New York Law Review

Tag: Informant Testimony

  • People v. Washington, 86 N.Y.2d 208 (1995): Prosecution’s Duty to Disclose Impeachment Evidence

    People v. Washington, 86 N.Y.2d 208 (1995)

    A prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory material under Brady v. Maryland extends to evidence impeaching the credibility of a prosecution witness, especially if that witness’s testimony may be determinative of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of murder and robbery based largely on informant testimony. After his conviction, he sought to vacate the judgment, presenting affidavits from informants recanting their testimony and alleging prosecutorial misconduct. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying a hearing on whether the prosecution failed to disclose information that could have impeached a key witness. The court emphasized that prosecutors must disclose evidence affecting witness credibility, and the failure to do so may warrant a new trial.

    Facts

    Regina Carter was killed during a robbery. Defendant was arrested based on statements from four police informants alleging he confessed to the crime. Two informants, Washington and McKinney, testified at trial. Years after his conviction, Defendant sought to vacate the judgment, submitting affidavits: Washington and McKinney recanted their trial testimony and Youmans, another informant who did not testify at trial, stated he told the prosecutor that Washington’s statement was false and induced by police promises. The prosecutor did not disclose Youmans’ recantation to the defense before trial.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment without a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed both the conviction and the denial of the motion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and modified the Appellate Division’s order, remitting the case for a hearing on the Brady issue.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s failure to disclose that a potential witness, Youmans, had informed the prosecutor that another witness, Washington, had fabricated his testimony constituted a violation of Defendant’s due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, warranting a hearing on Defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecutor has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, including evidence that could impeach the credibility of a key prosecution witness, and Youmans’ statement to the prosecutor suggested that Washington’s testimony was fabricated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that Youmans’ affidavit, stating he informed the prosecutor that Washington’s testimony was false, constituted potential Brady material. The court emphasized that a prosecutor’s duty extends to disclosing evidence that impeaches the credibility of a prosecution witness, particularly when that witness’s testimony is crucial to the case. The court cited Giglio v. United States, noting that the “good faith” of a prosecutor is not a valid excuse for nondisclosure. The court stated, “A prosecutor’s duty of disclosing exculpatory material extends to disclosure of evidence impeaching the credibility of a prosecution witness whose testimony may be determinative of guilt or innocence.” Because the People’s papers did not concede the truth of Youmans’ averments, and Youmans’ statements were not conclusively refuted, a hearing was required to determine whether Youmans communicated undisclosed Brady material to the prosecution. The Court directed the hearing court to determine whether the undisclosed evidence created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. If so, the conviction must be vacated and a new trial ordered; otherwise, the motion to vacate should be denied.

  • People v. Dancy, 76 N.Y.2d 720 (1990): Missing Witness Charge Requirements

    People v. Dancy, 76 N.Y.2d 720 (1990)

    A party seeking a missing witness charge must demonstrate that the uncalled witness is knowledgeable about a material issue, is under the opposing party’s control, and would be expected to testify favorably to that party; the opposing party must then demonstrate the witness is unavailable, not knowledgeable, or that their testimony would be cumulative.

    Summary

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a missing witness charge regarding a police informant. The defendant established a prima facie case that the informant, Pena, was knowledgeable and under the People’s control. The prosecution failed to adequately rebut this showing with conclusory remarks about Pena’s unavailability and lack of control. Because the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming and the jury’s note indicated the importance of Pena’s absence, the error was not harmless, warranting a new trial.

    Facts

    The defendant, Dancy, was found to have cocaine in her apartment. The police were led to Dancy by an informant, Ephraim Pena, who told them Dancy had received part of a cocaine shipment. Prior to Pena’s tip, the police were unaware of Dancy’s existence. During the trial, Dancy’s defense was that Pena planted the cocaine. Several defense witnesses testified that Pena had access to the closet where the cocaine was found. Dancy denied making a spontaneous admission to Detective Ramos about the cocaine. The defense requested a missing witness charge because the prosecution did not call Pena to testify.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. She appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her request for a missing witness charge. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a missing witness charge regarding the informant, Ephraim Pena, and whether such error was harmless.

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant established a prima facie case that Pena was knowledgeable and under the People’s control, which the People failed to adequately rebut. The error was not harmless because the evidence against the defendant was not overwhelming and the jury specifically inquired about Pena’s absence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that the defendant met her initial burden of showing that Pena was knowledgeable about a material issue and was under the People’s control. The court emphasized Pena’s role in providing the initial information that led to Dancy’s arrest. The court stated, “Pena’s relationship with law enforcement officials spanned a number of years, and it was Pena who informed the police that defendant — whose existence was previously unknown to the police — had had part of a shipment of cocaine delivered to her apartment.”

