New York Law Review

Tag: Intent

  • People v. Lamont, 24 N.Y.3d 315 (2014): Establishing Intent in Attempted Robbery Cases Through Circumstantial Evidence

    24 N.Y.3d 315 (2014)

    In attempted robbery cases, intent to steal can be inferred from the defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances, even in the absence of direct evidence of intent.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Jafari Lamont for attempted robbery in the second degree. The court found that the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to establish that Lamont possessed the requisite intent to steal. The case involved Lamont and an accomplice who appeared armed and masked at the back door of a Wendy’s before business hours. The court emphasized that intent in such cases is rarely proven through direct statements and can be inferred from the defendant’s actions, appearance (masked and armed), and the circumstances surrounding the incident, such as the time of day and the planned escape. The court distinguished this case from one where the evidence supported alternative criminal intents.

    Facts

    At approximately 6:30 a.m., before the Wendy’s was open, Lamont and an accomplice appeared at the rear door of the restaurant, armed and masked. They knocked on the door, but employees did not let them in. When a police officer arrived, the men fled. The officer saw Lamont wearing dark clothing, a black hat, gloves, and a mask, and carrying what appeared to be a handgun. The officer pursued Lamont, eventually apprehending him. The police recovered a black knit hat and glove during the chase, and found a backpack with additional gloves on Lamont. They also found BB guns near the restaurant and in Lamont’s car. Lamont stipulated that he was one of the masked men and was the person who ran from the police.

    Procedural History

    Lamont was convicted of two counts of attempted robbery in the second degree and acquitted of attempted burglary. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with a dissenting opinion arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish intent to steal. The Court of Appeals granted Lamont leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that Lamont had the specific intent to steal, as required for attempted robbery.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, including Lamont’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances, provided sufficient basis for a rational fact-finder to conclude that he intended to commit robbery.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the standard that a verdict is legally sufficient if any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to conclude that every element of the charged crime has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that intent is often proven through circumstantial evidence. The court reasoned that Lamont’s appearance (masked and armed) and conduct (knocking at the back door before opening hours, attempt to flee, and possession of getaway vehicle) supported an inference that he intended to rob the Wendy’s. The court distinguished the case from scenarios where other crimes might be inferred. The court cited "[t]he element of intent is rarely proved by an explicit expression of culpability by the perpetrator." Further, the court emphasized that the trier of fact was entitled to conclude that the defendant intended to commit robbery, not some other crime. The Court relied on the principle that intent can be "inferred from the defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances".

    Practical Implications

    This case underscores the importance of circumstantial evidence in establishing intent in attempted robbery cases. Prosecutors can use this decision to argue that evidence of a defendant’s actions, appearance, and the context of the crime can be combined to prove intent, even if there’s no direct admission of intent to steal. Defense attorneys must be prepared to argue that circumstantial evidence is consistent with alternative inferences other than robbery, which may create reasonable doubt. This case guides the analysis of evidence in attempted robbery cases and emphasizes the fact-finder’s role in drawing reasonable inferences. The case should also be applied in assessing whether there is sufficient evidence to bring charges in the first instance.

  • People v. Repanti, 23 N.Y.3d 707 (2014): Harassment as a Lesser Included Offense of Attempted Assault

    23 N.Y.3d 707 (2014)

    Harassment in the second degree is not a lesser included offense of attempted assault in the third degree because the intent elements of the two crimes are distinct and it is theoretically possible to commit attempted assault without also committing harassment.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that harassment in the second degree is not a lesser included offense of attempted assault in the third degree. The court clarified that to be considered a lesser included offense, it must be theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without simultaneously committing the lesser offense. The court found that the intent elements for the two crimes are distinct; attempted assault requires intent to cause physical injury, while harassment requires intent to harass, annoy, or alarm. Therefore, the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for both attempted assault and harassment, as the latter was not a lesser included offense of the former.

    Facts

    The defendant, Steven Repanti, and the complainant lived in the same senior community. Following an altercation in a staircase, Repanti was charged with attempted assault in the third degree. The prosecution subsequently added a charge of harassment in the second degree before trial. At trial, the complainant testified that Repanti forcefully “banged into” her with his shoulder. Repanti denied any physical contact. The trial court convicted Repanti of both attempted assault and harassment. The Appellate Term affirmed, and the New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Repanti of both attempted assault and harassment. The Appellate Term affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted Repanti leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether harassment in the second degree is a lesser included offense of attempted assault in the third degree.

