New York Law Review

Tag: joinder of offenses

  • People v. Foster, 12 N.Y.3d 566 (2009): Limits on Joining Offenses in a Superior Court Information After Waiver of Indictment

    12 N.Y.3d 566 (2009)

    When a defendant waives indictment, offenses joined in the superior court information must be “the same or similar in law,” and the inclusion of a criminal possession of stolen property charge was not sufficiently similar to a grand larceny offense to be properly joined.

    Summary

    Defendant waived indictment and pleaded guilty to grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property charges in a superior court information (SCI). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the criminal possession charge was improperly joined with the grand larceny charge because the two offenses were not sufficiently similar under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 200.20(2)(c). The Court emphasized that CPL 200.20(2)(c) is typically used when a defendant violates the same Penal Law provision on multiple occasions, or comparable criminal conduct in discrete incidents is alleged. This case underscores the importance of strict adherence to statutory requirements when utilizing waivers of indictment and the limits on joining offenses.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with grand larceny in the fourth degree for allegedly stealing $1,100 from a victim’s bank account. He was also charged with criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree after being found in possession of a stolen vehicle. These incidents were unrelated and occurred weeks apart.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was arraigned on both sets of charges in Buffalo City Court and held for grand jury action on the felony offenses. The grand larceny charge was dismissed and a new superior court felony complaint was filed. The defendant waived indictment and agreed to be prosecuted by SCI, pleading guilty to both grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, vacated the guilty plea, and dismissed the SCI.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the criminal possession of stolen property charge was properly joined with the grand larceny charge in the superior court information (SCI) under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 200.20(2)(c), which allows joinder of offenses that “are defined by the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently are the same or similar in law.”

    Holding

    No, because the criminal possession of stolen property charge was not sufficiently similar in law to the grand larceny offense to be properly joined in the SCI under CPL 200.20(2)(c).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 200.20(2)(c) is generally applied when a defendant has violated the same Penal Law provision multiple times or has engaged in comparable criminal conduct in separate incidents. The Court found that grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property lacked the requisite similarity. While both involved misappropriated property, the crimes had different elements and the criminal conduct was distinct. The Court emphasized the importance of ensuring that offenses joined under CPL 200.20(2)(c) share commonality and comparable criminal conduct. "Offenses will not be deemed sufficiently similar to support joinder under CPL 200.20 (2) (c) if the offenses do not share any elements and the criminal conduct at the heart of each crime is not comparable." The improper inclusion of an offense in a waiver of indictment and SCI is a jurisdictional defect that requires reversal and dismissal. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Zanghi, 79 N.Y.2d 815 (1991), noting that in this case, the triggering offense (grand larceny) was included in the SCI. However, the joinder of the possession of stolen property offense was still impermissible because the two offenses were not sufficiently similar in law.

  • People v. Bongarzone, 69 N.Y.2d 892 (1987): Harmless Error in Right to Counsel Violations

    People v. Bongarzone, 69 N.Y.2d 892 (1987)

    Statements obtained in violation of a defendant’s right to counsel after indictment, even during the investigation of a new crime, are inadmissible at the trial for the initial indictment but may be admitted at the trial for the new crime, and the admission of such statements is subject to harmless error analysis if the statements did not prejudice the defendant’s case regarding the initial charges.

    Summary

    Bongarzone was indicted for charges stemming from a fatal car accident. While awaiting trial, he conspired to murder an eyewitness. He was then charged with conspiracy and criminal solicitation, and the indictments were joined. The Court of Appeals held that joining the indictments was permissible because evidence of each crime was relevant to the other. Although post-indictment statements elicited without counsel were improperly admitted regarding the initial charges, the error was harmless because the statements pertained only to the new crimes and did not prejudice Bongarzone concerning the initial car accident charges, for which evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

    Facts

    Bongarzone was involved in a car accident that resulted in two deaths and was charged with related offenses.
    While incarcerated, he conspired with another inmate to murder an eyewitness to the accident.
    The inmate informed the police, who set up an undercover operation.
    Bongarzone instructed an undercover officer (posing as a hitman) to contact his mother or sister for a photo of the witness and a down payment.
    Although the officer contacted Bongarzone’s family, the arranged meeting never occurred.

