New York Law Review

Tag: Information

  • People v. Suber, 19 N.Y.3d 248 (2012): Corroboration Not Required for Information’s Facial Sufficiency

    People v. Suber, 19 N.Y.3d 248 (2012)

    A defendant’s admission need not be corroborated to satisfy the prima facie case requirement for an information.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that an information charging a defendant with failing to register as a sex offender was facially sufficient, even though the defendant’s admission of moving to certain residences without notification was not corroborated. The Court reasoned that while CPL 60.50 requires corroboration for a conviction based on an admission, the statutes governing informations (CPL 100.40) do not explicitly mandate corroboration for an information to be facially valid. Therefore, the Appellate Term’s reversal of the defendant’s conviction was incorrect. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the conviction.

    Facts

    Defendant Frank Suber, a registered sex offender, moved to two different addresses in Brooklyn in December 2005 and February 2006 without notifying the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) or verifying his address with local law enforcement, as required by Correction Law § 168-f. He eventually informed a police officer about his prior Brooklyn residences. Based on this admission, the People filed a misdemeanor information charging him with failing to register and verify his address.

    Procedural History

    In Criminal Court, the defendant challenged the facial sufficiency of the information, arguing that it lacked corroboration of his admissions. The Criminal Court found corroboration unnecessary and accepted his guilty plea. The Appellate Term reversed, holding that corroboration was required and the absence thereof rendered the information jurisdictionally insufficient. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s admissions must be corroborated to satisfy the prima facie case requirement for an information.

    Holding

    No, because the Criminal Procedure Law does not explicitly require corroboration of a defendant’s admission to establish a prima facie case in an information.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 60.50, which requires corroboration for a conviction based solely on a confession or admission, does not apply to the facial sufficiency of charging instruments. The Court emphasized that while an information must establish a prima facie case with non-hearsay allegations, the relevant statute (CPL 100.40) does not expressly mandate corroboration of admissions. The Court distinguished the requirements for informations from those for indictments, where corroboration is explicitly required by CPL 70.10(1) and 190.65(1). The Court noted the legislative history, pointing out that the legislature removed the term “legally sufficient evidence” which incorporates a corroboration requirement, when drafting the information provision. The Court also stated, “Since clear and unequivocal statutory language is presumptively entitled to authoritative effect CPL 100.40 (1) does not mandate corroboration of an admission in an information.” The Court clarified that while corroboration is not required for the *information* to be valid, CPL 60.50 *does* require corroboration before a conviction can be obtained at trial based solely on the defendant’s admission. The dissenting opinion argued that the majority departed from precedent and that an information must contain allegations establishing a legally sufficient case, which includes corroboration of admissions. The majority addressed the dissent’s reliance on People v. Alejandro and Matter of Jahron S. by stating “To the extent that Alejandro and Jahron S. may have tended to equate a prima facie case for an information or a juvenile delinquency petition with legally sufficient evidence under CPL 70.10 (1), those portions of the writings were dicta and, as we now explain, are incompatible with the governing statutes.”

  • People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354 (2000): Preserving Objections to Hearsay in Criminal Informations

    People v. Casey, 95 N.Y.2d 354 (2000)

    Hearsay pleading defects in the factual portion of a local criminal court information must be preserved by timely objection to be reviewable on appeal.

    Summary

    Casey was convicted of criminal contempt for violating a Temporary Order of Protection. He appealed, arguing the information charging him was jurisdictionally defective because it lacked non-hearsay allegations of his knowledge of the order and failed to attach the order itself. The Court of Appeals held that while the information had a potential hearsay defect, Casey’s failure to raise a timely pretrial objection waived his right to challenge it on appeal. The Court clarified that not all pleading defects are jurisdictional, distinguishing between failing to plead an element of the crime (non-waivable) and using hearsay to plead an element (waivable if not objected to). The Court emphasized the importance of preserving objections and the curability of hearsay defects through amendment.

    Facts

    A Temporary Order of Protection was issued against Casey in connection with a harassment charge. The complainant reported a violation of the order to the police. A detective verified the order and interviewed the complainant, who showed him a certified copy. The detective contacted Casey, who confirmed he was served with the order. Casey surrendered, was given Miranda rights, and made statements implying he violated the order.

