New York Law Review

Tag: judicial ethics

  • Matter of Simon, 40 N.Y.3d 36 (2023): Grounds for Removal of a Judge for Misconduct

    Matter of Simon, 40 N.Y.3d 36 (2023)

    A judge can be removed from office for egregious misconduct that demonstrates a pattern of injudicious behavior and damages public confidence in the integrity of the court, even if the judge acknowledges their actions were wrong.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals upheld the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s recommendation to remove Judge Alan M. Simon from his judicial positions. Simon conceded to multiple charges of misconduct, including violating rules regarding judicial integrity, impartiality, and appropriate conduct. The court found that Simon’s actions, which included using his position to bully, intimidate, and engage in political activity, constituted “truly egregious circumstances” that warranted removal. The court emphasized that even though Simon admitted his misconduct, his pattern of behavior, lack of remorse, and attempts to minimize his actions undermined public trust and demonstrated unfitness for judicial office.

    Facts

    Alan M. Simon served as a Justice in Spring Valley Village Court, Ramapo Town Court, and Acting Justice in Hillburn Village Court. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct brought six charges of misconduct against him. Simon conceded to the charges, which included violating various rules of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, such as upholding the integrity and independence of the judiciary, acting impartially, refraining from lending the prestige of the office to advance private interests, maintaining professional competence, and avoiding political activity. Specifically, Simon used sanctions improperly, bullied and intimidated various individuals, engaged in ethnic smearing and name-calling, threatened officials, and injected himself into the political process of an election other than his own.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Simon’s conduct and sustained six charges against him, recommending his removal from office. Simon sought review of the Commission’s determination from the New York Court of Appeals. Simon conceded his misconduct but argued for a lesser sanction than removal, such as censure. The Court of Appeals reviewed the record and the Commission’s findings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Court of Appeals should accept the recommendation of the State Commission on Judicial Conduct and remove Judge Simon from his judicial offices.

    Holding

    Yes, because Simon’s misconduct met the standard of “truly egregious circumstances” justifying removal from office, due to the pattern of misconduct, lack of remorse, and damage to public confidence in the judiciary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court cited its broad authority to determine appropriate sanctions in judicial misconduct cases, emphasizing that the goal is to safeguard the bench from unfit incumbents. The court differentiated between a judge’s poor judgment and misconduct that qualifies as “truly egregious circumstances” and thus justifies removal. The court found that the actions demonstrated a pattern of injudicious behavior, as well as an abuse of power that had damaged public confidence in the court. The court highlighted Simon’s use of sanctions inappropriately, his bullying and intimidating behavior, and his involvement in political activity, which all demonstrated a pattern of misconduct. The court noted the lack of remorse and evasiveness by Simon as additional justification for removal.

    The court quoted prior precedent, stating that the ultimate sanction of removal is “reserved for ‘truly egregious circumstances’ that extend beyond the limits of ‘even extremely poor judgment’”, and that removal is warranted when a judge exhibits “a pattern of injudicious behavior…which cannot be viewed as acceptable conduct by one holding judicial office.”

    Practical Implications

    This case serves as a clear warning to judges about the standard of conduct expected of them. It underscores that judges must not only act within the bounds of the law but also uphold the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The case is a reminder that the courts take seriously any actions that undermine public trust. The practical implication for attorneys and judges is that even if a judge believes their motives are pure, actions perceived as bullying, intimidation, or the abuse of power can lead to severe disciplinary action, including removal from office. Future judicial conduct cases will likely refer to Simon’s actions as examples of the types of misconduct that justify the ultimate sanction of removal.

  • Matter of Doyle, 23 N.Y.3d 653 (2014): Standard for Removing a Judge for Appearance of Impropriety

    Matter of Doyle, 23 N.Y.3d 653 (2014)

    Removal of a judge is warranted even in the absence of actual impropriety when the conduct creates a strong appearance of impropriety that undermines public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, especially when coupled with a prior disciplinary history.

    Summary

    This case concerns the removal of Surrogate Judge Cathryn M. Doyle from office based on allegations of creating an appearance of impropriety. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination that Judge Doyle’s actions, specifically involving her dealings with a court employee and a potential litigant, warranted removal, despite the absence of proven actual impropriety. The Court emphasized the importance of maintaining public confidence in the judiciary and considered Judge Doyle’s prior disciplinary history in reaching its decision. A dissenting opinion argued for a lesser sanction of censure, citing the referee’s finding that Judge Doyle was a credible witness.