    Procedural History

    Bongarzone was charged with conspiracy and criminal solicitation in addition to the original charges.
    The trial court joined the charges in a single nine-count indictment.
    The jury convicted Bongarzone on multiple counts, including criminal solicitation and conspiracy.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Bongarzone’s motion to sever the consolidated indictment.
    2. Whether the admission of recordings containing Bongarzone’s statements, elicited without counsel after indictment, constituted reversible error.
    3. Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved the overt act element of conspiracy.
    4. Whether the evidence at trial was sufficient for a guilty finding on the criminal solicitation charge.

    Holding

    1. No, because evidence relating to the automobile accident was material and admissible to establish motive with respect to the conspiracy and criminal solicitation charges, and vice versa.
    2. No, because the admission of the statements, while a violation of Bongarzone’s right to counsel, was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.
    3. Yes, because there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer an overt act by Bongarzone.
    4. No, this argument is without merit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by joining the indictments. CPL 200.20(2)(b) allows joinder if proof of either offense would be material and admissible as evidence-in-chief for the other. The accident evidence established motive for the conspiracy, and the conspiracy evidence showed consciousness of guilt regarding the accident.

    Regarding the right-to-counsel issue, the Court cited Maine v. Moulton, stating that post-indictment statements elicited without counsel are inadmissible at the trial for the initial indictment but admissible at the trial for the new crime. However, the Court explicitly stated: “Our analysis of the Supreme Court’s holding does not disclose that that court considered or created a per se rule governing this kind of error.”
    The Court determined that the admission of the statements was subject to harmless error analysis because the statements only pertained to the conspiracy and solicitation charges and did not reference the car accident. The Court stated that “…the rationale underlying the Moulton rule is not to bar the use of all postindictment statements made in the absence of counsel, but rather to prevent the use of such statements unfairly to prejudice the defendant’s case.”
    Because the evidence of guilt regarding the initial charges was “direct and overwhelming,” the error was deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    As for the conspiracy conviction, the Court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer an overt act by Bongarzone. This included his statements that he had spoken and would speak with his family to further the conspiracy, his assurance to the undercover officer that he would make the call immediately, and his instructions to the officer and provision of his mother’s phone number.

    The Court summarily dismissed Bongarzone’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for the criminal solicitation charge.

  • People v. Castillo, 47 N.Y.2d 270 (1979): Prejudice from Joined Charges Requires New Trial

    People v. Castillo, 47 N.Y.2d 270 (1979)

    When a defendant is tried on multiple charges arising from separate incidents and some charges are later dismissed due to a substantial possibility of misidentification, a new trial is required on the remaining charges if the evidence and jury instructions from the dismissed charges prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the remaining charges.

    Summary

    Leonel Castillo was convicted of attempted burglary. Prior to this, he faced multiple charges related to two separate incidents. The Appellate Division dismissed counts related to the first incident due to a substantial possibility of misidentification. Castillo argued that the remaining attempted burglary charge was prejudiced by the evidence and instructions related to the dismissed charges, and by evidence of his presence near the crime scene after his arrest. The Court of Appeals agreed that the joinder of the charges prejudiced Castillo, warranting a new trial, because the evidence presented for the dismissed counts influenced the jury’s assessment of Castillo’s intent on the remaining count.

    Facts

    On August 27, 1975, a woman in a Bronx apartment was sexually assaulted and robbed by an intruder. The victim could only describe the assailant as a Black teenage male. Two days later, on August 29, the woman’s father and brother saw a man trying to open their bathroom window from a ledge outside their apartment. Police found Leonel Castillo, who matched the general description, nearby. The father and son identified Castillo as the man on the ledge, and the daughter identified him as her assailant from August 27. Castillo, a 28-year-old Guatemalan native, denied involvement in both incidents, claiming he was on his way to work on August 29 and was home at the time of the August 27 incident.

    Procedural History

    Castillo was convicted on charges related to both incidents. The Appellate Division dismissed the charges from the August 27 incident, finding a substantial possibility of misidentification. The case was remanded for resentencing on the remaining attempted burglary count. Castillo appealed, arguing that the remaining charge was prejudiced by the dismissed charges. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the joinder of the August 29 charge with the counts that were later dismissed as based on a misidentification prejudiced Castillo’s right to a fair trial on the attempted burglary charge?

