New York Law Review

Tag: Intent

  • People v. Samuels, 99 N.Y.2d 20 (2002): Sufficiency of Evidence for “Offer to Sell” Controlled Substance

    People v. Samuels, 99 N.Y.2d 20 (2002)

    To support a conviction for offering to sell a controlled substance, the prosecution must present sufficient evidence demonstrating the defendant’s intent and ability to complete the sale.

    Summary

    Defendants Samuels and Henderson were convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance for offering to sell crack cocaine to an undercover officer. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence of both intent and ability to sell, distinguishing the case from *People v. Mike*. The Court emphasized that circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s statements and conduct indicative of a drug-selling operation, can establish the intent to sell. Furthermore, the presence of crack cocaine, acceptance of payment, and operation in a known drug-selling location are all factors supporting the inference that defendants had the ability to consummate a sale.

    Facts

    An undercover officer sought to purchase crack cocaine on a street corner known for drug sales. Samuels inquired about the officer’s needs and directed him to Henderson, who was sitting in a car. The officer gave Henderson prerecorded buy money. Instead of providing the crack, Henderson offered the officer a hit from a pipe containing what appeared to be crack, demanding the officer use the pipe before receiving the drugs to prove that he was not a police officer. Backup officers then arrived and arrested Samuels and Henderson. No crack, pipe or prerecorded buy money was recovered from the defendants.

    Procedural History

    Samuels and Henderson were indicted for third-degree sale of a controlled substance. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on insufficient evidence. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction, and the Court of Appeals granted the defendant’s motion to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the People presented sufficient evidence to establish that the defendants knowingly and unlawfully sold a narcotic drug by offering to perform a sale, specifically demonstrating both intent and ability to complete the sale.

    2. Whether the trial court erred by declining to charge the jury specifically on the intent and ability requirements for an “offer to sell” theory.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendants’ statements and conduct evinced an intent to sell crack cocaine, and several factors supported the conclusion that they had the ability to do so.

    2. No, because the charge as a whole adequately conveyed the required standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from *People v. Mike*, where the evidence of ability to sell was insufficient. Here, the undercover officer saw crack cocaine in the defendants’ possession, and the defendants engaged in conduct typical of drug sale operations. The court stated, “[A] defendant’s intent is the product of the invisible operation of his mind, to be determined, inevitably, on the basis of defendant’s statements and conduct.” The Court also emphasized that circumstantial evidence, such as operating at a known drug-selling location and accepting payment, can establish the ability to sell. While the trial court’s jury charge following the statutory language was sufficient, the Court advised that “the better practice for the future would be for jury instructions, in cases where the People allege an offer to sell drugs, to indicate that this theory requires proof that the defendant had the intent and ability to make the sale.” The Court noted that the jury was aware that “[A] person knowingly sells cocaine when that person is aware that he is selling cocaine,” and the issues were presented in the closing arguments. The Court upheld the Appellate Division’s decision.

  • People v. Salcedo, 92 N.Y.2d 1019 (1998): Consecutive Sentences for Weapon Possession and Murder

    People v. Salcedo, 92 N.Y.2d 1019 (1998)

    Consecutive sentences are permissible for criminal possession of a weapon and murder when the intent to kill is formed after the initial possession of the weapon, constituting separate and distinct acts.

    Summary

    Salcedo was convicted of second-degree murder and weapon possession after fatally shooting his former girlfriend. The Court of Appeals affirmed the imposition of consecutive sentences for these crimes. The Court held that even though the possession of the weapon was continuous, the initial intent to possess the weapon (to force the victim to talk) was distinct from the later-formed intent to kill her. Thus, the possession and the use of the weapon constituted separate acts justifying consecutive sentences under Penal Law § 70.25 (2).

    Facts

    The defendant, Salcedo, became enraged after his seven-year relationship with Ysidra Rosario ended. He stopped Rosario as she walked from church and demanded she talk to him. When she refused, Salcedo retrieved a concealed pistol from his vehicle and chased her, hiding the weapon from her view. He caught her inside a grocery store, again demanding she leave with him. Rosario refused and attempted to move away, resulting in Salcedo threatening her with the gun and firing a shot past her. When Rosario broke away and ran, Salcedo followed, brandishing the weapon, and ultimately cornered and fatally shot her at point-blank range.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in the trial court of second-degree murder and second and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon. He appealed the imposition of consecutive sentences for the murder and second-degree weapon possession charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals then reviewed and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences for the murder and second-degree weapons possession charges, where the defendant argued his possession of the weapon was coterminous with a continuous and uninterrupted intent to kill the victim, and the two crimes arose from the same “act” within the meaning of Penal Law § 70.25 (2)?