    Facts

    Judge Doyle was the Surrogate of Albany County. An attorney, Gary DiNardo, sought appointment as a court evaluator. DiNardo also represented clients in matters before Judge Doyle. Judge Doyle had a close relationship with a court employee, Lisa Circe, who was also DiNardo’s girlfriend. Judge Doyle attended social events with DiNardo and Circe. Judge Doyle appointed DiNardo as a court evaluator and made other favorable decisions regarding him. These actions created the appearance that DiNardo received preferential treatment because of his relationship with Circe and Judge Doyle. A separate incident involved Judge Doyle intervening in a landlord-tenant dispute on behalf of Circe, which further suggested an abuse of her judicial position.

    Procedural History

    The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Judge Doyle’s conduct. The Commission determined that Judge Doyle violated judicial ethics rules by creating an appearance of impropriety. The Commission recommended Judge Doyle’s removal from office. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination and the recommended sanction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision and ordered Judge Doyle’s removal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State Commission on Judicial Conduct abused its discretion when it determined that Judge Doyle should be removed from her position as Surrogate Judge.

    Holding

    No, because Judge Doyle’s conduct created a strong appearance of impropriety and undermined public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, particularly in light of her prior disciplinary history.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that even the appearance of impropriety can be as damaging to the judiciary’s reputation as actual misconduct. The court stated, “The appearance of impropriety is ‘as damaging to public confidence in the courts as actual impropriety’” (quoting Matter of харченко, 20 N.Y.3d 388, 396 [2013]). The Court found that Judge Doyle’s actions, specifically her relationship with the court employee and the attorney, and her intervention in the landlord-tenant dispute, created a situation where it appeared she was using her position to benefit her friends and associates. The Court also considered Judge Doyle’s prior disciplinary history, which included a prior admonishment for improper conduct, as an aggravating factor. The court reasoned that while removal is a severe sanction, it was necessary to maintain public trust in the judiciary. The dissenting judge argued that censure would have been a more appropriate sanction. The dissent highlighted that the referee found Judge Doyle credible and candid and that the prior disciplinary action was unrelated to the current misconduct. The dissent further argued that the misconduct did not rise to the level of “truly egregious circumstances” necessary for removal. The majority, however, disagreed, finding that the appearance of impropriety, coupled with the prior discipline, warranted removal.

  • In the Matter of Robert H. Battisti, 96 N.Y.2d 446 (2001): Judicial Misconduct and Breach of Confidentiality

    In the Matter of Robert H. Battisti, 96 N.Y.2d 446 (2001)

    Judges must maintain strict confidentiality regarding search warrants and other confidential proceedings, and violating that trust, even when motivated by anger rather than a sinister design, constitutes judicial misconduct warranting removal from office.

    Summary

    A town justice, Robert H. Battisti, was removed from office for judicial misconduct after he informed the attorney of a company about an impending search warrant that he himself had signed. Battisti claimed he acted out of anger because he felt betrayed by the company’s environmental violations after he had assisted them in obtaining a building permit. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination that Battisti’s actions constituted a serious breach of trust, jeopardized the legal system, and demonstrated an utter disregard for judicial ethics, warranting his removal.

    Facts

    Robert H. Battisti, a Justice of the Glenville Town Court, signed a search warrant authorizing investigators to search Capitaland Motors for environmental violations. After signing the warrant, Battisti phoned Capitaland’s attorney and informed him of the impending search. Battisti admitted to making the call but claimed it was out of irritation with Capitaland’s behavior. He stated he had previously helped Capitaland get a building permit and felt betrayed by their alleged environmental violations. His explanation was that he called the attorney to express his outrage, not to compromise the investigation.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct sustained one charge of misconduct against Battisti. An evidentiary hearing was held before a Referee, who found Battisti guilty of violating multiple Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. The Commission agreed with the Referee’s findings and determined that Battisti’s conduct merited removal from office. Battisti sought review of the Commission’s determination in the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a judge’s disclosure to a target’s attorney of an impending search warrant, even if motivated by anger rather than an intent to obstruct justice, constitutes judicial misconduct warranting removal from office.