    2. Whether there was sufficient proof of Castillo’s intent to commit a crime inside the building to sustain the attempted burglary charge?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence and jury instructions related to the dismissed charges prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the remaining attempted burglary charge.

    2. Yes, because the circumstantial evidence, including Castillo’s presence on the ledge and attempt to open the window in the early morning hours, was sufficient for a jury to infer intent to commit a crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the trial was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s effort to link the two incidents, creating a single theme of criminal activity. The evidence from the August 27 incident, which was later deemed unreliable, bolstered the identification of Castillo and provided a compelling argument for his intent on August 29. The trial court’s jury instruction allowed the jury to infer intent based on the August 27 incident, further tainting the proceedings. The Court stated, “if you find that this defendant was, in fact, the perpetrator of the acts alleged to have occurred on August 27th * * * then you may infer from such prior acts on these premises an intent to commit the same or similar crimes on August 29th.” This instruction improperly allowed the jury to consider the inflammatory nature of the dismissed charges when determining Castillo’s intent on the attempted burglary charge.

    The court also found error in the prosecutor’s use of testimony that Castillo was seen “wandering around” in the neighborhood three days after his arrest. This evidence was used to suggest a consistent course of criminality, but it lacked probative value and was prejudicial. Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for intent, the Court emphasized that intent could be established by circumstantial evidence. The Court reasoned that Castillo’s presence on the third-story ledge at night, attempting to open a bathroom window, allowed the jury to infer an intent to burglarize the apartment. The Court reasoned, “The presence of the perpetrator, like a cliff-climber, on the third-story ledge of a city apartment complex in the dead of night could hardly lead to any other inference but that a crime was in the offing.“

  • People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 244 (1969): Admissibility of Confession and Joinder of Offenses

    People v. Fuller, 24 N.Y.2d 244 (1969)

    A defendant’s confession is admissible if the defendant has not retained counsel, does not desire counsel at the time of questioning, and multiple charges of similar character may be joined in a single indictment and trial.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for the homicide of Richard Fuller and in the second degree for the homicide of Catherine Herrell. The defendant argued his confession was involuntary because police continued questioning him after he mentioned having an attorney, and that it was improper to charge him with two separate murders in a single indictment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant had not retained counsel for the current case, and he did not desire counsel during questioning. The court also held that Section 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the joinder of similar offenses in a single indictment and trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with two counts of murder for killing Catherine Herrell and Richard Fuller. The defendant made statements to the police and the district attorney. The defendant told a police officer that he “had” a lawyer who had represented him “down South in another case”, but clarified that he did not wish to speak to that lawyer and would seek an attorney if needed when he went to court.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree for Fuller’s homicide and in the second degree for Mrs. Herrell’s homicide. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing his confession was involuntary and the joinder of offenses was improper.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s confession was involuntary and should not have been admitted into evidence because police continued questioning him after he mentioned having an attorney.
    2. Whether the defendant was improperly charged in a single indictment and tried in a single trial for two separate murders.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant had not retained an attorney for the current case, did not express a desire to speak with the attorney he had from a previous case, and indicated he would seek counsel when he went to court.
    2. No, because Section 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly provides that a defendant may be indicted for “two or more acts…constituting crimes of the same or a similar character”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that further questioning of an accused in the absence of counsel is proscribed only after the police learn that an attorney has entered the proceeding in connection with the charges under investigation. Since the defendant did not have an attorney representing him in this case, or desire one at that time, there was no violation of his right to counsel.

    Regarding the joinder of offenses, the Court cited Section 279 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which explicitly allows for the joinder of similar offenses in a single indictment and trial. The Court referenced precedent such as People ex rel. Pincus v. Adams, 274 N.Y. 447 (1937), which upheld the constitutionality of this practice. The court stated, “There is nothing unique about a statute which provides that a person may be tried in a single trial for a number of crimes of a similar nature”.

    The Court found no merit in the defendant’s arguments and affirmed the judgment of conviction.