New York Law Review

Tag: involuntary statement

  • People v. Corrigan, 80 N.Y.2d 326 (1992): Scope of Immunity and Prosecutorial Misconduct Before Grand Jury

    People v. Corrigan, 80 N.Y.2d 326 (1992)

    A prosecutor’s mere possession and review of a defendant’s immunized statement during the defendant’s grand jury testimony does not automatically constitute an unconstitutional “use” of the statement requiring dismissal of the charges, absent a showing of actual prejudice or impairment of the grand jury proceeding’s integrity.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether a prosecutor’s possession and review of a police officer’s immunized statement during his grand jury testimony constituted a prohibited “use” of the statement, warranting dismissal of assault charges. The Court of Appeals held that while the practice was disfavored, it did not warrant dismissal because there was no indication that the prosecutor used the statement to elicit testimony, control the witness, or impair the integrity of the grand jury proceeding, and sufficient independent evidence existed to sustain the charges. This ruling emphasizes the necessity of demonstrating actual prejudice to justify dismissing charges based on potential prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury.

    Facts

    Defendant, an off-duty police officer, was working security at a restaurant. He confronted a group of young men drinking alcohol, leading to an argument with one, Bihn Nguyen. After police arrived, the defendant allegedly grabbed Nguyen by the throat, bent him over a car trunk, and struck him with a flashlight. The Police Department conducted an internal investigation, obtaining a compelled statement from the defendant under threat of dismissal. Subsequently, the matter was presented to a Grand Jury.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney filed an information charging the defendant with assault. The Town Court dismissed the information, concluding the prosecutor improperly used the defendant’s involuntary statement. The County Court affirmed, finding dismissal warranted despite the existence of other admissible proof. The Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order, reinstating the information and remitting the case for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s possession and review of the defendant’s immunized statement during his Grand Jury testimony constituted a prohibited “use” of the statement under the Fifth Amendment and the New York Constitution.

    2. Whether, assuming such conduct constituted a prohibited “use,” dismissal of the information was the appropriate remedy.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was no showing that the prosecutor used the statement as a source of information, to control the witness, or that the defendant was aware of the prosecutor’s possession of the statement.

    2. No, because the defendant was not inhibited from exercising his right to testify, the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings was not impaired, and ample independent evidence existed to sustain the charges.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that a statement made under threat of dismissal is automatically immunized. While the People bear the burden of proving that any evidence used was derived independently of the statement, the court found no evidence that the prosecutor used the statement as a source of information or to control the witness. The prosecutor’s questions were generally non-specific, and the defendant was given wide latitude in his testimony. CPL 210.35(5) allows dismissal only when the Grand Jury proceeding fails to conform to CPL 190 requirements, impairing its integrity and potentially prejudicing the defendant. Here, there was no indication that the defendant was aware of the prosecutor’s possession of the statement, and his testimony was not inhibited. The court cautioned against the practice of possessing immunized statements during Grand Jury presentations but held that dismissal was not warranted in this specific instance because sufficient independent evidence existed to sustain the charges. The court emphasized that “[a] defendant’s guarantee of immunity as well as his or her rights to testify before the Grand Jury must be scrupulously protected.”

  • People v. Mendoza, 82 A.D.2d 971 (1981): Requirement for Suppression Hearing on Involuntarily Made Statements

    People v. Mendoza, 82 A.D.2d 971 (1981)

    Under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 710.60(4), a hearing must be held on a motion to suppress a statement claimed to have been involuntarily made to a law enforcement official, even if the defendant’s factual allegations are minimal, as long as the People do not concede the facts and explicitly controvert the allegations surrounding the statement.

    Summary

    The defendant moved to suppress a statement, claiming it was involuntarily made. The People opposed the motion, submitting an affidavit stating that the allegations surrounding the statement were controverted, but the trial court summarily granted the motion without a hearing. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that CPL 710.60(4) mandates a hearing whenever a defendant claims a statement was involuntary, provided the People do not concede the facts and affirmatively controvert the defendant’s allegations. This case clarifies the procedural requirements for suppression hearings related to the voluntariness of statements in New York.

    Facts

    The defendant made a motion to suppress a statement given to law enforcement officials, alleging it was involuntarily made. The specific factual allegations made by the defendant in support of involuntariness are not detailed in the decision.

    Procedural History

    The trial court summarily granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the statement without holding a hearing. The People appealed this decision. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s order, finding that a hearing was required under CPL 710.60(4) because the People had explicitly controverted the defendant’s allegations and did not concede the facts. The case was remitted for a hearing.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 710.60(4) requires a hearing on a motion to suppress a statement claimed to be involuntary, even if the defendant’s factual allegations are minimal, when the People submit an affidavit controverting the allegations surrounding the statement.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 710.60(4) mandates a hearing whenever the defendant claims their statement was involuntary, irrespective of the strength of the defendant’s factual showing, so long as the People do not concede the facts and expressly controvert the allegations surrounding the statement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPL 710.60(4) explicitly requires a hearing on a suppression motion unless the motion is determined pursuant to subdivisions 2 or 3. Subdivision 2 requires a summary grant when the People concede the facts or stipulate not to use the evidence. Subdivision 3 permits a summary denial if the motion papers do not set forth a legal basis or the facts do not support the grounds advanced, but it expressly states that the absence of a factual basis does not permit denial of a motion to suppress an involuntarily made statement. The court emphasized that “in the latter case there must be a hearing whenever defendant claims his statement was involuntary no matter what facts he puts forth in support of that claim.”

    The court highlighted that requiring the People to do more than controvert the defendant’s allegations to trigger a hearing would improperly shift the burden of proof of voluntariness to the defendant. The court distinguished People v. Gruden, noting that in Gruden, the People did not dispute the facts alleged in the defendant’s motion papers, whereas in this case, “the People’s affidavit expressly stated that ‘the allegations surrounding the statement are controverted.’” The court also cited People v. Dean, where an oral statement of opposition was held sufficient to require a hearing. The court concluded that because the People filed a paper making clear their opposition and because the prosecutor advised the trial judge of what he proposed to prove, the trial court committed an error of law by summarily granting the motion.