New York Law Review

Tag: Intoxicated person

  • Zona v. Oatka Restaurant and Lounge, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 824 (1986): Contribution Allowed Under Dram Shop Act for Pain and Suffering

    Zona v. Oatka Restaurant and Lounge, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 824 (1986)

    Contribution is permissible under New York’s Dram Shop Act for claims related to pain and suffering and loss of support, even when the intoxicated individual who caused the harm is deceased and the claimant is a relative, as long as allowing contribution does not directly frustrate the Act’s policy.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether contribution is allowed under New York’s Dram Shop Act when the intoxicated person who caused the injury is deceased and related to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals held that contribution is permissible for claims of pain and suffering and loss of support. Even though allowing contribution might reduce the total recovery for the plaintiff, the court reasoned that because the reduction stems from the deceased’s death and is an indirect consequence, it does not violate the policy of the Dram Shop Act. The court emphasized the legislative intent to allow contribution unless it clearly frustrates the statute’s underlying policy.

    Facts

    An intoxicated individual (the vendee) caused injury and death. The vendee subsequently died after the accident. The injured party and the vendee were married, and the plaintiff seeking loss of support was their daughter. The plaintiff brought suit against the bar that served the vendee (Oatka Restaurant and Lounge, Inc.) under the Dram Shop Act. The defendant bar then sought contribution from the estate of the deceased vendee.

    Procedural History

    The lower court initially dismissed the third-party complaint seeking contribution from the vendee’s estate. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, thereby allowing the third-party claim for contribution to proceed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether contribution from the estate of a deceased intoxicated person is permissible under the Dram Shop Act for claims related to the pain and suffering of a deceased injured person and the loss of means of support of her daughter, when the deceased intoxicated person was the husband of the deceased injured person and the father of the plaintiff seeking loss of support.

    Holding

    Yes, because allowing contribution in this instance does not directly violate the policy of the Dram Shop Act, as the reduction in potential recovery stems from the fortuitous circumstance of the tortfeasor’s death and is an indirect consequence of allowing contribution.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the legislative intent behind CPLR 1401, which favors allowing contribution unless it directly frustrates the policy of the statute violated. The court stated, “The policy of the law, as declared by the Legislature in CPLR 1401, is to allow contribution ‘unless it is clear that the legislative policy which led to the passage of the statute would be frustrated by the granting of contribution in favor of the person who violated the statute’.” The court determined that allowing contribution from the vendee’s estate, even though it might reduce the total amount available to the daughter, did not directly contravene the Dram Shop Act’s goals. The court emphasized that the reduction was an indirect result of the vendee’s death, a “fortuitous circumstance.” The court distinguished this situation from one where contribution would directly undermine the Act’s purpose of protecting innocent third parties from alcohol-related harm. The court cited previous cases (Herrick v Second Outhouse, Smith v Guli, Weinheimer v Hoffman) that established contribution between a vendor and vendee doesn’t violate the Dram Shop Act.

  • Cummings v. State, 53 N.Y.2d 104 (1981): Duty of Care to Intoxicated Persons in Custody

    Cummings v. State, 53 N.Y.2d 104 (1981)

    Law enforcement officers owe a duty of reasonable care to individuals in their custody who are impaired by intoxication, but this duty does not make the state an insurer of the individual’s safety against all possible harm.

    Summary

    An intoxicated claimant, arrested by Officer Forbes, sustained injuries when he fell on an icy surface while being escorted by the officer. The Court of Claims found the State negligent and awarded damages. The Appellate Division reversed, finding no negligence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the officer’s actions, although intended to assist the claimant, did not meet the standard of reasonable care required under the circumstances. The court emphasized the officer’s awareness of the claimant’s intoxicated state and the icy conditions as factors contributing to the State’s negligence.

    Facts

    Officer Forbes found Cummings’ car in a highway median after it skidded on ice. Cummings appeared intoxicated and was arrested. At the hospital, Cummings refused a blood test and became hostile. Forbes handcuffed Cummings and placed him in the patrol car. Cummings complained that the handcuffs were too tight. Forbes pulled into a gas station to loosen the handcuffs, warning Cummings about the icy conditions. While Forbes was opening the car door, Cummings fell and broke his nose.

    Procedural History

    Cummings sued the State in the Court of Claims, alleging negligence. The Court of Claims dismissed all causes of action except negligence, sustaining that cause and awarding Cummings $14,500. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the claim, finding no negligence by Officer Forbes. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Court of Claims’ judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Officer Forbes breached his duty of reasonable care to Cummings, an intoxicated person in custody, by failing to adequately protect him from a foreseeable risk of harm (falling on ice), thereby constituting negligence on the part of the State.

    Holding

    Yes, because Officer Forbes, knowing Cummings was intoxicated and aware of the icy conditions, did not exercise reasonable care to prevent Cummings from falling and injuring himself. The State is responsible for the officer’s negligence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while police officers owe a duty of reasonable care to those in custody who are impaired, the State is not an insurer of their well-being. However, in this case, Officer Forbes knew Cummings was intoxicated and also knew the ground was icy. Despite this knowledge, he did not take sufficient precautions to prevent Cummings from falling. The court distinguished this case from situations where the hazard is not readily apparent. The court stated that the question of negligence is typically a question of fact. Here, given the totality of the circumstances (the intoxication of the claimant, the icy conditions known to the officer) it was reasonable for the Court of Claims to determine that the officer was negligent. The court cited the standard jury instruction PJI 2:26, which instructs that a police officer is required to exercise reasonable care for the safety of a person in custody. Quoting the dissent in the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals stated that the claimant’s condition created “a foreseeable risk of injury” and the officer should have taken steps to protect the claimant, such as holding his arm. The dissent argued that the officer took reasonable precautions, warning Cummings of the ice. The dissent also noted that the officer was attempting to alleviate Cummings’ discomfort from the handcuffs. The dissent believed that imposing liability in this case would require police officers to insulate intoxicated individuals from all unexpected harm, which is an unreasonable standard. The majority disagreed, holding that the officer failed to take reasonable steps to protect Cummings from a foreseeable risk, given Cummings’ impaired state and the known icy conditions.