New York Law Review

Tag: Interested Witness

  • People v. Duncan, 89 N.Y.2d 903 (1996): Preserving Jury Instruction Error for Appeal

    People v. Duncan, 89 N.Y.2d 903 (1996)

    To preserve for appellate review a claim that the trial court erred in failing to give an interested witness instruction, the defendant must specify on the record the particular witness for whom the instruction was requested.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery and attempted robbery. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing his request for an interested witness instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the issue was not preserved for appellate review because the defendant failed to specify which witness the instruction should apply to. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while a defendant generally need not submit specific proposed language for a jury instruction, under these circumstances, the failure to specify the witness waived the issue.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and attempted robbery in the first degree after a jury trial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to give an interested witness instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the issue was unpreserved. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must specify the particular witness for whom an interested witness instruction is requested to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Holding

    Yes, because under the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s failure to specify to the trial court on the record the particular witness for which the instruction was requested, although given an opportunity to do so, renders the defendant’s claim of error unreviewable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The court acknowledged the general rule that a defendant need not submit specific proposed language for a jury instruction to preserve an objection. However, the Court distinguished this case, emphasizing that the defendant was given an opportunity to specify the witness in question but failed to do so. The court reasoned that without this specification, the trial court could not properly evaluate the request and, therefore, the error was not preserved for appellate review. The court cited CPL 470.05[2] in support of the preservation requirement. The court differentiated the facts from cases such as People v. Karabinas, 63 NY2d 871, where preservation was found despite a lack of perfect specificity.

  • People v. Inniss, 83 N.Y.2d 653 (1994): Admissibility of Evidence for Witness Impeachment

    83 N.Y.2d 653 (1994)

    A trial court does not err in excluding evidence offered solely to impeach a witness’s credibility on a collateral matter when the witness’s bias and interest have been exhaustively explored during cross-examination.

    Summary

    Kenneth Inniss was convicted of murder and weapon possession. The key witness against him, Richard Saunders, had a cooperation agreement with the prosecution. Inniss appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to admit testimony from Saunders’s alleged victim in a dismissed robbery case and the transcript of Saunders’s cooperation agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence was offered only to impeach Saunders’s credibility on a collateral matter, and Saunders’s bias had already been thoroughly explored. The court also found that the refusal to give a specific “interested witness” charge was not reversible error because the jury was aware of Saunders’s potential bias.

    Facts

    Richard Saunders, awaiting trial on robbery charges, contacted authorities claiming knowledge of Brian Rich’s killer. Saunders testified that Inniss offered him $10,000 to kill Rich, which he declined. On August 3, 1986, Saunders witnessed Inniss shooting Rich with an Uzi. Saunders had a cooperation agreement with the District Attorney’s office, promising dismissal of his charges in exchange for truthful testimony. Saunders testified about incriminating conversations with Inniss before and after the murder. Forensic evidence supported Saunders’s account. Inniss presented an alibi defense but was convicted.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Inniss. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit testimony of the complainant in Saunders’s dismissed robbery indictment and the transcript of the cooperation agreement between Saunders and the prosecution.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an interested witness charge specifically regarding Saunders’s testimony.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was offered solely to impeach Saunders’s credibility on a collateral matter, and Saunders’s bias and interest were exhaustively explored during cross-examination.
    2. No, because the charge as a whole, including the instruction that the jury could consider the interest or bias of any witness, was sufficient to convey the need to scrutinize Saunders’s testimony with care.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Inniss only sought to introduce the evidence to contradict Saunders’s denial of guilt in the dismissed robbery charges, which was a collateral matter. The court cited People v. Pavao, stating that the collateral impeachment rule bars the admission of evidence used to establish “perjury” on collateral issues. Furthermore, the court noted that the terms of the cooperation agreement and Saunders’s interest and bias were “exhaustive[ly]” explored on cross-examination, making the documentary evidence cumulative, citing People v. Chin. The Court also addressed the refusal to give an interested witness charge regarding Saunders’s testimony, finding that because Saunders’s bias and interest were heavily emphasized, the jury was sufficiently informed to scrutinize his testimony. The court stated that the jury “intensely scrutinized Saunders’ testimony,” and thus, the omission was not reversible error, citing People v. Warren. The court emphasized that the key issue was whether any benefit Saunders received affected the truthfulness of his testimony. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the trial court failed to produce Brady and Rosario material by withholding the cooperation agreement and minutes from the proceeding dismissing the robbery charge. The dissent also argued that it was essential for the trial court to give more than the standard interested witness charge.

  • People v. Alcide, 56 N.Y.2d 964 (1982): Duty to Respond to Jury Notes and Interested Witness Charge

    People v. Alcide, 56 N.Y.2d 964 (1982)

    A court’s failure to respond to a jury note constitutes reversible error only if it seriously prejudices the defendant, and an interested witness charge is proper when the court instructs the jury that they may consider whether any witness has an interest in the outcome of the case.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by not responding to a jury note and by improperly instructing the jury on interested witnesses. The jury note concerned two jurors’ request to be dismissed before sundown due to Sabbath observance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the failure to respond to the jury note did not seriously prejudice the defendant and that the interested witness charge was proper because the court instructed the jury that they could consider whether any witness had an interest in the outcome of the case.

    Facts

    During jury deliberations, the jury sent out several notes requesting exhibits, readbacks, or additional instructions. On the second day, two jurors sent a note stating they were Sabbath observers and requested dismissal before sundown. The court did not respond to this note and did not inform counsel of its existence. Twenty minutes after the note was sent, the jury announced it had reached a verdict, and the court accepted the verdict without addressing the note.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial court’s failure to respond to the jury note and the interested witness charge were errors. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s failure to respond to the jury note regarding the jurors’ Sabbath observance constituted reversible error under CPL 310.30?

    2. Whether the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury regarding interested witnesses?

    Holding

    1. No, because the failure to respond to the jury note did not seriously prejudice the defendant.

    2. No, because the court gave a standard instruction that the jury could consider whether any witness had an interest in the outcome of the case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the jury note, the court stated that CPL 310.30 requires a meaningful response to jury requests for instruction or information. However, reversal is required only where the failure to respond “seriously prejudice[s]” the defendant. The court reasoned that the note did not concern the crimes charged or the evidence, and there was no significant probability that the jurors were coerced or pressured into returning a guilty verdict because of the court’s failure to respond. The court noted that the jury reached a verdict well before sundown, negating any inference of coercion. As stated in the opinion, “It is only where the failure to respond to a jury note ‘seriously prejudice[s]’ defendant that a reversal is required”.

    Regarding the interested witness charge, the court found no error because the trial court provided the standard instruction, informing the jury that they could consider whether any witness had an interest in the outcome of the case. The court clarified that merely because a witness was interested did not automatically mean that they were untruthful. The court also stated, “There is no question that defendant was an interested witness as a matter of law as the court appears to have charged”. While the judge specifically named the defendant’s wife, the instruction was not misleading, and the jury could have found any witness to be interested. The charge, viewed as a whole, was considered balanced and understandable.