New York Law Review

Tag: Intentional Murder

  • People v. Gause, 18 N.Y.3d 386 (2012): Double Jeopardy and Implied Acquittal in Inconsistent Verdicts

    People v. Gause, 18 N.Y.3d 386 (2012)

    When a jury is presented with inconsistent charges (intentional murder and depraved indifference murder) and convicts on one, that verdict implies an acquittal on the other, barring retrial on the latter under double jeopardy principles, even without an explicit acquittal.

    Summary

    Gause was initially convicted of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division reversed this conviction due to insufficient evidence and ordered a new trial for intentional murder. Gause was then convicted of intentional murder. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the second trial violated double jeopardy. Because the first jury had the opportunity to convict on either intentional or depraved indifference murder, its conviction on the latter implied an acquittal on the former. Since these crimes are inconsistent, a guilty verdict on one necessitates a not-guilty verdict on the other.

    Facts

    Following a dispute, Gause and an accomplice followed the victim. The accomplice shot the victim, and Gause struck the victim with a metal pole. The victim died from his injuries. Gause was charged with intentional murder, depraved indifference murder, and intentional assault.

    Procedural History

    The trial court instructed the jury that they could only convict Gause of one of the murder charges. The jury convicted Gause of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence for depraved indifference murder, dismissed that charge, and ordered a new trial on the intentional murder charge. Gause was convicted of intentional murder in the second trial, and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing the law of the case. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether double jeopardy bars retrial on an intentional murder charge after the defendant was initially convicted of depraved indifference murder, where the jury was instructed to consider the charges in the alternative and could only convict on one.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the first jury had a full opportunity to return a verdict on both inconsistent charges, and its conviction on depraved indifference murder impliedly acquitted Gause of intentional murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions protect against being tried twice for the same offense after an acquittal or conviction. Quoting In re Nielsen, the court noted the principle of “implied acquittal,” where a failure to convict when conviction was possible suggests acquittal. The court found that the first jury had the opportunity to convict on intentional murder but convicted on depraved indifference murder instead. It emphasized that intentional murder and depraved indifference murder are inconsistent charges under New York law: “guilt of one necessarily negates guilt of the other” (citing People v. Gallagher, 69 NY2d 525, 529 [1987]). The court reasoned that because the jury sought clarification on both charges and then convicted on depraved indifference murder, they necessarily rejected the intentional murder theory. Therefore, the retrial on the intentional murder charge was barred by double jeopardy. The court distinguished People v. Jackson, 20 NY2d 440 (1967), noting that it didn’t involve inconsistent counts where guilt of one necessarily negates guilt of the other. The court concluded that the indictment must be dismissed because no charges remain unconsidered.

  • People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202 (2005): Redefining Depraved Indifference Murder in New York

    People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202 (2005)

    Depraved indifference murder requires conduct so wanton, deficient in a moral sense of concern, and devoid of regard for the life or lives of others as to equate to a willingness to cause death or a lack of concern for the probable consequences of the actor’s conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals clarified the definition of depraved indifference murder, moving away from an expansive interpretation established in prior cases. The court held that depraved indifference murder requires more than just a grave risk of death; it demands conduct demonstrating a wanton disregard for human life. The decision emphasizes that depraved indifference should not be confused with intentional murder, and convictions for the former should be reserved for cases where the defendant’s actions reflect a complete lack of concern for the victim’s life, not simply an intent to cause harm.

    Facts

    The defendant, Suarez, stabbed the victim multiple times in the chest during an altercation. The victim died as a result of these stab wounds. The prosecution initially pursued charges of both intentional murder and depraved indifference murder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried and convicted of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to review the conviction in light of evolving legal standards for depraved indifference murder.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s actions in stabbing the victim multiple times in the chest constituted depraved indifference murder under the revised understanding of the statute, or whether the evidence indicated an intentional killing, precluding a conviction for depraved indifference.

