New York Law Review

Tag: Intent

  • People v. Diaz, 28 N.Y.2d 230 (1971): Defining Lesser Included Offenses Based on Intent

    People v. Diaz, 28 N.Y.2d 230 (1971)

    A crime is not a lesser included offense of another if it requires proof of an element not required for the greater offense.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether harassment could be considered a lesser included offense of assault. The defendant was charged with assault in the third degree for allegedly striking a police officer. The trial court instructed the jury that they could convict him of the “lesser offense” of harassment, and he was convicted of harassment. The Appellate Term reversed, holding that harassment could not be deemed a lesser included offense of assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that harassment requires proof of an intent to harass, annoy, or alarm, which is not an element of assault, which requires intent to cause physical injury.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00) for allegedly striking a police officer with intent to cause injury.

    At trial, the judge instructed the jury that they could find the defendant guilty of the “lesser offense” of harassment (Penal Law § 240.25).

    The jury convicted the defendant of harassment.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and dismissed the information, holding that harassment could not be deemed a lesser included offense of assault.

    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether harassment may be deemed a lesser included offense of assault.

    Holding

    No, because the violation of harassment requires proof of an element—an intent to harass, annoy, or alarm—which is not required to establish the crime of assault.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by examining the definitions of assault and harassment under the New York Penal Law. Assault in the third degree, as defined in § 120.00, requires proof that the defendant, “ [w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to [him] ”. Harassment, as defined in § 240.25, requires proof of an “ intent to harass, annoy or alarm ”. The statute reads that a person is guilty of harassment “ when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm ” he “ strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects [another] to physical contact ”.

    The court emphasized that the intent to injure, which is an element of assault, does not include an intent to harass, annoy, or alarm. Because harassment requires proof of an additional element not required for assault, it cannot be considered a lesser included offense. As the court stated, “since an additional element or fact must be shown to be present in a case of harassment, that violation may not be said to be included in the crime of assault.”

    The court also referenced the new Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), particularly § 220.20, which addresses guilty pleas. This section lists specific rules under which an offense of “lesser grade” than the one charged may be deemed a “lesser included offense for plea purposes only.” Subdivision 1, paragraph (f) of § 220.20 states that, “ [w]here the crime charged is assault * * * the offense of harassment [Penal Law, § 240.25] is deemed to constitute a lesser included offense ” “ only for the purposes of conviction upon a plea of guilty and not for purposes of conviction by verdict ” (subd. 2). The court reasoned that if the Legislature considered harassment a lesser included offense of assault for both plea and verdict purposes, there would have been no need to specify that it is only a lesser included offense for plea purposes. This distinction implies that the Legislature recognized that harassment is not a lesser included offense of assault under the general statutory definition (CPL, § 1.20, subd. 37).

    The court noted that while CPL § 220.20(2) allows conviction by verdict for lesser included offenses as defined in CPL § 1.20(37), the specific designation of harassment as a lesser included offense of assault “ only for purposes of conviction upon a plea of guilty ” constitutes a legislative determination that it is not an included crime under the statutory definition.

  • People v. Borrero, 26 N.Y.2d 430 (1970): Establishing Intent for Burglar’s Tools Possession

    People v. Borrero, 26 N.Y.2d 430 (1970)

    Circumstantial evidence can establish the intent to use an instrument for an unlawful purpose in a charge of possession of burglar’s tools, even without direct proof of ownership of the property targeted.

    Summary

    This case addresses the level of proof required to convict someone for possession of burglar’s tools, specifically concerning intent. Borrero was observed prying at a car window with a screwdriver, and Lugo was seen using a wire to try to enter a car. The court held that while screwdrivers and wires are not inherently burglar’s tools, their use under suspicious circumstances can provide sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer intent to commit a crime, even if the prosecution doesn’t directly prove the defendant didn’t own the car. The court emphasized that the evidence, viewed through “common human experience,” must lead a reasonable person to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Facts

    In Borrero, a detective saw Borrero using a screwdriver on a car vent window. After a brief conversation with another man, Borrero hid the screwdriver and walked away. He was arrested and found to possess heroin. In Lugo, Lugo and an accomplice were observed looking into cars. Lugo inserted a wire into a car window while his accomplice acted as a lookout. They stopped when people approached the car with keys and walked away. Lugo confessed to possessing the tool.