    Holding

    Yes, because effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice require judges to maintain strict confidentiality concerning the issuance and execution of search warrants; violating this trust, regardless of motivation, jeopardizes the legal system and demonstrates an utter disregard for judicial ethics.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of maintaining confidentiality in connection with search warrants to ensure effective law enforcement and public confidence in the judiciary. The court stated that investigators and the public must have full confidence that judges will maintain secrecy in connection with proceedings requiring confidentiality. The court reasoned that by informing the attorney of the search warrant, Battisti committed a serious breach of trust, irrespective of whether his motivation was sinister or stemmed from anger. The court cited Matter of Steinberg, 51 NY2d 74, 81, 82 (1980), stating that Battisti’s conduct went beyond “simple careless inattention to the applicable ethical standards” and instead manifested an “utter disregard of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,” thus warranting his removal. The court found his actions jeopardized the very legal system he was duty-bound to protect and administer.

  • In the Matter of Robert M. Corning, Sr., 96 N.Y.2d 451 (2001): Judicial Removal for Misconduct

    In the Matter of Robert M. Corning, Sr., 96 N.Y.2d 451 (2001)

    A judge may be removed from office for misconduct that demonstrates a pattern of serious disregard for the standards of judicial conduct, abuse of power, lack of judicial temperament, and mishandling of public funds.

    Summary

    Robert M. Corning, Sr., a Town Justice, was removed from office following a determination by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct sustaining five charges of misconduct. The charges included mishandling court funds, engaging in unprofessional conduct toward an attorney representing an opposing party, retaliating against an attorney for a past complaint, and improperly suspending a defendant’s driver’s license due to animosity toward the defendant’s attorney. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination, finding a pattern of serious disregard for judicial conduct standards.

    Facts

    Robert Corning, as Town Justice, failed to deposit court funds within 72 hours and remit them to the State Comptroller as required. His court account was deficient by $2,886.64, and he failed to report any funds to the State Comptroller, leading to a suspension of his salary. He also engaged in a dispute with an attorney representing a funeral home in a case against him, making threatening and derogatory remarks. He retaliated against another attorney who had previously filed a complaint against him. Finally, he suspended a traffic defendant’s driver’s license out of animosity for the defendant’s attorney, even after initially agreeing to recuse himself from the case.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Corning based on complaints received. The Commission sustained five charges of misconduct. Corning sought review by the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination and the record of the proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence supported the Commission’s findings that Corning violated regulations governing the handling of court funds.
    2. Whether Corning’s conduct toward attorneys and litigants constituted judicial misconduct.
    3. Whether the appropriate sanction for Corning’s misconduct was removal from office.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Corning admitted to deficiencies in his court account and failure to remit funds, providing no valid excuse.
    2. Yes, because Corning abused the power of his office and demonstrated a lack of judicial temperament in his interactions with attorneys and litigants.
    3. Yes, because Corning’s actions demonstrated a pattern of serious disregard for the standards of judicial conduct, warranting removal from office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that judges must observe high standards of conduct to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary, citing 22 NYCRR 100.1. The court found that Corning’s actions, both on and off the bench, demonstrated a pattern of serious disregard for these standards. The court highlighted that Corning repeatedly abused the power of his office, demonstrated a lack of judicial temperament, and mishandled public funds. The court stated that these standards “exist to maintain respect toward everyone who appears in a court and to encourage respect for the operation of the judicial process at all levels of the system” (Matter of Roberts, 91 NY2d 93, 97). The Court deferred to the Commission’s determination that removal was the appropriate sanction, finding it justified based on the severity and pattern of Corning’s misconduct.

  • In the Matter of Josephine D. Tyler, 75 N.Y.2d 525 (1990): Judicial Misconduct and Sanctions for Impartiality Violations

    In the Matter of Josephine D. Tyler, 75 N.Y.2d 525 (1990)

    A judge’s actions demonstrating partiality, abuse of power, and failure to uphold the integrity of the judiciary warrant severe sanctions, including removal from office.

    Summary

    This case involves a review of a determination by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct to remove Justice Josephine Tyler from her position as a Town Court Justice. The Commission found her guilty of multiple acts of misconduct, including presiding over a case involving her husband, improperly ordering child support, using court stationery for personal matters, and striking a defendant. The New York Court of Appeals upheld most of the Commission’s findings and agreed that removal was the appropriate sanction, emphasizing the importance of impartiality and fairness in the judicial system.

