New York Law Review

Tag: judicial misconduct

  • Sarisohn, Matter of, v. Appellate Division, 21 N.Y.2d 36 (1967): Admissibility of Wiretap Evidence and Judicial Misconduct

    Matter of Sarisohn, 21 N.Y.2d 36 (1967)

    Evidence obtained through illegal wiretaps is inadmissible in judicial disciplinary proceedings, and judges can be disciplined for misconduct both before and during their tenure, provided such misconduct reflects on their fitness for judicial office.

    Summary

    Floyd Sarisohn, a Suffolk County District Court Judge, appealed his removal from office by the Appellate Division. The charges included advising a prostitute, improper conduct as a judge (unlawful jailing of a litigant), imposing excessive bail, and improper handling of a traffic summons. A key piece of evidence was derived from wiretaps. The New York Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the wiretap evidence was illegally obtained and therefore inadmissible. While the court acknowledged the Appellate Division’s broad discretion in removal proceedings, it ruled that the impermissibly obtained evidence significantly impacted the lower court’s decision and warranted reconsideration of the sanction.

    Facts

    Floyd Sarisohn, a District Court Judge, was accused of several acts of misconduct, including:
    1. Advising a prostitute on how to handle her criminal case and continue her activities while Sarisohn was a Justice of the Peace. Evidence for this charge came from wiretapped phone conversations.
    2. Illegally jailing a defendant in a property damage case for refusing to disclose the owner of the vehicle.
    3. Setting an excessively high bail ($1,500,000) for an alleged burglar.
    4. Improperly handling a traffic summons for a journalist friend.
    5. Instructing a court attache to obliterate docket entries in a landlord-tenant case while Sarisohn was a Justice of the Peace.
    6. Displaying prejudice towards an attorney and using abusive language towards trial counsel.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division, Second Department, removed Judge Sarisohn from office based on multiple charges of misconduct. Sarisohn appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the inadmissibility of wiretap evidence and challenging the basis for his removal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether evidence obtained from wiretaps, authorized under a statute later deemed unconstitutional, is admissible in judicial disciplinary proceedings.
    2. Whether a judge can be disciplined for misconduct committed before their current term in office.

    Holding

    1. No, because the wiretaps were illegally obtained due to insufficient affidavits and unrecorded oral statements supporting the eavesdropping orders.
    2. Yes, because prior conduct affecting general character and fitness for judicial office can be considered, especially when the prior office is of a similar judicial nature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the wiretap evidence was inadmissible because the orders authorizing the wiretaps were not obtained in accordance with statutory requirements. The affidavits were insufficient, and oral statements made to the issuing Justices were not recorded, failing to establish an adequate factual basis for the orders. Citing People v. McCall, the Court emphasized the need for a complete record to justify such orders.

    Regarding the admissibility of evidence of misconduct prior to Sarisohn’s election as a District Court Judge, the Court held that such evidence is admissible if it reflects on the judge’s general character and fitness for office. The court stated, “It would be an unseemly and unsound distinction with respect to a matter affecting general character and fitness to immunize a Judge from his prior misconduct as a Judge of lesser or higher rank.”

    The Court, referencing Matter of Droege, acknowledged the Appellate Division’s broad discretion in determining what constitutes “cause” for removal. However, it found that the improperly admitted wiretap evidence likely influenced the Appellate Division’s decision. Therefore, the Court remanded the case to the Appellate Division for reconsideration without the tainted evidence.

    Chief Judge Fuld concurred regarding the inadmissibility of the wiretap evidence, asserting that section 813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure was unconstitutional in its entirety following the decision in Berger v. New York, rendering any ex parte order permitting eavesdropping invalid.

    The Court also highlighted instances of misconduct that supported the removal decision, such as the unlawful jailing of a litigant and attempts to coerce trial counsel, indicating a “pattern of unjudicial conduct.”

  • People v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 167 (1965): Improper Judicial Comment on Defendant’s Failure to Testify

    People v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 167 (1965)

    A trial court’s unsolicited remarks drawing attention to a defendant’s failure to testify, even when coupled with a later instruction that no unfavorable inference should be drawn, constitutes reversible error because it violates the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.

    Summary

    McLucas was convicted of burglary in the third degree. During the trial, a police officer testified about arresting McLucas and a conversation where McLucas denied the crime but admitted to avoiding home because he knew the police were looking for him. During jury instructions, the judge emphasized that McLucas’s out-of-court denial did not substitute for sworn testimony, improperly highlighting his failure to testify. Despite later instructing the jury not to draw negative inferences from McLucas’s silence, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the initial remarks violated McLucas’s constitutional right against self-incrimination, and no formal exception was needed to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Facts

    • McLucas was arrested approximately five months after an alleged burglary.
    • A police officer testified that McLucas admitted he knew the police were looking for him and that he had been staying in New Jersey and Connecticut.
    • McLucas denied committing the burglary during the same conversation.

    Procedural History

    • McLucas was convicted of burglary in the third degree.
    • The conviction was unanimously affirmed without opinion by a lower court.
    • The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    • Whether a trial court’s comments during jury instructions, highlighting a defendant’s failure to testify, violate the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination, even if the court later instructs the jury not to draw negative inferences from the defendant’s silence.
    • Whether the failure to expressly note an exception to the charge, as required by Section 420-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, precludes appellate review of a constitutional violation.

    Holding

    • Yes, because the court’s remarks improperly drew attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, thereby violating his Fifth Amendment rights as applied to the states.
    • No, because a deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right is reviewable on appeal, even in the absence of an explicit exception to the charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the trial judge’s repeated emphasis on the fact that the defendant’s out-of-court statement was not “sworn testimony from this witness chair” directly and improperly highlighted the defendant’s failure to testify. This violated the defendant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination. The court cited prior cases like People v. Minkowitz, People v. Leavitt, and People v. Hetenyi, which established that any statement from a trial judge that undermines the protection afforded by the statute regarding a defendant’s choice not to testify constitutes reversible error. The court emphasized, “In the trial of a criminal case it can never be necessary to add anything to the plain and simple language of the statute.” The later corrective instruction was insufficient to cure the prejudice created by the initial improper remarks. Furthermore, the court relied on Malloy v. Hogan, which extended the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination to state court proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment, and held that the absence of a formal exception did not preclude appellate review of a fundamental constitutional violation. The dissent is not mentioned because it did not provide substantive reasoning.