    Procedural History

    Borrero was convicted of possession of burglar’s tools and narcotics. The Appellate Term reversed the burglar’s tools conviction. Lugo was convicted of possession of burglar’s tools, and the Appellate Term affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether circumstantial evidence, in the absence of direct proof of ownership of the targeted vehicle, can sufficiently establish the intent to use possessed tools in the commission of a larceny offense, thus warranting a conviction for possession of burglar’s tools under New York Penal Law § 140.35.

    Holding

    Yes, because the surrounding circumstances can reasonably lead to the inference that the defendant intended to use the tools for an unlawful purpose. In Borrero, the Appellate Term’s judgment was reversed and remitted for factual determination. In Lugo, the judgment was affirmed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while items like screwdrivers and wires are not inherently burglar’s tools, their use in suspicious circumstances can establish the necessary intent for a conviction under Penal Law § 140.35. The court acknowledged the standard for circumstantial evidence, stating that the hypothesis of guilt should flow naturally from the facts and be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence. However, the court clarified that this test should not replace reasoned thought, quoting People v. Wachowicz, “In the end, it is a question whether common human experience would lead a reasonable man, putting his mind to it, to reject or accept the inferences asserted for the established facts.” The court distinguished these cases from mere possession, noting the defendants were essentially “caught in the act.” While direct proof of ownership is preferable, the court held that lack of ownership could be inferred from the circumstances. Regarding Borrero, the court stated that the defendant’s actions, including ceasing his actions and hiding the screwdriver, suggest intent to break into another’s car, as “common experience would suggest the owner of the car would have a locksmith or mechanic open the car, rather than pay the cost of a new window and its installation.” Regarding Lugo, the court found it “ludicrous” to believe his actions were consistent with innocence.

  • People v. Hicks, 287 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 1972): Establishing Intent for Felony Murder

    People v. Hicks, 287 N.E.2d 107 (N.Y. 1972)

    For a conviction of felony murder to stand, the intent to commit the underlying felony must precede or be concurrent with the killing; the felony cannot be merely an afterthought.

    Summary

    The case of People v. Hicks concerns the critical element of intent in a felony murder charge. Hicks was convicted of felony murder for killing Albert Hicks during a robbery. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the jury instructions allowed for a conviction even if the intent to rob arose after the killing. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, adequately conveyed that the intent to commit the robbery must have existed before or during the killing for a felony murder conviction to be valid. The court emphasized that the act of robbery must be connected to the act of killing to constitute felony murder.

    Facts

    The defendant, Hicks, while in the company of friends, stated he needed money and might have to kill someone to get it. Shortly after, Hicks encountered Albert Hicks. The two entered a building together. Upon exiting, Hicks attacked Albert Hicks, stabbing him fatally. Hicks then took change from the victim’s pocket. Police found the victim’s body with a pocket turned inside out.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Hicks of felony murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding the jury instructions allowed the jury to convict even if the intent to rob arose after the killing. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be convicted of felony murder where the intent to commit the underlying felony (robbery) arose after the killing.

    Holding

    No, because a person can only be convicted of felony murder if the killing occurs during the attempted execution of the underlying felony, and the intent to commit that felony must exist before or during the killing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the original conviction. The court emphasized that the trial judge repeatedly instructed the jury that the injury resulting in death must have been inflicted “during the commission of a robbery, or an attempted robbery, and while the killer was engaged in committing such act.” The court highlighted the importance of the connection between the act of killing and the intent to commit the robbery, stating, “To constitute felony murder the injury which resulted in death must have been inflicted during the commission of a robbery, or an attempted robbery, and while the killer was engaged in committing such act.” The court acknowledged the Appellate Division’s concern regarding the trial judge’s response to a jury question about whether robbery could be committed on a dead person. However, the court concluded that the judge’s overall instructions made it clear that the killing had to be perpetrated “for the purpose” or “in the course” of a robbery. In essence, the jury had to find that Hicks intended to rob Albert Hicks at the time he stabbed and killed him to convict him of felony murder. The court found the instructions as a whole were sufficient to inform the jury of this requirement. The court thus reinforced the principle that the intent to commit the underlying felony must precede or be concurrent with the killing for a felony murder conviction to stand.