    Facts

    Josephine Tyler, a Justice of the Caneadea Town Court, engaged in the following actions:

    1. Issued an arrest warrant for a defendant who gave her husband a dishonored check and then presided over the arraignment, setting bail at $5,000 and failing to appoint counsel, despite being advised to disqualify herself.
    2. Improperly ordered a defendant charged with harassment to pay child support.
    3. Sent a letter on court stationery to a contractor regarding a dispute over the installation of a septic tank at her father’s property.
    4. Requested a young man she had sentenced to return to court and struck him with a telephone directory after accusing him of vandalism.
    5. Sent a personal letter in a Town Court envelope to tenants of an apartment building owned by her father regarding water usage and also sent a letter to an attorney concerning the water quality.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Justice Tyler and sustained five of seven charges of misconduct. The Commission determined that removal from office was the appropriate sanction. Justice Tyler then sought review of the Commission’s determination in the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence substantiates the Commission’s findings of judicial misconduct.
    2. Whether the sanction of removal from office is an appropriate punishment for the sustained charges of misconduct.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence supports the Commission’s findings regarding charges I, V, VI, and supplemental charge I. Charge III was not supported by sufficient evidence.
    2. Yes, because Justice Tyler’s actions demonstrated a lack of fairness, impartiality, and self-restraint, posing a threat to the proper administration of justice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record, giving due deference to the Commission’s determination. It found sufficient evidence to support most of the charges. The Court emphasized that Justice Tyler’s actions, particularly her handling of the dishonored check case involving her husband, displayed a clear lack of impartiality. The court cited Matter of VonderHeide, 72 NY2d 658, 661, noting that the judge’s continuance in office would pose a threat to the proper administration of justice.

    Regarding the child support order (charge III), the Court agreed with Justice Tyler that it was an error of law rather than intentional misconduct. However, the Court found that the other actions sufficiently demonstrated a pattern of abuse of power and disregard for judicial ethics. The Court highlighted her failure to heed the advice of the District Attorney and a County Court Judge to disqualify herself. The Court concluded that “her conduct displayed a lack of the basic qualities of fairness, impartiality and self-restraint which are essential for judicial office.” This behavior violated multiple sections of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Therefore, the Court accepted the Commission’s determined sanction of removal from office, without costs.

  • In re Intemann, 73 N.Y.2d 580 (1989): Judicial Conduct and the Sanction of Removal

    In re Intemann, 73 N.Y.2d 580 (1989)

    A judge’s participation in business activities, practicing law while in office, failure to disqualify himself in cases involving close associates, and lack of candor during investigations warrant removal from judicial office.

    Summary

    Judge Intemann was charged with violating the Rules of Judicial Conduct for engaging in business activities, practicing law while serving as a judge, and failing to recuse himself in cases involving a close friend and business associate. The Commission on Judicial Conduct sustained the charges and recommended removal, finding that the judge also lacked candor during the investigation. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination and imposed the sanction of removal, emphasizing the serious nature of the misconduct and the judge’s dishonesty.

    Facts

    William H. Intemann, Jr., was elected as a Judge in Hamilton County in November 1983, taking office on January 1, 1984. From January 1984 to January 1986, Intemann actively participated in managing three businesses organized for profit, including retaining counsel and executing contracts. After assuming his judicial role, Intemann continued to practice law, specifically attempting to finalize three estate matters without informing the clients or transferring the files to the attorney who took over his practice. He also instructed a client to sign an undated estate tax form, which he later signed and backdated to appear as if he completed it before taking office. Furthermore, he intercepted mail addressed to the attorney who took over his practice to handle estate matters himself. During his first two years in office, Judge Intemann presided over 21 cases brought by an attorney who was a close friend, business associate, and his personal attorney.

    Procedural History

    The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct investigated Judge Intemann’s conduct and sustained charges of violating the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. The Commission recommended removal from office. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Judge Intemann’s participation in business activities after assuming judicial office violated section 100.5(c)(2) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct?

    2. Whether Judge Intemann’s actions in continuing to practice law, deceiving clients, and falsifying documents constituted judicial misconduct?

    3. Whether Judge Intemann’s failure to disqualify himself from cases involving a close friend and business associate created an appearance of impropriety and conflict of interest?

    4. Whether the sanction of removal from office was appropriate given the nature and extent of Judge Intemann’s misconduct and lack of candor during the investigation?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the unrebutted evidence showed Judge Intemann actively participated in the management of three businesses organized for profit after taking judicial office, violating section 100.5(c)(2) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.

