New York Law Review

Tag: intent to defraud

  • People v. Rodriguez, 17 N.Y.3d 486 (2011): Establishing Intent to Defraud in Forged Instrument Possession

    People v. Rodriguez, 17 N.Y.3d 486 (2011)

    Intent to defraud, deceive, or injure in criminal possession of a forged instrument can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, even without use or attempted use of the instrument.

    Summary

    Isidro Rodriguez was convicted of criminal possession of a forged instrument after police found multiple forged identification documents on his person during an arrest. The documents, bearing his photograph but under a false name, were discovered alongside his real identification. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that sufficient circumstantial evidence existed for the jury to infer the requisite intent to defraud, deceive, or injure, despite the absence of direct evidence of intended use. The Court distinguished this case from prior holdings, emphasizing the importance of surrounding circumstances.

    Facts

    Detective Goetz interviewed a complainant who identified Devine Perez as a suspect. Goetz contacted someone identifying himself as Devine Perez who claimed to be out of state. Later, Goetz located Rodriguez, who matched a photograph provided by the complainant, and arrested him. A search incident to arrest revealed forged identification documents (driver’s license, non-driver ID, Social Security card, and green card) bearing Rodriguez’s photograph but under the name “Louis Amadou.” Rodriguez also possessed his genuine identification documents and loose ID-sized photographs of himself. He was wearing a jacket that appeared in the photographs.

    Procedural History

    Rodriguez was convicted in a jury trial of four counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether there was legally sufficient evidence for a rational jury to infer that Rodriguez possessed the forged documents with the intent to defraud, deceive, or injure another, as required for a conviction of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree under Penal Law § 170.25.

    Holding

    Yes, because the totality of the circumstances provided a sufficient basis for the jury to infer that Rodriguez acted with the requisite intent to defraud, deceive, or injure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court stated that evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction where “ ‘there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial’ ” (People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 409 [2004]).

    The Court distinguished the case from People v. Bailey, where mere possession of forged bills was insufficient to prove intent. Here, the Court found several factors indicating intent:

    1. Rodriguez had a motive to assume a false identity because he was aware that the police were searching for him.
    2. Three of the four forged documents bore Rodriguez’s photograph, suggesting his active involvement in creating the false documents.
    3. Rodriguez was wearing the same jacket as in the photographs found with the forged documents, allowing the jury to infer his recent involvement in their production.
    4. Rodriguez carried the false documents separately from his real identification, suggesting he wanted to easily produce either set as needed.
    5. Rodriguez sent a letter to the court requesting to plead guilty, which the jury could interpret as an admission of intent.

    The Court emphasized that Penal Law § 170.25 does not require use or attempted use of the forged instrument, nor does it require that the contemplated use be imminent. The Court concluded that the circumstantial evidence established more than mere knowing possession, providing a solid basis for the jury to infer the requisite intent to defraud, deceive, or injure.

  • People v. Bailey, 13 N.Y.3d 67 (2009): Proof of Intent Required for Forged Instrument Possession

    13 N.Y.3d 67 (2009)

    To convict a defendant of criminal possession of a forged instrument, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant not only knew the instrument was forged but also possessed it with the specific intent to defraud, deceive, or injure another.

    Summary

    Eric Bailey was convicted of attempted grand larceny and possession of a forged instrument after police observed him engaging in suspicious behavior in Manhattan restaurants and found counterfeit bills in his pocket. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the forged instrument conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove Bailey possessed the counterfeit bills with the intent to defraud, deceive, or injure another. The court reasoned that his knowledge that the bills were counterfeit, coupled with his attempted larcenies, did not establish the specific intent required for the forgery charge.

    Facts

    Police observed Eric Bailey entering and leaving several fast-food restaurants without making purchases. In one restaurant, he attempted to steal a woman’s purse. In another, he was seen reaching for a woman’s handbag, and her coat pocket was turned inside out. Upon arrest, a search revealed three counterfeit $10 bills in Bailey’s pocket. When an officer remarked that the bills were counterfeit, Bailey responded, “[y]ou got me for the counterfeit money, but I didn’t have my hand near the purse.”

