New York Law Review

Tag: Ingress and Egress

  • Lewis v. Young, 92 N.Y.2d 443 (1998): Landowner’s Right to Relocate an Easement

    Lewis v. Young, 92 N.Y.2d 443 (1998)

    A landowner burdened by an express easement of ingress and egress may relocate it, without the easement holder’s consent, so long as the easement holder’s right of access and ingress is not impaired.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a landowner can relocate an easement holder’s right of way without consent. The New York Court of Appeals held that a landowner can relocate a right of way for ingress and egress, provided the easement holder’s right of passage is not impaired. Roger Lewis sued Neda Young, seeking to compel her to restore a driveway to its original location. The court reversed the lower court’s order to restore the driveway and remitted the case to the trial court to determine factual issues about impairment of the easement.

    Facts

    Roger Lewis and Neda Young owned adjacent parcels originally owned by the Browns. In 1956, the Browns divided their land, granting easements to the parcels sold, as they lacked direct road access. The Jaffe deed (later acquired by Lewis) included a right of way over the Brown’s driveway. Young purchased the Brown property in 1990, planning renovations that included a tennis court partially situated on the existing driveway. Young relocated the driveway, and Lewis objected, leading to the lawsuit.

    Procedural History

    Lewis sued Young seeking a declaration of rights and an injunction to restore the original driveway. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Lewis, ordering Young to restore the driveway. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the easement’s location was fixed by 37 years of use. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a landowner, absent explicit prohibition in the easement agreement, can relocate an easement holder’s right of way over the burdened premises without the easement holder’s consent.

    Holding

    Yes, because in the absence of a demonstrated intent to provide otherwise, a landowner can move a right of way for ingress and egress, as long as the change does not frustrate the parties’ intent, increase the burden on the easement holder, or significantly lessen the utility of the right of way.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that express easements are defined by the parties’ intent. When an easement grants only ingress and egress, it’s the *right of passage*, not the physical passageway itself, that is granted. Quoting Grafton v. Moir, 130 NY 465, 472, the court stated that “‘A right of way along a private road belonging to another person does not give the [easement holder] a right that the road shall be in no respect altered or the width decreased, for his right * * * is merely a right to pass with the convenience to which he has been accustomed.’” Therefore, landowners can narrow, cover, gate, or fence off easements, so long as the easement holder’s passage is not impaired. The court established a balancing test: landowners can relocate a right of way if they bear the relocation expense and the change doesn’t frustrate the easement’s purpose, increase the burden, or lessen its utility. The court found no intent in the original deed to deny the landowner’s right to relocate the driveway. The indefinite description of the right of way suggested an allowance for relocation. The court remitted the case to determine if the relocation impaired Lewis’s right of ingress and egress.

  • Anzalone v. Radigan, 69 N.Y.2d 640 (1986): Easement by Adverse Possession Cannot Be Relocated to Further Restrict Use

    Anzalone v. Radigan, 69 N.Y.2d 640 (1986)

    An easement obtained by adverse possession at a specific location cannot be relocated to a new location that further restricts the easement holder’s right of way, especially when the easement holder promptly objects to the relocation.

    Summary

    This case involves a dispute between neighbors over an easement for ingress and egress. The defendants, Radigan, had maintained a barrier on Flower Hill Road, arguably establishing rights to the easement by adverse possession at that location. However, they moved the barrier to a new location, further restricting Anzalone’s use of the road. Anzalone sought an injunction to restore the barrier to its original location. The New York Court of Appeals held that even if the defendants had acquired rights by adverse possession to maintain a barrier at the original location, they had no right to move it to a new location that further restricted the plaintiff’s right of way, especially after the plaintiff promptly objected.

    Facts

    Anzalone’s deed granted her a right of ingress and egress over Flower Hill Road, which abutted both properties. Radigan moved a barrier on Flower Hill Road to a new location, which further restricted Anzalone’s access. Anzalone promptly objected to the relocation of the barrier. Radigan argued that removing the relocated barrier would require trespassing on a non-party’s property.

    Procedural History

    Anzalone sued Radigan, seeking an injunction to compel the removal of the barrier from its new location and restore it to its original location. The lower courts ruled in favor of Anzalone, ordering the removal of the barrier. Radigan appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a party who may have acquired rights to an easement by adverse possession based on the existence of a barrier at one location can move that barrier to a new location that further restricts the easement holder’s use of the road, over the easement holder’s objection.

    Holding

    No, because even if the defendants acquired rights by adverse possession to maintain a barrier at the original location, they had no right to move it to a new location that further restricted the plaintiff’s right of way, especially after the plaintiff promptly objected.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the defendants might have acquired rights to the easement by adverse possession based on the barrier’s long-standing presence at the original location (citing Brand v Prince, 35 NY2d 634, 636; Belotti v Bickhardt, 228 NY 296, 302), those rights were limited to that specific location. The court emphasized that the defendants could not extend their adverse possession rights to a new location that further burdened the plaintiff’s easement. The court stated, “Whatever rights defendants may have acquired to the easement by adverse possession, based on the long-continued existence of a barrier at one location on Flower Hill Road, defendants obtained no right to move that barrier to a new location on Flower Hill Road so as to further restrict plaintiff’s use of the road, a move which was promptly objected to by plaintiff.” The court further noted that Anzalone’s property interest in ingress and egress permitted removal of the barrier, even if it meant entering the right of way. The court explicitly stated that it was not reaching any other issue.