New York Law Review

Tag: informant disclosure

  • People v. Williamson, 51 N.Y.2d 762 (1980): Limits on Informant Disclosure in Criminal Cases

    People v. Williamson, 51 N.Y.2d 762 (1980)

    A defendant is not entitled to disclosure of an informant’s identity unless they make an extremely strong showing of relevance, especially when the informant’s information is marginal.

    Summary

    This case concerns the extent to which a criminal defendant is entitled to the disclosure of an informant’s identity. The Court of Appeals held that because the informant’s information identifying the defendant was marginal, and the defendant failed to properly preserve objections, there was no error in denying disclosure. The Court further addressed and dismissed the defendant’s arguments regarding merger and the jury charge on motive. The decision underscores the high bar for compelling informant disclosure and the importance of preserving legal arguments at trial.

    Facts

    An informant observed the defendant walking with a child and provided the defendant’s name and address to the police. The defendant was subsequently charged with kidnapping. Prior to trial, the defendant sought disclosure of the informant’s identity, but the request was denied. At a Darden hearing (a proceeding to determine the reliability of an informant), the defendant submitted questions to be asked of the informant, potentially seeking exculpatory information. The Trial Judge’s memorandum after the Darden hearing did not explicitly refer to those questions.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of kidnapping at trial. The defendant appealed, arguing that he was entitled to disclosure of the informant’s identity, that the kidnapping charge should have merged with another crime, and that the jury charge regarding motive was erroneous. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant was entitled to disclosure of the informant’s identity, given the marginal nature of the information provided and the lack of a strong showing of relevance.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on merger.

    3. Whether the trial court erred in its charge to the jury regarding the necessity of proving motive for the abduction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the informant’s information was marginal, and the defendant failed to make an extremely strong showing of relevance or properly object to the lack of explicit reference to his questions in the Darden hearing memorandum.

    2. No, because no crime other than kidnapping was charged.

    3. No, because although a charge that the jury could consider motive on the issues of intent and knowledge would not have been improper if requested, the defendant’s attorney simply excepted to the charge as given and made no such request, thus failing to preserve the issue for review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the defendant was not entitled to disclosure of the informant’s identity because the information provided—observing the defendant walking with the child and providing his name and address—was of a marginal nature. The Court cited People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, 170, stating that disclosure is not required “absent an extremely strong showing of relevance.” The Court also emphasized that the defendant did not move for disclosure or object to the Trial Judge’s memorandum, failing to preserve the issue for appeal. Regarding the merger argument, the Court noted that since no other crime was charged besides kidnapping, the motion to dismiss based on merger was properly denied, citing People v. Cassidy, 40 N.Y.2d 763. Finally, the Court addressed the jury charge on motive, stating that while it would not have been improper to charge that the jury could consider the defendant’s motive on the issues of his intent and knowledge that restraint of the child was unlawful, the defendant’s attorney did not request such a charge and thus did not preserve the issue for review, citing People v. Sangamino, 258 N.Y. 85 and People v. Seppi, 221 N.Y. 62. The Court’s decision underscores the importance of preserving objections and adhering to established legal standards regarding informant disclosure.

  • People v. Santiago, 41 N.Y.2d 381 (1976): Informant Disclosure and Inclusory Concurrent Counts

    41 N.Y.2d 381 (1976)

    When a defendant is convicted of both a greater offense and a lesser included offense arising from the same conduct, the conviction for the lesser offense must be dismissed.

    Summary

    Santiago was convicted of selling and possessing a dangerous drug. He argued that the informant’s identity should have been disclosed and that the possession conviction was an inclusory concurrent count of the sale conviction. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly denied disclosure of the informant’s identity after an in camera hearing. However, the Court agreed that the possession charge was a lesser included offense of the sale charge and therefore, the conviction for criminal possession must be dismissed because a defendant cannot be convicted of both selling and possessing the same drugs.

    Facts

    An undercover officer was introduced to Santiago by a confidential informant. Santiago sold the officer heroin. The officer saw Santiago twice more in the following months and later arrested him. Prior to trial, Santiago moved for the disclosure of the informant’s identity.