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s initial intent in possessing the weapon (to force the victim to leave with him) was distinct from his later-formed intent to kill her. These were separate and distinct acts, permitting consecutive sentences.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 70.25 (2), which mandates concurrent sentences for offenses committed through a single act, but permits consecutive sentences for crimes committed through separate and distinct acts, even within a single transaction. The Court distinguished the case from situations where the possession and use of the weapon are so integrated as to constitute a single act.

    The Court highlighted that the People’s theory, supported by evidence, was that Salcedo initially possessed the weapon to force Rosario to leave with him. The crime of possessing the loaded gun with the intent to use it unlawfully against another was complete at that point. It was only after Rosario’s repeated refusals that Salcedo formed the specific intent to kill her. As the court noted, this “subsequently formed intent while possessing the weapon result[ed] in the commission of a second offense.” People v. Okafore, 72 NY2d at 83.

    The Court cited People v. Brown, 80 NY2d 361, noting that “[t]he act of the possessory crime, though continuing, is distinct for consecutive sentencing purposes from the discrete act of’ shooting the victim.” The court found the initial possession and subsequent use of the gun against Rosario constituted separate acts, justifying consecutive sentences. The Court stated, “We cannot say as a matter of law that the possession and actual use of the gun were so integrated that they constituted a single act for consecutive sentencing purposes.”

  • In re Carlos V., 604 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1993): Establishing Intent for Attempted Weapon Possession

    In re Carlos V., 82 N.Y.2d 288, 604 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1993)

    When a minor is charged with attempted criminal possession of a weapon, the act of carrying a loaded weapon on a public street provides sufficient inference of the intent to possess an operable firearm, even if the firearm is later proven inoperable.

    Summary

    In the case of In re Carlos V., the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of intent required for attempted criminal possession of a weapon by a minor. Carlos V. was found to have committed acts, that if committed by an adult, would constitute several crimes related to weapon possession. The charges stemmed from him being seen holding a loaded but inoperable firearm on a public street. The court held that the act of carrying a loaded weapon in public was sufficient evidence to infer the intent to possess an operable weapon, thus supporting the charges of attempted weapon possession. This decision highlights how actions can imply intent, especially in cases involving public safety.

    Facts

    Carlos V., a minor, was observed on a public street holding a firearm. The firearm was later determined to be loaded. Subsequent examination revealed that the firearm was inoperable. Carlos V. was charged with multiple counts related to attempted criminal possession of a weapon and unlawful possession of a weapon by a person under 16.

    Procedural History

    The presentment agency charged Carlos V. with acts that would constitute crimes if committed by an adult. Both the respondent and the agency operated under the assumption that the attempt charges required proof of specific intent to possess an operable firearm. The lower courts found that Carlos V. committed the alleged acts. The case then reached the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the act of carrying a loaded, but ultimately inoperable, firearm on a public street is sufficient to infer the intent necessary to support charges of attempted criminal possession of a weapon.

    Holding

    Yes, because the allegations that respondent carried a weapon on a public street and that the weapon was loaded are sufficient to support the inference that the respondent believed and intended the firearm to be operable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the act of carrying a loaded firearm on a public street inherently implies an intent to possess an operable weapon. The court highlighted that both the respondent and the presentment agency operated under the assumption that the attempted crimes required proof of specific intent to possess an operable firearm. The court found the respondent’s actions sufficient to establish this intent, stating, “The allegations that respondent carried a weapon on a public street and that that weapon was loaded are sufficient to support the inference that respondent believed and intended the firearm to be operable.” This inference is crucial because it addresses the element of intent, which is often difficult to prove directly. The court focused on the circumstances surrounding the possession—public display and the weapon being loaded—as indicators of the respondent’s belief and intent. The decision underscores the importance of considering the totality of the circumstances when determining intent in criminal cases, especially those involving weapons. The court did not discuss dissenting or concurring opinions. It’s important to note that this case does not establish a broad rule applicable to all attempt crimes but is specifically tailored to the context of weapon possession, where public safety is a paramount concern.