    Procedural History

    Bailey was convicted in a jury trial of attempted grand larceny and possession of a forged instrument. He moved to set aside the forgery conviction, arguing insufficient evidence of his intent to defraud. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove that Bailey possessed the counterfeit bills with the specific intent to defraud, deceive, or injure another, as required for a conviction of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree under Penal Law § 170.30.

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bailey possessed the counterfeit bills with the specific intent to defraud, deceive, or injure another; his knowledge of the bills’ counterfeit nature and his contemporaneous attempts at larceny were insufficient to establish the requisite intent for the forgery charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that while Bailey’s statement proved his knowledge that the bills were counterfeit, knowledge alone was insufficient for a conviction. The court emphasized that knowledge and intent are separate elements, each requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected the argument that intent could be inferred from Bailey’s presence in a shopping district, his possession of counterfeit bills, and his larcenous intent, noting that the intent to commit a crime must be specific to the crime charged. The court distinguished the case from others where intent was more directly linked to the crime, such as possessing multiple forged documents with the intent to sell them. The court noted, “[w]hy would Bailey, already embarked upon a brazen effort to commit theft, carry currency in his pocket that he knew to be bogus unless his plan was to pass it off to an unsuspecting storekeeper, newsvendor, or fast food worker?” The court rejected this notion stating, “[t]here is no dispute that defendant’s inculpatory statement proved that he knew the bills were counterfeit. However, knowledge alone is not sufficient to hold defendant criminally liable for possessing a forged instrument…Simply put, drawing the inference of defendant’s intent from his knowledge that the bills were counterfeit improperly shifts the burden of proof with respect to intent from the People to the defendant.” The court also noted that the legislature did not create a statutory presumption of intent regarding counterfeit bills, unlike statutes related to forged credit cards or welfare fraud. Judge Pigott dissented in part, arguing that the jury could reasonably infer that Bailey intended to pass the bills when the opportunity arose, given his guilty mind and possession of the bills in a shopping district.

  • People v. Ford, 73 N.Y.2d 905 (1989): Public Benefit Corporations and Intent to Defraud the State

    People v. Ford, 73 N.Y.2d 905 (1989)

    A public benefit corporation is not automatically considered “the state or any political subdivision thereof” under Penal Law § 175.35, and a conviction for offering a false instrument for filing requires proof of intent to defraud the State itself, not merely the public benefit corporation.

    Summary

    Ford, an assistant train conductor for Metro-North, was convicted of petit larceny and offering a false instrument for filing after submitting fraudulent time sheets. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction for offering a false instrument, holding that Metro-North, a public benefit subsidiary of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, is not automatically equivalent to “the state or any political subdivision thereof” under Penal Law § 175.35. The Court emphasized that the statute requires proof of intent to defraud the State, not just the corporation. The petit larceny conviction was upheld because the defense was not prejudiced by the late notice of the lesser included offense.

    Facts

    Defendant Ford worked as an assistant train conductor for Metro-North, a commuter railroad. He was indicted on multiple counts of grand larceny and offering a false instrument for filing. The indictment alleged that Ford stole money from Metro-North by submitting false time sheets indicating he worked more hours than he actually did. The time sheets were submitted on 10 separate occasions.

    Procedural History

    The trial court charged petit larceny as a lesser included offense of grand larceny. The jury convicted Ford of petit larceny and one count of offering a false instrument for filing. Ford appealed, arguing that Metro-North is not “the state or any political subdivision thereof” under Penal Law § 175.35, and that the petit larceny conviction should be overturned due to lack of notice. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Metro-North, a public benefit subsidiary corporation of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, can be considered “the state or any political subdivision thereof” for the purposes of Penal Law § 175.35.
    2. Whether the trial court’s failure to inform counsel prior to summations that it intended to submit petit larceny as a lesser included offense requires reversal of the petit larceny conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because public benefit corporations are not automatically considered the same as the State or its political subdivisions, and the statute requires proof of intent to defraud the State.
    2. No, because the error was harmless as the defense summation focused on a different charge and was not prejudiced by the lack of notice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that public benefit corporations are not identical to the State and are only treated as such for specific purposes, requiring a particularized inquiry. The Court noted, “Only conduct that falls within the plain, natural meaning of the language of a Penal Law provision may be punished as criminal.” Because public benefit corporations are not invariably treated as the State, they do not fall within the plain meaning of “state or any political subdivision thereof” in Penal Law § 175.35. The Court further emphasized that Metro-North was acting as a private employer when accepting the fraudulent time sheets, not as an agent of the sovereign. The court stated that criminal statutes must afford fair warning, and absent clear language, section 175.35 does not provide adequate notice that filing a false instrument with Metro-North constitutes defrauding the State. Therefore, the People had to prove the defendant intended to defraud the State itself, not just Metro-North. Regarding the petit larceny conviction, the Court found any error in failing to timely apprise counsel of the charge harmless because the defense summation focused exclusively on the charge of offering a false instrument and was not prejudiced because the elements of grand larceny and petit larceny were the same except for the value of property stolen.

