New York Law Review

Tag: Judicial Appointments

  • Matter of Spector v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 47 N.Y.2d 462 (1979): Appearance of Impropriety in Judicial Appointments

    Matter of Spector v. State Commission on Judicial Conduct, 47 N.Y.2d 462 (1979)

    Judges must avoid not only actual impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety in their official conduct, particularly regarding appointments, and cross-appointments of relatives with other judges can create such an appearance, warranting admonishment.

    Summary

    This case addresses the ethical implications of a judge’s appointments of the sons of other judges during periods when those judges were appointing his son. While no direct quid pro quo was proven, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the State Commission on Judicial Conduct’s determination that such cross-appointments created an appearance of impropriety. The court emphasized that judges are held to a higher standard than the morals of the marketplace and must avoid even the appearance of impropriety to maintain public confidence in the judiciary. The judge was admonished for this conduct.

    Facts

    A formal complaint was filed against Judge Spector by the Commission on Judicial Conduct, alleging misconduct related to his appointments of attorneys as guardians ad litem, receivers, and referees. The specific concern arose from appointments of Burton Fine, son of Justice Sidney Fine, and Sanford Postel, son of Justice George Postel. During the period in question, Judge Spector appointed Justice Fine’s son twice and Justice Postel’s son four times. Justice Fine appointed Judge Spector’s son eight times, and Justice Postel appointed Judge Spector’s son five times. Judge Spector was aware of these reciprocal appointments.

    Procedural History

    The Commission on Judicial Conduct served a formal complaint on Judge Spector. A Referee was appointed, who found two of the four charges unsubstantiated. The Referee found that some appointments lacked the appearance of propriety but found no actual impropriety. The Commission determined that cross-appointments created an appearance of impropriety and that admonishment was the appropriate sanction. Three commission members dissented, finding the facts did not warrant discipline. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals for review.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the pattern of cross-appointments between judges, involving their respective sons, created an appearance of impropriety in violation of judicial ethics canons, even in the absence of a proven quid pro quo arrangement?
    2. Whether the sanction of admonishment was appropriate for the appearance of impropriety stemming from these cross-appointments?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because even without a proven agreement, the reciprocal appointments created a circumstantial appearance of impropriety, suggesting each judge was securing appointments for his own son, and attempting to avoid a charge of nepotism.
    2. Yes, because reluctance to impose a sanction would be taken as reflecting an attitude of tolerance of judicial misconduct, and judges are to be held to a higher standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of avoiding not only actual impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety. It cited Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Canon 2 of the present Code of Judicial Conduct, stating: “A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.” The court condemned nepotism and disguised nepotism, stating that the enlarged evil in this instance is that an arrangement for cross appointments would not only offend the antinepotism principle; it would go a step further, seeking to accomplish the objectives of nepotism while obscuring the fact thereof.

    The court noted that the community is entitled to insist on a demanding standard of behavior from judges, referencing Chief Judge Cardozo’s statement in Meinhard v. Salmon: “A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.” The court rejected the argument that the conduct should be excused due to a possible existing modus operandi. The court explicitly stated it was improper for the administrator to introduce evidence of additional alleged misconduct on the part of the petitioner on arguments of the motions addressed to the Referee’s report, in connection with the commission’s consideration of the sanction to be imposed. Despite this impropriety, the Court of Appeals accepted the commission’s determination and admonished the judge.

  • Matter of Taylor v. Sise, 33 N.Y.2d 357 (1974): Constitutionality of Appointing Court of Claims Judges as Acting Supreme Court Justices

    Matter of Taylor v. Sise, 33 N.Y.2d 357 (1974)

    The New York State Constitution permits the legislature to increase the number of Court of Claims judges and the Appellate Division to temporarily assign those judges to the Supreme Court, even for felony trials, without violating the constitutional right to trial by elected judges.

    Summary

    This case addresses the constitutionality of a New York law designed to address an anticipated increase in drug felony prosecutions. The law increased the number of Court of Claims judges, who were then assigned to Supreme Court criminal parts by the Appellate Division. Petitioners, facing felony drug charges, argued that this scheme violated the constitutional requirement that Supreme Court justices be elected and infringed upon the separation of powers. The Court of Appeals upheld the law, finding that the constitution explicitly grants the legislature the power to increase the number of Court of Claims judges and permits temporary assignments to the Supreme Court.

    Facts

    Following Governor Rockefeller’s call for stricter drug penalties, the New York legislature passed the Emergency Dangerous Drug Control Act. This law increased the number of Court of Claims judges, allowing the Governor to appoint up to 68 additional judges. The Appellate Division then assigned these newly appointed judges to preside over criminal trials in the Supreme Court. Petitioners, indicted on drug felonies, challenged the constitutionality of these appointments and assignments.

    Procedural History

    Petitioners filed Article 78 proceedings challenging the authority of the acting Supreme Court Justices to preside over their trials. The Appellate Division dismissed these proceedings. The petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the legislation increasing the number of Court of Claims judges and their subsequent assignment to the Supreme Court violates the constitutional provision requiring election of Supreme Court Justices.
    2. Whether the provision requiring the Commissioner of the Division of Criminal Justice Services to jointly prepare a plan with the State Administrator of the Courts for the use of judicial resources violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Constitution authorizes the legislature to increase the number of Court of Claims judges and the Appellate Division to temporarily assign them to the Supreme Court. The constitutional requirement for elected Supreme Court Justices is simply the method by which the state chooses its regular Supreme Court Justices, not a guarantee to defendants.
    2. No, because the petitioners lack standing to challenge the provision as they are not directly affected by it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Constitution explicitly grants the Legislature the power to increase the number of Court of Claims Judges. The Constitution also authorizes the temporary assignment of Court of Claims judges to the Supreme Court, granting them the same powers as a Supreme Court Justice during the assignment. The Court emphasized that the Appellate Division’s order assigning the judges was temporary, lasting “until the further order of this Court,” satisfying the constitutional requirement. The Court deferred to the legislature’s determination that an emergency existed due to the new drug law, justifying the need for additional judges. Addressing the separation of powers argument, the Court found the petitioners lacked standing because they were not directly affected by the provision concerning the joint plan for judicial resource allocation. The Court distinguished People ex rel. Jackson v. Potter, noting that case involved irreconcilable constitutional provisions, unlike the present case where the grant of power was clear. The dissent argued that the law was an unconstitutional end-run around the requirement that Supreme Court justices be elected, and that assigning judges with nine-year terms was not a “temporary” assignment. The dissent also believed the executive branch’s involvement in judicial resource planning violated the separation of powers. The majority found no constitutional infirmity in the actions of the legislative, executive, or judicial branches, as each acted within its granted powers. The court emphasized the strong presumption that the legislature acted upon investigating the need for the legislation: “There is generally a very strong presumption that ‘the Legislature has investigated and found the existence of a situation showing or indicating the need for or desirability of the legislation’”.