New York Law Review

Tag: intoxication

  • People v. Cecunjanin, 15 N.Y.3d 487 (2010): Attempted Sexual Abuse Requires Victim’s Helplessness at Time of Attempt

    People v. Cecunjanin, 15 N.Y.3d 487 (2010)

    To be convicted of attempted sexual abuse of a physically helpless person, the prosecution must prove the victim was physically helpless at the specific moment the defendant attempted to commit the sexual contact.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of attempted sexual abuse in the first degree and unlawful imprisonment after an incident involving an intoxicated woman at his bar. The Court of Appeals reversed the attempted sexual abuse conviction, finding insufficient evidence that the woman was physically helpless at the moment the defendant allegedly attempted to subject her to sexual contact. While the woman was highly intoxicated and possibly helpless at times, the evidence showed she resisted the defendant’s advances, indicating she was not physically helpless during those specific moments. The Court affirmed the unlawful imprisonment conviction.

    Facts

    Catherine, the alleged victim, became extremely intoxicated at a bar owned by the defendant, Cecunjanin. Her blood alcohol content was .267%. While at the bar, she engaged in some mild displays of affection with Cecunjanin, whom she knew. As Catherine’s intoxication increased, Cecunjanin became more aggressive, making rude comments, preventing her from leaving, tugging at her shirt, and touching her thighs. He led her to a storage room with another man, where they pulled at her clothes and tried to kiss her. Catherine resisted, refusing to go upstairs with them and sitting on the floor. At one point, she was unable to open the storage room door. Cecunjanin prevented her from answering her cell phone. The encounter ended when Catherine’s father arrived.

    Procedural History

    Cecunjanin was indicted for attempted sexual abuse in the first degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, and forcible touching. The jury convicted him on the first two counts. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Catherine was “physically helpless” at the moment Cecunjanin attempted to subject her to sexual contact, as required for a conviction of attempted sexual abuse in the first degree under Penal Law § 130.65(2).

    Holding

    No, because the evidence showed that while Catherine may have been physically helpless at some points, she was able to resist Cecunjanin’s advances, proving she was not physically helpless during the specific moments of the alleged attempted sexual contact.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the statutory definition of “physically helpless” as “unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act” (Penal Law § 130.00 [7]). The Court acknowledged Catherine’s extreme intoxication and the testimony of her friends indicating she was slouched, unresponsive, and at one point, slid off her stool. However, the Court found no evidence that Cecunjanin attempted to subject her to sexual contact during those specific moments of helplessness. The Court highlighted Catherine’s testimony that she held her arms up to block Cecunjanin from putting his hands under her shirt, stating, “The argument is self-refuting; she could not have blocked him if she were helpless.” The Court distinguished this case from People v. Teicher, 52 NY2d 638 (1981), where the victim was weakened by sedation but still able to remove her hand from the defendant’s person. In Teicher, the court inferred a lack of capacity to consent to the initial touching due to her weakened condition. Here, the Court emphasized that Catherine actively resisted Cecunjanin’s attempts, demonstrating that she was not physically helpless at the time of the attempted contact. The court stated, “A reading of the record as a whole shows that Catherine may well have been physically helpless at some times, and that defendant may have attempted to subject her to sexual contact at other times, but there is no evidence that the two occurred together.” The Court affirmed the Appellate Division with the modification to vacate the conviction for attempted sexual abuse.

  • Merino v. New York City Transit Authority, 89 N.Y.2d 824 (1996): Establishing Duty and Causation in Negligence Claims

    89 N.Y.2d 824 (1996)

    To establish negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant breached a duty owed to them and that this breach was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Summary

    Merino sued the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) for negligence after he was struck by a train in a subway station. Merino, intoxicated and dizzy, had fallen onto the tracks. He claimed the NYCTA was negligent in lighting the station. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding that Merino failed to establish that the NYCTA breached a duty of care owed to him or that the alleged inadequate lighting was a substantial factor in causing his injuries. The court emphasized that an internal NYCTA planning guide does not automatically constitute a standard of reasonable care applicable to the station.

