New York Law Review

Tag: informant

  • People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415 (1993): Sufficiency of Factual Allegations to Warrant a Suppression Hearing

    People v. Mendoza, 82 N.Y.2d 415 (1993)

    A defendant is entitled to a suppression hearing if their motion papers contain sworn allegations of fact that raise a factual dispute regarding the legality of a search or seizure, considering the context of the case and the information available to the defendant.

    Summary

    The case concerns the requirements for a defendant to obtain a Mapp/Dunaway hearing to challenge the legality of a search and seizure. The defendant, charged with murder, moved to suppress evidence, claiming an unlawful arrest. He argued that he was arrested without probable cause and lacked sufficient information to provide more specific factual allegations. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s allegations were sufficient to warrant a hearing, emphasizing that the defendant’s limited access to information, combined with the People’s refusal to disclose the informant’s identity, created a factual dispute requiring resolution at a hearing.

    Facts

    Johnny Speller was stabbed to death on May 30, 2003. The defendant was arrested later that day. The People’s Voluntary Disclosure Form (VDF) stated that a witness picked out the defendant’s photo at 12:45 p.m. The defendant moved to suppress all evidence, claiming he was arrested without a warrant sometime after 12:30 p.m. He denied involvement in the stabbing and claimed he had no knowledge of the police’s basis for his arrest. He argued the police only knew of the stabbing and that his photo was picked out by an unknown witness whose information source was uncertain. The People refused to disclose the informant’s name.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the Mapp/Dunaway hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the defendant’s conclusory assertions were insufficient to create a factual issue. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant’s motion for a hearing should have been granted, vacated the plea, and remitted the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for a Mapp/Dunaway hearing on the ground that the defendant failed to present sufficient information to obtain a hearing, where the defendant denied acting as the principal or accomplice, raised a question of fact regarding the timing of his arrest, and challenged the reliability of the alleged witness.

    Holding

    Yes, it was error to deny the hearing because based on the defendant’s factual allegations, it was error to deny the hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division order and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for further proceedings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that pursuant to CPL 710.60 (1), a suppression motion must contain sworn allegations of fact stating the grounds for the motion. However, hearings are not automatic. The sufficiency of the factual allegations should be evaluated by the face of the pleadings, assessed in conjunction with the context of the motion, and evaluated by the defendant’s access to information. Here, the defendant alleged he was arrested at sometime after 12:30 p.m. away from where the crime took place. The People disputed this, stating the defendant was not arrested until 7:30 p.m., after being identified by a witness and making statements. The time of arrest is in dispute, and if the defendant was arrested before his arrival at the police station, the only basis for probable cause was the witness identification.

    The Court considered that the People could not both refuse to disclose the informant’s identity, or at least some facts showing a basis for the informant’s knowledge the police relied upon to establish probable cause for the arrest, and insist that the defendant’s averments in his pleadings were insufficient to obtain a Mapp/Dunaway hearing. Without more information, the defendant could do little more than dispute the circumstances surrounding his arrest.

    Quoting from People v. Hightower, “defendant could do little but deny participation in the sale.” Similarly, the Mendoza Court stated that defendant’s lack of access to information precluded more specific factual allegations and created factual disputes, the resolution of which required a hearing.

  • People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417 (1985): Establishes Stricter Probable Cause Standard Under the New York Constitution

    People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417 (1985)

    Under the New York State Constitution, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply; evidence seized pursuant to a warrant issued without probable cause must be suppressed, even if police acted in good faith reliance on the warrant.

    Summary

    Bigelow was arrested and his car seized without a warrant based on information from an informant and a police investigation. A subsequent search warrant was issued, and a search revealed contraband. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s suppression of the evidence. The Court held that neither the arrest nor the search warrant were supported by probable cause under either the Aguilar-Spinelli test or the totality of the circumstances test of Illinois v. Gates. Further, the court declined to adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule under the New York State Constitution, finding that allowing the evidence would frustrate the exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct. Therefore, the evidence was suppressed.

