New York Law Review

Tag: Interrogation

  • People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981): Right to Counsel and Interrogation on Related Charges

    People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981)

    Once a defendant is represented by counsel on a charge, even if that charge is unrelated to a new investigation, police cannot question the defendant about the new investigation in the absence of counsel if they are aware of the prior representation.

    Summary

    Bartolomeo was arrested and arraigned for criminal possession of stolen property. Subsequently, he was questioned about that crime and two rapes. He had counsel in connection to one of the rapes from a prior investigation. The Court of Appeals held that statements relating to the stolen car charge were inadmissible because his right to counsel had indelibly attached after arraignment on that charge. Further, because the police knew he had counsel on the prior rape charge, questioning on other matters, including the new rape charge, was precluded. The plea to the rape charge which was based on the erroneous denial of suppression was vacated, as was the other rape charge because the plea agreements were integrated.

    Facts

    Ms. McE reported a rape to police. Bartolomeo was represented by counsel for this charge in court proceedings related to a lineup.
    Ms. P reported being raped. She gave the license plate number of the car used, which was found to be stolen. Police found Bartolomeo asleep in the car, arrested him, and arraigned him on criminal possession of stolen property. He was not represented by counsel at this arraignment.
    Bartolomeo was then questioned about the stolen car and both rapes, making incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    Bartolomeo was indicted on two counts of rape and one count of criminal possession of stolen property.
    The County Court suppressed statements about the stolen property and the Ms. P rape, but admitted statements about the Ms. McE rape.
    The Appellate Division reversed and granted the suppression motion in its entirety.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements relating to the stolen car charge were admissible when Bartolomeo had been arraigned on that charge without counsel.
    Whether statements relating to the Ms. McE rape were admissible when Bartolomeo had counsel for that charge from a prior proceeding, even though it was a different investigation.
    Whether statements relating to the Ms. P rape were admissible given the illegal questioning about the stolen car and Bartolomeo’s representation by counsel on the Ms. McE rape charge.
    Whether the pleas to both rape counts should be vacated if one plea was based on an erroneous denial of suppression.

    Holding

    No, because Bartolomeo’s right to counsel had indelibly attached after the arraignment on the criminal possession charge, and he could not be interrogated on that charge without counsel present.
    No, because counsel having once entered the proceedings in connection with the charge under investigation, Bartolomeo could not waive his right to counsel in the absence of that attorney. The police and District Attorney were aware of the representation.
    No, because the questioning was an integrated whole where the questioning about the criminal possession was “so interrelated and intertwined” with the questioning about the Ms. P rape. Additionally, the defendant was known to be represented by counsel in connection with the “McE” rape charge, questioning on other matters was precluded.
    Yes, because the plea agreement with respect to the two rape counts was integrated and vacatur of one plea requires vacatur of both.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that once the right to counsel attaches, interrogation is prohibited unless counsel is present. This protection extends to questioning on matters that are “so interrelated and intertwined” with the charged crime. Because Bartolomeo had counsel on the McE rape charge, the police knew or should have known he had counsel and could not question him on any matter without counsel present.

    The Court cited People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979) stating questioning on other matters was precluded when the defendant was known to be represented by counsel. “Moreover, as defendant was known to be represented by counsel in connection with the “McE” rape charge, questioning on other matters was precluded.”

    The Court also agreed with the Appellate Division’s reasoning that the plea agreement was integrated, meaning that if one plea was vacated, both must be vacated. This ensures fairness and prevents the prosecution from benefiting from a plea bargain that was based on flawed evidence. “Inasmuch as the plea to the “McE” rape count was based on an erroneous denial of suppression that plea must be vacated. Additionally, we agree with the Appellate Division, and for the reasons stated in the opinion of Justice Guy T. Mangano, that, although the plea to the “P” rape count was made after suppression, nonetheless the plea agreement with respect to the two rape counts was integrated and vacatur of one plea requires vacatur of both.”

  • People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981): Duty to Inquire About Counsel After Prior Arrest

    People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981)

    When police know a suspect has been recently arrested by the same agency on an unrelated charge, they have a duty to inquire whether the suspect has counsel on that charge before interrogating the suspect; failure to inquire is equivalent to knowing the suspect has counsel, precluding interrogation without counsel present.

