Tag: journalist privilege

  • Matter of Winter, 22 N.Y.3d 234 (2013): New York’s Strong Public Policy Protecting Journalists’ Confidential Sources

    Matter of Winter, 22 N.Y.3d 234 (2013)

    A New York court should not issue a subpoena compelling a New York journalist to appear as a witness in another state when there is a substantial likelihood that she will be compelled to identify sources promised confidentiality, which would offend New York’s strong public policy protecting journalists’ confidential sources under the Shield Law.

    Summary

    Jana Winter, a New York-based journalist, published an article about a notebook belonging to James Holmes, the suspect in the Aurora, Colorado movie theater shooting. Holmes sought to compel Winter to testify in Colorado to reveal her confidential sources, claiming they violated a gag order. The New York Court of Appeals held that it would violate New York public policy to force Winter to disclose her sources in Colorado, where journalist protections are weaker than New York’s absolute Shield Law, which protects journalists from being compelled to reveal confidential sources, deeming such protection essential for a free press.

    Facts

    James Holmes, charged with murder for a mass shooting in Colorado, mailed a notebook to a psychiatrist before the event. The court issued a pretrial publicity order. Jana Winter, a New York-based Fox News reporter, published an article about the notebook, citing unnamed law enforcement sources. Holmes alleged law enforcement leaked the information, violating the court order, and sought sanctions. He then sought to compel Winter to testify in Colorado to reveal her sources.

    Procedural History

    Holmes obtained a certificate from the Colorado court to compel Winter’s attendance. He then commenced a proceeding in New York Supreme Court to issue a subpoena. The Supreme Court granted Holmes’s application. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that privilege issues should be resolved by the Colorado court. A dissenting opinion argued that the subpoena violated New York’s strong public policy. Winter appealed to the New York Court of Appeals based on the two-Justice dissent.

    Issue(s)

    Whether it violates New York public policy for a New York court to issue a subpoena directing a New York reporter to appear at a judicial proceeding in another state where there is a substantial likelihood that she will be directed to disclose the names of confidential sources or face being held in contempt of court.

    Holding

    Yes, because compelling a New York journalist to reveal confidential sources in a state with weaker protections would offend New York’s strong public policy, as embodied in its Constitution and Shield Law, which prioritizes the anonymity of confidential sources to ensure a free and informed press.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized New York’s long-standing tradition of protecting freedom of the press, tracing it back to the colonial era and the Zenger case. Article I, § 8 of the New York Constitution and the New York Shield Law provide strong protections for journalists and their confidential sources. The Court distinguished this case from Matter of Codey, where the privilege claim was based on another state’s law. Here, Winter relied on New York’s Shield Law, and Colorado offers significantly less protection to journalists. The Court emphasized that the sole purpose of requiring Winter’s testimony was to compel her to reveal the identities of her confidential sources. Quoting Matter of Beach v. Shanley, the Court stated, “[t]he inescapable conclusion is that the Shield Law provides a broad protection to journalists without any qualifying language… Even if one were to be in disagreement with the wisdom of the policy underlying section 79-h and no matter how heinous the crime under investigation, the courts are not free to ignore the mandate of the Legislature and substitute a policy of their own”. This would undermine the core principle of New York’s journalistic privilege, which is the protection of confidential sources. The Court found that Winter reasonably relied on New York’s Shield Law when she made promises of confidentiality. While reaffirming the general rule from Codey, the Court recognized a narrow exception when a strong public policy of New York is threatened. Applying Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 139 was deemed unsuitable. The Court clarified that this decision does not expand New York law beyond its borders but protects the integrity of its own processes and policies. This exception will only apply in unusual circumstances where a strong public policy is implicated, and there is a substantial likelihood that compelling the witness’s appearance would directly offend that policy. The Court concluded that the subpoena application should have been denied.

  • Matherson v. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233 (1984): Newspaper’s Right to Protect Anonymous Sources

    Matherson v. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233 (1984)

    A journalist’s right to protect anonymous sources, under New York’s Shield Law, shields them from contempt charges but does not grant complete immunity from alternative sanctions under CPLR 3126 if they refuse to disclose a source in a civil case; however, these alternative sanctions should be carefully tailored to avoid undermining newsgathering or the policy of the Shield Law.

    Summary

    Matherson sued the Babylon Beacon for libel after it published an anonymous letter critical of him. Matherson sought to compel the newspaper to reveal the letter writer’s identity. The newspaper refused, citing the Shield Law. The trial court, while acknowledging the Shield Law’s protection against contempt, struck the newspaper’s answer as a sanction for non-disclosure. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the reversal, holding that while the Shield Law protects against contempt, alternative sanctions under CPLR 3126 must be carefully applied to avoid chilling newsgathering, and the sanction imposed was too drastic given the circumstances.

    Facts

    Robert Matherson, owner of the Oak Beach Inn, ran an advertisement in the Babylon Beacon criticizing local officials. The newspaper subsequently published an anonymous letter to the editor accusing Matherson of endangering public safety in his management of the Inn. Matherson then sued the newspaper for libel and sought the identity of the letter writer through a pre-action disclosure request under CPLR 3102(c), arguing it was necessary to identify potential defendants. The newspaper refused, citing its policy of anonymity and First Amendment concerns.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially granted Matherson’s motion to compel disclosure. After reargument, the court adhered to its decision, stating the Shield Law only eliminated contempt as a remedy. When the newspaper still refused to disclose the name, Matherson sought to strike the newspaper’s answer. The trial court struck the answer, but the Appellate Division reversed, finding that the Shield Law created a privilege protecting journalists from disclosing sources and that subjecting them to monetary judgments would unduly restrict the law’s purpose. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal, but on different grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York’s Shield Law, which protects journalists from contempt for refusing to disclose their sources, also provides immunity from alternative sanctions under CPLR 3126 in a civil libel action.

    Holding

    No, because while the Shield Law protects journalists from contempt, it does not provide blanket immunity from all legal consequences for refusing to disclose a source. However, alternative sanctions under CPLR 3126 must be carefully tailored to avoid undermining newsgathering or the strong legislative policy expressed in the Shield Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the purpose of the Shield Law is to protect newsgathering by preventing the chilling effect of compelled disclosure of sources. The court emphasized that the statute explicitly exempts journalists from being “adjudged in contempt.” While CPLR 3126 provides alternative sanctions for non-disclosure, their application must be carefully considered in cases involving journalists protecting sources. The court reasoned that CPLR 3126 sanctions should not create new obstacles to newsgathering or undermine the Shield Law. The general rule is that “the demanding party should not be granted more relief for nondisclosure than is reasonably necessary to protect legitimate interests.”

    The court found the trial court’s sanction of striking the newspaper’s answer was too drastic. Because the newspaper agreed to defend the libel suit based on its own independent investigation, without relying on the anonymous source, a more appropriate remedy would be to preclude the newspaper from introducing evidence related to the source. The court also noted that using CPLR 3126 to force disclosure of a source to aid a separate suit against that source would subvert the Shield Law’s policy, as it would expose the source to potential civil liability. Quoting the statute, the court referenced the “exemption… from contempt”.

    The court emphasized the practical implications: “A newspaper should not be required to accept substantial financial loss as the price for continuing to honor a commitment to maintain the confidentiality of one of its sources.”