People v. Mayo, 36 N.Y.2d 1002 (1975)

An indictment must be supported by legally sufficient evidence establishing every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission thereof; mere suspicion or speculation is insufficient.

Summary

This case concerns the sufficiency of evidence presented to a grand jury to indict a toll collector for grand larceny. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence presented, which primarily consisted of a shortage of commutation tickets and the defendant’s attempt to dispose of tickets upon arrest, was insufficient to establish the necessary intent and deprivation of property required for a larceny conviction. The court emphasized that the evidence did not prove that the Thruway Authority was deprived of any money or that the detached commuter stubs had any monetary value.

Facts

Ann Mayo worked as a toll collector for the New York State Thruway Authority at the Tappan Zee Bridge for eight years. Tolls were collected via cash, credit, or commutation tickets. An audit revealed a shortage of 2,153 commutation tickets for Mayo over a four-week period. When a State Trooper approached Mayo for arrest, she attempted to flush 122 commutation tickets down the drain. She also had a small amount of cash. There was no evidence presented that she pocketed cash tolls and her cash and credit transactions were in order.

Procedural History

The County Court dismissed the grand jury indictment for grand larceny in the second degree. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

Issue(s)

Whether the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient to establish that Ann Mayo committed the offense of grand larceny, specifically whether there was sufficient evidence of intent to deprive the Thruway Authority of property and actual deprivation of property.

Holding

No, because the evidence presented did not establish every element of the offense charged, particularly the intent to deprive and actual deprivation of property. The shortage of commutation tickets and the attempt to dispose of them, without more, was insufficient to warrant an indictment for grand larceny.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that to constitute larceny, there must be an intent coupled with a taking or withholding of property from its owner. The evidence failed to demonstrate that the Thruway Authority was deprived of any money, as the detached commuter stubs had no monetary value in that state and cash/credit accounts were clear. The court cited CPL 190.65, stating that a grand jury may indict only where the evidence is legally sufficient to establish the commission of the offense. The court held that the test for dismissing an indictment is whether there has been a “‘clear showing’ that the evidence before the Grand Jury if unexplained and uncontradicted would not warrant conviction by a trial jury.” The court distinguished between carelessness, stupidity, or inefficiency and the crime of grand larceny, explaining that the former does not constitute the latter. The court stated that “Surmise, suspicion or speculation is no substitute for evidence.” While the defendant’s attempt to destroy evidence might suggest consciousness of guilt, such evidence “may be used to strengthen ‘other and more tangible evidence’ of guilt, it is not alone sufficient to sustain a conviction.” The court emphasized the presumption of innocence and held that the evidence presented was insufficient to overcome this presumption and warrant an indictment for grand larceny.