  • People v. Badr, 82 N.Y.2d 86 (1993): Admissibility of Prior Sexual Misconduct Evidence

    People v. Badr, 82 N.Y.2d 86 (1993)

    Evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged crimes and offenses is inadmissible when offered solely to demonstrate criminal propensity, and is unnecessary to prove intent when intent can be easily inferred from the charged act itself.

    Summary

    Badr was convicted of rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and attempted robbery. The prosecution sought to introduce evidence of Badr’s prior sexual misconduct to demonstrate intent, particularly given the complainant’s admitted consensual sex with Badr after the alleged attack. The trial court allowed the evidence, leading Badr to abandon his consent defense. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding the prior misconduct evidence was improperly admitted because intent was easily inferable from the alleged acts, and the evidence served only to show Badr’s propensity to commit such crimes, which is inadmissible.

    Facts

    The complainant alleged that Badr, in her apartment building, threatened her, blindfolded her, and sexually assaulted her on the roof. Following the alleged attack, she exchanged phone numbers with Badr and arranged a subsequent meeting, during which they had consensual sex. Badr claimed the sexual encounter on the roof was consensual, and the later encounter occurred at his apartment. Badr was charged with rape, sodomy, attempted robbery, sexual abuse, and assault.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled that the prosecution could present testimony from four women regarding Badr’s prior sexual misconduct. Badr abandoned his consent defense as a result of this ruling. Badr was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, ordering a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution could introduce evidence of Badr’s prior sexual misconduct to prove intent, when intent was readily inferable from the charged acts and the evidence primarily served to show Badr’s criminal propensity.

    Holding

    No, because the prior misconduct evidence was relevant only to suggest that because Badr had engaged in sexual misconduct with others, he was likely to have committed the charged acts. The evidence was improperly admitted because intent was easily inferable from the alleged acts themselves.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that evidence of uncharged crimes is inadmissible if its sole purpose is to suggest the defendant has a criminal disposition. While intent is a valid basis for admitting prior misconduct evidence, it’s unnecessary when intent is easily inferred from the commission of the act. The court distinguished this case from situations where intent is genuinely in question. Here, the court reasoned that if the jury believed the complainant’s account, Badr’s intent to commit the charged crimes was clear from the violent acts themselves. The prior misconduct evidence, therefore, served only to bolster the complainant’s credibility by portraying Badr as a person likely to commit such acts, which is impermissible character evidence. Quoting People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40, 56, the court noted the evidence tended to show only that “‘if defendant did it once * * * he would do it again; therefore, he probably abused the other children.’” The Court found that presenting two starkly different scenarios where credibility was the only issue made the prior misconduct evidence irrelevant to any issue other than criminal propensity. The Court concluded that the trial court’s ruling, which led Badr to abandon his consent defense, denied him a fair trial. Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone, Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Ciparick concurred.

  • People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497 (1993): Jury Instructions Must Not Mislead on Elements of Burglary

    People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497 (1993)

    A conviction for burglary requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant entered the premises with the contemporaneous intent to commit a crime therein; jury instructions that mislead the jury into believing that a non-criminal act could satisfy the intent element are prejudicial and require a new trial.

    Summary

    Defendant Ryan was convicted of burglary after entering a service station and stealing money. At trial, Ryan claimed he entered only to find a hose for his bicycle tire and decided to steal the money only after seeing the open cash register. The jury asked if the intent to take the hose, even temporarily, could satisfy the intent element of burglary. The trial court’s response implied that temporary use of the hose could be a crime, thus satisfying the intent element. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the jury instruction was prejudicially misleading because temporary use of the hose, if not a service the station charged for, was not a crime, and thus could not provide the necessary intent for burglary.

    Facts

    Ryan entered a service station at 2:00 a.m. and stole money from the cash register. He was charged with burglary in the third degree, among other crimes. At trial, Ryan testified he entered the station solely to find a missing hose from an air compressor to inflate his bicycle tire. He claimed the intent to steal the money arose only after he found the open cash register.