    Summary

    Bartolomeo was arrested for arson and represented by counsel. Days later, officers from the same police department arrested him for murder, aware of the arson arrest but not the representation. After waiving his rights, Bartolomeo made incriminating statements. The court held that because the police knew of the recent arrest, they had a duty to ask if he had counsel. Failing to do so, they were charged with that knowledge, rendering the waiver invalid. Thus, the statements were suppressed. However, the court upheld the search warrant for Bartolomeo’s car, finding probable cause existed based on an accomplice’s sworn statement.

    Facts

    On May 27, 1978, Bartolomeo was arrested for arson and arraigned with attorney Joseph Stabile representing him.
    On June 5, 1978, officers from the same police department arrested Bartolomeo for the April murder of John McLaughlin.
    The officers, Detectives Rafferty and Donohue, knew of the arson arrest but not that Bartolomeo had counsel in that case.
    Bartolomeo was advised of his Miranda rights and waived his right to counsel, not mentioning he had an attorney on the arson charge.
    After being confronted with an accomplice’s statement, Bartolomeo made incriminating statements about the McLaughlin homicide.
    About 45 minutes into the interrogation, an attorney contacted by Stabile informed police he represented Bartolomeo and demanded questioning cease, which it did.

    Procedural History

    Bartolomeo was convicted of second-degree murder after a jury trial.
    Prior to trial, Bartolomeo moved to suppress his statements and evidence seized from his car, which was denied.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion.
    Bartolomeo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements obtained during a police interrogation must be suppressed when the interrogating officers knew the suspect was recently arrested by the same law enforcement agency on an unrelated charge, and failed to inquire whether the suspect had counsel on the prior charge, when, in fact, the suspect was represented by counsel on that charge.
    Whether a search warrant for a vehicle was properly issued based on an accomplice’s sworn statement providing details of the crime.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the interrogating detectives possessed actual knowledge of the outstanding arson charge against the defendant, they were obligated to inquire whether defendant was represented by an attorney on that charge. Having failed to make such inquiry, the officers were chargeable with what such an inquiry would have disclosed.
    No, because an ample showing of probable cause was made based on the accomplice’s sworn statement, and the Aguilar test does not apply when the warrant application includes a sworn statement from someone with firsthand knowledge of the facts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that police knowledge of a suspect’s representation by counsel on a separate charge precludes interrogation without counsel present. “Knowledge that one in custody is represented by counsel, albeit on a separate, unrelated charge, precludes interrogation in the absence of counsel and renders ineffective any purported waiver of the assistance of counsel when such waiver occurs out of the presence of the attorney.”
    The court extended this principle to situations where police know of a recent prior arrest by the same agency. “Hence, the interrogating detectives here, with actual knowledge of the outstanding arson charge against defendant, were under an obligation to inquire whether defendant was represented by an attorney on that charge.”
    The court distinguished the case from situations with remote prior arrests or arrests by different agencies.
    The court rejected the argument to suppress evidence seized from the car because the warrant was based on a sworn statement from an accomplice, Caprisecca, providing firsthand details of the crime. The warrant recited that probable cause had been shown that the Volkswagen constituted evidence of a crime and tended to show that a particular person had committed a crime.
    The court found the Aguilar v. Texas two-pronged test inapplicable here because it applies when an officer’s affidavit relies on information from an informant, not when there’s a sworn statement from someone with direct knowledge.
    The court also rejected the argument to extend the accomplice corroboration rule (CPL 60.22) to the issuance of search warrants, citing the difference between proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and establishing probable cause.
    The court noted the significant difference in kind between the determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as the predicate for the imposition of criminal sanctions, on the one hand, and the demonstration of probable cause sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements for search and seizure as the warrant for police investigation, on the other, justifies a differentiation (Brinegar v United States, 338 US 160).

  • People v. Grimaldi, 52 N.Y.2d 611 (1981): Right to Counsel and Spontaneous Statements

    People v. Grimaldi, 52 N.Y.2d 611 (1981)

    Once a defendant is represented by counsel, any statements obtained by the police in the absence of that counsel are inadmissible, unless the statements are truly spontaneous and not the product of inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence by the authorities.

