47 N.Y.2d 554 (1979)

A criminal defendant’s sentence is interrupted for the purpose of computing sentence credit during the period of their release from detention between an intermediate appellate court’s reversal of their conviction and the subsequent reinstatement of that conviction by the highest state court.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant should receive sentence credit for the time spent out of custody following an appellate division’s reversal of his conviction, which was later overturned by the Court of Appeals itself. The court held that the defendant’s sentence was interrupted during the period of his freedom between the reversal and the reinstatement of his conviction. This decision rested on the principle that the defendant had been accorded a period of freedom to which he was ultimately not entitled, and therefore should not receive credit toward his sentence for that time.

Facts

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed his conviction and dismissed the indictment, leading to his release from custody on May 4, 1978. Subsequently, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and reinstated the appellant’s conviction on July 9, 1979. The appellant sought sentence credit for the 14-month period between his release and the reinstatement of his conviction.

Procedural History

The trial court convicted the appellant. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the original conviction. The appellant then appealed the denial of sentence credit for the time he was free.

Issue(s)

Whether CPL 430.10 precludes treating a defendant’s release following the reversal of his conviction by the Appellate Division as an interruption of his sentence, thus entitling him to sentence credit for the period between the Appellate Division’s decision and the Court of Appeals’ reinstatement of the conviction.

Holding

No, because the defendant was ultimately determined not to be entitled to the freedom he experienced during that time, and therefore should not receive credit towards his sentence for that period.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals rejected the appellant’s argument that only explicit statutory language mentioning the interruption of a sentence would suffice to create an exception under CPL 430.10. The court noted that the Appellate Division’s reversal and dismissal were actions specifically authorized by statute (CPL 470.15, 470.20, 470.45), leading to the defendant’s lawful discharge from custody. However, the court emphasized that its subsequent reversal meant the defendant had been “accorded a period of freedom to which we ultimately determined he was not entitled.” The court distinguished the case from situations involving a defendant’s voluntary misconduct (e.g., parole violations, escape), stating, “[a]n assertion that he should be deemed to be serving a sentence while he was free pursuant to statutory entitlement flies in the face of reality.” The court effectively reasoned that, while the initial release was legally authorized, the subsequent reversal nullified the basis for that release, making it unfair for the defendant to receive sentence credit for that time. The court stated that, “[i]n effect defendant was accorded a period of freedom to which we ultimately determined he was not entitled…there is no sufficient reason why the running of his sentence should not be tolled during the period he enjoyed what proved to be an undeserved benefit.”