    Procedural History

    Ryan was convicted of burglary in the third degree in the County Court, Onondaga County. He appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed. Ryan then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a jury instruction that allows the jury to conclude that the defendant’s intent to commit a non-criminal act upon entry can satisfy the “intent to commit a crime upon entry” element required for a burglary conviction.

    Holding

    No, because the jury instruction improperly allowed the jury to base a burglary conviction on the defendant’s intent to commit an act (temporary use of the air hose) that was not necessarily a crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s supplemental instruction was prejudicially misleading. The court reasoned that the jury instruction erroneously allowed the jury to determine whether temporary use of the air hose was a crime, which is a question of law reserved for the court. “Absent any proof that use of the air was a service for which the station charged, temporary use of the hose would not amount to any crime”. The court cited Penal Law § 165.15 [4] (theft of services) and Penal Law § 155.00 [1], [8]; § 155.05. Because the jury could have based the burglary conviction on the intent to temporarily use the hose, which may not have been a crime, the conviction was improper. The court stated that the instruction improperly allowed the jury to conclude that defendant’s intent to temporarily use the air hose could establish the “intent to commit a crime upon entry” predicate for a burglary conviction, therefore necessitating a new trial. The court reaffirmed the principle that “the crime of burglary is committed when a person knowingly and unlawfully enters a building with the contemporaneous intent to commit a crime therein”.

  • People v. Miller, 87 N.Y.2d 211 (1995): Legality of Attempted Robbery in the First Degree

    87 N.Y.2d 211 (1995)

    Attempted robbery in the first degree is a legally cognizable crime because the intent lies in the forcible taking (or attempted taking) of property, and the presence of aggravating factors, such as serious physical injury to a non-participant, elevates the severity of the offense and the punishment.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of attempted robbery in the first degree after a failed robbery attempt resulted in the victim’s death. The Appellate Division reduced the conviction, arguing that attempted robbery in the first degree is a nonexistent crime because it includes the unintended result of causing serious physical injury. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that attempted robbery in the first degree is a legally cognizable crime. The court reasoned that the intent lies in the forcible taking or attempted taking of property, and aggravating factors, like causing serious physical injury, elevate the severity of the offense. The dissent argued that the enhanced liability requires an unintended result that cannot be attempted.

    Facts

    Defendant and a group of teenagers planned to rob the victim, Grimes, of a bag of clothing. The defendant declared his intent to snatch the bag as Grimes exited a grocery store. The group attacked Grimes, and defendant attempted to grab the bag. Grimes resisted, and during the struggle, a shot was fired, mortally wounding Grimes. The bag was no longer in sight after Grimes collapsed. The jury convicted the defendant of attempted robbery in the first degree.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the defendant’s request to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted robbery in the first degree. The jury convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the conviction to attempted robbery in the third degree, finding that attempted robbery in the first degree is not a legally cognizable crime. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the conviction for attempted robbery in the first degree and remitting the case for consideration of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether attempted robbery in the first degree is a legally cognizable crime in New York.

    Holding

    Yes, because the essence of robbery is the forcible stealing of property. The intent lies in the act of attempting to forcibly take the property, and the presence of an aggravating factor, such as causing serious physical injury to a non-participant, elevates the severity of the offense and the punishment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the crime of robbery involves the forcible taking of property. The degree of the robbery depends on aggravating factors. First-degree robbery includes instances where the robber causes serious physical injury to a non-participant. Attempted robbery in the first degree requires the intent to forcibly steal property, and the act of attempting to do so. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Campbell, where the crime at issue, attempted assault in the second degree, included an unintended result as a core element. Here, the intent is the forcible taking or attempted taking, not the unintended injury. The Court stated, “[t]he robber’s conduct is rendered criminal by the forcible taking — or attempted forcible taking — not by an unintended result.” The court emphasized that strict liability attaches to the aggravating circumstance (serious physical injury) rather than the proscribed result (the taking of property). The Dissent argued that attempted robbery in the first degree should not be a cognizable crime as the statute requires forcible stealing and also causing serious injury. The dissent argues that Campbell controls in cases such as this as the enhanced liability turns on the unintended result. The dissent also pointed out that the People could have charged the defendant with felony assault which carries a similar punishment.

