New York Law Review

Tag: intentional tort

  • Marinaccio v. Kieffer Enterprises, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 501 (2013): Standard for Punitive Damages in Intentional Tort Cases

    Marinaccio v. Kieffer Enterprises, Inc., 20 N.Y.3d 501 (2013)

    Punitive damages in tort cases require more than just intentional conduct; they necessitate a showing of malice, fraud, evil motive, or a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others implying criminal indifference to civil obligations.

    Summary

    Marinaccio sued Kieffer Enterprises, Inc. (KEI) for trespass and nuisance, alleging intentional diversion of stormwater onto his property causing significant damage. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages against KEI. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the punitive damages award, holding that while KEI’s actions were intentional and caused considerable damage, the evidence did not demonstrate the requisite malice or wanton disregard necessary to justify punitive damages. The court emphasized that compliance with regulations and engagement of experts, even if ultimately unsuccessful, negated a finding of criminal indifference to civil obligations.

    Facts

    KEI, developing a residential subdivision, diverted water into a ditch that was mistakenly believed to be on KEI’s property but was actually on Marinaccio’s land, without his permission. The mitigation pond was insufficient, leading KEI to install drainage pipes that routed water onto Marinaccio’s property, creating a large flooded wetland. Marinaccio complained to KEI, but was ignored. The flooding caused mosquitos and frogs, which Marinaccio feared, to proliferate on his property. However, Marinaccio refused to allow the Town to clean the ditch on his property which would have alleviated the flooding.

    Procedural History

    Marinaccio sued KEI and the Town for trespass and nuisance, seeking damages. The trial court denied KEI’s motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim. The jury awarded compensatory damages against both the Town and KEI, and punitive damages against KEI. KEI appealed the punitive damages award. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision regarding punitive damages.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages against KEI for intentional diversion of stormwater onto Marinaccio’s property, constituting trespass and nuisance.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not demonstrate malice, fraud, evil motive, or a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others implying criminal indifference to civil obligations, which is required to justify punitive damages in tort cases.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the strict standard for awarding punitive damages, stating that it requires “spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton.” While KEI’s actions resulted in damage to Marinaccio’s property, KEI complied with planning and development laws, worked with the Army Corps of Engineers, and hired experts. This, even if ultimately unsuccessful in preventing damage, demonstrated that KEI’s actions could not be considered wanton or malicious. The court acknowledged that KEI should have ensured the Town obtained an easement from Marinaccio, making them liable for trespass and nuisance. However, “something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages.” The court found that KEI’s behavior, while not ideal, did not rise to the level of moral turpitude required for punitive damages. The court distinguished between volitional acts and those demonstrating a purposeful or grossly indifferent causing of injury. Punitive damages are awarded to punish and deter behavior involving moral turpitude, and KEI’s behavior did not meet this threshold. The court quoted Prozeralik v Capital Cities Communications, 82 NY2d 466, 479 (1993) stating that “[s]omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages”.

  • Chianese v. Meier, 98 N.Y.2d 270 (2002): Apportionment of Damages in Negligence Claims Involving Intentional Torts

    Chianese v. Meier, 98 N.Y.2d 270 (2002)

    In a negligence action against a landlord for inadequate security, CPLR Article 16 permits apportionment of damages between the negligent landlord and the intentional tortfeasor who directly caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, a tenant, was attacked in her apartment building. She sued the landlord, alleging negligent security. The jury found the landlord 50% liable and the attacker 50% liable. The trial court set aside the apportionment, but the Appellate Division affirmed based on an exception for “actions requiring proof of intent.” The New York Court of Appeals modified, holding that CPLR Article 16 allows apportionment in this case. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claim was based on the landlord’s negligence, not the attacker’s intent, and that denying apportionment would contradict the purpose of Article 16, which is to protect low-fault defendants.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was attacked in her apartment. She noticed that the building’s front and security doors were open upon arriving home. The attacker, Adger, was later apprehended and convicted. Plaintiff sued the building owner and managing agent, alleging inadequate security.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the complaint, finding material issues of fact. After trial, the jury apportioned liability 50-50 between the defendants and Adger, the attacker. The trial court then set aside the apportionment. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding an exception under CPLR 1602(5). The Court of Appeals modified, reinstating the jury’s apportionment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, in a negligence action against a landlord for inadequate security, CPLR 1602(5) precludes apportionment of damages between the negligent landlord and the intentional tortfeasor who attacked the plaintiff.