    The court found the prosecution’s response inadequate. The prosecutor’s claim that Pena was no longer under their control because he didn’t work for the District Attorney was insufficient. The court noted that “[c]ontrol is a ‘relative concept’ and the inquiry is directed to the relationship between the witness and the parties rather than physical availability.” The court reasoned that a witness who provided key information in the case at hand can generally be expected to give favorable testimony to the People. The prosecutor’s vague assertion that Pena was incarcerated in Texas also failed to demonstrate that he was beyond the People’s power to produce because the prosecutor had not made diligent efforts to locate Pena.

    Finally, the court determined the error was not harmless, citing People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 242. The evidence of Dancy’s guilt was not overwhelming, consisting mainly of the cocaine in her apartment and a contested admission. The defense argued Pena planted the cocaine, and the jury’s note about subpoenaing Pena indicated the importance of his absence. Thus, the court concluded a properly instructed jury could have acquitted Dancy.

  • People v. Smalls, 74 N.Y.2d 746 (1989): Right to Counsel at Lineup and Independent Source for Identification

    74 N.Y.2d 746 (1989)

    A defendant has a right to counsel at a lineup when a removal order has been issued to secure the defendant’s attendance, and in the absence of a hearing to determine independent source, in-court identification testimony from witnesses exposed to an uncounseled lineup is inadmissible.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and ordered a new trial because the defendant’s right to counsel was violated during pretrial lineups. The lineups occurred without counsel present despite a removal order securing the defendant’s attendance. The Court of Appeals held that the admission of the lineup evidence was not harmless error because the key issue at trial was identification, and the in-court identifications of the witnesses who attended the lineup were tainted. The court also addressed errors related to the testimony of an informant witness.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery and other charges. The People’s case rested significantly on eyewitness identifications. Two witnesses identified the defendant at lineups conducted without the presence of counsel, despite a removal order in place to ensure the defendant’s attendance. Another witness was a police informant who testified in exchange for a reduced sentence on an unrelated charge.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and then reversed the Appellate Division’s order, remanding the case for a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the lineup testimony of the two witnesses should have been suppressed due to the absence of counsel during the lineups, given that a removal order was issued to secure the defendant’s attendance.

    2. Whether the erroneous admission of the lineup evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

    3. Whether the in-court identification testimony of the witnesses who attended the uncounseled lineups was admissible without a hearing to determine if the testimony had an independent source.

    4. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the informant-witness’s testimony.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a removal order had been issued to secure defendant’s attendance at the pretrial identification procedures, defendant had a right to the presence of counsel during the lineups.

    2. No, because the only significant issue at defendant’s trial was identification, and the People’s strongest evidence came from the two eyewitnesses who had been exposed to the uncounseled lineups.

    3. No, because in the absence of a hearing to determine whether that testimony had an independent source, it cannot be assumed that that testimony was not also tainted and subject to exclusion.

    4. Yes, because the court should have instructed the jury to scrutinize the informant’s testimony carefully and determine whether any benefit he received affected the truthfulness of that testimony, and the court’s erroneous instruction created an imbalance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that because a removal order was issued to secure the defendant’s attendance at the lineups, the defendant had a right to counsel under People v. Coleman, 43 NY2d 222. Since the defendant did not waive that right, the lineups conducted without counsel violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.

    The court found that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by People v. Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237, because identification was the only significant issue at trial. Two of the four witnesses connecting the defendant to the crime were subject to serious impeachment, and the other two eyewitnesses had been exposed to the uncounseled lineups.

    The court emphasized that the in-court identification testimony of the witnesses who viewed the lineup was inadmissible without a hearing to determine whether the testimony had an independent source, citing United States v. Wade, 388 US 218, 240-241; People v. Coates, 74 NY2d 244; and People v. Dodt, 61 NY2d 408. The court noted, “in the absence of a hearing to determine whether that testimony had an independent source, it cannot be assumed that that testimony was not also tainted and subject to exclusion.” This underscored the importance of establishing that the in-court identification was based on the witness’s independent recollection of the crime and not influenced by the tainted lineup.

    Regarding the informant-witness, the court found that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to carefully scrutinize the informant’s testimony for truthfulness, given the benefits he received. The court stated that “the informant’s testimony should be scrutinized carefully and a determination made as to whether any benefit he received affected the truthfulness of that testimony.” The court also noted the error in instructing the jury that the informant’s criminal past could be considered only insofar as it implicated his general credibility, thereby ruling out consideration of the more specific possibilities of bias and motive to falsify, citing People v. Bell, 38 NY2d 116, 123.