  • People v. Trappier, 87 N.Y.2d 55 (1995): Intent and Recklessness Can Coexist for Different Outcomes

    People v. Trappier, 87 N.Y.2d 55 (1995)

    A defendant can simultaneously intend to cause one result (e.g., serious physical injury) while recklessly creating a grave risk that a different, more serious result (e.g., death) will occur; thus, convictions for attempted assault and reckless endangerment are not inherently repugnant.

    Summary

    Trappier was convicted of attempted first-degree assault and first-degree reckless endangerment for firing shots at a security guard. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the jury verdict was repugnant because it seemingly convicted Trappier of acting both intentionally and recklessly. The Court held that the convictions were not repugnant because the attempted assault charge required intent to cause serious physical injury, while the reckless endangerment charge required recklessly creating a grave risk of death. Because these charges pertained to two distinct potential outcomes, the jury could reasonably find Trappier guilty of both.

    Facts

    Following a dispute, Trappier vowed to return to an apartment complex after being asked to leave by security guard Vernon Hutchinson. Later that evening, Trappier returned and fired three shots in Hutchinson’s direction from approximately 70 feet away. One bullet hit Hutchinson’s pants leg, and another passed near his ears.

    Procedural History

    Trappier was charged with attempted second-degree murder, attempted first-degree assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and first-degree reckless endangerment. The jury acquitted Trappier of attempted murder but convicted him of the remaining counts. The trial court rejected Trappier’s argument that the verdict was repugnant. The Appellate Division reversed the attempted assault and reckless endangerment convictions, finding them legally inconsistent. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the convictions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a jury verdict finding a defendant guilty of both attempted first-degree assault (requiring intent to cause serious physical injury) and first-degree reckless endangerment (requiring recklessly creating a grave risk of death) is repugnant when the charges arise from the same act.

    Holding

    No, because the attempted assault charge pertains to the intent to cause serious physical injury, while the reckless endangerment charge pertains to recklessly creating a grave risk of death; these are distinct potential outcomes, and a defendant can simultaneously intend one outcome while recklessly disregarding the risk of another.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Gallagher, where it held that a defendant could not be convicted of both intentional murder and reckless manslaughter for the death of a single victim. In Gallagher, the act and the result were the same: the shooting and the death. The Court explained that “where the shooting (the act) and the death (the result) are the same, a defendant cannot be convicted twice for the murder, once for acting ‘intentionally’ and once for acting ‘recklessly’.” Here, the Court reasoned that while the act (the shooting) was the same, the potential results differed. Attempted assault required the intent to cause serious physical injury, which includes “a physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement or protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.” Reckless endangerment required recklessly creating a grave risk of death. The Court stated, “A defendant could certainly intend one result—serious physical injury—while recklessly creating a grave risk that a different, more serious result—death—would ensue from his actions.” The court emphasized that the jury had determined Trappier acted intentionally concerning one result and recklessly concerning a distinct, more serious result; thus, the verdict was not inconsistent. The court further clarified its holding in People v. Robinson, explaining that in that case, unlike the instant case, the defendant was convicted of acting intentionally and recklessly as to the same result—the death of the victim.

  • People v. Norman, 85 N.Y.2d 609 (1995): Proving Larceny by False Promise Requires Evidence Beyond Mere Non-Performance

    85 N.Y.2d 609 (1995)

    A conviction for larceny by false promise requires evidence establishing that the facts and circumstances are wholly consistent with guilty intent and wholly inconsistent with innocent intent, excluding to a moral certainty every hypothesis except the defendant’s intention not to perform the promise; mere non-performance is insufficient to infer guilt.

    Summary

    Robert Norman and John King were convicted of larceny-related charges for failing to deliver goods after receiving payment. Norman sold log home kits but failed to deliver to customers, using their money for personal debts. King sold a used car but never delivered it or provided a title. The New York Court of Appeals addressed the distinction between larceny by false promise and false pretenses, and the evidentiary burden for false promise, holding that the evidence against Norman was sufficient for larceny by false promise, while King’s conviction for false pretenses was upheld. The Court clarified the standard of appellate review for larceny by false promise convictions.