  • People v. Dales, 24 N.Y.2d 241 (1969): Admissibility of Uncharged Crimes to Prove Intent

    People v. Dales, 24 N.Y.2d 241 (1969)

    Evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible if its only purpose is to suggest the defendant has a criminal disposition, but such evidence can be admitted if it is directly probative of an element of the charged crime, such as intent, provided its probative value outweighs the risk of prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    Dales was convicted as a youthful offender based on assault and weapons charges. The prosecution introduced evidence of prior uncharged assaults against the victim to demonstrate Dales’ intent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the admission of the uncharged assaults was prejudicial error because the intent to cause physical injury was readily inferable from the charged act of stabbing the victim, and therefore the uncharged assaults served only to demonstrate Dales’ criminal propensity.

    Facts

    Dales was charged with assaulting his pregnant girlfriend, Belinda, after breaking into her apartment. Belinda testified that Dales beat her on a rooftop after a party and later broke into her apartment, attempted to strangle her, and stabbed her. Over defense counsel’s objections, Belinda also testified about several prior uncharged assaults, including threats with a knife, a prior strangulation attempt, and an incident where Dales allegedly threw their child to the floor. Dales denied all the assaults.

    Procedural History

    Dales was indicted on burglary, assault, and weapons charges, but was granted youthful offender status. He was adjudicated a youthful offender in the trial court and sentenced to an indefinite reformatory term. The Appellate Division affirmed. Dissenting justices argued that the uncharged assaults were improperly admitted. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony of prior uncharged assaults against the victim to prove the defendant’s intent in the charged crime.

    Holding

    No, because the act of stabbing the victim allowed for the easy inference of intent to cause physical harm; the admission of uncharged prior assaults introduced solely for intent was unduly prejudicial. The judgment was reversed and a new trial granted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while evidence of uncharged crimes is generally inadmissible to show criminal propensity, it may be admissible if directly probative of the crime charged, such as to prove intent. The court emphasized that the admissibility of such evidence hinges on balancing probative value against the risk of prejudice to the defendant. Evidence of prior acts to prove intent is more likely to be admitted when the acts constituting the charged crime are equivocal. Here, the act of stabbing itself strongly suggested intent to cause physical injury. The court found that Dales’ defense was that he did not commit the act, not that he lacked intent. Because intent could be easily inferred from the charged act, the evidence of prior assaults served only to demonstrate Dales’ criminal propensity, creating undue prejudice. Quoting from prior precedent, the court stated, “adjudication as a youthful offender must rest upon a finding that the defendant committed the criminal acts charged against him in the indictment or information”. The court concluded that the error in admitting the evidence was not harmless because the case hinged on Belinda’s credibility versus Dales’, and the evidence of prior assaults likely influenced the jury’s perception of Dales’ character, thereby prejudicing the outcome. The Court stated, “Before an error can be held to be harmless, the court must decide that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

  • People v. Washington, 18 N.Y.2d 366 (1966): Intent Requirement for Criminal Mischief

    People v. Washington, 18 N.Y.2d 366 (1966)

    To be guilty of criminal mischief under Penal Law § 1433, a defendant must have intended to damage the property, or at least intended to damage property, not merely committed an intentional act that resulted in unintended damage.

    Summary

    Washington was adjudged a youthful offender for malicious mischief after a trash can thrown by his codefendant, Cannon, damaged a parked car. The evidence suggested Cannon intended to hit the car’s occupants, not the car itself. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Penal Law § 1433, concerning willful property damage, requires intent to damage property, not merely an intentional act resulting in unintended damage. The court also found insufficient evidence to establish Washington as an accomplice.

    Facts

    The complaining witness, Williams, stopped his car to let a passenger out. Washington, Cannon, and another man were nearby. Washington shouted an epithet at Williams and swung at Williams’ companion. Williams exited the car on the other side. Cannon threw a litter basket at Williams, but it hit Williams’ car, causing damage. Washington then threw a pipe at Williams, striking him, but nothing thrown by Washington struck the car.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court of the City of New York found Washington guilty of malicious mischief. The Appellate Term affirmed by a 2-1 vote. A dissenting Justice cited People v. Hackley, arguing that intent to injure a person is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Penal Law § 1433. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Penal Law § 1433, which penalizes a person who “unlawfully and wilfully destroys or injures any real or personal property of another,” requires proof that the defendant intended to damage the property, or whether it is sufficient to show that the defendant willed the act that caused the damage, even if the damage was not intended.
    2. Whether, given that Cannon threw the litter basket that damaged the car, there was sufficient evidence to find Washington an accomplice to the crime of damaging the automobile.