  • People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241 (1969): Scope of Cross-Examination on Prior Bad Acts

    People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241 (1969)

    A criminal defendant who testifies may be cross-examined about prior immoral, vicious, or criminal acts relevant to their credibility, and extrinsic evidence may be used to contradict the defendant’s answers if that evidence is independently admissible on an issue other than credibility.

    Summary

    Schwartzman, president of Safety Circuit Corporation, was convicted of grand larceny for falsely representing an account receivable as unencumbered. On appeal, he argued improper cross-examination concerning 22 alleged instances of prior misconduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the cross-examination was within the trial court’s discretion because the prior acts related to obtaining money by false pretenses and were relevant to Schwartzman’s credibility. The court also addressed the use of documentary evidence to impeach Schwartzman’s testimony, finding it permissible because the evidence was independently admissible to prove intent to defraud, an essential element of the crime.

    Facts

    Roslyn Gladstone purchased an account receivable from Safety Circuit Corporation, represented by Schwartzman as unencumbered. In reality, Schwartzman had previously assigned the same receivable to Lester Balagur. Gladstone was unable to collect on the receivable. At trial, Schwartzman admitted to the double assignment, claiming Gladstone’s husband, acting as her agent, knew of the prior assignment. Mr. Gladstone denied this knowledge. The prosecution cross-examined Schwartzman extensively about 22 alleged instances of prior misconduct involving worthless checks, mortgaging property he didn’t own, and similar fraudulent activities.

    Procedural History

    Schwartzman was convicted of grand larceny in the first degree in a jury trial and sentenced to 2 1/2 to 5 years imprisonment. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the conviction. Schwartzman appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing he was denied a fair trial due to improper cross-examination regarding other criminal acts.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the defendant regarding prior immoral, vicious, or criminal acts was an abuse of discretion?

    2. Whether the use of documentary evidence during the cross-examination of the defendant was an impermissible use of extrinsic evidence on collateral matters?

    Holding

    1. No, because the nature and extent of cross-examination is subject to the sound discretion of the Trial Judge and the acts inquired into had a bearing on his credibility as a witness.

    2. No, because an exception to the rule against extrinsic evidence on collateral matters exists where the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case other than credibility, or if independently admissible to impeach the witness.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a defendant who testifies can be cross-examined about immoral, vicious, or criminal acts relevant to their credibility. Such offenses need not be similar to the charged crime, and the number of questions is not improper if asked in good faith with some factual basis. The court cited People v. Sorge, stating that a negative response does not preclude further inquiry to elicit a change in testimony.

    The court addressed the use of documentary evidence, reaffirming the rule that a cross-examiner cannot contradict a witness’s answers on collateral matters with extrinsic evidence solely to impeach credibility. However, an exception exists if the evidence is relevant to an issue other than credibility or independently admissible for impeachment. The court cited People v. Sorge, noting that the collateral evidence rule aims to prevent confusion and unfair surprise. Here, the court found the documentary evidence regarding the chattel mortgage was independently admissible to show intent to defraud, an essential element of grand larceny.

    The court cited People v. Molineux for the proposition that evidence of other crimes is admissible to establish motive or intention. Because Schwartzman admitted the transaction, his intent was the only fact in dispute, and evidence of similar misrepresentations was crucial. Quoting Wigmore, the court emphasized that “the essence of this probative effect is the likeness of the instance.”