    2. Yes, because Judge Intemann continued to practice law after becoming a judge, deceived his clients, and falsified documents related to estate matters, all of which constituted judicial misconduct.

    3. Yes, because the close relationship between Judge Intemann and the attorney appearing before him in 21 cases created an appearance of impropriety and a potential conflict of interest, requiring disqualification.

    4. Yes, because the serious nature of Judge Intemann’s improper acts, including deception practiced on clients and his lack of candor during the investigation and hearing, warranted removal from office.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Commission’s findings that Judge Intemann violated the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. The court emphasized that Judge Intemann’s active participation in business activities, continuing to practice law while in office, and failure to recuse himself created an appearance of impropriety. The court found his attempts to conceal his continued legal practice, including intercepting mail and falsifying documents, particularly egregious. The court noted, “In evaluating the sanction imposed, we find significant not only the serious nature of petitioner’s improper acts, including the deception practiced on several of his clients, but also petitioner’s lack of candor during the investigation and hearing. Such conduct cannot be condoned in a Judge and petitioner should be removed from office.” The court concluded that because of the serious misconduct and lack of candor displayed by the judge, removal from office was the appropriate sanction. The court cited Matter of Conti, 70 NY2d 416, 419 for the principle that judges must avoid even the appearance of impropriety.

  • In the Matter of Leroy A. VonderHeide, 72 N.Y.2d 658 (1988): Judicial Misconduct and Removal of a Judge

    In the Matter of Leroy A. VonderHeide, 72 N.Y.2d 658 (1988)

    Judges are held to high ethical standards, and ignorance of judicial rules or a pattern of injudicious behavior can warrant removal from office to safeguard the integrity of the bench.

    Summary

    A Town Court Justice in Northampton was found guilty of multiple counts of misconduct, including ex parte communications, intemperate behavior, and failure to disqualify himself from cases where he was a witness. The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct determined that removal was the appropriate sanction. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s decision, emphasizing that the purpose of judicial disciplinary proceedings is to protect the administration of justice from unfit incumbents, not to punish the judge. The court found a pattern of misconduct demonstrating the judge’s unfitness for judicial office.

    Facts

    The Town Court Justice was found to have:

    1. Routinely sought out and interviewed witnesses outside of court, making judgments based on unsworn ex parte communications.
    2. Berated a teenager for allegedly carrying an open container, threatening harsh treatment if he appeared in court.
    3. Arraigned, accepted a guilty plea, and sentenced a complaining witness in an unrelated matter without filing an accusatory instrument or informing the person of the charges.
    4. Failed to disqualify himself from two criminal cases where he was a witness.
    5. Required a teenager to sign a statement implicating a third party in an alleged crime as a condition of accepting a guilty plea.

    Procedural History

    The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct sustained multiple charges of misconduct against the Town Court Justice. The Commission determined that removal from office was the appropriate sanction. The Town Court Justice sought review of the Commission’s decision in the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the charges of misconduct, specifically the charge concerning verbal abuse of a teenager and the charges concerning ex parte communications.
    2. Whether the charges should be dismissed due to the judge’s status as a nonlawyer and lack of training.
    3. Whether the sanction of removal was too severe.

    Holding

    1. No, because the basis for the charge was intemperate behavior, not public intoxication; and the charges concerning ex parte communications were sufficiently specific.
    2. No, because ignorance and lack of competence do not excuse violations of ethical standards.
    3. No, because the charges, taken collectively, demonstrated that the judge posed a threat to the proper administration of justice and was not fit to be a judge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s findings, stating that the evidence substantiated the charges against the judge. The court rejected the argument that the judge’s lack of legal training excused his misconduct, citing Matter of Fabrizio, 65 NY2d 275, 277, which establishes that judges have an obligation to learn about and obey the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. The court emphasized that the judge’s actions were not mere occasional lapses in judgment but demonstrated a pattern of injudicious behavior. Regarding the sanction, the court stated: “that the purpose of judicial disciplinary proceedings is ‘not punishment but the imposition of sanctions where necessary to safeguard the Bench from unfit incumbents’ ” (Matter of Reeves, 63 NY2d 105, 111, quoting Matter of Waltemade, 37 NY2d [a], [lll]). The Court agreed with the Commission that the judge’s conduct demonstrated he was a threat to the proper administration of justice and unfit to be a judge.