    Holding

    1. No, because in the context of § 1433, “wilfully” includes and requires the element of intent to do the damage complained of, or at least an intent to damage property.
    2. No, because the proof was insufficient to establish the charged offense as to either Cannon or Washington.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the term “wilfully” in § 1433 requires intent to cause the damage, or at least an intent to damage property. The court noted the severe penalties associated with the statute, including a long term of imprisonment for damages exceeding $250 and liability for treble damages in a civil action. The court found it unlikely that the legislature intended such severe penalties for unintentional acts where the perpetrator intended to assault someone but missed and damaged property. The court stated, “In its context in section 1433 the word ‘wilfully’ would seem to include and require the element of intent to do the damage complained of, or at least an intent to damage property.” The court suggested that the appropriate remedy for unintentional damage in such a situation is a civil action for damages.

    Regarding Washington’s potential liability as an accomplice, the court stated that Washington could only be criminally liable if there was enough proof to justify finding him an accomplice. The court referenced People v. Kupperschmidt, 237 N.Y. 463, 465, stating that accomplice liability requires showing that the defendant has taken a guilty part in the commission of the crime. However, because the proof was insufficient to establish the charged offense as to either Cannon or Washington, the court declined to definitively rule on the accomplice issue.

    Judges Scileppi and Keating concurred in the reversal, but solely on the ground that Cannon alone caused the damage and there was insufficient evidence to prove that Washington was Cannon’s accomplice. They explicitly stated their disapproval of the holding in People v. Hackley, indicating that if there had been sufficient proof of accomplice liability, they would have voted for affirmance, notwithstanding the Hackley decision.

  • People v. Monaco, 14 N.Y.2d 43 (1964): Establishing Shared Intent in Second-Degree Murder

    People v. Monaco, 14 N.Y.2d 43 (1964)

    To convict a defendant of second-degree murder as an accomplice, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shared the principal’s design to effect the death of the victim; mere participation in a joint enterprise that results in a spontaneous act of homicide by one participant is insufficient.

    Summary

    This case addresses the level of intent required to convict an accomplice of second-degree murder. Monaco was convicted of second-degree murder for a shooting committed by his companion, Fasano, during a street fight. The New York Court of Appeals found insufficient evidence to prove Monaco shared Fasano’s intent to kill, pointing to testimony indicating their plan was only to scare and beat members of a rival gang. The court held that while Monaco’s actions supported a conviction for manslaughter in the first degree, the prosecution failed to demonstrate that Monaco had the requisite intent for a murder conviction. The court modified the judgment, reducing the conviction to manslaughter in the first degree.

    Facts

    Monaco and Fasano went to confront a rival gang, the “Ditmas Dukes.” Fasano carried a loaded gun. The evidence showed that the plan was to scare and beat a member of the rival gang. Fasano shot and killed a member of the Ditmas Dukes. Monaco was convicted of second-degree murder.

    Procedural History

    Monaco was initially convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial based on an error in jury instructions. The People appealed that reversal to the New York Court of Appeals, which reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to consider the facts. The Appellate Division then affirmed the judgment of conviction. Monaco then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for second-degree murder.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Monaco shared Fasano’s design to effect the death of the victim, thereby supporting a conviction for second-degree murder.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not sufficiently demonstrate that Monaco shared Fasano’s intent to kill; the evidence indicated a plan to scare and beat the rival gang members, not to kill them. The spontaneous use of the weapon by Fasano, without proof of Monaco’s prior agreement or intent to kill, is insufficient to attribute the design to kill to Monaco.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that second-degree murder requires a “design to effect the death of the person killed” (Penal Law, § 1046). While Fasano’s act of firing the gun could establish that design on his part, the court found a lack of evidence demonstrating that Monaco shared that intent. The court noted that the evidence, viewed most favorably to the prosecution, showed a purpose to engage in a fight and to scare and beat members of the rival gang, but not to kill anyone. The court stated: “An agreement to murder must be shown to exclude other fair inferences.”

    The court relied on the testimony of a police officer and Monaco’s own statement, which indicated the intention was to scare and hit someone, not to kill them. The court cited People v. Weiss, 290 N.Y. 160, stating that Monaco’s intent to kill must be “fairly deducible from the proof” and that the proof must exclude any other purpose. Because the record was consistent with a spontaneously formed decision by Fasano to shoot, in which Monaco took no purposeful part, the court held the evidence insufficient to sustain a conviction for second-degree murder.

    The court distinguished the case from situations involving co-conspirators who together intend to kill. The court concluded that the evidence supported a conviction for manslaughter in the first degree because Monaco was engaged in a plan to assault the deceased, and a homicide resulted without Monaco’s design to effect death. The court modified the judgment, reducing the degree of the crime to manslaughter in the first degree.