    Facts

    Police suspected Bigelow of drug trafficking based on the following facts: he telegraphed almost $25,000 to a Florida resident over four months; the address was near an area known for drug activity; he rented post office boxes in two New York towns; he received two packages from Florida at one post office box in August and September 1981 and another at another post office box in December 1981; and he frequented the apartment of a known drug user and dealer.

    On December 24, 1981, police observed Bigelow attempt to pick up a package from Florida, but the post office was closed. On December 26, they saw him pick up a package and drive to the drug user’s apartment. Police interviewed an informant who stated that Bigelow was a “drugger” dealing cocaine shipped from Florida and had conducted drug transactions as recently as “Christmas week of 1981.” However, the informant had not seen Bigelow sell or possess drugs at any time.

    Bigelow was later stopped, frisked, and taken to the police station. A search warrant was obtained, and a search of his person and vehicle revealed amphetamines, hypodermic needles, and over $4,500 in cash, but no cocaine.

    Procedural History

    Bigelow was charged with and convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance and hypodermic needles. He moved to suppress the evidence, which was denied by the suppression court, which found probable cause for the arrest and search. The Appellate Division reversed, granted the motion to suppress, and remitted the matter, finding a lack of probable cause. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the arrest of Bigelow was supported by probable cause.

    2. Whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause under either the Aguilar-Spinelli test or the totality of the circumstances test.

    3. Whether the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should be admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

    Holding

    1. No, because the police lacked sufficient information to support a reasonable belief that Bigelow had committed or was committing a crime.

    2. No, because the informant’s basis of knowledge was not established, and the police investigation did not sufficiently corroborate the hearsay information to establish probable cause under either test.

    3. No, because the New York State Constitution does not recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in this context.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that probable cause requires information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed, or that evidence of a crime may be found in a certain place. The Court reiterated New York’s adherence to the Aguilar-Spinelli rule for evaluating hearsay information, requiring the establishment of both the informant’s basis of knowledge and reliability.

    The Court found that the informant’s statement lacked any indication of personal observation and did not describe Bigelow’s activities with sufficient particularity to infer personal knowledge. The informant’s conclusory assertion that Bigelow was a “drugger” was insufficient. The police investigation, while corroborating some details, was susceptible to innocent interpretation and did not establish probable cause. The Court then considered the totality of circumstances test articulated in Illinois v. Gates but determined that even under that more relaxed standard, probable cause was lacking, because the informant’s basis of knowledge was not established, nor was the informant’s reliability demonstrated given the prior acquittal of charges resulting from his tips.

    Finally, the Court declined to adopt the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, reasoning that allowing the seized evidence would frustrate the exclusionary rule’s purpose of deterring unlawful police conduct. The Court emphasized that permitting the use of illegally seized evidence would place a premium on illegal police action and provide a positive incentive for similar lawless acts in the future, which is unacceptable under the New York State Constitution.

    The court stated, “[I]f the People are permitted to use the seized evidence, the exclusionary rule’s purpose is completely frustrated, a premium is placed on the illegal police action and a positive incentive is provided to others to engage in similar lawless acts in the future.”

  • People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982): Right to Counsel and Police Interrogation Through Informants

    People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 169 (1982)

    Once a suspect is represented by counsel, the police violate the suspect’s state constitutional right to counsel when they use an informant to elicit incriminating statements, even if the suspect is not in custody.

    Summary

    Knapp was convicted of reckless murder. The key evidence included statements he made to a police informant, a signed confession, and physical evidence from his car. Prior to these events, Knapp had retained counsel who instructed the police to cease questioning him. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the police violated Knapp’s right to counsel by using an informant to circumvent the attorney’s instructions. The court suppressed the confession and physical evidence derived from the illegally obtained statements, finding that their admission was not harmless error and warranted a new trial.

