New York Law Review

Tag: Intent to commit a crime

  • People v Williams, 2025 NY Slip Op 00901: Legal Sufficiency of Evidence for Burglary Conviction

    2025 NY Slip Op 00901

    A conviction for burglary requires legally sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in a building with the intent to commit a crime therein.

    Summary

    In People v. Williams, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a burglary conviction, holding that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the defendant knowingly entered a CVS store unlawfully, given a trespass notice barring his entry, and with the intent to commit a crime therein, demonstrated by his actions and statements. The dissent argued the evidence was insufficient to prove intent to steal the Red Bulls, emphasizing the lack of overt actions suggesting intent and critiquing the reliance on a confession made during a confusing police interrogation. The case underscores the importance of direct evidence of intent and the potential for prosecutorial overreach in charging minor offenses.

    Facts

    Raymond Williams was found to have entered a CVS store, despite having previously signed a trespass notice barring him from all CVS locations. He was observed on surveillance footage walking past the store, turning back, going to the beverage cooler, taking two Red Bull energy drinks, and then walking toward the self-checkout area without attempting to pay for the drinks. The store manager confronted him, at which point he “slammed” the Red Bulls down and left. During a subsequent police interrogation, Williams made statements that were interpreted as admissions to stealing the Red Bulls, although the dissent argued these statements were ambiguous and may have referred to a different incident.

    Procedural History

    Williams was convicted of third-degree burglary. The trial court sentenced him to 3.5 to 7 years in prison as a second violent felony offender. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the New York Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, leading to this appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the conviction for third-degree burglary, specifically regarding the elements of unlawful entry and intent to commit a crime.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the trespass notice, combined with Williams’ actions and statements, provided legally sufficient evidence for the jury to find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the standard of legal sufficiency, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution. It found that the trespass notice established that the defendant’s entry into the store was unlawful. The court determined that the surveillance footage depicting Williams’ behavior inside the store, along with his reaction when confronted, and his statements to the police constituted adequate evidence that the defendant intended to steal the Red Bull. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that innocent explanations for his conduct precluded a finding of intent. The court also noted that the defendant had failed to preserve an argument that his statements were not sufficiently corroborated.

    The dissent argued that no rational trier of fact could have concluded that Williams intended to steal, pointing out that his actions were ambiguous. The dissent also highlighted the lack of clarity in Williams’ confession to police. The dissent also referenced CPL 60.50, which says that a person cannot be convicted of an offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed.

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores that, for a burglary conviction to stand, there must be legally sufficient evidence to prove the defendant intended to commit a crime inside a building. Attorneys should analyze evidence carefully to establish whether intent can be reasonably inferred from the defendant’s actions and statements. Furthermore, this case is important for understanding the evidentiary requirements for burglary convictions. The court’s decision suggests that a signed trespass notice is sufficient to prove that the defendant’s presence in the building was unlawful, and it also illustrates the importance of a clear confession in the face of surveillance footage. Attorneys defending these types of cases should focus on the ambiguity of the defendant’s actions and the potentially misleading nature of the police interrogation to cast doubt on the prosecution’s claim of intent, as highlighted by the dissent.

  • People v. Lewis, 5 N.Y.3d 546 (2005): Clarifying ‘Intent to Commit a Crime Therein’ for Burglary

    5 N.Y.3d 546 (2005)

    The ‘intent to commit a crime therein’ element of burglary is not satisfied solely by a defendant’s intent to violate an order of protection by entering a dwelling that the order of protection declares off-limits; however, the element is satisfied if the defendant intended to engage in other conduct prohibited by the order while inside the premises.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary. The central issue was whether his intent to violate an order of protection by entering a prohibited dwelling alone satisfied the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary. The Court of Appeals held that it does not, but the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to commit another crime beyond the unlawful entry. The court reasoned that unlawful entry alone cannot elevate every order of protection violation to burglary, but other evidence demonstrated intent to harass or menace the complainant within the dwelling. The Appellate Division’s order affirming the conviction was upheld.

    Facts

    The complainant allowed the defendant to live with her despite having him arrested for damaging her property. An order of protection was issued requiring him to stay away from her and her home. The complainant allowed the defendant to return, but after another incident where defendant struck her, another order of protection was issued. Subsequently, the complainant took her keys and left. Defendant entered her apartment without her knowledge while both orders were in effect, seemingly by tampering with a window and fire escape. Upon her return, the defendant kicked her and swore at her as she tried to call the police. Her belongings were scattered outside the apartment.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with second-degree burglary and criminal contempt. At trial, he requested a jury instruction that intent to enter the banned premises alone cannot satisfy the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary. The trial court refused. The jury found him guilty of criminal contempt but was hung on the burglary charge initially. After a supplemental instruction, the jury convicted him of burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary can be satisfied solely by the defendant’s intent to violate an order of protection by entering the dwelling prohibited by the order?

    Holding

    No, because unlawful entry, standing alone, cannot be the predicate crime to satisfy the “intent to commit a crime therein” element of burglary. However, the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant intended to commit a crime in the apartment other than the trespass itself.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that if unlawful entry alone sufficed, every violation of a do-not-enter provision in an order of protection would be burglary. However, the Court noted that there was evidence that the defendant intended to commit other crimes within the apartment beyond the unlawful entry, such as harassment, menacing, or intimidation, which were separately prohibited by the order of protection. The court cited People v. Mackey, 49 NY2d 274 (1980), stating that the People need only allege and prove a knowing and unlawful entry coupled with an intent to commit a crime therein. The court emphasized that they do not need to allege or establish what particular crime was intended, citing People v. Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174 (1989). The Court found there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendant intended to “harass, menace, intimidate, threaten or interfere with complainant in her apartment” in violation of the order of protection. Judge R.S. Smith dissented, arguing that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury and that the defendant did not forfeit his right to appeal this error.