Matter of Steinberg v. Meisser, 50 N.Y.2d 77 (1980)
A judge convicted of a felony and disbarred before the 1976 constitutional amendments is not entitled to judicial salary for the period following disbarment because continued qualification as an attorney is an implied condition of receiving that salary.
Summary
This case concerns a Family Court Judge, Steinberg, convicted of perjury in 1974, resulting in automatic disbarment. He sought to recover his judicial salary for the period of 1975-1976, arguing that no formal removal proceedings had been initiated. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions in favor of Steinberg, holding that a judge who is disbarred due to a felony conviction prior to the 1976 constitutional amendments is not entitled to receive a judicial salary because continued qualification as an attorney is an implied condition of holding judicial office and receiving its associated compensation. The Court emphasized policy considerations, arguing it would damage the public’s perception of the justice system to allow a disbarred judge to continue receiving a salary.
Facts
Steinberg was appointed a Family Court Judge in Nassau County in 1972 and elected to a full term commencing in 1973.
In 1974, he was indicted and subsequently suspended with pay.
On December 27, 1974, Steinberg was convicted of first-degree perjury, a felony, leading to the cessation of his salary payments on December 31, 1974.
His conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division, and leave to appeal was denied.
No proceedings were ever brought to formally remove him from his judicial office.
Procedural History
Steinberg sued to recover his judicial salary for the period between January 1, 1975, and August 31, 1976.
Special Term granted summary judgment in favor of Steinberg, awarding him the salary but denying interest, based on the precedent of Matter of La Carrubba v. Klein.
The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment but modified it to include interest from August 31, 1976.
The Court of Appeals heard the case as a matter of right.
Issue(s)
Whether a judge, convicted of a felony and automatically disbarred before the effective date of the 1976 constitutional amendments, is entitled to receive the salary of that judicial office when no proceedings to remove him from office have been initiated.
Holding
No, because being qualified to practice law is a continuing requirement to receive a judicial salary, and a judge who is disbarred due to a felony conviction has disqualified himself from receiving that salary.
Court’s Reasoning
The court distinguished this case from Matter of La Carrubba v. Klein, which held that the Public Officers Law does not apply to judicial officers regarding removal for misconduct. Here, the disqualification arose not from the Public Officers Law, but from Section 90(4) of the Judiciary Law, which mandates automatic disbarment upon felony conviction. The court emphasized that Steinberg’s conviction occurred before the 1976 constitutional amendments.
The Court reasoned that while Article VI, Section 20(a) of the Constitution requires a person to have been admitted to practice law for at least ten years to “assume the office of judge,” this requirement implies a continuing obligation to remain qualified as an attorney to continue receiving the salary of judicial office. Citing Thaler v. State of New York, the Court emphasized that it was a continuing requirement that “the occupant of the office must continue to be an attorney admitted to practice law in the State.”
The Court also considered policy implications. Quoting Matter of Mitchell, the Court stated it “would invite scorn and disrespect for our rule of law” if a convicted judge continued to receive a salary while incarcerated. The court addressed concerns about diminishing a judge’s compensation during their term (Article VI, Section 25(a)), arguing that it is not a diminishment when a judge disqualifies themselves and fails to perform the functions of their office. The provision against diminishment protects judicial independence from legislative control, not from a judge’s own disqualifying actions.
The Court stated that the Constitution should be construed to give its provisions practical effect and that the requirement to be a lawyer imports not only experience but also “the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney”.