    Holding

    1. No, because the plaintiff’s claim is based on the landlord’s negligence, not the attacker’s intent, and CPLR 1602(5) does not apply to preclude apportionment in this scenario.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPLR Article 16 was enacted to remedy inequities created by joint and several liability on low-fault defendants. Section 1601 modifies the common-law rule, making a tortfeasor whose fault is 50% or less liable only to the extent of their share of the non-economic loss.

    The court stated that the plaintiff’s complaint asserted only negligence as the basis for the defendant’s liability. “Because plaintiff’s negligence claim is not an ‘action requiring proof of intent,’ section 1602 (5) on its face does not apply to preclude apportionment of liability.” The court further reasoned, “That a nonparty tortfeasor acted intentionally does not bring a pure negligence action within the scope of the exclusion.”

    The court distinguished Section 1602(5) from Section 1602(11), which deals with parties acting knowingly or intentionally and in concert. The Court also noted that the legislative history of CPLR Article 16 indicated its purpose was to protect low-fault landowners and municipalities. Interpreting the statute to deny apportionment based on the third-party’s intent would create the very inequity Article 16 was meant to eliminate.

    The Court rejected the argument that evidence of prior complaints about the building’s security doors being left open constituted constructive notice. The court held that the evidence of prior complaints was sufficient to establish constructive notice of the specific recurrence on the day of the assault on plaintiff.

  • Cunningham v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 248 (1983): Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity and Intentional Torts

    Cunningham v. State, 60 N.Y.2d 248 (1983)

    Acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits or a Workers’ Compensation Board determination that an injury is accidental, employment-related, and compensable precludes a lawsuit against the employer, even for intentional torts.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law bar claimants from suing their employer (the State) for intentional assault related to the Attica prison uprising. The New York Court of Appeals held that claimants who either received workers’ compensation benefits or had a Workers’ Compensation Board determination that their injuries were accidental and compensable are barred from suing the State, even for intentional torts. This is because applying for and accepting benefits or a Board determination triggers the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law. Claimants must seek reconsideration from the Board, not the courts.

    Facts

    These appeals stem from the Attica Correctional Facility uprising in 1971. Some claimants were survivors of deceased guards, seeking wrongful death damages, alleging intentional injuries inflicted by individuals under the State’s control. Other claimants were employees taken hostage who sought damages for intentional assault also inflicted by persons under the State’s control.

    Procedural History

    The claimants filed actions against the State. The State moved for summary judgment, arguing the Workers’ Compensation Law precluded these actions. The Court of Claims denied the motions. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the suits. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether claimants who applied for and received workers’ compensation benefits can maintain actions against the State for intentional torts related to the same injuries.
    2. Whether claimants, for whom the Workers’ Compensation Board determined that their injuries were accidental, employment-related, and compensable, can maintain actions against the State for intentional torts, even if the State filed the claims and the claimants received indirect benefits.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because by applying for and accepting workers’ compensation benefits, claimants forfeit their right to maintain actions against the employer for intentional torts.
    2. No, because a determination by the Workers’ Compensation Board that a claimant’s injuries are accidental is binding, even if the claimant did not apply for or accept benefits directly.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, specifically Sections 11, 23, and 29(6). Section 11 states that workers’ compensation liability is exclusive and replaces any other liability. Section 23 states that a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Board is final and conclusive. Section 29(6) makes workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy against the employer. The Court stated, “If the right to sue the employer has been stripped away by [workers’] compensation coverage, it is an arrogation of jurisdiction to consider a tort complaint on its merits.” The Court emphasized that it is the responsibility of the Workers’ Compensation Board to determine factual matters and that claimants cannot circumvent this process by seeking resolution in the courts. Regarding the hostage claimants, the Court stated that the Board has discretion to process claims filed by either the employee or the employer, even if the claimant objects. The court cited O’Connor v. Midiria, stating that a Board determination that injuries are accidental precludes an action against the employer for intentional tort. The court noted that claimants are not without recourse, as they can petition the Board for reconsideration. However, they cannot undermine the Board’s determinations through a collateral attack.

