New York Law Review

Tag: Interstate Agreement on Detainers

  • People v. Feliciano, 17 N.Y.3d 16 (2011): Duty to Promptly Execute a Violation of Probation Warrant

    People v. Feliciano, 17 N.Y.3d 16 (2011)

    A court’s failure to promptly execute a violation of probation (VOP) warrant for a defendant incarcerated out-of-state does not automatically divest the court of jurisdiction, especially when extradition is complex and the delay is partially attributable to the defendant’s actions.

    Summary

    Luis Feliciano pleaded guilty to a felony drug charge and received a split sentence of jail time and probation. He violated his probation by fleeing to Puerto Rico, prompting the court to issue a VOP warrant. Years later, while incarcerated in Pennsylvania for a separate crime, Feliciano requested resolution of the VOP. The New York court delayed the VOP hearing until Feliciano’s release from Pennsylvania due to extradition difficulties. After his release, Feliciano was resentenced to a prison term. The New York Court of Appeals held that the delay did not divest the court of jurisdiction because of the complexities of interstate extradition and the defendant’s initial flight, distinguishing the case from situations where a defendant is readily available within the state.

    Facts

    In 1992, Feliciano was sentenced to jail and probation for a drug felony.

    He violated probation by fleeing to Puerto Rico without permission.

    A VOP complaint was filed, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

    In 2000, he was arrested in Pennsylvania for homicide-related crimes.

    In 2002, he requested resolution of the outstanding VOP from New York.

    The District Attorney noted the difficulties of extraditing him from Pennsylvania.

    The court postponed the VOP hearing until his release from Pennsylvania.

    In 2007, after his release from Pennsylvania, the VOP warrant was executed, and he was resentenced.

    Procedural History

    The County Court initially imposed a split sentence for the drug charge.

    After Feliciano violated his probation, the County Court declared him delinquent and issued an arrest warrant.

    After serving time in Pennsylvania, Feliciano was returned to Greene County, and the County Court revoked his probation and resentenced him.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the resentencing.

    Feliciano filed two CPL 440.20 motions, claiming jurisdictional defect and ineffective assistance of counsel, both of which were denied.

    His application for a writ of error coram nobis was denied by the Appellate Division, but leave to appeal was granted by the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the five-year delay in adjudicating the VOP complaint, due to the defendant’s incarceration in another state and the difficulties of extradition, violated his statutory or constitutional rights and divested the County Court of jurisdiction to revoke his probation.

    Holding

    No, because the delay was not unreasonable given the complexities of interstate extradition, the defendant’s initial flight from New York, and the lack of a clear legal obligation for New York to prioritize his return for the VOP hearing while he was serving a sentence in Pennsylvania.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Horvath, where the probationer was incarcerated within New York and readily available. The court emphasized that CPL 410.30 requires the court to “promptly take reasonable and appropriate action,” but what constitutes “reasonable and appropriate action” depends on the circumstances.

    The court cited Carchman v. Nash and Moody v. Daggett, highlighting that the Supreme Court has drawn distinctions between detainers based on criminal charges and those based on probation violations, noting the reduced urgency and constitutional dimension of the latter.

    The court also distinguished this case from People v. Winfrey, where the People made no effort whatsoever to secure the defendant’s return from out-of-state. Here, the District Attorney investigated the possibility of extradition and determined it was impractical.

    The court stated, “The arguments that defendant asserts trial counsel should have advanced at the VOP hearing are not so strong that ‘no reasonable defense lawyer could have found [them] … to be not worth raising.’ They are, in fact, novel and call for an extension of or change in — not an application of — existing law.”

    Because the arguments were not clearly dispositive, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them.

  • People v. Reid, 84 N.Y.2d 477 (1994): Waiver of Speedy Trial Rights Under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers

    84 N.Y.2d 477 (1994)

    A defendant’s mere concurrence in a trial date set by the court, even if that date falls outside the 180-day speedy trial period mandated by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), does not constitute a waiver of their speedy trial rights under the IAD.

    Summary

    Defendant Reid, incarcerated in Ohio, requested a speedy trial on pending New York charges under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). At a hearing to set a trial date, defense counsel agreed to a date suggested by the court that was beyond the IAD’s 180-day speedy trial window. Reid later moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing a violation of his IAD speedy trial rights. The trial court denied the motion, holding Reid had waived his rights. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the burden to comply with the IAD falls on the prosecution and the courts, not the defendant, and mere concurrence in a trial date is not a waiver.

    Facts

    In December 1993, Monroe County officials lodged a detainer against Reid, who was imprisoned in Ohio, for murder and robbery charges. Reid invoked his rights under Article III of the IAD, requesting a final disposition of the New York charges. The request was received by the Monroe County Court and prosecutor on January 10, 1994, triggering the IAD’s 180-day speedy trial provision.

    Procedural History

    Reid was indicted on March 11, 1994. In May 1994, Reid filed pretrial motions, which the court decided in December 1994. On January 9, 1995, a trial date of May 1, 1995, was set with the defense’s agreement. On April 17, 1995, Reid moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to bring him to trial within the IAD’s 180-day period. The trial court denied the motion, and Reid was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, granting Reid’s motion to dismiss.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, by concurring in a trial date set by the court that falls outside the 180-day period mandated by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), waives their right to a speedy trial under that statute.

    Holding

    No, because the burden of complying with the IAD’s speedy trial requirements falls on the prosecution and the courts, not the defendant, and mere concurrence in a trial date does not constitute an affirmative request for a trial date beyond the speedy trial period.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the IAD’s purpose is to ensure the orderly and expeditious disposition of untried charges against prisoners incarcerated in other states. The Court noted that the IAD places the burden of compliance with its speedy trial provisions on the prosecution and the courts, not on the defendant. The Court distinguished between a defendant’s passive agreement to a trial date and an affirmative request for a delay. “From the statutory language and objectives it follows that the IAD does not impose an obligation on defendants to alert the prosecution or the court to their IAD speedy trial rights or to object to treatment that is inconsistent with those rights.” The Court cited Brown v. Wolff, 706 F.2d 902, 907 (9th Cir.), in support of this proposition. The Court reasoned that imposing such an obligation would shift the burden of compliance from state officials, diminishing the statute’s effectiveness. The Court stated, “Similarly, where, as here, the defendant simply concurred in a trial date proposed by the court and accepted by the prosecution, and that date fell outside the 180-day statutory period, no waiver of his speedy trial rights was effected.” Because Reid was not brought to trial within the 180-day period, the Court held that the indictment must be dismissed as mandated by IAD Article V(c).