    Facts

    Linda Velzy disappeared on December 9, 1977. Knapp was questioned during the missing person investigation and agreed to a polygraph test. He was already under indictment for unrelated charges and represented by counsel, John Owen. Owen advised Knapp not to take the polygraph. Despite this, police continued questioning him until Owen explicitly directed them to cease the harassment. Subsequently, the police, through an agreement with an informant (Hitt, who had pending felony charges), recorded conversations with Knapp where Knapp requested an alibi. Eventually, Knapp confessed to Hitt that he had killed Velzy. Hitt alerted the police, who then set up a stakeout and arrested Knapp as he was moving Velzy’s body.

    Procedural History

    The Otsego County Grand Jury indicted Knapp on two counts of second-degree murder. The trial court denied Knapp’s motion to suppress his statements to Hitt, his signed confession, and evidence from his car. At trial, Hitt testified about Knapp’s confession. Knapp was convicted of reckless murder. The Appellate Division agreed that the signed confession was obtained in violation of Knapp’s right to counsel but affirmed the conviction, deeming the error harmless. The Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police violated Knapp’s State constitutional right to counsel by using a paid informant to elicit incriminating statements after Knapp had retained counsel and his attorney had instructed the police to cease questioning him?

    Whether physical evidence obtained as a result of those illegally obtained statements should have been suppressed?

    Holding

    Yes, because the police knowingly circumvented Knapp’s right to counsel by using Hitt as their agent to obtain incriminating statements, violating Knapp’s State constitutional right to counsel.

    Yes, because the physical evidence was derived directly from the illegally obtained statements and is therefore inadmissible under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that once an attorney has entered a proceeding, the police cannot use an informant to circumvent the suspect’s right to counsel. The court emphasized that Hitt was acting as an agent of the police when he elicited the incriminating statements from Knapp. Because the statements were obtained in violation of Knapp’s right to counsel, they were inadmissible. Citing Wong Sun v. United States, the court extended this exclusion to the physical evidence obtained as a result of the illegally obtained statements, applying the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. The court rejected the argument that the error was harmless, stating that the illegally obtained evidence formed the core of the prosecution’s case. The court also declined to consider a “missing-person-emergency exception” to the right to counsel, as it was not raised in the lower courts. The Court stated, “In employing Hitt as their agent to obtain incriminating statements from defendant who was represented by counsel, the police violated defendant’s State constitutional right to counsel.”

  • People v. назва, 44 N.Y.2d 663 (1978): Exception to Warrant Specificity Requirement

    People v. De Bour назва, 44 N.Y.2d 663 (1978)

    A minor discrepancy in a search warrant’s description of the premises to be searched is not fatal if the warrant names the occupant, the police are led to the correct apartment by an informant, the occupant confirms their identity, and the warrant is amended before the search.

    Summary

    This case addresses the issue of a discrepancy in a search warrant and whether it invalidates the search. The Court of Appeals held that a minor error in the apartment number listed on a search warrant did not invalidate the search because the warrant also named the occupant, an informant led the police to the correct apartment, the occupant confirmed their identity, and the warrant was amended before the search was conducted. The court emphasized the practical aspects of the situation, focusing on the fact that the police were clearly directed to the correct location and person intended by the warrant.

    Facts

    A search warrant was issued for an apartment described as “25J.” However, the apartment intended to be searched was actually “25C.” The warrant named the occupant of the apartment. An informant accompanied the police to the apartment. The person named as the occupant admitted the police, confirming that he was the person referenced in the warrant. Before any search or seizure occurred, the warrant was amended to reflect the correct apartment designation, “25C.”

    Procedural History

    The lower court initially ruled on the admissibility of the evidence seized. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a discrepancy in the apartment number listed on a search warrant invalidates the search and seizure when the warrant also names the occupant, an informant leads the police to the correct apartment, the occupant confirms their identity, and the warrant is amended before the search.

    2. Whether the prosecution was required to establish due diligence in attempting to locate the informant and produce him at the hearing on the warrant.