    Facts

    On April 9, 1989, at 3:00 a.m., Merino, after consuming several beers, was at the 183rd Street subway station in the Bronx. He was dizzy and intoxicated. While standing at the platform edge, he fell onto the tracks as a train approached. He was struck by the train, resulting in severe injuries, including the loss of his left arm.

    Procedural History

    Merino sued the NYCTA, alleging negligence. The trial court initially set aside a verdict in Merino’s favor and ordered a new trial, which the Appellate Division affirmed. After a second verdict for Merino, the Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, finding that Merino failed to establish negligence and causation. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Merino demonstrated that the NYCTA breached a duty of care owed to him by failing to provide adequate lighting in the subway station.

    Whether the alleged breach of duty was a substantial factor in causing Merino’s injuries.

    Holding

    No, because Merino failed to establish that the NYCTA breached any duty owed to him.

    No, because Merino failed to prove that the alleged negligence of the NYCTA was a substantial factor in causing his injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals agreed with the Appellate Division that Merino failed to demonstrate that the NYCTA breached any duty of care owed to him. The court noted that Merino’s expert relied on an internal Transit Authority station planning guide to argue the station’s lighting was inadequate; however, Merino failed to establish that this internal guide constituted a standard of reasonable care applicable to the subway station in question. The court cited Schwartz v New York State Thruway Auth., 95 AD2d 928, affd 61 NY2d 955, to support this point. Even assuming a breach of duty, the court found that Merino failed to demonstrate that the NYCTA’s alleged negligence was a substantial factor in causing his injury. The court cited Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Co., 51 NY2d 308, 315, emphasizing that the defendant’s negligence must be a substantial cause of the injury. Because Merino was intoxicated and fell onto the tracks, the court implied that his own actions were a more direct cause of the injury, breaking the causal chain between the lighting and the harm. The court did not elaborate further on what would constitute a breach of duty in the context of subway lighting but focused on the failure of the plaintiff’s evidence.

  • Franco v. New York City Transit Authority, 54 N.Y.2d 666 (1981): Admissibility of Evidence of Intoxication to Prove Contributory Negligence

    Franco v. New York City Transit Authority, 54 N.Y.2d 666 (1981)

    Evidence of a plaintiff’s intoxication is admissible to prove contributory negligence if there is a reasonable basis to conclude that the intoxication contributed to the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Summary

    In this negligence action against the New York City Transit Authority, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order and granted a new trial. The Court held that the trial court improperly excluded evidence relevant to the decedent’s possible contributory negligence. Specifically, the trial court erred in refusing to admit a Transit Authority officer’s report indicating the decedent was intoxicated and in curtailing cross-examination of witnesses regarding their opinions on the decedent’s intoxication. The Court reasoned that evidence of intoxication was relevant to determining the extent of the defendant’s liability, as the decedent’s culpable conduct could proportionately reduce it.

    Facts

    The plaintiff’s decedent fell from a subway platform onto the tracks and sustained injuries. The plaintiff subsequently sued the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), alleging negligence. The NYCTA contended that the decedent’s own negligence, specifically intoxication, contributed to the accident. The NYCTA sought to introduce evidence suggesting the decedent was intoxicated at the time of the incident.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found the NYCTA negligent and liable for the decedent’s injuries. However, the trial court excluded evidence proffered by the NYCTA regarding the decedent’s possible intoxication. The NYCTA appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The NYCTA then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the decedent’s intoxication, which the defendant proffered to demonstrate contributory negligence.

    Holding

    Yes, because a finding that the decedent was intoxicated at the time he fell from the subway platform to the tracks and thereby contributed to his own injuries would be relevant in determining the extent of defendant’s liability, and the trial court improperly stifled development of the record on that issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court improperly excluded evidence related to the possibility of contributory negligence on the decedent’s part. The Court emphasized that evidence of the decedent’s intoxication was relevant in determining the extent of the NYCTA’s liability. The Court cited Coleman v New York City Tr. Auth., 37 NY2d 137, 144, in support of its position. The Court pointed out that the trial court refused to admit a Transit Authority officer’s report, based on first-hand observation, that was probative of the decedent’s condition. Additionally, the court curtailed the NYCTA’s attempts to cross-examine witnesses about their opinions as to whether the decedent was intoxicated at the time of the incident. The Court noted that these actions prejudiced the NYCTA’s case, preventing them from adequately arguing that their liability should be proportionately reduced by the decedent’s culpable conduct. The court referenced People v Eastwood, 14 NY 562, 566, and Richardson, Evidence [Prince, 10th ed], § 364, subd [h], regarding the admissibility of opinion evidence. The Court stated, “Although there was sufficient evidence presented to support the trial court’s determination that defendant was negligent and should be held liable for plaintiff decedent’s injuries, the trial court improperly excluded evidence relating to the possibility of contributory negligence on the decedent’s part and stifled development of the record on that issue.”