    Procedural History

    Casey moved to suppress his statements, which was denied. He was convicted of criminal contempt. The Appellate Term affirmed, rejecting Casey’s arguments that the information was defective and his statements inadmissible. Casey appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a hearsay pleading defect in a local criminal court information, specifically the failure to include a non-hearsay allegation of the defendant’s knowledge of the order violated, must be preserved by timely objection to be reviewable on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because hearsay pleading defects in the factual portion of a local criminal court information must be preserved to be reviewable on appeal. Casey’s failure to raise a timely objection waived the defect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed whether the hearsay allegation regarding Casey’s knowledge of the order was a jurisdictional defect that could be raised for the first time on appeal. The Court distinguished People v. Alejandro, clarifying that while failure to plead an element of a crime is a non-waivable jurisdictional defect, using hearsay to plead an element is waivable if not objected to. The Court reasoned that pre-CPL case law required non-hearsay criminal pleadings, but any hearsay defect was waived if not raised in a pretrial motion. The court found no legislative intent in the Criminal Procedure Law to change this. It stated that the non-hearsay requirement is met if the allegation falls under a hearsay exception. Here, the detective’s allegation of service was admissible under the public documents exception (certified copy of the order) and Casey’s admission to the detective. The Court stated, “So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading.” The Court emphasized that pleading deficiencies cannot be jurisdictional because a court must have and exercise subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the sufficiency of a pleading. Moreover, the defect was curable by amendment. The Court concluded that because Casey failed to object to the hearsay defect before trial, he was precluded from raising it on appeal.

  • People v. Casey, 47 N.Y.2d 966 (1979): Facial Sufficiency of Information Requires Allegation of Every Element of the Crime

    People v. Casey, 47 N.Y.2d 966 (1979)

    For an information to be facially sufficient, it must allege every element of the offense charged and the defendant’s commission of that offense; failure to specify an essential element renders the conviction jurisdictionally defective.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed a County Court order and dismissed an information charging the defendant with harassment. The information was deemed facially insufficient because it failed to allege that the defendant’s actions were done “with intent to harass, annoy or alarm,” an essential element of the crime of harassment under Penal Law § 240.25. The Court held that the omission of this element rendered the information jurisdictionally defective, as it did not adequately state the crime with which the defendant was charged.

    Facts

    The information alleged that the defendant, Casey, indicated that he wanted the complainant to leave his premises. It further stated that Casey “did strike, shove and otherwise subject [the complainant] to physical contact and threatened * * * physical harm.” This was the full extent of the factual allegations supporting the charge of harassment.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in a lower court where Casey was convicted of harassment. The County Court upheld the conviction. Casey then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the information was facially insufficient.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an information charging harassment is facially sufficient when it fails to allege that the defendant acted “with intent to harass, annoy or alarm,” as required by Penal Law § 240.25.

    Holding

    No, because the absence of an allegation regarding the defendant’s intent to harass, annoy, or alarm renders the information jurisdictionally defective, as it fails to specify an essential element of the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the fundamental requirement that an information must state the crime charged and the particular facts constituting that crime. Citing prior cases, the court stated, “It is a fundamental and nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite that an information state the crime with which the defendant is charged and the particular facts constituting that crime.” The court noted that CPL 100.40, subd 1, par [c]; 100.15, subd 3 requires that every element of the offense and the defendant’s commission of it must be alleged for an information to be sufficient on its face.

    The court found that the information against Casey was deficient because it did not allege that his actions were done “with intent to harass, annoy or alarm,” which is an essential element of harassment under Penal Law § 240.25. The court reasoned that without such an allegation, the acts complained of did not constitute criminal conduct. As the court stated, “Absent such an allegation, the acts complained of did not constitute criminal conduct and, hence, defendant’s conviction was jurisdictionally defective.” Therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order and dismissed the information against Casey.

  • People v. Farrar, 38 N.Y.2d 627 (1976): Limits on Fines for Continuous Violations Charged in a Single Count

    People v. Farrar, 38 N.Y.2d 627 (1976)

    When a municipal ordinance defines each day of a continuing violation as a separate offense, multiple such violations can be charged in a single information, but only if each violation is stated in a separate count; absent separate counts, the maximum fine that can be imposed is the maximum for a single violation.