    Holding

    1. No, because it is not theoretically impossible to commit attempted assault without also committing harassment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 1.20(37), which defines a lesser included offense. The court stated that to establish a lesser included offense, a defendant must show “that it is theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without at the same time committing the lesser.” The court emphasized this determination must be based on a comparison of the statutes in the abstract, without reference to the specific facts of the case. The court found that attempted assault requires the intent to cause physical injury, while harassment requires the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm. The court explained, “an additional element or fact must be shown to be present in a case of harassment, requiring proof of an intent to harass, annoy or alarm, which is not a required element of an assault count.”

    The court cited *People v. Moyer*, which held that harassment is not a lesser included offense of assault, because it requires proof of an intent to harass, annoy, or alarm, which is not a required element of assault. The court also rejected Repanti’s argument that the *Stanfield* rule applied because the counts were based on the same conduct. The court clarified that *Stanfield* was limited by *Glover* which stated, “the theoretical impossibility requirement “is mandated by the provisions of CPL 1.20 (subd 37)”. The court affirmed the convictions based on the distinct intent elements of the two crimes.

  • People v. Gordon, 23 N.Y.3d 643 (2014): Sufficiency of Evidence for Robbery Absent Recovery of Stolen Property

    23 N.Y.3d 643 (2014)

    A conviction for robbery can be sustained even if the stolen property is not recovered from the defendant, provided there is sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the defendant used force with the conscious objective of retaining stolen property.

    Summary

    Hazel Gordon was convicted of robbery and assault after a department store incident where security personnel suspected her of stealing earrings. Although no merchandise was recovered, witnesses testified that Gordon concealed earrings and later threatened security guards with pens when confronted outside the store. The Appellate Division reduced the robbery convictions to petit larceny, citing the lack of recovered property. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the absence of recovered property does not preclude a robbery conviction if other evidence supports the inference that the defendant used force to retain stolen property. The court emphasized that intent is a factual question for the jury.

    Facts

    Rayon James, a loss prevention officer, observed Gordon selecting two sets of earrings, concealing them, and dropping the backings on the floor. Gordon made multiple layaway stops without visibly purchasing merchandise. Upon exiting the store, Gordon was stopped by security guard Michael Lisky, who suspected her of shoplifting. Gordon became aggressive, pounding Lisky’s chest and later brandishing pens, threatening the guards. Gordon’s son allegedly displayed a knife and discarded items in a nearby cemetery, but neither stolen merchandise nor the knife were recovered. Gordon then hit another employee, Lance Pappas, with her car while fleeing the scene.

    Procedural History

    Gordon was convicted in Supreme Court of robbery in the first degree, two counts of robbery in the second degree, and assault in the second degree. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the robbery convictions to petit larceny, finding insufficient evidence to infer that Gordon used force to retain stolen property since no property was recovered. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the robbery convictions, reinstating the original convictions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a conviction for robbery in the first and second degrees can be sustained when the allegedly stolen property is not recovered from the defendant or her accomplices.

    2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant acted with the conscious objective to cause physical injury to Lance Pappas for the assault conviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the failure to recover stolen property from a defendant does not preclude a jury from inferring that the defendant used force with the conscious objective of preventing resistance to the retention of that stolen property when there is other evidence supporting that inference.

    2. Yes, because the testimony from the victim and several eyewitnesses that the defendant swerved into Pappas, and his testimony as to the physical injuries he incurred were more than enough to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a jury can infer intent to forcibly steal property from a defendant’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances. The court rejected the notion that recovery of the stolen property is a prerequisite for a robbery conviction. “The applicable culpability standard — intent—require[s] evidence that, in using or threatening physical force, [the] defendant’s ‘conscious objective’ was either to compel [the] victim to deliver up property or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking” or retention thereof (quoting People v. Smith, 79 NY2d 309, 315 [1992]). The court emphasized that intent is a question for the jury, which may consider the defendant’s actions inside and outside the store. The court noted that requiring recovery of stolen property would allow defendants to escape prosecution by disposing of the evidence. The court found sufficient evidence, including the defendant’s suspicious behavior in the store, the removal of earring backings, and the violent reaction to security guards, to support the jury’s conclusion that the defendant used force to retain stolen property. As to the assault charge, the court found sufficient evidence existed to sustain the conviction.

