New York Law Review

Tag: intermediate scrutiny

  • People v. Hughes, 21 N.Y.3d 39 (2013): Second Amendment and Severity of Punishment for Gun Possession

    People v. Hughes, 21 N.Y.3d 39 (2013)

    The Second Amendment does not categorically limit the severity of punishment for unlawful gun possession, although in some extreme cases, it might; intermediate scrutiny applies when evaluating Second Amendment claims related to gun control regulations.

    Summary

    Hughes was convicted of a class C felony for possessing a loaded, unlicensed weapon in his home due to a prior misdemeanor conviction, which, under New York law, removed the “home exception” to the felony charge. Hughes argued that enhancing the charge to a felony based on a misdemeanor violated his Second Amendment rights. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that the law, which allows most misdemeanants to obtain gun licenses, substantially relates to the important government objective of preventing gun violence and keeping guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated an inability to follow the law. The court applied intermediate scrutiny, assuming without deciding that Second Amendment scrutiny applied to the severity of punishment.

    Facts

    Hughes, who had a prior misdemeanor conviction for resisting arrest, possessed a loaded handgun in his ex-girlfriend’s apartment (deemed by the trial court to be his home as well). He did not have a permit for the handgun. Following an argument outside the apartment, Hughes shot and killed a man. He was acquitted of murder and related charges based on a justification defense but convicted of second-degree (felony) and third-degree (felony) criminal possession of a weapon because of his prior conviction and lack of a permit.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Hughes of second and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. Hughes moved to set aside the second-degree conviction, arguing a Second Amendment violation. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether enhancing a weapon possession charge to a class C felony based on a prior misdemeanor conviction impermissibly burdens the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment.

    Holding

    No, because the statute bears a substantial relationship to the achievement of an important governmental objective.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court assumed, without deciding, that the Second Amendment could limit the severity of punishment for unlawful gun possession. It then applied intermediate scrutiny, a standard adopted by several federal circuit courts following District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago. The court reasoned that New York’s law, which elevates the charge to a felony only when the possessor has a prior conviction and lacks a license, is substantially related to the important government objective of preventing gun violence. The law allows most misdemeanants to obtain gun licenses, mitigating the burden on Second Amendment rights. The court emphasized that “preventing the criminal use of firearms is an important government objective; and keeping guns away from people who have shown they cannot be trusted to obey the law is a means substantially related to that end.” The court explicitly chose not to explore what a truly draconian sentence might have meant for the outcome of the case. Thus, the court found that the 3 1/2 year sentence Hughes received did not violate the Second Amendment.

  • People v. Jiovon M., 12 N.Y.3d 41 (2009): Juvenile Curfews and Constitutional Rights

    People v. Jiovon M., 12 N.Y.3d 41 (2009)

    A juvenile curfew ordinance that lacks a parental consent exception and is not substantially related to the important government interests of reducing juvenile crime and victimization violates both the minor’s and the parent’s constitutional rights.

    Summary

    This case concerns the constitutionality of Rochester’s juvenile curfew law. A father and son challenged the law, arguing it violated the son’s rights to freedom of movement, expression, and equal protection, and the father’s due process rights to raise his child without undue government interference. The New York Court of Appeals found the curfew unconstitutional because it lacked a parental consent exception and was not substantially related to the stated goals of reducing juvenile crime and victimization. The court emphasized the importance of parental autonomy and the need for a close nexus between the curfew’s burdens and its stated objectives.

    Facts

    In 2006, the Rochester City Council adopted a juvenile nighttime curfew. It prohibited minors (under 17, excluding married or emancipated individuals) from being in public places between 11:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. (midnight to 5:00 a.m. on weekends). Exceptions existed for minors accompanied by a parent/guardian, those engaged in lawful employment, emergencies, school/religious/recreational activities, exercising First Amendment rights, or interstate travel. Police officers could request information from seemingly underage individuals during curfew hours and detain them if a violation was reasonably suspected. The city justified the curfew by claiming a significant number of minors were victims or perpetrators of crime during nighttime hours. The curfew was enacted to reduce youth victimization and crime and advance public safety.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs filed suit, challenging the curfew’s constitutionality. The Supreme Court (trial court) dismissed the claim, upholding the curfew. The Appellate Division reversed, declaring the ordinance unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. The Appellate Division found the curfew inconsistent with state law and violated constitutional rights. The City appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a juvenile curfew ordinance that lacks a parental consent exception and is not substantially related to the important government interests of reducing juvenile crime and victimization violates constitutional rights.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Rochester curfew ordinance lacks a parental consent exception and the City failed to demonstrate a substantial relationship between the curfew and the stated goals of reducing juvenile crime and victimization, the curfew ordinance violates both the minor’s and the parent’s constitutional rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court applied intermediate scrutiny, requiring the City to show that the curfew was substantially related to achieving important government interests (preventing minors from perpetrating and becoming victims of crime during nighttime hours). The Court acknowledged the City’s legitimate interest in protecting children but found the evidence presented insufficient. The Court noted that incidents cited by the City would not have been prevented by the curfew and that crime statistics indicated minors were more likely to be victims or perpetrators of crime outside of curfew hours. The court noted the methodology of the statistics was over-inclusive and that no effort was made to ensure that the population targeted by the ordinance represented that part of the population causing trouble or that was being victimized.

    The Court emphasized that “the purpose of requiring [proof of] that close relationship is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions” (Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-726 [1982]).

    The Court also found the curfew imposed an unconstitutional burden on a parent’s substantive due process rights. It stated that the curfew failed to offer parents enough flexibility or autonomy in supervising their children. The absence of a parental consent exception was a critical flaw. The Court noted, “The . . . notion that governmental power should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition” (Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 446-447 [1990]). The court distinguished the Rochester curfew from other curfews which were upheld, noting many of those other ordinances contained exceptions such as “where the minor is on an errand at the direction of the parent, (2) where the minor is on the sidewalk that abuts the minor’s or the next-door-neighbor’s residence, and (3) where the minor is generally exercising First Amendment rights”.