    Facts

    Robert Norman operated a log home kit business. The Ganas contracted to buy a kit for $20,325, paying in full after Norman pressured them. Norman failed to deliver, offering excuses. He later admitted spending their money on personal and business debts. Evidence showed Norman had other unfilled orders and shut down his mill before taking the Ganas’ money.

    John King, a used car dealer, agreed to sell Carol Bondy a Bronco for $4,977.50. Bondy paid in full, but King never delivered the vehicle or provided a title, claiming he hadn’t received full payment and later suing Bondy. Investigation revealed no Bronco was ever registered to King.

    Procedural History

    Norman was convicted of grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence of intent. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    King was convicted of grand larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed. King appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence against Norman was sufficient to establish larceny by false promise, considering the heightened evidentiary standard.

    2. Whether King’s conviction for larceny by false pretenses was proper, or whether the case should have been submitted as larceny by false promise, thus requiring a higher burden of proof.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence, viewed favorably to the People, allowed a rational jury to conclude that Norman intended not to deliver the log cabin kit when he took the Ganas’ money.

    2. Yes, because the evidence supported a conviction for larceny by false pretenses based on King’s misrepresentation that he owned the vehicle and could transfer title.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between larceny by false promise (a false statement of future intent) and false pretenses (a false statement of present or past fact). For larceny by false promise, Penal Law § 155.05(2)(d) requires evidence “establishing that the facts and circumstances of the case are wholly consistent with guilty intent…and excluding to a moral certainty every hypothesis except that of the defendant’s intention or belief that the promise would not be performed.” The Court emphasized that mere non-performance is insufficient to prove larceny by false promise.

    Regarding Norman, the Court found sufficient evidence of intent not to perform, including his financial state, closure of his mill, and false statements to investigators. The Court clarified that appellate review assesses whether the inference of wrongful intent logically flows from the proven facts. The “moral certainty” standard is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court reviewing for legal sufficiency. The Court noted the jury could consider Norman’s intent when he received the Ganas’ money, not just when the contract was signed.

    Regarding King, the Court held he misrepresented that he owned the vehicle, justifying the conviction for false pretenses. King’s actions implied he had the authority to sell the car, fulfilling the elements of false pretenses. The prosecution had the right to prosecute under the theory best supported by the facts. Dissent argued the cases were civil matters and the majority lowered the standard of review.

  • People v. Ely, 82 N.Y.2d 353 (1993): Admissibility of Uncharged Conduct to Prove Intent

    People v. Ely, 82 N.Y.2d 353 (1993)

    Evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible to prove the defendant’s intent to commit the charged crime, provided that the evidence is relevant and its probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice.

    Summary

    Defendant, a secretary, was convicted of grand larceny and forgery for stealing from her legally blind employer. The prosecution introduced evidence of 146 additional forged checks, discovered after the indictment, to demonstrate the defendant’s intent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was properly admitted to prove intent, and the defendant’s other claims were unpreserved or without merit. The court emphasized that this evidence did not amend the indictment but served as evidentiary support for the larceny charge.

    Facts

    The defendant, a secretary to the complainant, was charged with grand larceny and forgery for stealing money from her employer. The indictment stated that the defendant stole over $700,000 between December 1981 and October 1989. The defendant was also accused of forging the complainant’s signature on checks without authorization. An audit revealed discrepancies between the complainant’s income and bank deposits exceeding $700,000.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted by a jury of grand larceny and multiple counts of forgery. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, holding that the defendant’s claim that the indictment was duplicitous was unpreserved and that evidence regarding public assistance received by the defendant’s mother was properly admitted. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of 146 uncharged forged checks to prove the defendant’s intent.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in precluding evidence of insurance coverage to demonstrate bias on the part of the complainant.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the People to cross-examine the defendant on the collateral issue of her mother’s receipt of public assistance.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence of the uncharged forged checks was offered to prove the defendant’s intent to commit the crimes charged, and it did not amend or add to the charges in the indictment.
    2. No, because the defendant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the introduction of evidence of insurance coverage was not preserved for appellate review.
    3. No, because the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in allowing the People to cross-examine her on the collateral issue of whether her mother had received public assistance was also unpreserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the evidence of the 146 uncharged forged checks was admissible to prove the defendant’s intent to commit the charged crimes, citing People v. Molineux, 168 NY 264. The court emphasized that this evidence did not amend or add to the charges in the indictment or submitted to the jury, but rather served only as evidentiary support for the larceny count. The court found that the defendant’s arguments regarding the preclusion of insurance coverage evidence and the cross-examination about her mother’s public assistance were unpreserved because the defendant did not properly raise these objections at trial. As such, the Court of Appeals declined to review them. The Court stated, “Here, the evidence of the 146 uncharged forged checks was offered to prove defendant’s intent to commit the specific crimes charged.”