  • People v. Beaty, 19 N.Y.3d 918 (2012): Entitlement to Intoxication Charge in Criminal Cases

    People v. Beaty, 19 N.Y.3d 918 (2012)

    A defendant is entitled to an intoxication charge only when there is sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable person to doubt whether the defendant formed the required intent due to intoxication; self-serving statements and the mere smell of alcohol are typically insufficient.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of rape and burglary. He argued that the trial court erred in denying his request for an intoxication charge, claiming he was too drunk to form the necessary intent. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence presented by the defendant—his own self-serving statements and the victim’s testimony that she smelled alcohol on his breath—was insufficient to warrant an intoxication charge. The Court emphasized that the defendant’s actions, such as cutting a screen, instructing the victim to be quiet, and stealing her phone, indicated purposeful behavior inconsistent with a lack of intent due to intoxication.

    Facts

    The victim returned home, charged her cell phone, and fell asleep. She was awakened by the defendant, who was lying next to her and smelled of alcohol. The defendant choked and raped her, threw a blanket over her head, and fled. The victim’s cell phone was missing. Police found cuts in the porch screen of the victim’s apartment. Ten days later, during questioning about another incident, the defendant was asked about the rape. A search warrant of defendant’s apartment revealed the victim’s cell phone hidden in the ceiling. Defendant gave a written statement claiming he had an alcohol problem and remembered knocking on the victim’s window but did not admit to the rape, claiming he fell asleep on the couch and fled when the woman screamed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s request for an intoxication charge. The jury convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the defendant failed to establish his entitlement to an intoxication charge. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for an intoxication charge based on the evidence presented at trial.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s self-serving statements about his intoxication and the victim’s testimony that she smelled alcohol on his breath were insufficient to warrant an intoxication charge, especially in light of the evidence showing the defendant’s purposeful actions during the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while intoxication is not a defense, evidence of intoxication is admissible to negate an element of the crime. An intoxication charge is required when “there is sufficient evidence of intoxication in the record for a reasonable person to entertain a doubt as to [an] element … on that basis” (People v. Perry, 61 N.Y.2d 849, 850 (1984). To meet this threshold, the defendant must present corroborating evidence beyond bare assertions, such as the number of drinks, the time frame of consumption, the lapse of time, whether alcohol was consumed on an empty stomach, the alcohol content of the drinks, and the specific impact of the alcohol on behavior or mental state (People v. Gaines, 83 N.Y.2d 925, 927 (1994).

    The Court found the defendant’s statements about his intoxication were insufficient. The Court also noted that the defendant’s actions showed a purposeful intention. "[H]e cut a hole in a screen to gain entry, instructed the victim to be quiet, threw a blanket over her head, and stole her cell phone so she could not call the police. Given this evidence, the court correctly ruled an intoxication charge was not warranted." Thus, the evidence did not allow a reasonable juror to doubt the element of intent based on intoxication. The Court cited People v. Sirico, 17 N.Y.3d 744, 745 (2011), for the proposition that bare assertions of intoxication are insufficient to warrant the charge.

  • People v. Martinez, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013): Depraved Indifference Murder Requires Proof of Culpable Mental State

    People v. Martinez, 22 N.Y.3d 972 (2013)

    A conviction for depraved indifference murder requires proof of a culpable mental state, and is not established where the evidence points to an intentional killing.

    Summary

    Martinez was convicted of depraved indifference murder for fatally shooting Lee after an altercation. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, vacating the depraved indifference murder conviction and dismissing that count of the indictment. The Court held that the evidence presented, which indicated Martinez obtained a gun and fired multiple shots at close range after chasing Lee, was inconsistent with depraved indifference murder, which requires a culpable mental state distinct from intent to kill. The court remitted for resentencing and granted the People leave to present a charge of manslaughter to a new grand jury.

    Facts

    Defendant Martinez, a drug dealer, argued with Lee, a prospective drug buyer. The argument escalated into a physical fight. Martinez retrieved a gun, chased Lee into a building, and fired four or five shots at him. Lee died from a gunshot wound to the chest, and a bystander was also wounded when Lee attempted to use him as a shield.

