New York Law Review

Tag: Invasion of Privacy

  • Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982): Limits of Privacy Claims Absent Statutory Violation

    55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982)

    In New York, a cause of action for invasion of privacy is strictly limited to the statutory provisions outlined in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, precluding common-law claims for invasion of privacy based on unreasonable publicity.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs sued over portrayals in books and a movie, claiming invasion of privacy and defamation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim, holding that New York does not recognize a common-law right to privacy beyond the statutory protections in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, which prohibit the use of a person’s name, portrait, or picture for commercial purposes without consent. Since the plaintiffs’ names, portraits, or pictures were not used, no cause of action existed under the statute. The defamation claims were not addressed in this motion to dismiss and remained for later consideration.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, for commercial gain, portrayed them with detailed accuracy in books and a movie represented as true stories. They asserted that the portrayals were so accurate regarding their physical characteristics and activities that they were effectively identified, leading to an invasion of their privacy.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs brought suit alleging invasion of privacy and defamation. The defendant moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion regarding the invasion of privacy claim, but the appellate division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the appellate division’s order dismissing the invasion of privacy claim, while the defamation claims were not part of this appeal and remained for future proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York State recognizes a common-law right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy based on unreasonable publicity, beyond the protections afforded by Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.

    Holding

    No, because in New York, the right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy is limited to the statutory provisions outlined in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, and does not extend to common-law claims based on unreasonable publicity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plaintiffs’ claim for invasion of privacy failed because Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law exclusively govern such claims in New York. These sections prohibit using a person’s “name, portrait or picture” for commercial purposes without consent. Since the defendants did not use the plaintiffs’ names, portraits, or pictures in the books or movie, there was no violation of the statute. The court explicitly stated, “whatever may be the law in other jurisdictions with respect to the right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy in consequence of unreasonable publicity, in our State thus far there has been no recognition of such right other than under sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.” The court reinforced the idea that any expansion of privacy rights in New York must come from the legislature, not the courts. The court distinguished this case from defamation claims, which were not addressed by the motion to dismiss and remained open for future litigation. This underscores the court’s strict interpretation of the statutory limits on privacy claims, leaving potential plaintiffs with limited recourse in situations where their likeness or identity is not directly exploited.

  • Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560 (1970): Limits on Intrusion as Invasion of Privacy

    Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560 (1970)

    Under District of Columbia law, a claim for invasion of privacy based on intrusion requires unreasonably intrusive conduct designed to elicit information of a confidential nature not available through normal inquiry or observation.

    Summary

    Ralph Nader sued General Motors (GM) for invasion of privacy based on GM’s alleged attempts to intimidate him after learning of his forthcoming book criticizing GM’s automotive safety. The complaint detailed several intrusive actions. The New York Court of Appeals, applying District of Columbia law, held that while some of GM’s actions (like overzealous surveillance and wiretapping) could constitute an invasion of privacy, others (like general questioning and harassment) did not, as they didn’t seek confidential information through unreasonable means. The court clarified the scope of “intrusion” within the tort of invasion of privacy.

    Facts

    Ralph Nader, an author and automotive safety critic, was the target of an alleged intimidation campaign by General Motors (GM) after GM learned of his forthcoming book, “Unsafe at any Speed.” Nader alleged that GM’s agents engaged in the following activities: (1) interviewed acquaintances, casting aspersions on his character and views; (2) kept him under surveillance in public places; (3) had him accosted by women to entice him into illicit relationships; (4) made threatening phone calls; (5) tapped his phone and eavesdropped on private conversations; and (6) conducted a harassing investigation into his background.

    Procedural History

    Nader filed suit in New York, alleging four causes of action, including two for invasion of privacy. GM moved to dismiss the first two causes of action. The lower courts denied the motion to dismiss. GM appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of the Appellate Division on a certified question regarding the legal sufficiency of the invasion of privacy claims.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under District of Columbia law, the alleged actions by General Motors, including interviewing acquaintances, surveillance, attempts at entrapment, harassing phone calls, wiretapping, and a harassing investigation, constitute actionable invasions of privacy.

    Holding

    1. No, because interviewing acquaintances and casting aspersions on Nader’s character does not seek confidential information through unreasonable intrusion.
    2. No, because accosting by girls and harassing phone calls, though offensive, do not involve gathering private or confidential information.
    3. Yes, because unauthorized wiretapping and eavesdropping constitute a tortious intrusion under District of Columbia law.
    4. The court did not provide a conclusive yes or no, but stated that under certain circumstances, overzealous surveillance may be actionable, depending on the nature of the proof.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed the scope of invasion of privacy under District of Columbia law, referencing cases like Pearson v. Dodd and Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe. The court emphasized that the right to privacy protects against unreasonable and serious interference with another’s interest in not having their private affairs known to others. The court differentiated between actions that merely annoy or harass and those that intrude into a person’s private affairs to gather confidential information. While actions like wiretapping and overzealous surveillance aimed at uncovering private details are actionable, general questioning or harassment, though potentially offensive, do not constitute an invasion of privacy unless they involve the gathering of private information through improper means.

    The court reasoned that information already known to others cannot be considered private. “Information about the plaintiff which was already known to others could hardly be regarded as private to the plaintiff.” The court also noted that while harassment may give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, that cause of action has different elements than invasion of privacy. As for surveillance, the court stated, “A person does not automatically make public everything he does merely by being in a public place”.

    The court found that because the complaint included allegations (wiretapping and possibly overzealous surveillance) sufficient to state a cause of action, the motion to dismiss was properly denied, even though other allegations were insufficient. The court clarified that the non-actionable allegations could still be pertinent to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.