New York Law Review

Tag: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

  • Chanko v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 27 N.Y.3d 46 (2016): Breach of Physician-Patient Confidentiality and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

    27 N.Y.3d 46 (2016)

    A physician’s duty to maintain patient confidentiality, established by statute, is breached when confidential information is disclosed to those not involved in the patient’s care, and is not dependent on the sensitivity or embarrassment associated with the information; claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress require conduct that is extreme and outrageous, exceeding all bounds of decency.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed a case involving the filming of a patient’s medical treatment and death in a hospital emergency room for a television documentary. The court held that the hospital and treating physician could be liable for breach of physician-patient confidentiality due to unauthorized disclosure, but that the conduct did not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous” required for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court emphasized the breadth of the physician-patient privilege and the high standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, distinguishing this case from prior rulings.

    Facts

    Mark Chanko was treated at New York-Presbyterian Hospital after being hit by a car. While he was being treated, an ABC News crew filmed a documentary series, with the hospital’s permission, but without Chanko’s or his family’s knowledge or consent. After Chanko’s death, the filming continued, and the events were included in an episode of the documentary series, 16 months later his widow, Anita Chanko, and other family members saw the footage, leading to distress. The family sued the hospital, the physician, and ABC, alleging breach of confidentiality and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed most claims but allowed breach of physician-patient confidentiality against the hospital and physician, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants, to proceed. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the entire complaint. The Court of Appeals granted the plaintiffs leave to appeal, addressing the viability of these claims.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against the hospital and physician for breach of physician-patient confidentiality.

    2. Whether the conduct of the defendants was sufficiently “extreme and outrageous” to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the complaint alleged an unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical information, and the physician-patient privilege should be construed broadly.

    2. No, because the defendants’ conduct, while potentially insensitive, did not meet the high threshold of “extreme and outrageous” behavior required for this tort.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found the breach of physician-patient confidentiality claim was adequately stated. The physician-patient privilege, codified in CPLR 4504, aims to encourage open communication between patients and providers by protecting patient privacy. The privilege covers all information acquired during treatment and is not limited to embarrassing information. Here, the hospital and doctor allowed the filming and disclosure to the film crew without the patient’s consent. The court noted that a lack of consent could be inferred from the allegations of the complaint.

    Regarding intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found the defendants’ actions were not sufficiently outrageous. The court emphasized that this tort requires conduct “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” The court cited prior cases where the behavior was not found outrageous enough to satisfy this standard. The fact that the footage shown was edited to include less than three minutes of content was a significant factor in the court’s decision. Therefore, the court held that the defendants’ conduct, while reprehensible, did not meet the stringent standard required to support this claim.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the scope of the physician-patient privilege in New York, emphasizing its broad protection of medical information. It serves as a reminder that any disclosure of such information to unauthorized parties can form the basis of a breach of confidentiality claim. It also underscores the high bar for establishing intentional infliction of emotional distress. Attorneys should carefully assess whether the conduct alleged is truly “extreme and outrageous” and, if not, should consider other causes of action.

    This case affects how hospitals, physicians, and media companies must act in their relationships with patients, especially in situations involving filming or recording. It also highlights the need for healthcare providers to balance their need to give information, the privacy concerns of patients, and the need to obtain informed consent before filming medical treatments and sharing patient information with external parties. The standard the court applied for intentional infliction of emotional distress continues to be a major hurdle for plaintiffs seeking damages on this basis.

  • Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115 (1993): Limits on Emotional Distress and Privacy Claims in Newsgathering

    Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115 (1993)

    The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot be used to circumvent the limitations on right to privacy claims, especially when the publication involves a newsworthy event and the photograph has a real relationship to the article.