    Procedural History

    Martinez was indicted on charges of intentional murder, depraved indifference murder, assault, and weapons offenses in 1991. He was a fugitive until 1995, was tried, and the trial court denied Martinez’s motion to dismiss the depraved indifference murder count. The jury acquitted Martinez of intentional murder but convicted him of depraved indifference murder, assault, and criminal possession of a weapon. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Appellate Division Justice granted Martinez leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to establish Martinez’s guilt of depraved indifference murder.
    2. Whether the defendant adequately preserved the argument that a blatantly intentional killing cannot constitute depraved indifference murder.

    Holding

    1. Yes, the evidence was insufficient.
    2. Yes, the defendant adequately preserved his argument.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that its jurisprudence on depraved indifference murder had evolved, shifting from an objective degree-of-risk standard to requiring a culpable mental state. The court noted its prior holding in People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288 (2006), which explicitly overruled People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270 (1983) and People v. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d 373 (2002), clarifying that “depraved indifference to human life” is a culpable mental state. The court emphasized that intent to kill and depraved indifference are incompatible states of mind. A point-blank shooting, the court stated, is ordinarily not considered depraved indifference murder. The court found Martinez’s actions inconsistent with depraved indifference, which requires indifference to the result. The court also found that Martinez adequately preserved his argument by moving to dismiss the depraved indifference murder count at trial, arguing that the evidence pointed to intentional conduct rather than reckless disregard.

  • People v. Levy, 16 N.Y.3d 509 (2011): Trademark Counterfeiting and the Scope of “Goods”

    People v. Levy, 16 N.Y.3d 509 (2011)

    New York’s trademark counterfeiting statute applies even when a counterfeit mark is affixed to goods different from those for which the trademark is registered, as long as the mark identifies the product as genuine to the average consumer.

    Summary

    Mordekhay Levy was convicted of trademark counterfeiting for selling automotive parts with counterfeit Ford trademarks. Levy argued that the statute only applied if the counterfeit mark was used on the same type of goods for which the trademark was registered. The New York Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the statute applies as long as the counterfeit mark identifies the product as a genuine article to the average consumer, regardless of whether the trademark is registered for that specific type of good. The court also rejected Levy’s argument regarding the lack of a “knowledge charge,” finding that the intent to evade a lawful restriction necessarily implies knowledge that the goods were fake.

    Facts

    Police executed search warrants at Mordekhay Levy’s auto parts business, Black & Yellow Major Auto Parts, seizing allegedly counterfeit Ford parts in 2004, 2005, and 2006. Ford also filed a trademark infringement suit against Levy, resulting in a stipulated preliminary injunction prohibiting him from selling automotive parts bearing Ford trademarks or confusingly similar marks. The seized parts, not manufactured by Ford, bore Ford trademarks or product numbers. Levy purchased and sold parts at below dealer cost. Ford’s trademark counsel testified to the validity and use of Ford’s trademarks.

    Procedural History

    Levy was indicted and tried for second-degree trademark counterfeiting. He moved to dismiss, arguing some parts weren’t covered by the trademark registrations. The trial court denied the motion and refused to instruct the jury that an “intent to evade a lawful restriction” required knowledge the parts were counterfeit. The jury convicted Levy. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York’s trademark counterfeiting statute requires that a counterfeit mark be used on the same type of goods for which the trademark is registered to constitute trademark counterfeiting.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to provide a “knowledge charge” to the jury, specifically instructing that the defendant must have known the goods were counterfeit to be convicted of intending to evade a lawful restriction on the sale of goods.

    Holding

    1. No, because New York’s trademark counterfeiting statute is not limited to instances where the counterfeit mark is used on the same goods for which the mark is registered; it applies if the mark identifies the product as a genuine article to the average consumer.