  • Bottalico v. State, 59 N.Y.2d 302 (1983): State Liability for Negligence Despite Driver Intoxication

    Bottalico v. State, 59 N.Y.2d 302 (1983)

    In a wrongful death action against the state for negligent highway maintenance, the state’s negligence can be a proximate cause of an accident even if the decedent’s intoxication contributed to the incident.

    Summary

    Bottalico died in a one-vehicle accident on a dead-end road. The Court of Claims found the State negligent for failing to provide adequate warnings about the road conditions, contributing to the accident. The Appellate Division affirmed, assigning 60% liability to the State and 40% to the decedent. The State appealed, arguing the decedent’s intoxication (.17% BAC) was a supervening cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, emphasizing the narrow scope of review for affirmed findings of fact and the lower burden of proof in wrongful death cases. The Court found sufficient evidence of the State’s negligence constituting a proximate cause, irrespective of the decedent’s intoxication.

    Facts

    The decedent died in a single-vehicle accident on a dead-end segment of old Route 7 in Broome County. The accident occurred just after midnight on November 2, 1977, and was unwitnessed. The decedent had a blood alcohol level of .17% at the time of death. The State had failed to cover a “Route 7” sign after the Route 7 turnoff. The double line from the center of the road continued onto the dead-end segment. The barrier at the end of the road was improperly constructed and marked.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Claims found the State negligent and liable for 60% of the damages. The Appellate Division affirmed the Court of Claims’ judgment. The State appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State’s negligence in maintaining the highway was a proximate cause of the decedent’s accident, despite evidence of the decedent’s intoxication.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was sufficient evidence to support the lower courts’ findings that the State’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident, and the decedent’s intoxication does not automatically exonerate the State from liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized its limited scope of review, noting it cannot overturn affirmed findings of fact if supported by evidence. It cited ample evidence of the State’s negligence, including the misleading signage, improper road markings, and poorly constructed barrier. The court acknowledged the decedent’s intoxication but affirmed the finding that the State’s negligence was also a proximate cause of the accident. The court cited Noseworthy v. City of New York, noting the lower burden of proof in wrongful death cases. It also referenced Wragge v. Lizza Asphalt Constr. Co., stating that evidence must be viewed favorably to the claimant. The court rejected the State’s argument that the decedent’s intoxication was a supervening cause, stating: “The State’s argument that decedent’s blood alcohol level at the time of his accident is a supervening cause as a matter of law must be rejected. Claimant need not exclude all other possible causes of the accident. The fact that decedent’s ability to drive was impaired does not exonerate the State from liability on the ground that its negligence was not one of the proximate causes of the accident.” The Court cited Hulett v State of New York to further support the proposition that impaired driving does not automatically absolve the State of liability. The Court highlighted that the claimant does not need to exclude all other possible causes of the accident; the State’s negligence only needs to be *one* of the proximate causes.

  • People v. Orr, 27 N.Y.2d 814 (1970): Proof Needed for Criminal Negligence While Intoxicated

    People v. Orr, 27 N.Y.2d 814 (1970)

    Proof of intoxication alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction for criminal negligence; the prosecution must demonstrate that the intoxication directly impaired the defendant’s physical and mental capacity, causing them to operate a vehicle in a culpably reckless manner.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the necessary evidentiary standard for convicting a defendant of criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The court held that mere proof of intoxication is not enough. The prosecution must also prove that the intoxication impaired the defendant’s physical and mental abilities, causing them to drive in a culpably reckless manner. The court reversed the defendant’s conviction for criminal negligence because the prosecution failed to establish that his intoxication caused him to strike the decedent, while affirming the conviction for driving while intoxicated.