    Holding

    1. No, because the warrant also named the occupant, the informant accompanied the police to the correct apartment, the occupant confirmed his identity, and the warrant was amended before any search or seizure was conducted.

    2. No, because the warrant was issued based on the informant’s sworn testimony before the issuing judge, a transcript of which was presented at the hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the discrepancy in the warrant was not material because the warrant named the occupant, the informant guided the police to the correct apartment, and the occupant confirmed their identity. The court also highlighted the fact that the warrant was amended to reflect the correct apartment number before any search or seizure took place. The court cited People v. Taggart, People v. Law, and People v. Nieves in support of its decision, indicating that minor technical defects should not invalidate a search when the officers acted reasonably and in good faith to identify the correct premises. Regarding the informant, the Court stated that there was no obligation to produce him at the hearing on the warrant because the warrant was issued based on his testimony under oath before the issuing Judge, a transcript of which was presented at the hearing. This satisfied the requirements for establishing probable cause. The court emphasized that requiring the prosecution to demonstrate due diligence in locating the informant in this situation would be overly burdensome and unnecessary, given the circumstances.

  • People v. Lucas, 41 N.Y.2d 370 (1977): Establishing Probable Cause for Arrest Based on Informant Information

    People v. Lucas, 41 N.Y.2d 370 (1977)

    Information from a reliable informant that a suspect is involved in drug dealing and narcotics have been observed at a specific location can establish probable cause for the suspect’s arrest.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether police had probable cause to arrest the defendant, Lucas, based on information from a reliable informant. The New York Court of Appeals held that the informant’s tip, stating that Lucas and another individual were drug dealers and that narcotics were observed at their premises, was sufficient to establish probable cause. Consequently, the arrest and the incidental search of Lucas were deemed lawful. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for review of the facts.

    Facts

    Police had information from a reliable informant that Lucas and another individual were drug dealers. The informant also stated that narcotics had been observed at the premises associated with Lucas. Based on this information, Lucas was arrested.

    Procedural History

    The case initially involved a question of whether search warrants authorized a search of Lucas outside a specific apartment, which the Court of Appeals determined they did not. The People argued that the search was justified as incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause, but this issue wasn’t raised at the original hearing. The case was remanded for a further hearing on the issue of probable cause. The trial court found probable cause existed. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remitted the case to the Appellate Division for review of the facts.

    Issue(s)

    Whether information from a reliable informant that the defendant was a drug dealer and that narcotics had been observed at his premises was sufficient to establish probable cause for the defendant’s arrest.

    Holding

    Yes, because the police had information from a reliable informant that the defendant and another individual were drug dealers and narcotics had been observed at the premises. This information was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime, making the arrest and incidental search lawful.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on whether the informant’s tip provided sufficient probable cause to justify the arrest. The court emphasized the reliability of the informant and the specificity of the information provided (drug dealing and observation of narcotics at the premises). The court reasoned that this level of detail and the informant’s reliability created a reasonable belief that the defendant had committed a crime, thus justifying the arrest. The court stated, “In our view this was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed a crime. Thus the arrest, and the incidental search were lawful.” The court relied on established precedent regarding the use of informant information to establish probable cause, balancing the need for effective law enforcement with the protection of individual rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

  • People v. Solimine, 18 N.Y.2d 477 (1966): Hearing Not Required When Attacking Informant’s Veracity, Not Affiant’s

    People v. Solimine, 18 N.Y.2d 477 (1966)

    A defendant is not entitled to a hearing to challenge a search warrant affidavit where the challenge is to the veracity of the informant providing information to the affiant, rather than the truthfulness of the affiant’s statements themselves.

    Summary

    Solimine pleaded guilty to criminally buying and receiving stolen property. He sought to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant, arguing the warrant’s affidavit was based on hearsay from a confessed thief. The trial court denied a hearing, but the Appellate Division reversed, citing People v. Alfinito. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Solimine’s challenge attacked the informant’s credibility, not the detective’s truthfulness. The Court reasoned that to warrant a hearing, the defendant must cast doubt on the affiant’s allegations, which Solimine failed to do, rendering a hearing unnecessary.