    2. No, because it is impossible to intend to evade a lawful restriction on the sale or distribution of goods without knowing that those goods were fake.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that statutory interpretation begins with the words of the statute. New York’s trademark counterfeiting statute lacks the explicit “identity-of-goods requirement” present in the federal Trademark Counterfeiting Act. The court reasoned that the legislature’s choice not to include this requirement indicated an understanding that consumers rely on the mark itself, not on knowing the precise products for which the mark is registered. The court provided an example: “assume that Ford makes brake pads for all of its cars, but that it expressly does not place the familiar ‘Ford oval’ on those pads, and therefore does not register the ‘Ford oval’ trademark for that purpose. If a counterfeiter places the ‘Ford oval’ on brake pads, the use of that mark nevertheless ‘identifies’ the good as a genuine Ford product.” Regarding the lack of a “knowledge charge”, the court found it would be impossible to “intend to evade a lawful restriction” on the sale or distribution of goods without knowing that those goods were fake. The court cited People v Samuels, 99 NY2d 20, 25-26 (2002), noting that jurors are presumed to have sufficient intelligence to make elementary logical inferences. The court determined that ample evidence existed for a rational juror to find that Levy intended to evade a lawful restriction, considering the multiple searches, Ford representatives’ visits, and the preliminary injunction.

  • People v. Naradzay, 11 N.Y.3d 460 (2008): Defining ‘Dangerously Near’ in Attempted Crimes

    People v. Naradzay, 11 N.Y.3d 460 (2008)

    To be guilty of an attempted crime, a defendant’s conduct must pass beyond mere intent or preparation and come ‘dangerously near’ the commission of the completed crime, though the defendant need not take the final step necessary.

    Summary

    Jason Naradzay was convicted of attempted murder and burglary after being found near D.G.’s home with a loaded shotgun and a plan to harm her and her family. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that Naradzay’s actions, including purchasing the gun, driving to the victim’s neighborhood, and possessing the loaded weapon near her property, constituted conduct that came “dangerously near” the commission of the intended crimes, even though he was apprehended before entering the home. The court emphasized that the jury was entitled to infer intent from Naradzay’s conduct and surrounding circumstances, rejecting his claim that he had abandoned his plan.

    Facts

    D.G. met Jason Naradzay through a mutual friend. After D.G. attempted to end their contact, Naradzay’s behavior became troubling. He appeared at events she attended, and on February 3, 2004, she told him not to contact her again. On February 4, Naradzay created a “to-do” list outlining a plan to break into D.G.’s home and shoot her and her husband. He purchased a shotgun and ammunition, telling the seller he needed a gun with less “kick” for his elderly father. He borrowed a friend’s car under false pretenses, drove to D.G.’s neighborhood, and loaded the shotgun. A motorist saw him concealing the shotgun near D.G.’s property and called 911.

    Procedural History

    Naradzay was indicted for attempted murder, attempted burglary, and criminal possession of a weapon. The Supreme Court denied his motion to suppress evidence. A jury convicted him on all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Justice granted Naradzay leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Naradzay’s actions constituted conduct that came “dangerously near” the commission of burglary and murder, thereby establishing the elements of attempt under New York law.

    Holding

    Yes, because Naradzay’s actions went beyond mere preparation and placed him in a position to commit the intended crimes but for the intervention of law enforcement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied Penal Law § 110.00, which defines an attempt as engaging in conduct that “tends to effect the commission” of a crime with the intent to commit that crime. The court emphasized that the defendant’s conduct must go beyond “mere intent or mere preparation” and come “dangerously near” the completed crime. The court found that Naradzay’s actions—creating a detailed plan, purchasing a shotgun and ammunition, driving to D.G.’s neighborhood, loading the gun, and approaching her property with the weapon—demonstrated a clear intent and constituted conduct that was “potentially and immediately dangerous.” The court rejected Naradzay’s argument that his intent wavered, stating that the jury was entitled to discredit his self-serving testimony about considering suicide. The court noted that the intervention of an observant motorist and the prompt response of law enforcement prevented Naradzay from carrying out his plan. The court cited People v. Mahboubian, stating, “there comes a point where it is ‘too late in the stage of preparation for the law to conclude that no attempt occurred.’” The court also held that the police questioning was threshold questioning and did not violate Naradzay’s Miranda rights.

  • People v. Washington, 8 N.Y.3d 565 (2007): Enforceability of Conditional Agreements in Conspiracy Law

    People v. Washington, 8 N.Y.3d 565 (2007)

    An agreement to commit a crime can form the basis of a conspiracy charge even if the agreement’s execution is conditional, provided the defendant subjectively believes the condition is likely to be fulfilled.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a conditional agreement to commit murder can be prosecuted under conspiracy law. The defendant, incarcerated on other charges, agreed to pay for the murder of a rival upon his release from prison. He was subsequently convicted of conspiracy in the second degree. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the conditional nature of the agreement (defendant’s release from prison) did not negate the existence of a conspiracy because the defendant reasonably believed the condition would be met. The court emphasized that the agreement to commit murder was concrete and unambiguous, and overt acts were undertaken in furtherance of that agreement.