    Facts

    The defendant, Orr, was involved in a motor vehicle accident that resulted in a fatality. He was subsequently charged with and convicted of both operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and criminal negligence pursuant to section 1053-a of the Penal Law. The prosecution presented evidence of Orr’s intoxication. However, the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove that Orr’s intoxication caused him to drive recklessly, leading to the accident.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court on charges of both operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and criminal negligence. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether proof of intoxication alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction for criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, or whether the prosecution must also prove that the intoxication caused the defendant to operate the vehicle in a culpably reckless manner.

    Holding

    No, because proof of intoxication alone is not sufficient. The People must also prove that the defendant’s intoxication affected his physical and mental capacity to the extent that it caused him to operate his vehicle in a culpably reckless manner.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on precedent from previous cases, including People v. Fink, People v. Manning, People v. Harvin, People v. Fyfe, and People v. Lacey, to support its holding. These cases established that to convict someone of criminal negligence related to drunk driving, the prosecution must demonstrate a causal link between the intoxication and the reckless operation of the vehicle. The court emphasized that simply being drunk while driving is not enough; the intoxication must be the reason for the reckless driving.

    The Court stated, “Proof of intoxication alone is not enough to sustain a conviction of criminal negligence. The People must also prove that the defendant’s intoxication affected his physical and mental capacity to the extent that it caused him to operate his vehicle in a culpably reckless manner”.

    In this case, the Court found that the prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence that Orr’s intoxication caused him to drive at an excessive speed or that his intoxication caused him to strike the decedent. Therefore, the Court reversed the conviction for criminal negligence.

    The practical implication of this case is that prosecutors must present specific evidence demonstrating how the defendant’s intoxication led to their reckless driving behavior, not just that they were intoxicated while driving.

  • Mitchell v. The Shoals, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 338 (1967): Limits on Bar Liability to Intoxicated Patrons

    Mitchell v. The Shoals, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 338 (1967)

    Under New York’s Dram Shop Act, an injured person can recover damages from a bar that unlawfully served alcohol to an intoxicated person who caused the injury, unless the injured person actively participated in causing the intoxication.

    Summary

    Yvonne Mitchell sued The Shoals, Inc. under New York’s Dram Shop Act for injuries sustained when a car driven by an intoxicated Robert Taylor crashed. Mitchell and Taylor had been drinking together at The Shoals, where Taylor was visibly drunk and continued to be served alcohol. Mitchell passed out due to her own intoxication. The court held that Mitchell could recover damages because, although she was intoxicated, she did not actively cause or encourage Taylor’s intoxication. The court clarified that merely being a drinking companion is insufficient to bar recovery; the injured party must have a more affirmative role in causing the intoxication of the person who caused the injury.

    Facts

    Yvonne Mitchell, Robert Taylor, and another couple went to The Shoals for drinks and dancing. Mitchell consumed several drinks and passed out. Taylor became drunk and noisy. Despite Taylor’s visible intoxication, the bartender continued to serve him drinks, ignoring instructions to stop. The two couples left, with Taylor driving. Taylor lost control of the car, crashing it and causing serious injuries to Mitchell and killing himself. Mitchell sued The Shoals, Inc. under the Dram Shop Act.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rendered a verdict in favor of Mitchell. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The Shoals, Inc. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an individual who is injured as a result of the intoxication of another person has a cause of action against the establishment that unlawfully served alcohol to the intoxicated person, under the Dram Shop Act, if the injured individual was also intoxicated but did not actively contribute to the other person’s intoxication.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Dram Shop Act allows an injured party to recover damages from the establishment that unlawfully served alcohol to the intoxicated person who caused the injury, provided the injured party did not actively cause or procure the other’s intoxication. The plaintiff’s mere consumption of alcohol alongside the intoxicated individual is insufficient to bar recovery.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the language and purpose of the Dram Shop Act, which provides a right of action to those injured “by reason of the intoxication” of another against the person who unlawfully sold or assisted in procuring liquor for the intoxicated individual. The court emphasized that the statute doesn’t prevent an intoxicated person from recovery unless they caused the intoxication of the other party. The court found no basis in the law for denying recovery simply because the injured party was also served alcohol and became intoxicated, as long as they did not affirmatively contribute to the intoxication of the person who caused the injury.

