Matter of Bailey, 67 N.Y.2d 61 (1986)

A judge may be removed from judicial office for misconduct committed while holding a different judicial office, even if the voters were aware of the misconduct when they elected the judge to the subsequent office.

Summary

This case addresses whether a judge can be removed from office for misconduct committed during a prior judicial role, despite being elected to a new judicial position with public knowledge of the prior misconduct. The New York Court of Appeals held that such removal is permissible. Ronald V. Bailey, a Justice of the Keeseville Village Court, was subject to disciplinary proceedings for actions he committed while a Justice of the Chesterfield Town Court. The Court found that a judge’s fitness for office is not negated by a subsequent election, and the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination of removal was upheld. The decision emphasizes the judiciary’s integrity and the importance of maintaining public trust, even when voters are aware of past transgressions.

Facts

From 1971 to 1981, Ronald V. Bailey served as a Justice of the Chesterfield Town Court. In 1980, Bailey illegally obtained hunting licenses by falsely certifying signatures on applications to increase the number of deer his hunting party could kill. On September 8, 1982, Bailey pleaded guilty to making a false statement to obtain a license, a misdemeanor, and was fined and given a conditional discharge. Subsequently, Bailey was elected as Justice of the Keeseville Village Court, assuming office on April 2, 1984.

Procedural History

The State Commission on Judicial Conduct initiated a formal complaint against Bailey after he assumed his role as Keeseville Justice. Bailey waived a hearing and stipulated to a statement of facts. The Commission sustained the charges and determined that removal from office was the appropriate sanction. Bailey then sought review of this determination in the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether a judge can be removed from his position as a Village Justice for misconduct committed during a prior term as a Town Justice, when the voters were aware of the prior misconduct at the time of the election to the subsequent position?

Holding

No, because knowledge of the voters cannot immunize a judge from removal for misconduct in a prior judicial office; the integrity of the judiciary and the intention of the legislature outweigh the voters’ awareness.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals relied on precedent, particularly Matter of Sarisohn, which established that prior misconduct as a judge, regardless of the specific court, affects general character and fitness for judicial office. The court reasoned that immunizing a judge from prior misconduct based on a subsequent election would create an “unseemly and unsound distinction.” The court also cited Matter of Hayes and Matter of Newman v. Strobel in support of its decision. The court stated, “It would be an unseemly and unsound distinction with respect to a matter affecting general character and fitness to immunize a Judge from his prior misconduct as a Judge of lesser or higher rank.”

The Court rejected the argument that voter knowledge of the misconduct should excuse it. The court emphasized that the Constitution and statutes do not vest voters with the power to pardon judicial misconduct. Permitting an election to absolve misconduct that would otherwise disqualify someone from judicial office would pervert logic and legislative intent. The Court emphasized that Judiciary Law § 47 provides that removal of a judge renders that judge ineligible to hold any other judicial office.