    The court found one error: the prosecutor asked about a check charge for which Schwartzman had been acquitted. However, the court found the prosecutor acted in good faith, unaware of the acquittal, and the error was harmless given the other evidence. The court also declined to review a comment on the right to appeal, as no objection was made at trial.

  • People v. Graham, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867): Sufficiency of Forgery Indictment Without Addressee

    People v. Graham, 6 Park. Crim. Rep. 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867)

    An indictment for forgery is sufficient even if the forged instrument lacks a specific addressee, provided the instrument on its face demonstrates the potential to injure or affect the rights or property of another.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of forgery for uttering a false instrument purporting to be a request from Daily & Co. for the delivery of goods. The instrument was not addressed to any specific person. The defendant argued that the indictment was deficient because the instrument lacked an addressee and because the Meriden Cutlery Company, the entity defrauded, was improperly identified. The court upheld the conviction, reasoning that the statute covered any instrument affecting property rights and that the indictment sufficiently identified the intended victim of the fraud.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for forging an instrument purporting to be a request from Daily & Co. for the delivery of certain goods. The instrument was presented to the Meriden Cutlery Company, and the defendant obtained goods using it. The instrument was not addressed to any specific person or entity. The Meriden Cutlery Company was located in Connecticut and had an agency in New York City where the instrument was presented and the goods were obtained. The indictment charged the defendant with intent to defraud the Meriden Cutlery Company.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the indictment was insufficient because the forged instrument lacked a specific addressee and because the Meriden Cutlery Company was improperly identified. The Supreme Court reviewed the conviction on a writ of error.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an instrument lacking a specific addressee can be the subject of forgery under the statute.

    2. Whether the Meriden Cutlery Company could properly be regarded as the subject of an intended fraud.

    3. Whether the indictment was defective because it charged the defendant with intent to defraud persons unknown to the jury, when the grand jury and petit jury allegedly knew who was defrauded.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statute covers any instrument that affects property rights and aims to prevent any question of whether the specific paper forged is embraced by or specially enumerated in the statute.

    2. Yes, because the evidence showed the existence of the company, its property, and the fact that it was defrauded, thus making it a capable subject of fraud, or because, even if the company did not legally exist, the indictment was sufficiently broad to reach its individual members or agent.

    3. No, because the knowledge of the petit jury is irrelevant to the validity of the indictment, and it is not necessary for the indictment to particularly designate the party meant to be defrauded if the indictment indicates a real person or entity that was defrauded or intended to be defrauded.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the statute (2 R.S., p. 673, § 33) was broad enough to cover any instrument in writing that purported to be the act of another and by which a pecuniary demand or obligation was created, or by which property rights were transferred, conveyed, discharged, or diminished. The court emphasized the revisers’ intent to create a sweeping provision that embraces every forgery of a writing that could injure an individual or body politic in person or estate. The court distinguished English cases that required a specific addressee, noting that New York’s statute omits the enumeration of specific instruments, instead using the general designation “any instrument.” The court stated, “It is sufficient that the paper or instrument be of such a character that, by its use, another may be deprived of his property, or by which a pecuniary liability might be created.”

    Regarding the identity of the defrauded party, the court held that the Meriden Cutlery Company could be the subject of fraud, whether it was a corporation or a copartnership. Even if the company did not legally exist, the indictment was sufficient because it charged an intent to defraud “divers other persons to the jury unknown,” which could include the company’s members or agent. The court emphasized that the proof showed the existence of the company, its property, and the fact that it was defrauded.

    Regarding the third exception, the court found no error in the refusal to charge that the indictment must be disregarded if the grand jury and petit jury knew who was defrauded. The court reasoned that the knowledge of the petit jury was irrelevant, and it was not necessary for the indictment to particularly designate the party meant to be defrauded. The court cited Lowel’s case (1 Leach, 248; 2 East. P.C., p. 990, § 60) to support the proposition that it is sufficient if any person could be indicated from the words used in the indictment, and whether that person was the meditated object of the fraud is a matter for the jury to consider at trial. The court stated that “it is essential to aver that some real person or existent body was defrauded, or that the intent existed to defraud some such.”