  • Matter of Mazzei, 69 N.Y.2d 355 (1987): Judicial Conduct and Charitable Fundraising

    Matter of Mazzei, 69 N.Y.2d 355 (1987)

    Judges are prohibited from soliciting funds for charitable organizations or using the prestige of their office for that purpose, and a prior lack of enforcement or differing disciplinary approaches in other cases does not excuse a violation.

    Summary

    Judge Mazzei participated in a “Jail Bail for Heart” event, a fundraising scheme for the American Heart Association where mock charges were brought against solicitors, and the Judge “fined” them the amount they raised. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination that Judge Mazzei violated the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct by using his office’s prestige for charitable fundraising. The Court rejected Mazzei’s arguments that his conduct was excusable because he misinterpreted the rules or because the Commission hadn’t previously warned him. The sanction of admonition was deemed appropriate, regardless of whether the Commission could have handled the matter differently.

    Facts

    Judge Mazzei participated in “Jail Bail for Heart,” a fundraising event for the American Heart Association. Mock criminal charges were prepared for fund drive solicitors. The Sheriff brought the solicitors before Judge Mazzei, where the District Attorney “prosecuted” them. Judge Mazzei “fined” them the amount they had collected. The collected funds were then turned over to the Heart Association within the courthouse. Judge Mazzei did not directly solicit funds but his role was part of the fundraising effort.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct determined that Judge Mazzei violated section 100.5 (b) (2) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Commission’s determination and the imposed sanction of admonition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Judge Mazzei violated section 100.5 (b) (2) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct by participating in the “Jail Bail for Heart” event.

    Holding

    Yes, because Judge Mazzei’s participation in the “Jail Bail for Heart” event constituted using the prestige of his office for charitable fundraising, which is prohibited by the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that Judge Mazzei’s role in the “Jail Bail for Heart” event was clearly part of the overall fundraising effort. The Court directly quoted the relevant rule: Judges are prohibited from soliciting funds for charitable organizations or using the prestige of their office for that purpose. The Court stated, “[H]is role was clearly a part of the over-all fund-raising effort. We conclude, therefore, that the Commission did not err in finding that petitioner violated both the letter and the spirit of section 100.5 (b) (2) of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.”

    The Court rejected Judge Mazzei’s argument that his conduct was excused because he misinterpreted the rule or because he had participated in a similar event the previous year without consequence. The Court also dismissed his contention that the Commission should have only issued a warning, as it had done in a similar case involving another judge.

    The Court reasoned that even if the Commission could have handled the situation more effectively by acting swiftly and informally to prevent further breaches, this did not change the fact that Judge Mazzei violated the rules. The Court emphasized that the appropriate sanction was admonition and accepted the Commission’s determination without costs.

  • In the Matter of Ernest J. Conti, 80 N.Y.2d 418 (1992): Judicial Removal for Dishonesty and Ticket Fixing

    In the Matter of Ernest J. Conti, 80 N.Y.2d 418 (1992)

    A judge’s dishonesty and lack of judgment, particularly in the context of ticket-fixing and false explanations, warrant removal from judicial office.

    Summary

    Judge Conti was charged with misconduct for improperly handling two speeding tickets and dismissing 31 cases without notifying the prosecutor, violating CPL 170.45, 170.55, and 210.45. The Judicial Conduct Commission sustained the charges, citing his false explanations as an exacerbating factor and recommending removal. The New York Court of Appeals agreed, finding Conti’s conduct demonstrated unacceptable dishonesty and lack of judgment for a member of the judiciary. The court emphasized the seriousness of ticket-fixing, compounded by Conti’s dishonesty and insensitivity to judicial ethics.

    Facts

    Judge Conti was accused of misconduct related to two speeding tickets. The first involved John Reedy, son of a former Town Justice. Evidence suggested the ticket was altered to a lesser charge (“unsafe tire”) and then dismissed by Conti, even though the case was not properly before him. The second ticket was issued to a local attorney who was representing Conti on personal matters. Conti dismissed this ticket without notifying the prosecution. He claimed the issuing officer told him the ticket would be dismissed due to radar failure, but the officer denied this.

    Procedural History

    The Judicial Conduct Commission conducted a hearing, sustained the charges against Judge Conti, and recommended his removal from judicial office. Judge Conti appealed this determination to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Judge Conti’s actions, specifically the handling of the two speeding tickets and his subsequent explanations, constituted judicial misconduct warranting removal from office.