    Procedural History

    Santiago was convicted of third-degree criminal sale of a dangerous drug and sixth-degree criminal possession of a dangerous drug. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions without opinion. Santiago appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant.
    2. Whether the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a dangerous drug should be dismissed as an inclusory concurrent count of the criminal sale conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because the informant’s testimony was not relevant to the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
    2. Yes, because the defendant could not have committed the criminal sale without also possessing the drug, making the possession conviction a lesser included offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the informant’s identity, the Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Goggins, stating that "the truly crucial factor in every case is the relevance of the informer’s testimony to the guilt or innocence of the accused." The court found that the trial court had properly determined, after an in camera examination of the informant, that the informant’s testimony would not have been relevant to Santiago’s defense. The court noted the general rule that defense counsel should have access to the record the judge bases his decision on, but upheld the conviction on the sale charge.

    Regarding the inclusory concurrent count, the Court found the District Attorney conceded that under the facts of the case, Santiago could not have sold the drugs without also possessing them. The Court applied CPL 300.30 (subd 4), defining "inclusory concurrent counts," and CPL 300.40 (subd 3, par [b]), mandating dismissal of the lesser count upon conviction of the greater. The court stated that "[a]s these counts were ‘inclusory concurrent counts’…a verdict of guilty upon the greater is deemed a dismissal of every lesser." Therefore, the conviction for criminal possession was dismissed.

  • People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163 (1974): Balancing Disclosure of Informant Identity with Defendant’s Right to Fair Trial

    People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163 (1974)

    When a defendant’s guilt or innocence is at issue, the decision to disclose the identity of a police informant requires balancing the defendant’s rights to confrontation, due process, and a fair trial against the state’s interest in protecting informants, and disclosure is warranted when the informant’s testimony is relevant to the defendant’s guilt or innocence.

    Summary

    This case addresses the circumstances under which a defendant is entitled to the disclosure of a confidential informant’s identity. The Court of Appeals held that while the state has an interest in protecting informants, this interest must yield when the informant’s identity is crucial to the defendant’s ability to present a defense and avoid wrongful conviction. The court emphasized that the defendant must establish a factual basis demonstrating that the demand for disclosure is not a mere speculative attempt to undermine the prosecution’s case. The court distinguished this situation from cases involving probable cause determinations where an in camera review may be sufficient.

    Facts

    Goggins was charged with selling drugs to an undercover officer, Barnes, on two occasions. Barnes met Goggins, known as “Abdul,” through an informant at a bar. The informant introduced Barnes to Goggins, and Barnes subsequently purchased drugs from Goggins outside the bar on both occasions. Barnes’ description of Goggins to the backup team was sketchy, and over a year passed between the sale and Barnes’ in-court identification of Goggins.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Goggins’ request to reveal the informant’s identity. The Appellate Division reversed, directing disclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for disclosure of the informant’s identity, given the circumstances surrounding the identification and the informant’s role in introducing the defendant to the undercover officer.

    Holding

    Yes, because the informant played a crucial role in setting up the drug sale, and there were weaknesses in the identification testimony, thus making the informant’s testimony highly relevant to the defendant’s guilt or innocence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the prosecution has a privilege to protect the identity of informants, this privilege must yield to the defendant’s right to a fair trial when the informant’s testimony is relevant to the defendant’s guilt or innocence. The court stated, “The privileges must yield to the overriding consideration of avoiding the risk of convicting the innocent, unless, of course, the prosecution should elect to abandon its case rather than allow disclosure.”

    The court emphasized that a defendant cannot simply make bare assertions or conclusory allegations that a witness is needed to establish innocence. “Instead he must show a basis in fact to establish that his demand does not have an improper motive and is not merely an angling in desperation for possible weaknesses in the prosecution’s investigation.”

    The court highlighted the informant’s role, noting that disclosure is more likely warranted when the informant was an eyewitness or participant in the crime or played an active part in setting the stage, as was the case here. The court found that the gaps and weaknesses in the prosecutor’s case, specifically the sketchy description given to the backup team and the lapse of time between the sale and the identification, coupled with the informant’s role in introducing the parties, made the informant’s testimony crucial. Furthermore, Goggins presented a credible defense, further warranting disclosure.

    The court contrasted this case with People v. Brown, a companion case where the identification was stronger and the defendant presented no significant defense, thus not justifying disclosure. The Court cautioned that the decision to disclose should not be made ex parte, as that would potentially violate the defendant’s rights to confrontation and counsel.

    Ultimately, the court affirmed the order to disclose, emphasizing that the prosecution could choose to forego the case rather than reveal the informant’s identity.