    Summary

    Grimaldi was arrested and charged with second-degree murder and assigned counsel. Despite knowing Grimaldi was represented, Investigator Reidy questioned him. Grimaldi refused to speak without talking to his father first. Reidy arranged for Grimaldi to call his father and secretly listened to the conversation, recording incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that these statements were inadmissible because they violated Grimaldi’s state constitutional right to counsel. The court reasoned that the phone call and subsequent statements were a direct result of the illegal police questioning.

    Facts

    On December 14, 1979, Grimaldi was arrested and charged with second-degree murder. He was arraigned and assigned counsel the same day.
    The next morning, his counsel from the Public Defender’s office visited him in jail.
    Later that morning, Investigator Reidy, knowing Grimaldi was represented by counsel, interrogated him.
    Grimaldi refused to make any statements without speaking to his father.
    Reidy arranged a phone call for Grimaldi with his father. He placed Grimaldi in his cell with a phone, and then Reidy stood 15-20 feet away and secretly listened to the phone conversation and recorded incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Grimaldi’s motion to suppress the statements made during the phone call.
    The statements were admitted at trial, and Grimaldi was convicted of second-degree murder.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the statements were admissible because the police questioning had not directly elicited them.
    Grimaldi appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made by a defendant during a phone call with his father, arranged by police after the defendant had been assigned counsel but without counsel’s presence, are admissible as spontaneous statements.

    Holding

    No, because the statements were the result of prior illegal questioning and the police took affirmative advantage of the phone call. Therefore, the statements were not truly spontaneous and should have been suppressed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that once a defendant is represented by counsel, a waiver of rights can only be obtained in the presence of counsel, citing People v. Settles, People v. Hobson, and People v. Arthur. The court stated, “Any statement obtained in disregard of this rule violates the State Constitution and must be suppressed.” The court acknowledged the “indelible” right to counsel, which attaches upon a request for an attorney, arraignment, or the filing of an accusatory instrument.

    The People argued that the statements were spontaneous because no questioning was occurring during the phone call. The court rejected this argument, clarifying that a statement being volunteered does not automatically make it spontaneous. “Admission of a truly spontaneous statement, blurted out by defendant without any ‘inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence [by the authorities], no matter how subtly employed’ has been said to be proper, even if the statement was made in the absence of counsel”. However, this situation did not meet that criteria.

    The court found that the statements were a result of the illegal questioning initiated by Reidy. Because of the police conduct, Grimaldi found it necessary to speak with his father. The court stated that “since the need to make the telephone call was created by and was in effect an extension of the illegal questioning, and since the police ultimately arranged, acquiesced in and took affirmative advantage of the phone call, the statements must be deemed inadmissible.”

  • People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981): Limits on “Indelible” Right to Counsel in Interrogations on Unrelated Charges

    People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981)

    The “indelible” right to counsel, which prevents police questioning in the absence of an attorney, does not extend to unrelated charges when that right arises solely from the filing of an accusatory instrument on the unrelated charge, unless the police know about the pending unrelated charge.

    Summary

    Bartolomeo was convicted of murder. He argued that his confession should have been suppressed because he had an “indelible” right to counsel on an unrelated shoplifting charge due to an outstanding arrest warrant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the right to counsel on the shoplifting charge did not preclude questioning on the murder charge, as the police lacked actual knowledge of the outstanding warrant. The Court distinguished between actual representation by counsel and the mere existence of an outstanding charge, limiting the scope of the Rogers rule.

    Facts

    Bartolomeo was a suspect in a murder investigation. He voluntarily accompanied detectives to a police station and then to undergo a polygraph examination. Before the polygraph, the detective knew of an outstanding shoplifting charge against Bartolomeo. After the polygraph, Bartolomeo confessed to the murder. Bartolomeo argued that because an accusatory instrument and arrest warrant were outstanding on the shoplifting charge, his right to counsel had attached, and his confession to murder should be suppressed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Bartolomeo’s motion to suppress his confession. He was convicted of murder. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “indelible” right to counsel, arising from the filing of an accusatory instrument and the issuance of an arrest warrant on an unrelated charge, precludes police questioning on a new charge when the police know of the pending unrelated charge.