    Facts

    Defendant, while incarcerated, told a fellow inmate (a government informant) that he was willing to pay to have the complaining witness in his child endangerment case killed. Later, he changed the intended victim to a rival named “Seven,” who allegedly shot him. The informant, working with police, introduced an undercover officer posing as a hitman to the defendant. The defendant instructed the undercover to contact his associates to arrange the killing. He gave the undercover contact information and a description of Seven. The defendant specified that the killing should occur after his release from prison and after he obtained money.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with conspiracy in the second degree. The Supreme Court found the defendant guilty after a non-jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy where the agreement to commit murder was conditional upon the defendant’s release from prison and his ability to secure funds.

    Holding

    Yes, because the conditions imposed by the defendant did not negate the existence of a conspiratorial agreement, as he reasonably believed the condition (his release from prison) would occur, and the agreement itself was concrete and unambiguous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals referenced Penal Law § 105.15, which defines conspiracy in the second degree as agreeing with one or more persons to engage in conduct constituting a Class A felony, with the intent that such conduct be performed. The court noted that a conspiracy consists of an agreement to commit a crime, coupled with an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court addressed the issue of whether conditions placed on an agreement negate the existence of a conspiracy. It surveyed federal circuit court approaches, noting the split between circuits that consider the likelihood of the condition being met and those that deem conditions irrelevant unless they make the agreement illusory. The court aligned itself with the First and Eighth Circuits, indicating that an agreement with a condition is effective if the defendant subjectively believes the condition is likely to be fulfilled. The Court distinguished the case from United States v. Melchor-Lopez, where there was no agreement because the defendant’s conditions were unacceptable to the other party. The court stated: “Here, the conditions that defendant imposed on the performance of the agreement — to commit a murder — were that nothing was to happen to Seven until defendant was released from jail and was able to secure money to pay for the hit. These requirements were not “conditions” negating the existence of an agreement to kill Seven — they were terms of the agreement.” The court further noted that a conspiratorial agreement requires a “concrete and unambiguous . . . expression of [defendant’s] intent to violate the law” (People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 149 [2005]). In this case, the defendant’s intent was clear, and overt acts were committed to further that intent. The court found sufficient evidence of an agreement on the price for the murder, noting that the defendant did not object when the amount was mentioned in front of the undercover officer. The Court concluded, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that the defendant’s conviction was supported by the evidence presented at trial.

  • People v. Gorghan, 9 N.Y.3d 470 (2007): Double Jeopardy and Prosecutorial Misconduct

    People v. Gorghan, 9 N.Y.3d 470 (2007)

    When a prosecutor engages in misconduct during trial, double jeopardy will only bar retrial if the misconduct was deliberately intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of rape and related charges. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct. Upon remittal, the defendant sought to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds, arguing the misconduct warranted dismissal of the charges. The Court of Appeals held that while the prosecutor’s conduct was deplorable, it did not bar retrial because the intent was to secure a conviction, not to provoke a mistrial. The court clarified that double jeopardy bars retrial only when the prosecutorial misconduct is specifically intended to cause a mistrial, depriving the defendant of their right to a verdict from the initial jury.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of raping his live-in girlfriend’s daughter in 1997. The victim reported the abuse to the police in 1999, including allegations of childhood abuse. The defendant was subsequently charged with rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and criminal possession of a weapon, all allegedly occurring in 1997 or later. Prior to trial, the court ruled much of the evidence of defendant’s prior uncharged criminal and immoral acts inadmissible. The prosecutor repeatedly attempted to introduce the excluded evidence, referenced matters not in evidence, made unsupportable assertions, and urged the jury to draw improper inferences, despite the court’s rulings. The defendant objected and moved for a mistrial three times, but the motions were denied.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on all charges. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, citing a pervasive pattern of prosecutorial misconduct prejudicial to a fair trial. Upon remittal to the County Court, the defendant moved to bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds, which was denied. The defendant then commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division to prohibit a second trial. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition, finding the misconduct was intended to secure a conviction, not to provoke a mistrial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether double jeopardy principles bar retrial of a defendant when the conviction was reversed on appeal due to prosecutorial misconduct, but the misconduct was intended to secure a conviction rather than to provoke a mistrial motion?