    The court distinguished between merely being a drinking companion and actively causing another person’s intoxication. The court reasoned that to deny recovery based solely on limited alcohol capacity would impair the statute’s purpose. Citing precedents from other states, the court acknowledged varying interpretations of Dram Shop Acts, some of which bar recovery for mere participation in drinking with the intoxicated person. However, the court explicitly rejected this broader interpretation, stating, “It is our view that the injured person must play a much more affirmative role than that of drinking companion to the one who injures him before he may be denied recovery against the bartender or tavern keeper who served them.”

    The court noted that the trial court’s charge regarding contributory negligence was erroneous but deemed it harmless error.

  • People v. Schompert, 19 N.Y.2d 300 (1967): Admissibility of Confessions Under Self-Induced Intoxication

    People v. Schompert, 19 N.Y.2d 300 (1967)

    A confession obtained from a person under self-induced intoxication is admissible as evidence if it is deemed reliable, considering the confessor’s capacity to understand their statements and the accuracy of the confession as confirmed by subsequent events.

    Summary

    Schompert appealed his conviction for grand larceny and burglary, arguing his confession was involuntary due to severe alcoholism and intoxication at the time it was made. He voluntarily contacted the police and confessed to the crimes, providing detailed information that led to the recovery of stolen property. The Court of Appeals held that self-induced intoxication does not automatically render a confession inadmissible. The key is the confession’s reliability, which can be assessed by the confessor’s understanding at the time of the statement and whether subsequent events confirm the confession’s accuracy. Because Schompert provided detailed information and the stolen property was recovered as he described, his confession was deemed reliable and therefore admissible.

    Facts

    Schompert, a chronic alcoholic with a history of psychosis, was in a bar in Rochester and called the police. He told them he had burglarized a premises. The police disbelieved him until he stated he had the stolen goods in a locker at the Greyhound bus station and possessed the key. The police and Schompert went to the locker, and the police found items that had been taken from the burglarized premises.

    Procedural History

    Schompert was convicted of grand larceny in the second degree and burglary in the third degree in 1963. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals was denied. Schompert then filed a proceeding in the nature of error coram nobis to vacate the judgment of conviction, arguing the involuntariness of his confession. The County Court dismissed his petition after a hearing, and the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. Schompert then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a confession made by a person under the influence of self-induced intoxication is inadmissible as involuntary, regardless of its reliability and corroborating evidence.

    Holding

    No, because in cases of self-induced intoxication, the key determinant of admissibility is the trustworthiness of the confession, assessed by the confessor’s capacity to understand their statements and whether the confession’s details are confirmed by subsequent events.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between confessions obtained through coercion or police-induced intoxication (which are inadmissible regardless of truthfulness) and those resulting from self-induced intoxication. In the latter case, the primary concern is the confession’s reliability. The court emphasized that excluding confessions due to coercion or unfairness aims to prevent abuse of power by officials, not to protect wrongdoers from punishment. The court stated: “*proof that the accused was intoxicated at the time he confessed his guilt of crime will not, without more, bar the reception of the confession in evidence. But if it is shown that the accused was intoxicated to the degree of mania, or of being unable to understand the meaning of his statements, then the confession is inadmissible.*”

    The court found that although Schompert was highly intoxicated, he provided a detailed and accurate account of the burglary, which was verified by the discovery of the stolen property at the location he specified. This demonstrated that Schompert was sufficiently aware of his actions and the nature of his statements at the time of the confession. The court considered the subsequent confirmation of the confession’s details as strong evidence of its reliability. The Court also noted that it was important and frequently critical whether the intoxication was self-induced or police-induced. The court also notes that Wigmore’s analysis that the fundamental theory upon which confessions become inadmissible is that when made under certain conditions they are untrustworthy as testimonial utterances. Therefore, because the confession was trustworthy, it was admissible.