    Holding

    No, because the “indelible” right to counsel does not extend to unrelated charges solely because of the existence of an outstanding accusatory instrument unless the police actually know about the pending unrelated charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished its prior holding in People v. Rogers, which held that once a defendant is represented by counsel, they cannot be questioned on any matter without counsel present. The Court noted that Rogers involved actual representation by an attorney, whereas Bartolomeo’s right to counsel on the shoplifting charge stemmed solely from the commencement of formal proceedings (the outstanding warrant). The Court emphasized that extending the Rogers rule to situations where the police were unaware of pending unrelated charges would place an unreasonable burden on law enforcement. The Court stated, “To extend the Rogers rule to the circumstances here presented would be to expand the derivative right to counsel beyond the reach of logic and sound policy. To hold that the warrant outstanding in a Town Court 50 miles away constructively interposes an attorney between the police and defendant, would unrealistically limit police interrogation procedures.” The Court also pointed out that there was no active attorney-client relationship on the shoplifting charge to be protected. The dissent argued that the commencement of criminal proceedings should be equated with actual representation by counsel, and that the Rogers rule should apply to prevent police from circumventing the right to counsel by questioning defendants on unrelated charges. Chief Judge Cooke, in dissent, asserted that “the rationale of Rogers itself—that law enforcement officials should not be permitted to circumvent the right to counsel by the simple expedient of questioning on unrelated charges—requires this result.” The majority rejected this view, fearing it would “unrealistically limit police interrogation procedures.”

  • People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863 (1979): Waiver of Counsel in Interrelated Offenses

    People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863 (1979)

    When two offenses are so interwoven that questioning about one necessarily involves the other, a suspect represented by counsel on one charge cannot waive counsel on the second charge without counsel being present.

    Summary

    William Ermo was convicted of murder. The Appellate Division overturned the conviction, and the People appealed. Ermo, represented by counsel on an assault charge, was questioned about an unrelated murder. He waived his right to counsel and confessed to the murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that because the questioning about the assault and murder were interwoven, Ermo could not waive his right to counsel on the murder charge without his attorney present. The dissent argued that established precedent allowed questioning on an unrelated charge, and the charges here were sufficiently distinct.

    Facts

    William Ermo was accused of assaulting a young schoolgirl on March 13, 1972. This led police to question him about the murder of Ursula Shiba, which occurred seven months prior. There was no initial suspicion linking Ermo to the murder; only the proximity of his address to the victim’s led to the questioning. Ermo waived his Miranda rights and confessed to the murder during questioning.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Ermo of murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who is represented by counsel on one charge, can waive his right to counsel and be questioned about a separate, but possibly related, charge without his attorney present, and whether a confession obtained during such questioning is admissible.

    Holding

    Yes, because the questioning regarding the assault and the murder were interwoven, the defendant could not waive his right to counsel on the murder charge without his attorney present. The confession was therefore inadmissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding the questioning regarding the assault and the murder were interwoven. Even though the charges were initially considered separate, the sexual nature of the assault charge brought the prior unsolved murder into the discussion. The court emphasized the importance of protecting a defendant’s right to counsel, particularly when the questioning blurs the lines between ostensibly separate offenses.

    The dissenting judge, Gabrielli, argued that the majority opinion disregarded established precedent. He cited cases such as People v. Stanley, People v. Simons, and People v. Coleman, which held that a defendant could waive counsel on an unrelated pending charge without counsel present. Gabrielli argued that the mere fact that the defendant has been arraigned or indicted on one charge does not prevent law-enforcement officials from interrogating him, in the absence of an attorney, about another and different crime. He asserted that the two crimes were not significantly related. He stated, “Representation by counsel in a proceeding unrelated to the investigation is insufficient to invoke” the rule that a person may not be interrogated after a lawyer has entered another proceeding in which he is represented by counsel.

  • People v. Byrne, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979): Admissibility of Confessions Before Right to Counsel Attaches

    People v. Byrne, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979)

    When a defendant makes a confession, part of which is obtained before the defendant’s right to counsel attaches and part after, the portion of the confession obtained before the right to counsel attached is admissible, provided it can be clearly separated from the inadmissible portion and was not the result of prior illegality.