  • People v. Post Standard Co., 13 N.Y.2d 185 (1963): Intent Required for Contempt of Court for False Reporting

    13 N.Y.2d 185 (1963)

    To be convicted of contempt of court for publishing a false or grossly inaccurate report of court proceedings under New York Penal Law § 600(7), the publication must be made with the intent to defy the dignity and authority of the court, not merely be factually incorrect.

    Summary

    The Post Standard Company and several of its employees were indicted for contempt of court for publishing a false report of court proceedings, in violation of Penal Law § 600(7). The newspaper reported that a witness accused a particular officer of assault, which was inaccurate. The trial court sustained a demurrer, but the appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed again, holding that a conviction under § 600(7) requires proof of intent to defy the dignity and authority of the court. The court reasoned that interpreting the statute otherwise would create an unconstitutional restriction on freedom of the press by punishing minor, unintentional reporting errors.

    Facts

    The Post Standard newspaper published an article about a court proceeding in which a witness, Percy Lee Holloway, testified. The article falsely stated that Holloway accused Sgt. Thomas Sardino of assault during the proceeding. The official court minutes showed that Holloway made no accusations against Sgt. Sardino. The indictment alleged that the newspaper’s report was a false and grossly inaccurate report of the court proceedings.

    Procedural History

    The Onondaga County Court initially sustained a demurrer to the indictment, agreeing with the defendants that the indictment was deficient. The Appellate Division reversed the County Court’s decision and ordered the indictment reinstated. The case then came before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a conviction for contempt of court under Penal Law § 600(7) for publishing a false or grossly inaccurate report of court proceedings requires proof that the publication was made with the intent to defy the dignity and authority of the court.

    Holding

    No, because the court held that § 600(7) requires proof of intent to defy the dignity and authority of the court. The statute penalizes the publication of a false report only when that publication constitutes a contempt of court in the traditional sense, meaning it is intended to impugn or defy the court’s authority.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the phrase “commits a contempt of court” in the statute’s opening paragraph limits and qualifies the language in subdivision 7, requiring an intent to assail the dignity and authority of the court. The court drew an analogy to Judiciary Law § 750, which contains similar language. Despite the seemingly absolute language in § 750, the Court of Appeals had previously held that an intent to defy the dignity and authority of a court is a necessary element of criminal contempt. The court emphasized that interpreting § 600(7) otherwise would allow convictions based on minor, unintentional errors, infringing on freedom of the press. The court quoted Craig v. Harney, stating that “mere errors in reporting, where no willfulness is alleged, are not usually considered a sound basis for contempt proceedings.” The court noted the lack of any allegation or evidence that the false report, on its face, affronted the dignity and authority of the court. Chief Judge Desmond dissented, arguing that the statute should be enforced as written and that the prosecution only needed to prove that the article was false or grossly inaccurate. He argued there is no constitutional right to publish false statements. The majority rejected this view, reversing the Appellate Division’s order and dismissing the indictment. The court also noted the potential for the Appellate Division’s construction of the statute to impinge upon the freedom of the press as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.

  • Seiter v. Geiszler, 70 N.Y. 294 (1877): Usury Requires Intent by Borrower to Pay and Lender to Receive Illegal Interest

    Seiter v. Geiszler, 70 N.Y. 294 (1877)

    Usury requires a corrupt agreement where the borrower intends to pay, and the lender intends to receive, interest exceeding the legal rate; the mere fact that a lender extracts an unlawful premium without the borrower’s knowledge or consent does not establish usury.

    Summary

    This case addresses the essential elements of usury. Seiter loaned Geiszler money, ostensibly at a legal interest rate. However, Seiter charged Geiszler an additional “commission” through the attorney facilitating the loan, which Geiszler disputed. The court held that usury was not established because Geiszler did not intend to pay usurious interest, and Seiter’s extraction of the commission was without Geiszler’s agreement or knowledge. The critical element of a mutual agreement to violate the usury laws was absent, making the loan valid.

    Facts

    Geiszler owed Seiter $172.45 on two past-due notes. Seiter agreed to loan Geiszler $1,500, with the existing debt to be paid from the loan proceeds. At the loan closing, Geiszler received a statement showing the $172.45 debt, an attorney’s bill for $230.45 (including a $150 “commission for obtaining loan”), and a check for $1,097.10. Geiszler questioned the $150 commission, stating he did not expect to pay it. Seiter responded that it was “cheap enough.” The $150 was, in fact, retained by Seiter, not paid to the attorney.

