New York Law Review

Tag: judicial bias

  • People v. Alcide, 21 N.Y.3d 687 (2013): Judge’s Participation in Testimony Readback

    People v. Alcide, 21 N.Y.3d 687 (2013)

    While a trial judge should generally avoid participating in readbacks of testimony to the jury, doing so is not a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal absent preservation, unless the judge’s actions demonstrate bias that deprives the defendant of a fair trial.

    Summary

    James Alcide was convicted of murder and weapon possession. During jury deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of testimony from two key witnesses. The trial judge, in an effort to expedite the process, participated in the readbacks by reading either the questions or the answers. Alcide argued that this participation constituted a mode of proceedings error, requiring reversal even without an objection. The New York Court of Appeals held that while it’s generally advisable for a judge not to participate in readbacks, doing so does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it demonstrates bias, and that Alcide’s claim was unpreserved.

    Facts

    Alcide was convicted of fatally shooting a man in a grocery store. Key evidence included testimony from a bystander who identified Alcide as the shooter and the victim’s friend who saw Alcide fleeing the scene with a gun. The defense attacked the reliability and credibility of these witnesses, citing inconsistencies and potential biases. During deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of the testimony of the bystander and the first police officer on the scene.

    Procedural History

    Alcide was convicted in the trial court. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial judge committed mode of proceedings errors. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Alcide appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial judge’s participation in the readback of testimony to the jury, by reading either the questions or answers, constituted a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal even in the absence of a timely objection.

    Holding

    1. No, because while it is generally advisable for a judge not to participate in readbacks of testimony, doing so does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it demonstrates bias that deprived the defendant of a fair trial, and Alcide’s claim was unpreserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. O’Rama, where the trial judge withheld the contents of a jury note from counsel. Here, the content of the jury’s requests for readbacks was disclosed in open court, and defense counsel had the opportunity to object to the judge’s proposed procedure. Because counsel did not object, the claim was unpreserved. The Court acknowledged the Second Department’s dictum in People v. Brockett that a trial judge should not participate as a reader during a read-back of testimony, as it might convey the impression that the court is aligned with a particular party. However, the Court clarified that such participation, while generally inadvisable, does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it creates a situation analogous to People v. De Jesus, where the judge’s conduct demonstrated clear bias against the defense. The court noted, “Not every procedural misstep in a criminal case is a mode of proceedings error”; rather, this narrow exception to the preservation rule is “reserved for the most fundamental flaws.” Here, the judge’s stated reasons for participating in the readbacks were to expedite the process and make it easier for the jury to follow, not to demonstrate bias. Because defense counsel failed to object to the judge’s participation in the readbacks at a time when the error could have been cured, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order affirming Alcide’s conviction.

  • People v. Hinds, 78 N.Y.2d 75 (1991): Addressing Racial Bias in Courtroom Counsel Exclusion

    People v. Hinds, 78 N.Y.2d 75 (1991)

    A trial court’s decision to exclude an attorney from participating in a case based solely on the attorney’s race violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions and undermines public policy favoring justice without racial bias.

    Summary

    In People v. Hinds, the New York Court of Appeals addressed a situation where a trial judge excluded an African-American attorney from participating in a trial because of her race. The judge explicitly stated that the attorney’s presence was an attempt to gain undue sympathy from the jury. Justice Smith’s concurring opinion argues that this exclusion violated the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions and ran contrary to the state’s public policy. While the majority and dissenting opinions condemned the trial judge’s ruling, they differed on whether the issue was properly preserved for appellate review. Justice Smith contended that the constitutional issue was sufficiently raised and briefed at the Appellate Division, making it appropriate for the Court of Appeals to review the decision. This case highlights the importance of addressing racial bias within the judicial system and ensuring fair representation for all defendants.

    Facts

    During a criminal trial, the lead defense attorney requested that a second attorney, who was African-American, assist with the cross-examination of a witness.

    The trial judge denied the request, stating that he believed the defense was attempting to garner sympathy from the jury by having an African-American attorney present, given that the defendant was black.

    The judge explicitly stated that his decision was influenced by the attorney’s race.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defense’s request to have the second attorney participate.

    On appeal to the Appellate Division, the defendant argued that the trial court’s ruling violated his right to counsel and the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. and New York State Constitutions.

    The Appellate Division disapproved of the trial court’s reasoning but concluded that the defendant’s constitutional rights were not impaired.