    Summary

    Dominick Byrne was convicted of grand larceny for his role in the kidnapping of Samuel Bronfman. Byrne argued that oral statements he made to FBI agents should have been suppressed because they were taken before he was allowed to consult with his attorney. The New York Court of Appeals held that statements made before Byrne’s attorney contacted the FBI were admissible because Byrne had been fully advised of his rights, no coercion was used, the statements made after the attorney’s call were excluded, and the pre-attorney statements were not tainted by any prior illegality or inextricably bound to the later statements. The Court also rejected Byrne’s argument that the agents’ deferment of his request to go to church violated his rights.

    Facts

    Samuel Bronfman was kidnapped at gunpoint. Byrne contacted the New York City police claiming he and Lynch were coerced into participating in the kidnapping. FBI agents questioned Byrne at FBI headquarters after advising him of his constitutional rights. Byrne initially claimed coercion, but later confessed to his role in the crime, detailing the planning and execution of the kidnapping over several hours. Later, Byrne’s attorney contacted the FBI and requested that questioning cease. The government continued questioning Byrne after receiving that call.

    Procedural History

    Byrne was convicted of grand larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. Byrne appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting his oral statements to the FBI agents because they continued to question him after being contacted by his attorney. The trial court suppressed written and oral statements made after the attorney’s phone call.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether oral statements made by the defendant to FBI agents before his attorney contacted them, but after he had been advised of his Miranda rights, are admissible when statements made after the attorney’s contact were suppressed?
    2. Whether the agents’ deferment of Byrne’s request to attend church during the interrogation was a violation of his constitutional rights?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statements made before the attorney’s contact were distinct from and not tainted by the illegally obtained statements after the attorney’s contact.
    2. No, because there was no indication that Byrne’s church request flowed from an intention to seek the aid of a clergyman rather than that of a lawyer as a primary source of help and advice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished this case from People v. Failla, where the defendant’s lawyer was deliberately kept waiting while police questioned the defendant. In Byrne, the initial interrogation by the FBI agents occurred over many hours before the attorney’s call. The court emphasized that the statements elicited after the attorney’s call were either duplicative or committed to a written form and were excluded by the trial court.

    The court noted the principle that an invalidly obtained prior confession may require exclusion of a subsequent validly taken one (see People v. Valerius, 31 NY2d 51, 55), reasoning that once the police have illegally caused a defendant to “let the cat out of the bag,” statements he makes afterward, no matter the safeguards the police employ as to these, may be found as a matter of fact to stem from the initial illegality (see, e.g., People v. Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115; People v. Stephen J. B., 23 NY2d 611, 615). However, the court pointed out that in such cases the taint is prospective only, never retrospective.

    Regarding Byrne’s request to attend church, the court distinguished this from People v. Bevilacqua, where the police engaged in a “seemingly conscious scheme * * * to prevent [an 18-year-old defendant] from establishing contact with anyone who might be able to provide him with assistance or advice”. The court found no similar intent to frustrate Byrne’s access to counsel. The court reasoned that the constitutional right to counsel does not transform into a right to consult with clergymen, physicians, or others.

  • People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979): Right to Counsel and Interrogation on Related Charges

    People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979)

    Once an attorney has been assigned to represent a defendant, the police cannot question the defendant about any crime, even if unrelated, in the absence of counsel.

    Summary

    Rogers was arrested and assigned counsel. The attorney notified the Sheriff that Rogers was not to be questioned without counsel present. Subsequently, the police questioned Rogers about a different crime. The New York Court of Appeals held that questioning Rogers about a different, but related, crime without his lawyer present violated his right to counsel. The Court emphasized that once representation begins, questioning is prohibited even on separate matters. The Court also addressed the defendant’s request to represent himself, stating the trial court must conduct a thorough inquiry to ensure the defendant understands the implications of self-representation.

    Facts

    Rogers was arrested and arraigned on burglary charges. Counsel was assigned to represent him. Rogers’ assigned counsel sent a letter to the Sheriff instructing that Rogers not be questioned without counsel being present. While in jail on those charges, police questioned Rogers about a separate but similar burglary that occurred at the same location (Tanner Building Company) a week earlier. Rogers made incriminating statements during the interrogation about the second burglary.

