Tag: judicial discipline

  • Backal v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 86 N.Y.2d 1 (1995): Disciplinary Action Against Resigned Judges

    86 N.Y.2d 1 (1995)

    A judge’s resignation does not automatically preclude disciplinary action for misconduct committed while in office; the State Commission on Judicial Conduct retains jurisdiction to impose sanctions, including removal, for a limited time after resignation.

    Summary

    Lorraine Backal, a Civil Court Judge, resigned amidst allegations of judicial misconduct stemming from her interactions with a drug dealer and her failure to report a cash gift. The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct sought to remove her from office despite her resignation, arguing that Judiciary Law § 47 allowed for continued jurisdiction. Backal challenged the Commission’s authority, arguing the Constitution only allows for removal of sitting judges. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Commission’s jurisdiction, finding that the Constitution’s grant of authority to discipline “judges” extends to misconduct committed while in office, even if the judge resigns afterward. The court accepted the determined sanction of removal.

    Facts

    Lorraine Backal, a Civil Court Judge, engaged in conversations with Selwyn Wilson, her former driver, who was also an FBI informant involved in drug dealing and money laundering. During these conversations, Backal advised Wilson on how to evade the FBI, hide large sums of cash, and provided misleading information to law enforcement. She also accepted a $1,500 cash gift from Wilson and failed to report it as required by law and judicial rules. Wilson secretly recorded these conversations.

    Procedural History

    The Commission on Judicial Conduct charged Backal with violating standards of judicial conduct. Rather than answering the complaint, Backal resigned. The Commission deemed the allegations admitted and determined removal was the appropriate sanction. Backal then sought review by the New York Court of Appeals, challenging both the Commission’s determination and the constitutionality of Judiciary Law § 47.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Judiciary Law § 47, which permits the Commission on Judicial Conduct to exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over resigned judges, violates Article VI, § 22 of the New York State Constitution.
    2. Whether the admitted allegations against Backal establish conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, justifying her removal from office.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the constitutional grant of authority to the Commission to discipline and remove “judges” necessarily and logically covers all acts of misconduct undertaken by a Judge while serving in office.
    2. Yes, because advising a known lawbreaker, furnishing a hiding place for the fruits of crime, accepting a cash gift for participating in concealment efforts, and agreeing to mislead law enforcement authorities are inconsistent with a judge’s pledge to uphold the law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an independent judiciary demands high standards of conduct. The constitutional grant of authority to discipline “judges” covers misconduct committed while in office, regardless of a subsequent resignation. The court emphasized that allowing resignation to halt disciplinary proceedings would undermine the integrity of the judiciary and encourage judges to evade accountability. The Court quoted Matter of Quinn v. State Commn. on Judicial Conduct, 54 NY2d 386, 395, stating resignation would allow judges to “avoid the consequences of removal for cause by racing to resign.” Furthermore, Article VI, § 22 (h) of the Constitution provides that a Judge “removed by the court of appeals shall be ineligible to hold other judicial office,” and continued jurisdiction is necessary to enforce this mandate. Addressing the specific charges, the court held that Backal’s actions constituted a clear violation of judicial ethics and public trust. The court directly quoted from Matter of Steinberg, 51 NY2d 74, 81: “Wherever [she] travels, a Judge carries the mantle of [her] esteemed office with [her], and, consequently, [she] must always be sensitive to the fact that members of the public, including some of [her] friends, will regard [her] words and actions with heightened deference simply because [she] is a Judge”. The court concluded that where a judge conveys a willingness to flout the law, removal is appropriate. The court highlighted that ethical codes dictate judges are accountable “at all times” for their conduct, citing Code of Judicial Conduct, canon 2 [A] and Matter of Kuehnel v State Commn. on Judicial Conduct, 49 NY2d 465, 469.