Feinberg v. Saks & Co., 56 N.Y.2d 206 (1982)

A finding of probable cause for initial detention does not automatically bar a malicious prosecution claim if intervening facts arise after the detention that would negate probable cause and demonstrate malice.

Summary

Doris Feinberg sued Saks & Company for false arrest and malicious prosecution after being acquitted of petit larceny charges filed by Saks’ security. The jury found for Feinberg on malicious prosecution but for Saks on false arrest. Saks moved to set aside the malicious prosecution verdict, arguing inconsistency. The trial court denied the motion, but the Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the malicious prosecution claim, reasoning that probable cause for detention barred the claim absent intervening exonerating facts. The Court of Appeals modified, holding that the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the complaint because some evidence existed that, if credited, could establish an intervening circumstance supporting an inference of malice, warranting a new trial.

Facts

Doris Feinberg was detained by Saks & Company security personnel who accused her of petit larceny. Criminal charges were filed against her. Feinberg was later acquitted of the charges. Feinberg then sued Saks & Company for false arrest and malicious prosecution.

Procedural History

The trial court rendered a general verdict for Feinberg on malicious prosecution and for Saks on false arrest. Saks moved to set aside the malicious prosecution verdict, which was denied by the trial court. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the malicious prosecution claim. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case for a new trial on the malicious prosecution claim.

Issue(s)

1. Whether a jury verdict finding probable cause for false arrest necessarily bars a claim for malicious prosecution.
2. Whether the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the malicious prosecution claim when there was some evidence of intervening facts suggesting a lack of probable cause and demonstrating malice.

Holding

1. No, because probable cause for an initial detention does not automatically bar a malicious prosecution claim if intervening facts arise after the detention that negate probable cause and demonstrate malice.
2. Yes, because there was some evidence presented at trial that, if believed, could show an intervening circumstance supporting an inference of malice, which should have led to a new trial rather than dismissal.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals held that while the Appellate Division had the power to review the consistency of the verdicts, its dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim was improper. The court reasoned that dismissal was only appropriate if “there was no evidence at trial that the defendant, between the time of detention and the time of instituting the criminal proceeding against the plaintiff, had knowledge of some intervening fact exonerating plaintiff.” The court found there was some evidence in the record that, if credited by the jury, could establish an intervening circumstance supporting an inference of malice. In resolving this question, appellate courts “should consider the facts adduced at trial in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every favorable inference that can reasonably be drawn from the facts.” (Martin v City of Albany, 42 NY2d 13). Therefore, the proper disposition was a new trial to allow a jury to determine whether the plaintiff should recover on the malicious prosecution claim. The court emphasized that its review was limited to the corrective action of the Appellate Division, as Saks & Company had failed to preserve the inconsistency issue for review by not raising a timely objection at trial. The practical effect is that Saks & Company cannot rely on the initial probable cause for detention if new information came to light indicating Feinberg’s innocence, potentially vitiating their continued prosecution of the petit larceny charge. Failure to consider such “intervening facts” could lead to a finding of malice.