    Summary

    The People appealed a decision reducing a fine imposed on the defendant for violating a municipal code regarding property maintenance. The defendant was charged with failing to maintain his property, leading to insect and rodent infestation, over a period of several months. The city’s code defined each day of violation as a separate offense, and the trial court levied a fine exceeding the maximum single-violation amount. The Appellate Term reduced the fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while the ordinance validly permitted cumulative penalties for continuous violations, those violations had to be charged in separate counts in the accusatory instrument.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with violating the Long Beach Municipal Code by failing to maintain his property, resulting in insect and rodent infestation. The violation was alleged to have occurred continuously from October 21, 1971, to April 11, 1972. The City of Long Beach’s ordinances stated that each day a violation continues constitutes a separate violation. The City Court imposed a fine of $350 for Count X, which exceeded the maximum fine of $250 for a single violation under the city ordinances.

    Procedural History

    The City Court of Long Beach convicted the defendant upon a guilty plea and imposed fines totaling $1,050 and a jail sentence. The Appellate Term modified the judgment by reducing the fine for Count X from $350 to $250. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Term’s order, albeit on different grounds.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be fined an amount exceeding the ordinance maximum for a single violation when the information alleges a continuous violation over a period of months, where the ordinance defines each day of violation as a separate offense, but the information does not contain separate counts for each day of violation.

    Holding

    No, because when a continuous violation is charged in a single count, the maximum fine that can be imposed is the maximum for one count, even if the ordinance specifies that each day of violation constitutes a separate offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the City of Long Beach’s ordinance validly allowed for cumulative penalties for continuous violations, the information charging the defendant did not properly reflect this. The court stated, “As in the case of an indictment, and subject to the rules of joinder applicable to indictments, two or more offenses may be charged in separate counts of an information.” The court emphasized that because the offenses charged in Count X were contained in only one count, it was impermissible to punish the defendant as if he were charged with multiple counts. The court noted that each of the violations were joinable with others in the same information. The court distinguished the case from People v. Briary Improvement Corp., noting that Long Beach was not a second-class city and therefore not subject to the limitations of the Second Class Cities Law. The Court of Appeals declined to address whether Count X was void for duplicity because the defendant failed to cross-appeal. Therefore, the maximum fine imposable on the defendant was limited to $250, the maximum for a single count. The practical implication is that municipalities must carefully draft informations to include separate counts for each distinct violation when seeking cumulative penalties for continuing offenses.

  • People v. Bebbah, 9 N.Y.2d 565 (1961): Sufficiency of Information Based on Hearsay

    People v. Bebbah, 9 N.Y.2d 565 (1961)

    An information serving as the basis for a trial and conviction must be supported by sworn factual allegations demonstrating the complainant’s knowledge or identifiable sources and grounds for belief that a crime has been committed; an information based solely on generalized hearsay is insufficient to establish jurisdiction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of the defendant for driving while intoxicated, finding that the information upon which the conviction was based was insufficient. The information, sworn to by a police officer, lacked any personal knowledge of the facts and relied solely on conversations with other individuals without specifying the content of those conversations or establishing any factual basis for the officer’s belief that the defendant had committed the offense. The Court held that an information must be supported by sworn factual allegations demonstrating either the complainant’s knowledge or identifiable sources and grounds for belief to establish jurisdiction.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted in the City Court of New Rochelle for driving while intoxicated. The information that initiated the proceedings was sworn to by a police officer who lacked personal knowledge of the facts underlying the charge. The information stated that the allegations were based on information and belief, with the “source” of the information and “grounds” for belief being “conversations between” four named individuals. The information did not specify the content of these conversations or how they related to the alleged offense.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was arraigned, tried, convicted, and fined in the City Court of New Rochelle. At trial, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the information by appropriate motion. The case was appealed, ultimately reaching the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an information, used as a pleading for trial and conviction, is sufficient when it is based entirely on hearsay and lacks any sworn factual support from a person with knowledge of the facts or identifiable sources and grounds for belief.