  • O’Connor v. Midiria, 55 N.Y.2d 538 (1982): Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity Bars Intentional Tort Claims After Board Determination

    O’Connor v. Midiria, 55 N.Y.2d 538 (1982)

    A Workers’ Compensation Board determination of compensability, even without the employee’s application or acceptance of benefits, bars a common-law action against the employer for damages based on intentional tort until the Board’s determination is set aside.

    Summary

    Michaeline O’Connor sued her co-employee and employer for an alleged intentional tort after being locked in a cooler, resulting in injuries. The Workers’ Compensation Board had already determined the injuries were accidental and compensable. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Board’s determination, even absent O’Connor’s application for or acceptance of benefits, was binding and barred the lawsuit. The court emphasized the exclusivity of the workers’ compensation remedy and the quasi-judicial nature of the Board’s decisions. This ensures employers are protected from further liability once a workers’ compensation claim has been adjudicated, unless the board’s determination is successfully challenged.

    Facts

    Michaeline O’Connor, an employee at Pizza Hut, was allegedly locked in a walk-in cooler by her co-employee, Midiria. In attempting to return to the restaurant after escaping the cooler, O’Connor stumbled, fell, and sustained injuries. A report of the injury was filed with the Workers’ Compensation Board by both O’Connor’s treating physician and her employer. O’Connor and her husband subsequently sued Midiria, Pizza Hut, and the restaurant manager for compensatory and derivative damages, alleging intentional tort.

    Procedural History

    Special Term denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the motions and dismissing the complaint, holding that the Workers’ Compensation Board’s determination of accidental injury was conclusive and binding. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a Workers’ Compensation Board determination of compensability, made without the employee’s application for or acceptance of benefits, bars a subsequent common-law action by the employee against the employer for damages based on intentional tort.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Workers’ Compensation Law provides an exclusive remedy, and the Board’s determination is considered final and binding between the parties unless and until it is set aside.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law and principles of res judicata. The court noted that the Board’s determination of “accident, notice and causal relationship” was binding between the parties due to sections 11, 23, and 29 of the Workers’ Compensation Law, as well as settled principles of res judicata applicable to administrative determinations made by agencies acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Citing Werner v. State of New York, the court emphasized that permitting further adjudication after the Board’s award would be inconsistent with the statutory mandate that the compensation remedy be exclusive as to the employer and that the Board’s decision be conclusive. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the employer should be estopped from filing a compensation claim on the employee’s behalf when the employee elects to pursue a common-law remedy for intentional tort, explaining that an employer’s report of injury protects both the employer and the employee. The court noted that an employee can contest compensability before the board by demanding a hearing under Section 20 of the Workers’ Compensation Law. The court emphasized that the employee may seek a change in the board’s determination under section 123, but cannot undermine the conclusiveness of the board’s determination through a collateral action. The court reasoned that the “quid pro quo for the ‘swift and sure source of benefits to the injured employee’… is the limitation of the employer’s liability for work-related accidents to compensation.”

  • Werner v. State, 53 N.Y.2d 346 (1981): Workers’ Compensation as Exclusive Remedy

    53 N.Y.2d 346 (1981)

    Acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits bars a claimant from pursuing a separate wrongful death action against the employer for intentional assault, due to the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law.

    Summary

    Juanita Werner, widow of a deceased Attica prison guard, Ronald Werner, filed for and accepted workers’ compensation benefits following his death during the Attica uprising. Subsequently, she filed a claim against the State for wrongful death, alleging intentional assault. The New York Court of Appeals held that because Werner accepted workers’ compensation benefits, she was barred from pursuing a separate action against the State for intentional assault. The court reasoned that the Workers’ Compensation Law provides an exclusive remedy, and accepting benefits constitutes an election of that remedy, precluding a separate tort action.