    Summary

    Pamela Howell, a patient at a psychiatric facility, sued the New York Post for publishing a photograph of her taken without her consent while she was walking with Hedda Nussbaum, a figure of public interest due to her involvement in the Lisa Steinberg case. Howell claimed the publication revealed her hospitalization, causing her emotional distress. The Court of Appeals held that while the conduct of newsgathering could be tortious, the publication was related to a matter of public interest, and the photograph bore a real relationship to the article about Nussbaum’s recovery. Therefore, neither the privacy claim nor the emotional distress claim could succeed because the publication was qualifiedly privileged.

    Facts

    Pamela Howell was a patient at Four Winds Hospital, a psychiatric facility, and desired to keep her hospitalization private. Hedda Nussbaum, known for her involvement in the Lisa Steinberg case, was also a patient. A New York Post photographer trespassed onto the hospital grounds and took pictures of Nussbaum and Howell. The Post published a front-page photograph of Nussbaum and Howell walking together, contrasting Nussbaum’s healed appearance with a previous photo of her bruised face after Lisa Steinberg’s death. Howell’s name was not mentioned, but her face was visible.

    Procedural History

    Howell sued the New York Post for violating Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, trespass, harassment, and prima facie tort. The Supreme Court dismissed all claims except for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the derivative claim. The Appellate Division modified, dismissing the entire complaint. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the dismissal of the privacy and emotional distress claims.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the publication of Howell’s photograph violated her statutory right to privacy under Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51.
    2. Whether the New York Post’s actions constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Holding

    1. No, because the photograph was related to a newsworthy article about Hedda Nussbaum and bore a real relationship to the article.
    2. No, because the publication of the photograph was qualifiedly privileged as a newsworthy event, and the newsgathering methods, while involving a trespass, did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that to succeed on a privacy claim under Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, Howell needed to show that the photograph was used for trade or advertising purposes and bore no real relationship to a matter of public interest. Since the article concerned Hedda Nussbaum, a figure of public interest, and the article was not an advertisement, the court focused on whether the photograph had a real relationship to the article. The court found that the photograph did have a real relationship because it contrasted Nussbaum’s improved appearance with her prior disfigured state, illustrating her recovery. Quoting Murray v New York Mag. Co., the court reiterated that ” ‘a picture illustrating an article on a matter of public interest is not considered used for the purpose of trade or advertising within the prohibition of the statute * * * unless it has no real relationship to the article * * * or unless the article is an advertisement in disguise.’ “

    Regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court acknowledged that while newsgathering methods could be tortious, the conduct alleged did not meet the stringent requirements for the tort. The court emphasized the “privileged-conduct” exception, stating that “[a] newspaper’s publication of a newsworthy photograph is an act within the contemplation of the ‘privileged-conduct’ exception.” The court further explained that for conduct to be considered outrageous, it must be “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community’ ” (quoting Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp.). Trespassing to take the photograph, while unlawful, did not meet this high standard, especially because the photograph was taken outdoors and from a distance.

  • Burlew v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 63 N.Y.2d 412 (1984): Exclusivity of Workers’ Compensation for Delay in Authorizing Treatment

    Burlew v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 63 N.Y.2d 412 (1984)

    The Workers’ Compensation Law provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, including those allegedly resulting from an employer’s (or its insurer’s) delay in authorizing medical treatment, unless the conduct rises to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Summary

    Bernice Burlew sued American Mutual Insurance Company, her employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, alleging negligence and bad faith due to the insurer’s delay in authorizing surgery for a work-related injury. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Workers’ Compensation Law provided the exclusive remedy for such claims, preempting common-law negligence actions. While intentional torts could be pursued outside the workers’ compensation system, the insurer’s conduct in this case did not meet the high threshold for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court emphasized the comprehensive regulatory scheme of the Workers’ Compensation Law and the availability of administrative remedies for unreasonable delays.

    Facts

    Bernice Burlew suffered a work-related injury due to inhaling fumes at her workplace, Voplex Corporation, and began receiving workers’ compensation benefits from American Mutual Insurance Company, the employer’s insurer. Her physician determined she needed surgery and sought authorization from American Mutual. The insurer delayed authorization for four to five months before finally granting the request. Burlew subsequently sued American Mutual, alleging negligence and bad faith based on the delay.