    Holding

    No, because the act of stabbing someone in the chest, while creating a grave risk of death, typically evinces an intent to cause serious physical injury or death, and does not demonstrate the extreme indifference to human life required for depraved indifference murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the earlier, broader interpretations of depraved indifference murder in cases like People v. Register and People v. Sanchez had blurred the distinction between intentional murder and depraved indifference murder. The court emphasized that depraved indifference requires more than a grave risk of death; it requires circumstances evincing a complete disregard for the value of human life. The court stated that, “[d]epraved indifference murder is not merely a heightened form of intentional homicide.” The court highlighted that the act of stabbing someone in the chest, while undoubtedly dangerous, typically indicates an intent to cause serious physical injury or death, rather than a depraved indifference to whether the person lives or dies. “[D]efendant’s conduct here—however purposeful—was directed at one person. It is indicative of an intent to cause injury or death to that one person…” Therefore, the court held that the evidence presented did not support a conviction for depraved indifference murder, and reversed the conviction. The concurring opinion explicitly stated that People v. Register and People v. Sanchez should be overruled. The court acknowledged the difficulty of revisiting prior convictions but emphasized the importance of adhering to the legislature’s original intent for the depraved indifference statute.

  • People v. Wall, 107 N.Y.2d 465 (2006): Distinguishing Intentional Murder from Depraved Indifference Murder

    People v. Wall, 107 N.Y.2d 465 (2006)

    Depraved indifference murder requires recklessness and a lack of specific intent to cause death, distinguishing it from intentional murder, which involves a conscious objective to cause death.

    Summary

    The defendant, Wall, shot the victim ten times at close range. He was charged with both intentional and depraved indifference murder. The jury acquitted him of intentional murder but convicted him of depraved indifference murder. The Court of Appeals reversed the depraved indifference murder conviction, holding that the evidence only supported a charge of intentional murder. Because the defendant’s actions demonstrated a specific intent to cause death, the charge of depraved indifference murder was inappropriate, as that crime requires a reckless disregard for the risk of death, not a conscious objective to cause it.

    Facts

    Wall entered a barber shop, spoke to another person, left, and then returned to shoot the victim multiple times. He shot the victim in the chest and head from close range, and then fired eight more shots into the victim’s back and head as he lay on the floor. Wall then warned the barber not to say anything. After his arrest, Wall stated he was afraid of the victim and “blanked out” during the shooting, but later admitted he shot the victim.

    Procedural History

    Wall was indicted for intentional and depraved indifference murder, along with criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court denied Wall’s motion to dismiss the depraved indifference murder charge. The jury acquitted Wall of intentional murder but convicted him of depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division reversed the murder conviction, finding insufficient evidence of depraved indifference. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for depraved indifference murder when the defendant shot the victim ten times at close range.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s conduct demonstrated a specific intent to cause death, which is inconsistent with depraved indifference murder, which requires a reckless disregard for the risk of death.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that depraved indifference murder differs from intentional murder because it doesn’t result from a specific intent to cause death but from indifference to the risks of the defendant’s conduct. The court stated, “A defendant acts intentionally with respect to a result ‘when his conscious objective is to cause such result’ (Penal Law § 15.05 [1]).” Examples of depraved indifference murder include firing into a crowd or abandoning an intoxicated person on a snowy highway. The court distinguished those scenarios from the facts of this case, where the defendant specifically targeted the victim and shot him multiple times at close range. The court emphasized that one cannot act both intentionally and recklessly concerning the same result, quoting People v. Gallagher, 69 NY2d 525, 529 (1987): “The act is either intended or not intended; it cannot simultaneously be both.” The court concluded that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider the depraved indifference murder charge because the evidence only supported a charge of intentional murder. The court clarified that the depravity of the circumstances of an intentional homicide is irrelevant when the defendant’s conscious objective is to cause death. The reckless conduct must be “‘so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a person who intentionally causes the death of another.’” (People v Russell, 91 NY2d 280, 287 [1998], quoting People v Fenner, 61 NY2d 971, 973 [1984]).

  • People v. Hafeez, 100 N.Y.2d 253 (2003): Limits of Depraved Indifference Murder

    100 N.Y.2d 253 (2003)

    Depraved indifference murder requires conduct so imminently dangerous and presenting a very high risk of death, demonstrating heightened recklessness, and is inconsistent with a quintessentially intentional attack directed solely at the victim.