    Facts

    Ronald Werner, a guard at Attica Correctional Facility, was killed during the 1971 Attica uprising. His widow, Juanita Werner, filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits on behalf of herself and her children. She received and accepted these benefits until she remarried. Subsequently, Werner filed a claim against the State, alleging negligence and intentional assault, claiming her husband’s death was caused by a State Police Officer. She alleged the officer “willfully and intentionally assaulted and battered the Claimant’s decedent by firing several shots of a gun at Claimant’s decedent…thereby causing his death.”

    Procedural History

    The State moved to dismiss the claim. The Court of Claims dismissed the negligence claim but denied the motion regarding the intentional assault claim. The State’s appeal of this decision was not perfected. The State then moved for summary judgment based on Werner’s receipt of compensation benefits. The Court of Claims denied this motion, but the Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the State, distinguishing Jones v. State of New York because in Jones, the claimant had not applied for or accepted compensation benefits. Werner appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits forecloses a wrongful death action against the State for intentional assault.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Workers’ Compensation Law provides an exclusive remedy, and accepting benefits constitutes an election of that remedy, precluding a separate tort action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Law, particularly sections 11, 23, and 29. Section 11 states that the employer’s liability under the law is exclusive. Section 23 states that the Workers’ Compensation Board’s decisions are final and conclusive. Section 29(6) provides that compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy when an employee is injured or killed by the wrong of another in the same employ. The court stated, “The combination of those provisions requires affirmance of the Appellate Division’s order.” It emphasized that because Werner accepted compensation benefits, she was bound by the Board’s finding that her husband’s death was accidental and occurred in the course of his employment. This finding is binding due to section 23 of the Workers’ Compensation Law and principles of res judicata, which apply to administrative determinations. The court reasoned that permitting a separate action for intentional assault would allow for duplicative recoveries, which the Workers’ Compensation Law aims to prevent. The court cited Legault v. Brown, 283 App. Div. 303, which held that an employee who avails themselves of workers’ compensation benefits loses the right to a common-law action. The court acknowledged that Werner might have been misled into filing for compensation but indicated her recourse was to petition the Board to rescind its prior decision under section 123, but until such action, the award bars her action for assault.

  • Copart Industries, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564 (1977): Defining Nuisance and the Types of Conduct Giving Rise to Liability

    Copart Industries, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 41 N.Y.2d 564 (1977)

    Liability for nuisance can arise from intentional and unreasonable conduct, negligence, or abnormally dangerous activities; negligence must be proven when a nuisance has its origin in negligent conduct; and an intentional nuisance requires proof that the defendant acted for the purpose of causing the invasion or knew it was substantially certain to result from their conduct.

    Summary

    Copart Industries sued Consolidated Edison (Con Ed) for nuisance, trespass, and air pollution violations, alleging that Con Ed’s emissions damaged cars stored on Copart’s property. The trial court dismissed some claims and merged trespass into nuisance, instructing the jury on nuisance based on negligence and intentional conduct. The jury found for Con Ed. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding an intertwining of negligence with the claimed nuisance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, clarifying the elements of nuisance and holding that negligence must be proven when the nuisance arises from negligent conduct, and intent must be proven for intentional nuisance.

    Facts

    Copart Industries leased land adjacent to Con Ed’s plant to store and prepare new cars. Copart alleged that emissions from Con Ed’s plant damaged the cars, requiring repainting and causing dealers to cease doing business with them. Con Ed’s plant produced steam and electricity and had converted from coal to oil fuel prior to the events in question. Copart claimed damages for loss of investment and profit due to these emissions.

    Procedural History

    Copart sued Con Ed in the trial court, asserting nuisance, trespass, and air pollution violations. The trial court dismissed the air pollution claim, merged the trespass claim into the nuisance claim, and instructed the jury on nuisance based on negligence and intentional conduct. The jury found in favor of Con Ed, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in charging the jury that Copart was required to prove Con Ed’s intent to cause damages to establish a nuisance.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in charging the jury that Copart had the burden of proof regarding Con Ed’s negligence and Copart’s freedom from contributory negligence.

    Holding

    1. No, because a private nuisance based on intentional conduct requires proof that the defendant acted for the purpose of causing the invasion or knew it was substantially certain to result from their conduct.

