New York Law Review

Tag: Joint Tortfeasors

  • Hecht v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 57 (1983): Limits on Appellate Review Regarding Non-Appealing Parties

    Hecht v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 57 (1983)

    An appellate court generally cannot grant affirmative relief to a non-appealing party unless it is necessary to do so to accord full relief to a party who has appealed, or where the parties have a united and inseverable interest in the judgment.

    Summary

    Hecht sued the City of New York and Square Depew Garage Corporation for injuries sustained from a fall on a sidewalk outside the garage. The jury found both defendants equally liable. Only the City appealed, and the Appellate Division dismissed the complaint against both defendants. The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the action against Square Depew, the non-appealing party, as the City’s appeal did not automatically extend relief to Square Depew since their interests were severable.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Hecht fell on a sidewalk outside a garage operated by Square Depew Garage Corporation, allegedly due to a gap between sidewalk flagstones. She sued both the City of New York, responsible for sidewalk maintenance, and Square Depew, the adjacent property owner, alleging negligence in failing to maintain a safe sidewalk.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found both the City and Square Depew equally liable after a jury trial. The City of New York appealed to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, dismissing the complaint against both the City and Square Depew. Hecht then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division had the authority to dismiss the complaint against Square Depew Garage Corporation, a defendant who did not appeal the trial court’s judgment.

    Holding

    No, because the power of an appellate court to review a judgment is limited to the parts of the judgment that have been appealed and that aggrieve the appealing party. Further, multiple tortfeasors do not have an inseverable interest in a judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that an appellate court’s power to review a judgment is triggered by a timely appeal. The scope of review is generally limited to the parts of the judgment that the appealing party challenges. A reversal regarding an appealing party does not automatically benefit a non-appealing co-party unless their interests are “united and inseverable.” Here, the City’s interest was severable from Square Depew’s, as they were joint tortfeasors. The court stated that “[w]hen multiple tort-feasors are found to be liable for damages, they may not be said to have an inseverable interest in the judgment, even though the factual basis for each party’s liability is identical.” The Court rejected the argument that CPLR 5522 grants appellate courts discretionary power to grant relief to non-appealing parties, stating that the provision merely enumerates the types of dispositions an appellate court may order. Therefore, the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the complaint against Square Depew, which had not appealed the original judgment. The Court modified the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the judgment against Square Depew. The court emphasized that the power to fashion complete relief to an appealing party does not automatically extend to non-appealing parties unless their interests are inseparable, which was not the case here. “[N]either CPLR 5522 nor any other statutory or constitutional authority permits an appellate court to exercise any general discretionary power to grant relief to a nonappealing party.”

  • Mayer v. Cronkite, 40 N.Y.2d 857 (1976): Effect of General Release on Joint Tortfeasors After Subsequent Change in Law

    Mayer v. Cronkite, 40 N.Y.2d 857 (1976)

    A general release, without reservation of rights, given to some joint tortfeasors discharges all other joint tortfeasors from liability, and a subsequent change in the law does not revive liability extinguished by the release, especially where the initial settlement was judicially approved and operated as a final judgment.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a general release given to some joint tortfeasors barred a subsequent action against other joint tortfeasors after a change in law that arguably created new liability. The infant respondent received a general release without reservation of rights in 1968. Later, the court’s decision in Gelbman v. Gelbman removed the bar on intrafamilial tort actions. The Court of Appeals held that the general release discharged all tortfeasors, including the parents, and that Gelbman did not create new liability that would override the effect of the release, which operated as a final judgment under CPLR 1207 because it was judicially approved.

    Facts

    In 1968, an infant respondent, Mayer, received a general release without any reservation of rights related to a tort claim. The release was given to other joint tortfeasors. The order of compromise authorizing the general release was judicially approved.

    Procedural History

    The defendant parents moved to amend their answer to assert a defense of general release. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified a question.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a general release, given to some joint tortfeasors without reservation of rights, discharges other joint tortfeasors from liability, even after a subsequent change in law that removes a bar to the specific type of tort action.