    Procedural History

    The mortgagee, Seiter, brought the action against the mortgagor, Geiszler, to foreclose on the mortgage. The lower court likely found in favor of the mortgagee. Geiszler appealed the decision, arguing the mortgage was usurious. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the loan was usurious when the lender charged and retained a “commission” that, if considered interest, would exceed the legal rate, but the borrower did not agree to pay it and protested the charge.

    Holding

    No, because there was no intent on the part of the borrower to pay usury, nor any expectation that the lender should receive usury. The essential element of a corrupt agreement to violate usury laws was missing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that usury requires a specific intent and agreement by both parties: the borrower must intend to pay, and the lender must intend to receive, interest exceeding the legal rate. The court stated, “There was no intent on the part of Geiszler to pay usury; no expectation on his part that Seiter should have usury. And I am not able to perceive how, in the absence of such intent, there could have been an agreement or contract for it.” Because Geiszler protested the $150 commission and never agreed to it, Seiter’s actions were viewed as a potential fraud or unauthorized extraction of funds, but not usury. The court reasoned that “either the attorney, without right, or Seiter, by false pretense, has deprived the defendant Geiszler of the money due to him, but it was by virtue of no agreement, and so there can be no usury.” The court distinguished between waiving a tort and implying an agreement, stating that “from a fraud you cannot imply or import a term into a valid agreement, for the purpose of rendering that agreement void.” The remedy, if any, would be a claim by Geiszler for the unauthorized deduction, not a finding of usury invalidating the entire loan.

  • Bacon v. Gilmore, 74 N.Y. 36 (1878): Admissibility of Testimony Regarding Intent in Transactions with Deceased Persons

    Bacon v. Gilmore, 74 N.Y. 36 (1878)

    Under New York’s Dead Man’s Statute, a party is generally prohibited from testifying about personal transactions or communications with a deceased person if the testimony is offered against the deceased person’s estate.

    Summary

    This case concerns the admissibility of testimony regarding the plaintiff’s intent when transferring property to a deceased individual. The court held that the plaintiff could not testify about his intent in placing property with the deceased, Bacon, because that intent was part of a personal transaction, and Bacon could no longer refute it. The ruling reinforces the principle that when one party to a transaction is deceased, the other party’s testimony about that transaction is restricted to ensure fairness and prevent potential fraud against the deceased’s estate. The court affirmed the judgment, finding no errors in the exclusion of the plaintiff’s testimony.

    Facts

    The plaintiff allegedly placed funds and property with Bacon (now deceased) to delay or defraud his creditors. The defendant (presumably representing Bacon’s estate) presented evidence to support this defense. The plaintiff was then asked if he had placed property in Bacon’s hands with the intent to defraud creditors. The referee sustained an objection to this question.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to trial where the referee excluded certain testimony from the plaintiff. The court reviewed the referee’s decision to exclude evidence regarding the plaintiff’s intent and other related matters. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the judgment, focusing on the evidentiary rulings made during the trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff’s testimony regarding his intent when placing property in the hands of the deceased, Bacon, is admissible under the restrictions of the Dead Man’s Statute regarding personal transactions with deceased individuals.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff’s intent was an integral part of the personal transaction with Bacon, and therefore, testimony about it is inadmissible under the rule preventing parties from testifying about personal transactions with deceased individuals when the testimony is offered against the deceased’s estate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s intent was intrinsically linked to the act of placing property with Bacon, making it a part of the personal transaction. Allowing the plaintiff to testify about his intent would be akin to allowing him to testify about the transaction itself, which is prohibited by the Dead Man’s Statute. The court emphasized the need for fairness, stating, “There is the same reason for excluding the living party from testifying as to the intent with which a personal transaction with a deceased party was performed, as for excluding him as a witness to any other part of the transaction. Such evidence can generally be disproved only by what was said and done at the time of the transaction, and hence, when death has sealed the lips of one party the law should seal the lips of the other.” The court further noted that when evidence is excluded upon a general objection, the ruling will be upheld if any ground existed for the exclusion. The questions regarding ownership of the mortgage and real estate were also deemed inadmissible as they related to property placed in Bacon’s hands, thus involving personal transactions. Church, Ch. J., and Andrews, J., dissented, arguing that evidence of the plaintiff’s intent should have been admitted.