  • People v. Lanier, 54 N.Y.2d 725 (1981): Probable Cause for Search Warrants Based on Informant Testimony and Observation

    54 N.Y.2d 725 (1981)

    A search warrant may be validly issued when probable cause is established by a detailed informant’s description of criminal activity corroborated by independent police investigation and observation.

    Summary

    This case addresses the requirements for establishing probable cause for a search warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that a search warrant for a residence was validly issued. The probable cause was based on a detailed description of a robbery provided by one of the participants (acting as an informant), the close physical proximity of the suspects’ residences, and corroborating observations made by an investigator. The court emphasized the reliability of the informant’s detailed account, made in the presence of counsel, and the specificity of the items to be seized, supporting the warrant’s validity.

    Facts

    A robbery occurred in Livingston. One of the participants provided a detailed description of the crime, including the roles of other individuals involved, and was made in the presence of their counsel. The informant’s statements included details of the joint activities of the participants. The residences of the participants were in close physical proximity. Investigator Baker conducted surveillance and observed the post-robbery activities of the individuals, further corroborating the informant’s information. Based on this information, a warrant was obtained to search the premises at 55 Rensselaer Street for eight specifically identified items of home furnishings connected to the robbery.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case then came before the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the information provided by an informant, coupled with independent police observation, established sufficient probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the informant provided a detailed description of the joint activities of the participants, the residences of the participants were in close physical proximity, and Investigator Baker’s personal observations corroborated the informant’s account.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the “peculiar circumstances disclosed in this record” supported the lower court’s finding of probable cause. The court emphasized the reliability of the informant’s detailed description of the robbery, which was given in the presence of counsel. The Court also noted the undisputed physical proximity and connection among the residences of the participants. Further, the description of their joint, post-robbery activities, based on the continuing personal observations of Investigator Baker, corroborated the informant’s account. The court concluded that the suppression court’s finding of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant was not erroneous as a matter of law, given these circumstances. The warrant was also deemed valid because it narrowly prescribed the purpose of seizing the eight explicitly identified articles of home furnishings.

  • People v. Wright, 37 N.Y.2d 88 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause for a Search Warrant Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Wright, 37 N.Y.2d 88 (1975)

    An affidavit supporting a search warrant based on hearsay information from an informant must demonstrate both the informant’s veracity and the basis of the informant’s knowledge to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a weapon. The court held that the search warrant was improperly issued because the affidavit supporting it lacked probable cause. The affidavit relied on information from an informant, James, who claimed the defendant received a stolen pistol. However, the affidavit failed to establish how James knew this information. The single observed narcotics transaction involving the defendant was insufficient to establish a likelihood of narcotics being kept on the premises. Therefore, the evidence seized during the search and the defendant’s admission of ownership should have been suppressed.

    Facts

    Police obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s apartment for narcotics or weapons based on an affidavit by Patrolman Hantz. The affidavit stated that officers saw the defendant pass a glassine envelope to a police officer under investigation for robbery. A “reliable informant,” James, stated that the officer under investigation and another person had robbed narcotics dealers of narcotics and two pistols, with one pistol given to the defendant. The affidavit didn’t explain how James knew the defendant received the pistol, or when/where it occurred.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in a jury trial for criminal possession of a weapon. His motions to suppress the pistol and his admission of ownership were denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the conviction, suppressed the evidence, and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit provided probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant for either narcotics or weapons in the defendant’s apartment.

    Holding

    No, because the affidavit failed to establish a sufficient basis for the informant’s knowledge that the defendant possessed a stolen pistol, and the single narcotics transaction was insufficient to establish probable cause that narcotics were present in the defendant’s apartment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that when an affidavit relies on hearsay from an informant, it must satisfy two prongs: (1) the informant’s veracity and (2) the basis of the informant’s knowledge. While James’ statement against penal interest could establish his credibility, the affidavit failed to reveal the basis for his knowledge regarding the defendant’s possession of the pistol. The affidavit did not clarify whether James personally witnessed the transfer or learned about it through another source. The court cited People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129 (1969) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), noting that the magistrate could not rely on James’ statement without knowing its foundation.

    The court also determined that the affidavit lacked probable cause to believe narcotics were present in the defendant’s apartment. The single narcotics transaction observed by Hantz was not linked to the defendant’s residence, and it didn’t demonstrate that the defendant was a large-scale dealer or user. As the court stated, “Wright’s giving Antomez one glassine envelope did not establish him as a large-scale dealer or user likely to have narcotics on his premises.”

    Because the warrant lacked probable cause, the pistol and the defendant’s admission of ownership obtained as a result of the illegal search should have been suppressed. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and dismissed the indictment.