People ex rel. Grimmick v. New York State Div. of Parole, 71 N.Y.2d 306 (1988)

A New York parolee convicted of a felony in another state and sentenced to a determinate term is entitled to a final parole revocation hearing in New York, as the statutory exemption from such a hearing applies only when the parolee receives a new indeterminate sentence in New York.

Summary

Grimmick, a New York parolee under supervision in California, was convicted of rape in California and sentenced to a three-year term. New York revoked his parole without a final hearing, relying on a statute that allows revocation without a hearing for parolees convicted of a new felony and sentenced to an indeterminate term. The New York Court of Appeals held that this exemption applies only to new indeterminate sentences imposed in New York. Because Grimmick’s California sentence was determinate, he was entitled to a final revocation hearing in New York.

Facts

Grimmick was paroled in New York in 1982, with a remaining indeterminate sentence of 5 to 15 years for a 1969 burglary conviction. He moved to California in 1983 and was supervised by California parole authorities under the Interstate Parole Compact. In 1985, he was convicted of forcible rape in California and sentenced to a three-year prison term. After receiving credit for good conduct and time in custody, he was released to California parole supervision in April 1987. A preliminary parole revocation hearing was held concerning his New York parole status. He was then returned to New York, and the New York State Parole Board revoked his parole without a final revocation hearing based on the California felony conviction and sentence.

Procedural History

Grimmick filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was wrongly denied a final parole revocation hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ, holding that Executive Law § 259-i (3) (d) (iii) authorized revocation without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether Executive Law § 259-i (3) (d) (iii), which dispenses with the final parole revocation hearing for parolees convicted of a new felony and sentenced to an indeterminate term, applies to a parolee convicted of a felony and sentenced to a determinate term in another state.

Holding

No, because the statute’s plain language and legislative intent limit the exemption to parolees sentenced to a new indeterminate term in New York.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized that the statute plainly requires an “indeterminate” sentence for the exemption from the final revocation hearing to apply. Grimmick’s California sentence was a determinate three-year term, not an indeterminate sentence as defined under New York law. The court stated, “When its language is clear and unambiguous, it should be construed so as to give effect to the plain meaning of its words.”

The court rejected the Division of Parole’s argument that the California sentence should be treated as if it were a New York indeterminate sentence, noting that such an interpretation is not supported by the statute’s language, purpose, or legislative history. The purpose of the exemption is to avoid redundant hearings when a parolee’s violation has already been established by a New York felony conviction and indeterminate sentence, which automatically fixes the parolee’s reappearance before the Board. The court reasoned that, unlike a new New York indeterminate sentence, the California determinate sentence does not automatically fix the parolee’s reappearance date before the board, making a final revocation hearing necessary to determine that date.

The court also pointed out that the Division of Parole had itself recognized this statutory gap and proposed legislation to extend the exemption to out-of-state felony convictions. The court concluded, “A significant change of the kind urged by respondents, expanding such an exemption from the usual statutorily mandated hearing requirement, should come from the Legislature.” Because Grimmick was denied a timely final revocation hearing, the court ordered him restored to parole status, as ordering a hearing at this stage would render the timeliness requirement meaningless.