  • People v. Spivey, 81 N.Y.2d 356 (1993): Establishing Intent in Felony Assault and Verdict Sheet Restrictions

    People v. Spivey, 81 N.Y.2d 356 (1993)

    The intent necessary for a felony assault conviction is inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony, and the defendant need not be physically present at the scene of the assault, as long as the assault occurs during the immediate flight from the predicate felony; furthermore, verdict sheets listing statutory elements are reversible error unless agreed upon by both parties.

    Summary

    Defendant Spivey was convicted of second-degree assault (felony assault) after his accomplices assaulted a police officer during their flight from a robbery. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the assault count and ordering a new trial, also directing the trial court to sanction the prosecution for a Rosario violation (failure to produce a police officer’s memo book). The Court of Appeals reinstated the assault count, holding that the intent for felony assault can be inferred from the underlying felony, even if the defendant wasn’t physically present during the assault. The Court also affirmed the new trial order due to an improper verdict sheet but removed the mandate to fashion a Rosario sanction because the defendant received the relief requested at trial.

    Facts

    Transit Police Officer Schumacher witnessed Spivey and three others robbing a man. Schumacher apprehended Spivey but pursued the other three into a subway. The three suspects assaulted Schumacher. After a chase, two were caught. Spivey was tried jointly with the other defendants. Officer Schumacher’s memo book, containing entries about the case, was lost before trial. At a reconstruction hearing, Schumacher testified about the incident. The defense moved for a mistrial or to preclude Schumacher’s testimony, but the court denied the mistrial and stated there was no reconstruction testimony before the jury.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Spivey of second-degree assault and other crimes. The Appellate Division reversed the assault conviction, dismissed that count, and remanded for a new trial on the remaining counts. The Appellate Division also directed the trial court to fashion a sanction for the Rosario violation. The People appealed the dismissal of the assault count and the Rosario sanction direction. Spivey appealed the new trial order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the intent necessary for a felony assault conviction can be inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony, similar to felony murder doctrine.
    2. Whether a defendant must be physically present at the scene of the assault for a felony assault conviction.
    3. Whether the defendant was entitled to an additional sanction for the Rosario violation.
    4. Whether the verdict sheet containing additional explanatory language was proper.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the intent necessary to sustain a conviction for felony assault is inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony, and whether the assault occurred during the immediate flight from a predicate felony is a question of fact for the jury.
    2. No, because it is sufficient that the assault is made on a nonparticipant of a predicate felony “in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of [the] felony, * * * or of immediate flight therefrom” (Penal Law § 120.05 [6]).
    3. No, because the trial court granted the alternative relief requested by the defense (preclusion of reconstruction testimony), no additional sanction is required.
    4. No, because giving the jury a verdict sheet that lists some of the statutory elements of the counts is reversible error unless the parties agree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals analogized felony assault (Penal Law § 120.05 [6]) to felony murder (Penal Law § 125.25), noting their similar language. It cited People v. Gladman, 41 NY2d 123, stating that in felony murder, intent is inferred from the intent to commit the underlying felony. The Court applied the same logic to felony assault, referencing People v. Snow, 74 NY2d 671, which affirmed the Appellate Division’s reasoning that the intent for felony murder or assault is inferred from the underlying felony. The Court held that the assault occurring during immediate flight is a factual question for the jury.

    The Court further held that physical presence isn’t required, emphasizing the statute’s language about assaults made “in furtherance” of the felony or flight. Regarding the Rosario violation, the Court noted that the defense requested, and received, preclusion of reconstruction testimony, thus satisfying the need for a sanction.

    Finally, the Court reaffirmed the rule against verdict sheets listing statutory elements without agreement from both parties, citing People v. Kelly, 76 NY2d 1013, and other cases. This necessitates a new trial despite the reinstatement of the assault charge.