    2. No, because when a nuisance originates from negligence, negligence must be proven, and the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is a relevant consideration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court clarified that nuisance is a field of tort liability describing the consequences of conduct (inconvenience to others) rather than a specific type of conduct. Liability for private nuisance can arise from: (1) intentional and unreasonable conduct, (2) negligence, or (3) abnormally dangerous activities. The court emphasized the distinction between nuisance and trespass, noting that trespass involves the invasion of a person’s interest in the exclusive possession of land, while nuisance involves interference with the use and enjoyment of land. When a nuisance is based on negligence, negligence must be proven, and contributory negligence is a valid defense. For an intentional nuisance, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted to cause the invasion or knew it was substantially certain to result from their conduct. The court quoted the Restatement of Torts § 825: “An invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is intentional when the actor (a) acts for the purpose of causing it; or (b) knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result from his conduct.” The court distinguished Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., noting that in Boomer, the nuisance was based on an intentional and unreasonable invasion, not negligence, as the defendant had taken all available precautions to prevent dust emissions. Here, Copart introduced evidence suggesting Con Ed operated its plant negligently. Therefore, the trial court’s charge to the jury was proper.

  • De Long Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 14 N.Y.2d 346 (1964): Right to Pre-Verdict Interest in Intentional Tort Cases

    De Long Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 14 N.Y.2d 346 (1964)

    In cases of intentional tort resulting in property damage, a successful plaintiff is entitled to pre-verdict interest as a matter of right, calculated from the date the cause of action accrued, to ensure full indemnification.

    Summary

    De Long Corp. sued Morrison-Knudsen Co. for inducing breach of contract and unfair competition. The trial court awarded damages, including pre-verdict interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that in intentional tort cases causing property damage, pre-verdict interest is a matter of right, not discretion. This principle ensures the plaintiff is fully compensated for the defendant’s wrongful actions from the time the damage occurred. The court likened the case to other intentional torts like conversion and fraud, where pre-verdict interest is routinely granted to provide complete indemnification. The decision clarifies the availability of pre-verdict interest in intentional torts affecting property rights.

    Facts

    De Long Corp. brought an action against Morrison-Knudsen Co. alleging inducement of breach of contract and unfair competition.
    The plaintiff sought damages for the harm caused by the defendant’s intentional interference with its contractual and business relations.
    The specific facts underlying the breach of contract and unfair competition claims are not detailed in this decision, as the primary focus is on the availability of pre-verdict interest.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rendered a final judgment in favor of De Long Corp.
    The trial court also issued non-final orders adding interest to the verdict and denying a new trial.
    Morrison-Knudsen Co. appealed the final judgment and the non-final orders to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the lower court’s decisions.
    The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals by leave from the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in an action for inducing breach of contract and unfair competition, the successful plaintiff is entitled to pre-verdict interest as a matter of right on the amount of recovery.

    Holding

    Yes, because in actions involving intentional torts resulting in property damage, the successful plaintiff is entitled to pre-verdict interest as a matter of right to ensure full indemnification for the defendant’s wrongful interference with the plaintiff’s property rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that pre-verdict interest is necessary to afford a plaintiff “full indemnification” for the defendant’s wrongful interference with property rights, citing Flamm v. Noble. The court drew an analogy to other intentional torts, such as conversion, fraud, and trespass, where pre-verdict interest is recoverable as a matter of right.
    The court distinguished this case from actions involving negligent injury to property, where interest is discretionary. It emphasized that intentional torts warrant mandatory pre-verdict interest to provide complete compensation.
    The court quoted the authors of Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y. Civ. Prac., stating that CPLR 5001(a) “is phrased broadly and is designed to obliterate all distinctions that may turn on the form of the action * * *, the type of property involved, or the nature of the encroachment upon the plaintiff’s property interests.” This suggests a legislative intent to expand the right to interest in property damage actions, regardless of the specific cause of action.
    The court found no basis to differentiate the case from other intentional torts causing property damage. The focus was on the nature of the tort (intentional) and the type of damages (property-related), rather than the specific cause of action (inducing breach of contract).