summary

    This case involves a Town and Village Justice, James H. Reedy, who engaged in misconduct by improperly handling traffic tickets issued to his son and his son’s friend. Reedy transferred the cases to another judge but then contacted that judge, misrepresented an agreement from the District Attorney’s office, and influenced the reduction of charges. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination to remove Reedy from office, emphasizing that ticket-fixing is a grave offense, particularly in light of Reedy’s prior censure for similar misconduct. The court found that Reedy’s actions compromised the integrity of the judicial system and justified the severe sanction of removal.

    Facts

    James H. Reedy was a Town Justice of the Town of Galway and a Village Justice of the Village of Galway.

    On April 2, 1982, Reedy’s son and a friend received speeding tickets in the village.

    The tickets were returnable before Reedy, and he transferred the cases to Justice Norman Neahr in the adjoining Town of Providence.

    Reedy contacted Judge Neahr and informed him that the defendants were his son and his son’s friend, asking him to accept the transfer.

    Reedy later called Judge Neahr again, falsely stated that an Assistant District Attorney had agreed to reduce the speeding charges to illegal parking if Judge Neahr agreed, and inquired about the sentence.

    Judge Neahr agreed to the reduction, setting the fine at $25 per defendant.

    At Reedy’s request, Judge Neahr picked up the case papers at Reedy’s home and found the tickets and simplified informations, along with $50 in cash.

    The tickets had been signed by the defendants, and the speeding charge on the informations had been altered to a parking violation, without the State trooper’s consent.

    Neither defendant appeared before Judge Neahr, nor did an attorney on their behalf.

    Procedural History

    The Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Reedy’s actions.

    The Commission found Reedy guilty of misconduct.

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination under Article VI, § 22 of the NY Constitution and § 44 of the Judiciary Law.

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s finding of misconduct and accepted the determined sanction of removal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether falsely informing a judge about an agreement with the District Attorney’s office to reduce charges and influencing the reduction of those charges constitutes judicial misconduct.

    2. Whether the sanction of removal from office is excessive for a judge who engaged in ticket-fixing, especially considering a prior censure for similar misconduct.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a judge’s intercession in a case involving family members and misrepresentation of agreements constitutes misconduct. The court stated that “petitioner’s intercession would constitute misconduct even if the statement were true.”

    2. No, because ticket-fixing is a grave offense warranting removal, particularly when compounded by prior disciplinary actions. The court stated that “Ticket-fixing is misconduct of such gravity as to warrant removal, even if this matter were petitioner’s only transgression.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that Reedy’s actions constituted serious judicial misconduct. Even if Reedy had not falsely informed Judge Neahr about the Assistant District Attorney’s agreement, his attempt to influence the outcome of the cases involving his son and his son’s friend was itself misconduct.

    The court emphasized that the circumstantial evidence strongly suggested that Reedy altered the informations and sent the $50 to Judge Neahr, which further supported the finding of misconduct. The court relied on the fact that Reedy did not present any evidence refuting the charges against him.

    The court found that the sanction of removal was appropriate, citing that ticket-fixing is a serious offense that undermines the integrity of the judicial system. Given Reedy’s prior censure in 1979 for similar misconduct involving attempts to influence other judges, the court concluded that removal was justified.

    The court reasoned that a judge must maintain impartiality and avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Reedy’s actions in this case violated this principle and warranted the severe sanction imposed.

  • Matter of Petrie, 54 N.Y.2d 807 (1981): Upholding Judicial Removal for Mismanagement of Funds

    Matter of Petrie, 54 N.Y.2d 807 (1981)

    A judge’s disregard for record-keeping requirements and carelessness in handling public funds constitutes a serious breach of public trust, warranting removal from office.

    Summary

    This case concerns the removal of a town court justice, David W. Petrie, for mishandling court funds and failing to adhere to statutory record-keeping requirements. The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Petrie after receiving a letter from the Department of Audit and Control regarding his inability to account for certain court funds. When Petrie failed to respond to the formal complaint issued by the Commission, they availed themselves of summary proceedings and determined that his conduct warranted removal. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination, emphasizing the importance of maintaining public trust and the seriousness of Petrie’s violations.

    Facts

    The Department of Audit and Control notified the State Commission on Judicial Conduct that Justice Petrie of the Town Court of Danube, Herkimer County, was unable to properly account for court funds.
    The Commission investigated Petrie’s handling of court funds and record-keeping practices.
    The Commission served Petrie with a formal written complaint detailing the charges against him.
    Petrie failed to answer the complaint or raise any questions of fact regarding the allegations.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated and determined that Justice Petrie’s conduct warranted removal from office.
    Petrie challenged the Commission’s procedures and the imposed sanction in the New York Court of Appeals.
    The Court of Appeals accepted the Commission’s determination and removed Petrie from his position as Justice of the Town Court of Danube.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the procedures followed by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct in investigating and determining Justice Petrie’s removal were beyond its powers or denied him due process.
    Whether the sanction of removal from office was excessive given Justice Petrie’s conduct.