    Holding

    No, because an information must be supported by sworn factual allegations that demonstrate either the complainant’s knowledge of the facts or provide identifiable sources and grounds for belief that a crime has been committed. A generalized reference to “conversations” without specifying their content or factual basis is insufficient to establish jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on its prior decision in People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383, which emphasized the need for an information to be supported by some sworn knowledge of facts to establish jurisdiction. The court reasoned that criminal proceedings must be underpinned by “the sanction of an oath and subject to the penalty for perjury if willfully false.” The Court distinguished the present case from People v. Belcher, 302 N.Y. 529, where the information was based on the complainant’s personal knowledge, and from People v. Jacoby, 304 N.Y. 33, where the defendant admitted guilt under oath. Citing People v. James, 4 N.Y.2d 482, the Court stated that an information used solely as a pleading must be sworn to by a person competent to testify as to the facts or, at the very least, provide identifiable sources of information and grounds for belief. The Court emphasized that both conditions—identifiable sources and factual grounds for belief—must be met. Because the complaining officer lacked personal knowledge and the information provided no factual basis for believing the unspecified “conversations” established probable cause, the Court held the information insufficient and reversed the conviction. The court found that the information failed to provide the Magistrate with any sworn factual support for the criminal charge, rendering the proceedings jurisdictionally defective.

  • Hewitt v. Newburger, 141 N.Y. 538 (1894): Liability for False Imprisonment Based on a Defective Warrant

    Hewitt v. Newburger, 141 N.Y. 538 (1894)

    A person who actively instigates an arrest based on a warrant issued pursuant to a fatally defective information can be held liable for false imprisonment because the warrant is void ab initio.

    Summary

    Hewitt sued Newburger for false imprisonment, arguing he was arrested based on a warrant issued without legal authority. Newburger swore out an information alleging Hewitt threatened to damage property. The warrant led to Hewitt’s arrest, but the proceedings were later dismissed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal of Hewitt’s claim, holding that because the information and warrant failed to allege the requisite unlawful and criminal intent, the warrant was void. As Newburger actively procured the arrest, he was liable for false imprisonment.

    Facts

    Newburger swore out an information against Hewitt, alleging that Hewitt threatened to tear down a wall being erected by City Mills. A warrant was issued based on this information, and Hewitt was arrested. Hewitt was detained for a few hours and released, and the proceedings were dismissed shortly after.

    Procedural History

    The Montgomery County Circuit dismissed Hewitt’s complaint for false imprisonment. The General Term of the Supreme Court, Third Department, affirmed the dismissal. Hewitt appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Newburger was liable for false imprisonment when he instigated Hewitt’s arrest based on a warrant issued pursuant to an information that failed to allege the necessary elements of a crime.

    Holding

    Yes, because the information and warrant were fatally defective as they failed to allege unlawful and criminal intent, rendering the warrant void and Newburger liable for false imprisonment as he actively procured the arrest.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the information and warrant were deficient because they did not allege that Hewitt acted “willfully or maliciously” (as required by Penal Code § 639) or “unlawfully and willfully” (as required by Penal Code § 654) when he allegedly threatened to damage the wall. The court stated that “the fatal vice of the information and warrant is that they utterly fail to aver the unlawful and criminal intent which constitutes crime.” Citing People v. Stevens, 109 N.Y. 159, 163, the court emphasized that a criminal intent is crucial for transforming a trespass into an indictable offense. Because the information lacked these essential elements, the recorder’s act was without jurisdiction, rendering the warrant void. The court also emphasized Newburger’s active role in procuring the arrest, stating he was “active and officious” in ensuring Hewitt’s arrest, thus establishing his liability. The court highlighted the distinction between civil injury and criminal action, emphasizing that the presence of criminal intent dictates the classification. “But the word ‘willfully’ in the statute means something more than a voluntary act, and more also than an intentional act which in fact is wrongful. It includes the idea of an act intentionally done with a wrongful purpose, or with a design to injure another, or one committed out of mere wantonness or lawlessness.” (Wass v. Stephens, 128 N.Y. 123, 128). As there was no evidence of such intent, the process was void, and the defendant was liable.