    Procedural History

    Burlew filed suit in January 1983, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. American Mutual moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term granted the motion to dismiss the negligence cause of action but not the bad faith claim. The Appellate Division modified, dismissing the entire complaint. Burlew appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an employee can bring a common-law negligence action against a workers’ compensation insurer for delays in authorizing medical treatment for a work-related injury.
    2. Whether the insurer’s conduct in delaying authorization constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress, allowing for a tort action outside the scope of the Workers’ Compensation Law.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Workers’ Compensation Law provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, including those arising from delays in authorizing treatment.
    2. No, because the insurer’s conduct, even if considered bad faith, did not meet the high threshold of being “so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all bounds of decency” required for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Workers’ Compensation Law is a comprehensive scheme designed to be the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries. The court emphasized that the law regulates not just the fact of injury but also the administration of claims and provides specific remedies for employer misconduct. According to the court, “all employer conduct that is regulated by the Workers’ Compensation Law is subject to the protection of that law’s exclusivity; if the employer violates any provision of the code, an employee’s remedies cannot exceed those granted in the statutes.” The court noted that the Workers’ Compensation Law provides a mechanism for employees to seek authorization for medical treatment directly from the Workers’ Compensation Board if the employer or insurer delays unreasonably. The Court further reasoned that while intentional torts are generally not covered by workers’ compensation, the insurer’s conduct in this case did not rise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court cited Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557, stating that the conduct must be “so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all bounds of decency or to be utterly intolerable in civilized society.” The court found that neither the agent’s statement nor the attempt to disprove Burlew’s claim met this high standard. The court explicitly declined to rule on whether a third-party beneficiary claim could be brought because the insurer’s behavior did not even amount to “bad faith”.

  • Weicker v. Weicker, 22 N.Y.2d 8 (1968): Barring Claims for Emotional Distress Arising from Matrimonial Disputes

    Weicker v. Weicker, 22 N.Y.2d 8 (1968)

    Strong policy considerations prevent courts from applying the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to disputes arising out of matrimonial differences, as it would revive issues similar to those addressed by the abolition of alienation of affections and criminal conversation actions.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued her former spouse and another woman, seeking damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from holding themselves out as husband and wife. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of these claims, holding that public policy considerations prevent the application of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to disputes arising out of matrimonial differences. Allowing such claims would undermine the legislative intent behind the abolition of actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation.

    Facts

    Plaintiff brought an action against her former husband and another woman. The claims included a request for damages based on the intentional or reckless infliction of mental suffering. She also sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from holding themselves out as husband and wife and to prevent the defendant woman from using the former husband’s name.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division dismissed the portions of the plaintiff’s second amended complaint seeking damages for intentional infliction of mental suffering and injunctive relief. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a claim for damages based on the intentional infliction of emotional distress can be sustained in the context of a dispute arising out of matrimonial differences.

    2. Whether injunctive relief is available to restrain defendants from holding themselves out as husband and wife in a dispute arising out of matrimonial differences.

    Holding

    1. No, because strong policy considerations militate against applying the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress to the factual context of disputes arising out of matrimonial differences.

    2. No, because the same policy reasons barring damages also bar injunctive relief, and because courts of equity should not administer paternal relief in domestic affairs as such decrees are practically unenforceable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that allowing a claim for damages in this context would effectively revive the evils that prompted the Legislature to abolish actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. These abolished causes of action historically allowed a spouse to sue a third party for interfering with the marital relationship. The court noted the legislature’s clear intent to eliminate causes of action based on marital discord. The court held that claims for emotional distress stemming from matrimonial disputes should also be barred to prevent an end-run around the legislative intent. The court quoted Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N.Y. 382, 389 stating that “ [i]t is not the province of courts of equity to administer paternal relief in domestic affairs. As a matter of practical fact, such decrees cannot be enforced ”. Therefore injunctive relief was deemed inappropriate.