Hubbell v. Carpenter, 59 N.Y. 447 (1875)

A judgment entered irregularly due to a procedural defect, but not affecting a substantial right of the adverse party, cannot be set aside on motion more than one year after its rendition.

Summary

This case addresses the limitations on setting aside a judgment for irregularity under New York law. The plaintiffs obtained separate judgments against two partners for a joint partnership debt, which was procedurally incorrect. The defendant moved to vacate the judgment more than a year after it was rendered. The Court of Appeals held that because the error was merely an irregularity and did not affect a substantial right of the defendant, the motion to set aside the judgment was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

Facts

The plaintiffs, Carpenter and Rose, sued Hubbell and Taylor, who were co-partners, for a joint debt. Hubbell defaulted, and Taylor had the fact of the joint debt found against him. Instead of entering a joint judgment against both partners, the plaintiffs entered separate judgments against Hubbell and Taylor for slightly different amounts, reflecting the total debt.

Procedural History

The defendant, Hubbell, moved to vacate the judgment more than one year after it was entered, arguing that the separate judgments were irregular and unauthorized. The Special Term denied the motion. The General Term reversed the Special Term’s order, directing an amendment of the judgment. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals from both the order directing amendment and a subsequent order denying a motion to resettle the first order.

Issue(s)

Whether the entry of separate judgments against partners for a joint partnership debt, instead of a single joint judgment, constitutes an irregularity that can be challenged by motion more than one year after the judgment was rendered, considering the one-year limitation for setting aside judgments for irregularities.

Holding

No, because the error was merely a technical irregularity that did not affect any substantial right of the defendant. The motion to set aside the judgment, made more than one year after its rendition, was therefore time-barred.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the plaintiffs’ entry of separate judgments was indeed irregular—deviating from the prescribed rule for obtaining a joint judgment—it did not affect any substantial right of the defendant. The court emphasized that each partner bears full liability for the entire partnership debt. As the court noted, “upon each partner rests an absolute liability for the whole amount of every debt due from the partnership.” The Court stated that the form of the judgment does not affect the debtor’s relations with his co-partner; for if he pays the debt or judgment, he will be entitled to contribution. The Court cited Brinkerhoff v. Marvin, 5 Johns. Ch., 326, noting that because the judgments were taken against each partner, for a partnership debt, the partnership property is bound to the same extent as if there had been but one judgment, for the whole, against both partners. Because the error was only an irregularity and not something that affected a substantial right, the statutory period for motions to correct the error had passed, and therefore the General Term’s order was reversed and the Special Term’s order reinstated. The Court emphasized the statutory limit: “no judgment in any court of record shall be set aside for irregularity on motion, unless such motion is made within one year after the time such judgment was rendered.”