    The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court’s exclusion of an attorney based on race violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions, and whether this issue was properly preserved for appellate review.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial court’s explicit reliance on race in excluding the attorney constituted a clear violation of equal protection principles, and the issue was adequately addressed at the appellate division, despite not being initially and explicitly raised at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Justice Smith, in concurrence, emphasized that the trial court’s statement alone demonstrated an abuse of discretion. The judge’s explicit consideration of race in his ruling was a violation of equal protection. Although a constitutional argument should generally be raised at the earliest opportunity, the parties fully briefed the constitutional issue at the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division addressed and decided the constitutional issue. The concern that the issue was not raised at the trial level should not prevent review by the Court of Appeals, especially where all facts pertaining to the constitutional issue are in the record.

    Justice Smith cited People ex rel. Roides v Smith, 67 NY2d 899, 901, arguing that legal arguments may be reviewed even if raised for the first time on appeal if the opposing party has no factual or legal counterstep that could have been made below. The trial court’s statements were dispositive of the defendant’s constitutional appeal.

    Furthermore, issues impacting public policy can be reviewed even if raised for the first time on appeal. Justice Smith cited Matter of Niagara Wheatfield Adm’rs Assn. [Niagara Wheatfield Cent. School Dist.], 44 NY2d 68, 72. Racial discrimination within the judicial system is a matter of significant public policy.

    Citing Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 415, Justice Smith stated, “The Fourteenth Amendment’s mandate that race discrimination be eliminated from all official acts and proceedings of the State is most compelling in the judicial system”. Refusing to consider the constitutional claims would immunize the Appellate Division’s determination from review, even though the error is of constitutional magnitude. Racial discrimination is never a valid basis for exercising discretion. The judge issued a procedural ruling based solely on the skin color of the defendant and his counsel, which is unacceptable and “improperly infects our entire judicial process.”

  • Matter of Grant v. Kreindler, Relin and Goldberg, 28 N.Y.2d 419 (1971): Double Jeopardy and Manifest Necessity for Mistrial

    Matter of Grant v. Kreindler, Relin and Goldberg, 28 N.Y.2d 419 (1971)

    A mistrial granted without manifest necessity, and over the defendant’s objection, bars a retrial on double jeopardy grounds.

    Summary

    This case concerns a defendant, Grant, whose trial was terminated by a mistrial declared by the judge due to a potential, albeit remote, appearance of bias. The New York Court of Appeals held that declaring a mistrial under these circumstances, over the defendant’s strenuous objection and without manifest necessity, violated the defendant’s double jeopardy rights, thus prohibiting a retrial. The court emphasized that the appearance of impropriety alone is insufficient to justify a mistrial; there must be a demonstrable and substantial basis, a “manifest necessity,” to override the defendant’s right to have his trial completed by the original tribunal.

    Facts

    The trial court judge, during Grant’s trial, recalled that his cousin was acquainted with Grant’s father. Grant’s father had previously contacted the judge’s chambers about a complaint of police harassment unrelated to the current case. The judge had no personal interaction with Grant or his father, and the contact was minimal (a call to the judge’s clerk a year prior). The judge, concerned that this recollection “might in some conceivable way affect his judgment,” “disqualified” himself and declared a mistrial “in the interests of justice.”

    Procedural History

    The trial commenced without a jury, and after a police witness testified, jeopardy attached. Grant’s counsel objected to the mistrial, arguing that no cause existed and noting a tactical advantage gained from the police officer’s testimony. After the mistrial was declared, Grant sought relief under CPLR Article 78, seeking to prohibit retrial based on double jeopardy. The Appellate Division prohibited the retrial. The prosecution appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a mistrial, declared by a judge due to a remote possibility of bias and over the defendant’s objection, constitutes manifest necessity, thus permitting a retrial without violating the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

    Holding

    No, because the judge’s subjective appraisal of a remote possibility of bias was not within the ambit of the well-established rule that “manifest necessity” must be shown to justify a mistrial. The remote possibility of unfair treatment, combined with a clear showing of prejudice to the defendant, interdicted the mistrial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the mistrial was improperly granted because it lacked “manifest necessity.” The court emphasized the importance of a defendant’s right to have their trial completed by a tribunal they believe to be favorably disposed to their fate. The court quoted United States v. Jorn, stating that the judge must consider “the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate”. Although the appearance of impropriety is a valid concern, it cannot be used as an “escape hatch from the performance of an unpleasant duty.” The court emphasized that “the necessity must be ‘manifest,’” and the remote possibility of unfair treatment, combined with the prejudice to the defendant (losing a tactical advantage), made the mistrial improper. The Court distinguished between a genuine, demonstrable need for a mistrial and a mere subjective apprehension of bias. The court noted that a mistrial declared in the public interest and against the defendant’s will must have some basis of demonstrable substance.