    Summary

    Hafeez and a codefendant plotted revenge against the victim, who had injured the codefendant in a bar fight months prior. They lured the victim out of a bar, where the codefendant stabbed him fatally. Hafeez was convicted of depraved indifference murder as an accomplice, along with other charges. The Appellate Division reversed the depraved indifference murder and conspiracy convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the reversal of the depraved indifference murder conviction, finding the evidence consistent with intentional murder, reinstated the conspiracy conviction, and upheld the tampering with physical evidence conviction. The court emphasized that depraved indifference murder requires heightened recklessness not present in this intentional, targeted attack.

    Facts

    • Defendant and his codefendant plotted to lure the victim out of a bar to retaliate for an earlier injury to the codefendant.
    • The codefendant carried a concealed knife.
    • The defendant pushed the victim against a wall, allowing the codefendant to stab him in the heart.
    • The defendant and codefendant fled, disposing of the knife handle.
    • Defendant initially denied knowing about the knife but later led police to its location.

    Procedural History

    • Defendant and codefendant were indicted on charges including intentional murder and depraved indifference murder.
    • Defendant was acquitted of intentional murder but convicted of depraved indifference murder, conspiracy, tampering, and hindering prosecution.
    • The Appellate Division reversed the depraved indifference murder, conspiracy, and hindering prosecution convictions.
    • Both the People and the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for depraved indifference murder.
    2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy in the fourth degree.
    3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for tampering with physical evidence.

    Holding

    1. No, because the codefendant’s conduct was consistent with intentional murder rather than depraved indifference murder.
    2. Yes, because the evidence established that the defendant conspired to commit the class B felony of assault in the first degree.
    3. Yes, because the defendant intentionally suppressed physical evidence, believing it would be used in an official proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    • Depraved Indifference Murder: The court emphasized that to convict the defendant of depraved indifference murder as an accomplice, the prosecution had to prove he intentionally aided the codefendant and shared the same culpable mental state. The court found the codefendant’s actions, which included months of plotting and a deliberate knife wound, were indicative of intentional murder, not depraved indifference. The court distinguished this case from People v. Sanchez, where the defendant fired into an area where children were playing, creating a heightened risk of unintended injury. Here, the actions were focused on intentionally injuring the victim. “The ‘heightened recklessness’ required for depraved indifference murder was simply not present.”
    • Conspiracy: The Appellate Division incorrectly required proof of a class A felony. The court found the evidence sufficient to establish a conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree, a class B felony, as the defendant intended to cause serious physical injury with a deadly weapon.
    • Tampering with Physical Evidence: The court found sufficient evidence that the defendant believed the codefendant intended to discard the murder weapon and assisted by stopping his van. This constituted intentionally suppressing evidence.

  • People v. Gallagher, 69 N.Y.2d 525 (1987): Inconsistent Murder Counts Must Be Charged in the Alternative

    People v. Gallagher, 69 N.Y.2d 525 (1987)

    When a defendant is charged with both intentional murder and depraved mind murder for a single homicide, the counts are inconsistent and must be submitted to the jury in the alternative, preventing convictions for both.

    Summary

    A police officer, after heavy drinking, shot and killed a fellow officer. He was charged with both intentional murder and depraved mind murder. The trial court instructed the jury on both counts, resulting in convictions for intentional murder and reckless manslaughter (as a lesser included offense of depraved mind murder). The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the manslaughter conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the murder counts were inconsistent and should have been charged in the alternative. The Court reasoned that the jury’s failure to determine the defendant’s mental state required a new trial, as the intentional and reckless mental states are mutually exclusive in this context.

    Facts

    Defendant, a New York City police officer, consumed large quantities of alcohol during an all-night St. Patrick’s Day celebration.

    Following the celebration, the defendant shot and killed a fellow police officer.

    The defendant was charged with two counts of murder in the second degree: intentional murder and depraved mind murder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of intentional murder and reckless manslaughter in the trial court.

    The Appellate Division upheld the intentional murder conviction but reversed the reckless manslaughter conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the intentional murder conviction and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, in a single homicide case, it is permissible to submit both intentional murder and depraved mind murder counts to the jury without instructing them to consider the counts in the alternative.