    Holding

    Yes, because the general release, without a reservation of rights, discharged all other joint tortfeasors from liability and the subsequent change in law did not create new liability that would override the effect of the release, especially given that the initial settlement was judicially approved and operated as a final judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent that a general release without a reservation of rights discharges all joint tortfeasors. The court cited Oliver v. Washburn, Berlow v. New York State Thruway Auth., and Milks v. Mclver. The Court distinguished the case from situations where rescission of the release might be warranted due to mutual mistake or other grounds. The court stated, “There was no reservation of rights in the unlimited general release given on May 16, 1968 to the other joint tort-feasors, and, hence, the infant respondent’s parents, against whom this new action has been brought, were discharged from any alleged tort liability on their part.”

    The court addressed the argument that Gelbman v. Gelbman, which removed the bar on intrafamilial tort actions, created new liability. The court held that Gelbman did not create new liability encompassed by the general release but only removed a judicially created impediment. It also noted that Gelbman was only retrospectively applicable to matters which had not gone to final judgment, and the order of compromise authorizing the execution of the general release operated as a final judgment pursuant to CPLR 1207.

    The court emphasized that the release was given in 1968, before the enactment of section 15-108 of the General Obligations Law (effective Sept. 1, 1972), and thus the statute did not apply. The court addressed a procedural issue related to the denial of the defendant’s motion to amend their answer, acknowledging that such decisions are typically discretionary and not reviewable. However, it reasoned that the lower courts likely would have permitted the amendment had they believed the defense was available as a matter of law. The court concluded that the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and the appellants granted leave to serve an amended answer asserting the defense of general release.

  • Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25 (1972): Apportioning Damages Among Joint Tortfeasors

    Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25 (1972)

    Under Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., damages among joint or concurrent tortfeasors should be apportioned based on their relative degrees of fault, regardless of whether their negligence is characterized as “active” or “passive.”

    Summary

    Willis Kelly, a laborer, was injured when a crane on a construction site contacted high-tension wires owned by Long Island Lighting Co. (LILCO). Kelly sued LILCO and Herrick Manor, Inc. (Herrick), the general contractor. Both defendants cross-claimed against each other. The jury found both defendants negligent, and the trial court dismissed the cross-claims, finding both actively negligent. The Court of Appeals modified the order, holding that damages should be apportioned based on relative fault, and remanding the case for the trial court to determine the percentage of fault attributable to each defendant. The court emphasized this new rule does not affect a plaintiff’s right to recover the full amount of damages from any joint tortfeasor.

    Facts

    LILCO owned and maintained high-tension wires along Clinton Avenue. Herrick was the general contractor for an apartment building being constructed near these wires. Kelly, a laborer, was injured when a crane contacted the wires, causing him to be electrocuted. LILCO knew about the construction but took no protective measures regarding the wires. Herrick’s president knew of the danger posed by the wires and requested LILCO to insulate them but did not warn the workers, including Kelly, of the danger, even when he saw the crane moving towards the wires.

    Procedural History

    Kelly and his wife sued LILCO and Herrick. Both defendants filed cross-claims against each other. The jury found both LILCO and Herrick negligent and awarded damages to the plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed both cross-claims, finding each party actively negligent. Herrick appealed the dismissal of its cross-claim. The Appellate Division affirmed. Herrick appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether damages among joint or concurrent tortfeasors should be apportioned based on their relative degrees of fault, regardless of whether their negligence is characterized as “active” or “passive”.

    Holding

    Yes, damages should be apportioned based on the relative fault of each tortfeasor because to require a tortfeasor who is only slightly negligent to pay the same amount as a more negligent co-tortfeasor is inequitable and unjust.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the rule established in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., which permits the apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors based on their relative degrees of fault, regardless of the nature of their concurring fault. The court found that the previous rule, which prevented a defendant found guilty of “active” negligence from recovering from another negligent party, was inequitable. The court stated, “To require a joint tort-feasor who is, for instance, 10% causally negligent to pay the same amount as a co-tort-feasor who is 90% causally negligent seems inequitable and unjust. The fairer rule, we believe, is to distribute the loss in proportion to the allocable concurring fault.” This refinement of the contribution rule does not affect the plaintiff’s right to recover the total amount of damages from any joint tortfeasor. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine the relative degrees of negligence or fault and the percentage of fault attributable to each defendant. The court clarified that this case addresses contribution between joint tortfeasors and does not concern issues like vicarious liability where the active-passive dichotomy would still apply.