    Procedural History

    Rogers was indicted on both incidents in the same indictment. Rogers moved to suppress the statements made during the interrogation. The trial court denied the motion and also summarily denied Rogers’ request to represent himself. Rogers pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Rogers appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police violated the defendant’s right to counsel by questioning him about a different crime than the one for which he was being held, after counsel had been assigned and had instructed the police not to question him in the absence of counsel?

    2. Whether the trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant’s request to represent himself?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because once a defendant is represented by counsel, the police cannot question the defendant about any crime in the absence of counsel, especially where the charges are related.

    2. Yes, because a defendant has a right to represent himself, and the court must conduct an inquiry to determine if the defendant is aware of the consequences of self-representation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the police violated Rogers’ right to counsel because he was represented by counsel at the time of the interrogation. The fact that the police officers questioned Rogers about a different crime was a “technicality of little significance” because both incidents involved burglaries at the same location and were closely related in time. The Court cited People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, in support of its holding. The Court emphasized the importance of the attorney-client relationship and the need to protect a defendant’s right to counsel once it has been invoked. The court found the charges to be sufficiently related, noting “the Grand Jury considered the charges together, and the defendant was indicted for both incidents in the same indictment.”

    Regarding self-representation, the Court held that the trial court should not have summarily denied Rogers’ request to represent himself, citing People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10. The Court stated that the trial court must make further inquiry to ensure that the defendant is fully aware of the consequences of representing himself. The Court noted the fact that Rogers may intend to present an insanity defense does not preclude him from representing himself, as long as he is competent to proceed, citing People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351.

  • In re Richard W., 35 N.Y.2d 167 (1974): Substantial Compliance with Juvenile Interrogation Statutes

    35 N.Y.2d 167 (1974)

    Substantial compliance with Family Court Act § 724 regarding juvenile interrogations is sufficient when there is no evidence of prejudice to the juvenile and no indication of willful or negligent disregard of the statute.

    Summary

    Richard W. was arrested for violent crimes, identified by a victim, and taken to a precinct. Police notified his mother after administering Miranda warnings. He was questioned before his mother arrived, and then again with her present, resulting in a signed confession. The Family Court admitted the signed confession, leading to a finding that Richard committed acts constituting manslaughter, assault, and possession of a dangerous instrument, and he was committed to Elmira Reception Center. The Appellate Division reversed, finding a failure to comply with § 724. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that substantial compliance with the statute occurred, and there was no prejudice to the juvenile.

    Facts

    Richard W. was arrested with two others in connection with serious violent crimes. He and his companions were identified by one of their victims from a hospital bed. The arresting officers took Richard to the precinct station house. He was given pre-interrogation warnings per Miranda v. Arizona. His mother was notified, though not immediately. Richard was questioned before his mother arrived. After she arrived, the warnings were read again to both, and permission was sought to question Richard again in his mother’s presence. Both consented, and Richard made a further statement, reduced to writing and signed by both of them.

    Procedural History

    The Family Court suppressed testimony about Richard’s oral statements made before his mother’s arrival but admitted his signed written statement. The Family Court determined Richard committed acts that would constitute manslaughter, assault, and possession of a dangerous instrument if committed by an adult. He was committed to Elmira Reception Center. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient compliance with Family Court Act § 724 regarding the written statement. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the failure to call the boy’s mother until arrival at the station house was a violation of the statutory mandate that “the peace officer shall immediately notify the parent” (§ 724, subd [a]).

    2. Whether the station house to which respondent was taken was not “a facility designated by the appropriate appellate division of the supreme court as a suitable place for the questioning of children” (§ 724, subd [b], par [ii]).

    3. Whether there was a failure to take respondent directly to Family Court as required by section 724 (subd [b], par [ii]).

    Holding

    1. No, because the call was made without undue delay, and there was reasonable justification for such delay as did occur.

    2. No, because at the time of respondent’s arrest the Appellate Division had not yet designated any facility in the First Judicial Department suitable for the questioning of children.