    Holding

    No, because the counts are inconsistent. The court must instruct the jury to consider the counts in the alternative, directing that a guilty verdict on one count necessitates a not guilty verdict on the other.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that intentional murder and depraved mind murder are inconsistent counts when based on the same act and result. “One who acts intentionally in shooting a person to death— that is, with the conscious objective of bringing about that result (Penal Law § 15.05 [1]) — cannot at the same time act recklessly — that is, with conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such a result will occur (Penal Law § 15.05 [3]).” The act cannot be simultaneously intended and not intended.

    The Court relied on CPL 300.40 (5), which mandates that inconsistent counts be submitted in the alternative, directing the jury to convict on only one. The trial court’s failure to do so allowed the jury to sidestep determining the defendant’s mental state.

    The Court rejected the People’s argument that the Appellate Division’s reversal of the manslaughter conviction cured the error. The Court stated, “It is not for the Appellate Division in the first instance to determine whether defendant acted intentionally or recklessly at the time of the crime. That is the jury’s function.”

    The Court distinguished the case from the law relating to lesser included offenses, where charging in the alternative benefits both the accused and the state by allowing for a less drastic choice than acquittal and preventing an empty prosecution. In this case, allowing two convictions for the same act confers an unintended advantage on the prosecution and allows the jury to avoid determining mens rea.

  • People v. Pagan, 60 N.Y.2d 788 (1983): Determining Accomplice Status for Corroboration Requirements

    People v. Pagan, 60 N.Y.2d 788 (1983)

    A witness is an accomplice as a matter of law only if the jury could reasonably conclude, based on the evidence, that the witness participated in the charged offense or an offense based on the same facts or conduct.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a witness, Destino, was an accomplice as a matter of law in the intentional murder of James Amico, requiring corroboration of his testimony. The defendant argued Destino was an accomplice because of his involvement in the earlier assault and attempted robbery of Amico. The Court held that Destino was not an accomplice as a matter of law to the murder because the evidence did not conclusively link him to the intentional murder itself; his car loan was ostensibly for taking Amico to the hospital, and the intent to murder was formed later. Additionally, the murder was a separate crime from the initial robbery and assault, as the facts constituting the murder were distinct.

    Facts

    Destino was involved in the initial assault and attempted robbery of James Amico. Destino provided his car, purportedly to transport Amico to a hospital. Later, Destino learned that others had dumped Amico in the Barge Canal. There was a significant time interval between the assault and the murder. The agreement to use Destino’s car appeared to be for a different purpose than murder. Destino participated in removing bloodstains from his car after the murder.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of intentional murder. The defendant’s attorney moved for a trial order of dismissal at the close of the People’s case, arguing Destino was an accomplice as a matter of law, but the motion was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the witness, Destino, was an accomplice as a matter of law to the intentional murder of James Amico, thus requiring corroboration of his testimony under CPL 60.22.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not conclusively establish that Destino participated in the intentional murder or in an offense based on the same facts or conduct as the murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that under CPL 60.22, a witness is an accomplice requiring corroboration only if the evidence reasonably leads to the conclusion that the witness participated in the charged offense or an offense based on the same facts. The court found no direct connection between Destino and the intentional murder, other than the use of his car. The court emphasized that the car was provided under the pretense of taking Amico to the hospital, and the intent to murder was formed later. The court distinguished this case from People v. Cona, where there was an ongoing criminal enterprise. Here, the robbery and assault were separate incidents from the intentional murder. The court stated, “Nothing connects Destino to the intentional murder other than the use of his car. As to that, the only evidence adduced is that the car was provided so that Amico could be taken to a hospital, and that it was not until four hours later that Destino learned that the others…had dumped Amico in the Barge Canal instead of taking him to the hospital.” The court also cited Grunewald v. United States and the ALI Model Penal Code to support the argument that Destino’s act of cleaning bloodstains did not make him an accomplice. The court concluded that the facts and conduct involved in the robbery attempt and assault were distinct from those constituting the intentional murder, therefore Destino was not an accomplice as a matter of law.