Mayer v. City of New York, 9 N.Y.2d 294 (1961)
The standard of care owed to trespassers is to refrain from willful, wanton, or intentional acts, or their equivalents; the determination of whether a condition is inherently dangerous is a question of fact for the jury, unless a statute or ordinance dictates otherwise.
Summary
This case addresses the duty of care owed to trespassers and whether the storage of flammable liquid constituted an inherently dangerous condition. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s judgment, holding that it was a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the City of New York created or maintained an inherently hazardous situation by storing accessible, highly flammable material in a darkened, vacated recess adjacent to a former public playground area. The court also noted the importance of determining whether the children were, in fact, trespassers.
Facts
Infant plaintiffs were injured by a fire in a recess adjacent to a former public playground area owned by the City of New York. The area contained highly flammable material, some of which had spilled on the floor. The trial court charged the jury that the inflammable liquid was inherently dangerous as a matter of law.
Procedural History
The trial court rendered a judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial.
Issue(s)
- Whether the trial court erred in charging the jury that the inflammable liquid was inherently dangerous as a matter of law.
- Whether the infants were actually trespassers.
Holding
- Yes, because in the absence of a statute or ordinance, it is a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the storage of accessible, highly inflammable material constitutes an inherently hazardous situation.
- The court suggested that consideration should be given at the new trial to the question of whether the infants were actually trespassers.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the proper standard of care owed to trespassers is refraining from willful, wanton, or intentional acts, or their equivalents. The court emphasized that determining whether an inherently dangerous situation existed is a question of fact for the jury, considering all relevant circumstances, including the continued storage of accessible, highly inflammable material, some of which had spilled on the floor, within a darkened vacated recess adjacent to a former public playground area.
The Court cited Mayer v. Temple Props., stating that the consequences of maintaining an inherently hazardous situation may well have been anticipated. The Court distinguished situations where a statute or ordinance defines a substance as inherently dangerous, making it a question of law. In this case, absent such a provision, the determination belonged to the jury.
The court also raised the point of whether the infants were actually trespassers, citing Collentine v. City of New York, indicating that their status could impact the duty of care owed to them. The Court reasoned that even if no exception was taken at trial, the issue should be considered during the new trial, as it would determine the level of duty the City owed to the children.