    3. No, because the statutory mandate that the child be taken to Family Court is made subject to the express exception, “unless the peace officer determines that it is necessary to question the child,” an exception evidently applicable in this case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the irregularities, taken singly or together, did not require suppressing Richard’s signed statement. The Court found the call to the mother was made without undue delay and there was reasonable justification for the delay. Because the Appellate Division had not designated a suitable questioning facility at the time, precise compliance wasn’t possible. The requirement to take the child directly to Family Court has an exception for necessary questioning, applicable in this case.

    The court emphasized substantial compliance and noted there was no evidence of prejudice or willful disregard of the statute. The court stated, “With respect to respondent’s later written statement, rather than intentional flouting of the statute there appears to have been conscientious observance, to the extent then possible, of respondent’s statutory and due process rights, the terms of the statute were substantially complied with, and there is no evidence in this record of prejudice or suggestion of significant prejudice to respondent.”

    The court further reasoned that no useful prophylactic purpose would be served by penalizing the police for failing to conform to the statute literally, especially since there was no evidence of willful or negligent disregard of the statutory requirements. The court distinguished the facts from situations involving intentional disregard or a pattern of neglect.

  • People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178 (1964): Right to Counsel During Interrogation

    People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178 (1964)

    A confession obtained from a suspect is inadmissible at trial if police denied the suspect’s attorney access to him during questioning, even if the denial occurred after the interrogation had begun.

    Summary

    Failla was convicted of second-degree murder. His conviction was based, in part, on a confession obtained while he was in police custody. An attorney, retained by Failla’s father, attempted to see Failla during the interrogation but was denied access by the police. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the denial of access to counsel rendered the confession inadmissible. The court reasoned that fragmenting a confession into admissible and inadmissible parts based on when counsel was denied access would create confusion and be unworkable. The Court emphasized the importance of allowing counsel access to the accused upon proper identification to ensure fairness and protect the accused’s rights.

    Facts

    On October 7, 1960, Failla was arrested around 1:00 a.m. and taken to a hospital for a gastric lavage based on a report that he had ingested sleeping pills. After the procedure, while in police custody at Westchester County Parkway Police Headquarters, an Assistant District Attorney began taking a statement from Failla at 2:58 a.m., continuing until 4:45 a.m., with a brief interruption. The statement was described as a complete and voluntary confession to the murder of Kathryn Levy. Additional statements were taken at the crime scene at 7:00 a.m. and in a tape-recorded session at 8:00 a.m. Failla was arraigned at 10:00 a.m. the same morning. An attorney, contacted by Failla’s father, arrived at Troop K State Police Barracks (near the Parkway Police Headquarters) around 3:00 a.m. but was initially told he could not see Failla. Upon arriving at the Parkway Police Headquarters between 3:15 and 3:30 a.m., the attorney identified himself and requested to see Failla, but was refused.

    Procedural History

    Failla was convicted of second-degree murder in Westchester County Court. He appealed the conviction, arguing that the confession used against him was inadmissible because his attorney was denied access to him during questioning. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a confession is admissible when police deny an attorney access to the accused during questioning, even if the denial occurs after the interrogation has commenced but before its completion?

    Holding

    No, because interfering with the right to counsel violates the principles established in People v. Donovan, and fragmenting a confession based on the timing of the denial of access is impractical and creates uncertainty.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the case fell under the rule established in People v. Donovan, which held that a confession taken after counsel had been denied access to the accused is inadmissible. The Court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the confession should be admissible because it had substantially progressed before the attorney was denied access. The Court stated, “If there had been an interference with the right to counsel within the Donovan rule, it would be wholly impracticable to dissect a confession into parts to be deemed admissible before counsel arrived and was refused access to the accused, and parts to be deemed inadmissible after he arrived.” This fragmentation would lead to confusion in police investigations and uncertainty in the admissibility of evidence. Instead, the Court proposed a “pragmatic and much simpler test” of invariably admitting the lawyer to see his client upon proper identification. The Court emphasized that denying access to counsel after a confession has begun taints the entire process, rendering the confession inadmissible. The Court noted that a reasonable practice for attorneys would be to request a police blotter entry of their appearance to confer with an accused, and for police officials to make such entries to avoid uncertainty.