    Holding

    No, because the Commission is empowered with broad authority to investigate charges of improprieties by members of the judiciary, and the course of the investigation and proceedings are governed by detailed provisions of section 44 of the Judiciary Law. The statutory requirement authorizing the commission to make a determination after a hearing does not require the commission to go through a meaningless formal hearing where no issue of fact is raised.
    No, because Justice Petrie’s disregard for statutory record-keeping requirements and his carelessness in handling public moneys constituted a serious violation of his official responsibilities and a breach of the public’s trust, warranting removal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the Commission acted within its broad authority to investigate judicial improprieties, as outlined in Section 44 of the Judiciary Law and as interpreted in Matter of Nicholson v State Comm., 50 NY2d 597. Since Petrie failed to answer the complaint or raise any factual disputes, the Commission was not required to hold a formal hearing. The Court emphasized the importance of the judiciary maintaining public trust, stating that “Petitioner’s disregard for statutory record-keeping requirements and his carelessness in handling public moneys is a serious violation of his official responsibilities. Such a breach of the public’s trust warrants removal.” The Court cited Matter of Cooley, 53 NY2d 64 and Bartlett v Flynn, 50 AD2d 401, in support of its decision to uphold the removal sanction. The court determined the penalty was not excessive. The court found that Petrie’s actions went to the heart of his duties as a member of the bench and as such, the removal was a justified remedy.

  • In re коятот, 52 N.Y.2d 394 (1981): Judicial Removal for Conduct Demonstrating Lack of Judgment and Disregard of Impropriety

    In re котораят, 52 N.Y.2d 394 (1981)

    A judge may be removed from office for off-the-bench conduct demonstrating a blatant lack of judgment, judicial temperament, and disregard for appearances of impropriety, even if their reputation within the legal community is otherwise excellent.

    Summary

    This case concerns the removal of a Civil Court Judge, котораят, for misconduct related to his involvement with the Associated Humane Societies of New Jersey (AHS). котораят, a trustee of AHS, used his position as a judge to attempt to influence city officials regarding permits and summonses issued to AHS. The Court of Appeals found that his actions demonstrated a lack of judgment and disregard for the appearance of impropriety, warranting removal from office, despite his otherwise good reputation. The court emphasized that judicial conduct, both on and off the bench, must maintain the integrity of the judiciary.

    Facts

    Respondent, a Civil Court Judge, was a trustee for AHS, which sought a permit to operate an animal shelter. AHS received summonses for operating without a permit and for health certificate violations. Respondent contacted city officials, including Dr. Alan Beck and Dr. Howard Levin, identifying himself as a judge and attempting to influence them regarding the permit and summonses. He spoke in a hostile and profane manner, even threatening to use his political influence. He also approached Judge Eugene Nardelli during a hearing regarding AHS, commenting on the case.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated the respondent’s actions and determined that they were improper. The commission recommended censure. The Court of Appeals reviewed the commission’s findings and conclusions. While confirming the factual findings of misconduct, the Court of Appeals rejected the recommended sanction of censure and instead imposed the sanction of removal from office.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a judge’s conduct off the bench, demonstrating a blatant lack of judgment, judicial temperament, and disregard for the appearance of impropriety, warrants removal from office, even if their reputation within the legal community is otherwise excellent.

    Holding

    Yes, because any conduct, on or off the Bench, inconsistent with proper judicial demeanor subjects the judiciary as a whole to disrespect and impairs the usefulness of the individual Judge to carry out his or her constitutionally mandated function.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a judge’s conduct, both on and off the bench, must be consistent with proper judicial demeanor to maintain the integrity of the judiciary. The court rejected the respondent’s argument that his actions were unrelated to his judicial position because he was acting on behalf of a non-profit corporation. The court found that the respondent’s attempts to influence officials, his hostile and profane language, and his threats to use political influence demonstrated a lack of judicial temperament and a disregard for the appearance of impropriety. The court noted that the respondent’s continued insistence that his actions involved neither impropriety nor the appearance of impropriety was a compounding factor. Even though character witnesses testified to his integrity, honesty and judicial demeanor, the court found that the evidence of misconduct was cumulative and reliable. The court quoted Matter of Kuehnel, 49 NY2d 465, 469, stating that “[a]ny conduct, on or off the Bench, inconsistent with proper judicial demeanor subjects the judiciary as a whole to disrespect and impairs the usefulness of the individual Judge to carry out his or her constitutionally mandated function”. The court concluded that the respondent’s insensitivity to the ethical obligations of judges rendered him unfit for judicial service, warranting removal from office. The court stated, “that petitioner’s complete insensitivity to the special ethical obligations of Judges [renders] him unfit for judicial service”.