    Holding

    No, because double jeopardy only bars retrial when the prosecutorial misconduct was deliberately intended to provoke a mistrial motion. Here, the prosecutor’s intent was to secure a conviction, not to cause a mistrial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, holding that while the prosecutor’s conduct was “deplorable,” double jeopardy did not bar retrial because the misconduct was motivated by an intent to secure a conviction, not to provoke a mistrial. The Court explained that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants from multiple prosecutions for the same offense, including the right to have the case decided by the initial jury. However, this right is not absolute. An exception exists when a prosecutor engages in misconduct specifically intended to provoke a mistrial motion, thereby eviscerating the defendant’s right to a verdict from the first jury. The Court emphasized that this exception applies equally to reversals on appeal as to mistrials granted by the trial court. Citing Matter of Davis v. Brown, the court stated that when a prosecutor “fears the case is headed toward acquittal and intentionally causes a mistrial, the calculated result of this prosecutorial misconduct is to deprive the defendant of the right to have the case completed before the first jury.” However, because the Appellate Division found that the prosecutor’s intent was to obtain a conviction, the defendant was only entitled to a new, fair trial. As the court noted in People v. Adames, “The corrective action for prosecutorial trial misconduct should ordinarily not vary whether a verdict is nullified by a trial court or by an appellate court”.

  • People v. Green, 5 N.Y.3d 540 (2005): Claim of Right Defense Not Applicable in Robbery Cases

    5 N.Y.3d 540 (2005)

    A defendant in a robbery prosecution is not entitled to a claim-of-right jury instruction, even if they believed in good faith that the property taken was theirs, because the statutory claim-of-right defense is limited to larceny by trespass or embezzlement, and public policy discourages forcible self-help.

    Summary

    Green was convicted of robbery for forcibly taking a disc player from Pabon, believing it was his stolen property. At trial, Green requested a jury instruction on the claim-of-right defense, arguing he lacked the intent to steal. The trial court denied the request, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the claim-of-right defense is unavailable in robbery prosecutions. The Court reasoned that the Legislature limited the defense to larceny by trespass or embezzlement, and allowing it in robbery cases would encourage the use of force to recover property. While a defendant can argue lack of intent, they are not entitled to a specific claim-of-right jury instruction.

    Facts

    Defendant Green forcibly took a disc player from Pabon, believing Pabon was among a group who had previously stolen Green’s own disc player. Green approached Pabon, snatched the disc player, and walked away. Pabon followed, asking for it back, at which point one of Green’s associates punched Pabon. Green testified that he believed Pabon was one of the individuals who had stolen his disc player because Pabon resembled one of them and was holding a similar disc player.

    Procedural History

    Green and an associate were charged with second-degree robbery and criminal possession of stolen property. The trial court denied Green’s request for a jury instruction on the claim-of-right defense. Green was convicted on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant, prosecuted for robbery of a specific chattel, who in good faith believed that the property was his, is entitled to a “claim-of-right” jury instruction?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Legislature has limited the availability of the statutory claim-of-right defense to prosecutions for larceny by trespass or embezzlement, and public policy considerations militate against encouraging the use of forcible self-help to recover property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 155.15(1) provides a claim-of-right defense only for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement. While a good-faith claim of right negates larcenous intent, this does not automatically extend the defense to robbery cases. The Court acknowledged that robbery is essentially larceny accomplished through force, but the Legislature’s explicit limitation of the claim-of-right defense to specific larceny offenses indicates a deliberate choice not to extend it to crimes involving force. Citing People v. Reid, 69 N.Y.2d 469 (1987), the Court emphasized that if the Legislature intended to excuse forcible taking, it would have explicitly stated so. The court highlighted the policy concerns associated with encouraging self-help through force. A specific jury instruction on claim-of-right defense would give the defendant an unfair advantage by emphasizing one aspect of the proof. The court noted that a defendant can still argue lack of intent based on a claim of right, but is not entitled to a special jury instruction on the defense: “However, simply because a jury might be convinced by a claim-of-right argument, it does not follow that a claim-of-right charge, derived from a statutory defense limited to certain types of larceny, is also available to defendants in robbery prosecutions.”