    Holding

    Yes, because Judge Conti’s actions, involving ticket-fixing, dishonesty, and a lack of judgment, demonstrated a level of misconduct unacceptable for a member of the judiciary.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found the evidence against Conti convincing. Regarding the Reedy ticket, the testimony strongly suggested that the ticket was altered and improperly dismissed under Conti’s direction. The court deemed Conti’s explanation incredible. Similarly, the court rejected Conti’s explanation for dismissing the attorney’s ticket, finding the officer’s testimony more credible. The court emphasized that ticket-fixing is a serious impropriety that can warrant removal, citing Matter of Reedy, 64 NY2d 299. Here, Conti’s actions were aggravated by his dishonesty in altering a ticket and providing false explanations. Furthermore, Conti demonstrated insensitivity to judicial ethics by adjudicating his personal attorney’s traffic case. The court quoted: “[s]uch deception is antithetical to the role of a judge who is sworn to uphold the law and seek the truth”. Even if the attorney’s ticket had to be dismissed, Conti’s handling of the matter created an appearance of impropriety and a potential conflict of interest. Therefore, the court accepted the Commission’s recommendation of removal.

  • In the Matter of Joseph E. Myers, 67 N.Y.2d 550 (1986): Judicial Misconduct and Abuse of Power

    In the Matter of Joseph E. Myers, 67 N.Y.2d 550 (1986)

    A judge’s exploitation of the criminal process and misuse of judicial office for personal or familial gain, coupled with attempts to conceal such activity and intimidate witnesses, warrants removal from office.

    Summary

    Joseph E. Myers, a Town Justice, was investigated by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct for allegedly abusing his power by participating in a case where he, his son, and daughter had a personal interest. The Commission found Myers prepared a criminal summons and improperly influenced police to serve it, attempted to transfer the case to another judge without proper notification, and threatened a witness in the Commission’s proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination that Myers’ conduct constituted judicial misconduct and warranted removal from office, emphasizing the importance of maintaining public trust in the judiciary.

    Facts

    An automobile accident occurred involving damage to a car owned by Justice Myers’ daughter, insured under a policy for which Myers paid premiums. Terry Kerr was allegedly responsible. Myers discussed the case with the Police Chief, leading to a traffic ticket and unsigned criminal summons for Kerr. Myers then asked a State Trooper and a Sheriff’s Department Sergeant to serve the summons after the Police Chief was unable to. After Kerr failed to appear in court, Myers allegedly contacted Kerr’s sister and threatened to have Kerr’s license suspended if damages weren’t paid.

    Procedural History

    The State Commission on Judicial Conduct initiated proceedings against Myers based on a complaint. A Referee found all counts sustained except for the phone call to Kerr’s home. The Commission affirmed the Referee’s findings, concluding Myers violated multiple rules and canons of judicial conduct. Myers petitioned for review, arguing the evidence was insufficient and the sanction too harsh. The Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s determination and accepted the sanction of removal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Justice Myers violated sections 100.1 and 100.2 of the Rules Governing Judicial Conduct and canons 1, 2, and 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct by involving himself in a case where he and his family had a personal interest.

    2. Whether the determined sanction of removal from office was appropriate given the alleged misconduct.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Justice Myers exploited the criminal process and misused his judicial office for his and his family’s personal gain.

    2. Yes, because Justice Myers’ abuse of power brought disrepute to the judiciary and damaged public confidence in the integrity of the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that Myers’ actions constituted an egregious violation of judicial ethics. The court relied on the testimony of multiple witnesses, including police officers and another judge, to establish that Myers had improperly prepared a criminal summons and attempted to influence the service of that summons. The Court highlighted Myers’ attempt to mislead the Commission by presenting a false note purporting to transfer the case to another judge, as well as his intimidation of a witness. The court found this deception antithetical to the role of a judge. Citing Matter of Steinberg, 51 NY2d 74, 78, 1, the court reiterated that judges are sworn to uphold the law and seek the truth. The court also noted Myers’ failure to testify regarding the charges against him. The Court concluded that Myers’ actions demonstrated a clear abuse of power, warranting the sanction of removal from office. The Court stated, “In short, petitioner has clearly abused the power of his office in a manner that has brought disrepute to the judiciary and damaged public confidence in the integrity of his court.”