    Facts

    A detective obtained a search warrant based on an affidavit stating a named informant, incarcerated near the courthouse, confessed to burglarizing business premises with Solimine. The informant claimed Solimine possessed a calculating machine, a barometer, and a pistol at his home, car, or business, providing detailed descriptions verified by the detective.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Bronx County, convicted Solimine after he pleaded guilty. Solimine’s motion to suppress evidence was denied without a hearing. The Appellate Division reversed, finding Solimine was entitled to a hearing under People v. Alfinito. The New York Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to a hearing to challenge a search warrant affidavit when the defendant’s challenge is directed at the veracity of the informant providing information to the affiant, rather than the truthfulness of the affiant’s statements.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s challenge must put into issue the truthfulness of the affiant’s statements to warrant a hearing. Here, the defendant only challenged the credibility of the informant, not the truthfulness of the detective’s affidavit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from People v. Alfinito, emphasizing that Alfinito allows inquiry into whether the affidavit’s statements were perjurious, with the burden of proof on the attacker. The Court found Solimine’s affidavit did not attack the detective’s veracity but the credibility of the informant. The Court emphasized the importance of directing the challenge to the affiant’s truthfulness: “A challenge directed at the veracity of the informer does not put into issue the truthfulness of the affiant’s statements.” When reasons are given for crediting the source of information and the items and location are particularly detailed, a hearing will not be granted unless the moving papers imply perjury. The Court considered the detective’s specific details, such as the location of the items and verification of the informant’s information, did not imply falsity. The court found that the addition of details like color, model, and serial number of the calculating machine, likely from the victim, did not give the affidavit an air of falsity. Therefore, since Solimine’s challenge did not impugn the detective’s truthfulness, the Appellate Division erred in ordering a hearing. The key takeaway is that a defendant must directly challenge the affiant’s veracity, not merely question the informant’s credibility, to warrant a hearing on a search warrant affidavit.

  • People v. Santiago, 13 N.Y.2d 326 (1963): Establishing Reasonable Cause for Warrantless Searches Based on Informant Tips

    People v. Santiago, 13 N.Y.2d 326 (1963)

    A warrantless search is lawful if incident to a lawful arrest, and an arrest is lawful if officers have reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed and the defendant committed it; this reasonable cause can be based on a reliable informant’s tip, especially when corroborated by other factors.

    Summary

    These consolidated appeals address the legality of searches without warrants in two separate narcotics cases. In People v. Santiago, the court upheld the conviction, finding the search was justified by reliable information from a known drug addict corroborated by police investigation. In People v. Martin, the court reversed the conviction, deeming the search illegal because it was based on unverified information from an unreliable informant and involved an unlawful intrusion into a building. The differing factual scenarios highlight the importance of corroboration and the manner of entry in determining the legality of a warrantless search.

    Facts

    People v. Santiago: Police officers, acting on information from Elfman, a known drug addict seeking leniency, identified Lee Santiago as her narcotics supplier. Elfman provided Santiago’s address, phone number, and car description. After confirming the phone number and overhearing Elfman arrange a drug purchase with someone she called “Lee,” officers followed Elfman to Santiago’s apartment. Elfman signaled to the officers that narcotics were present, and the officers entered the apartment where they observed Santiago discard glassine envelopes containing heroin. Santiago admitted the drugs belonged to her.

    People v. Martin: Police officers, after arresting Robert Void on unrelated charges, received information from him about narcotics being cut up at an apartment on Edgecomb Avenue. Void described the occupant as a woman named Rose and advised that entry should not be made from the front. Without verifying Void’s information, officers entered the building by forcing open a skylight. They saw narcotics in an apartment through an open door. Rosalee Martin was later arrested in another apartment and charged with possession of the drugs found in the Edgecomb Avenue apartment.

    Procedural History

    People v. Santiago: Santiago was convicted of felonious possession of narcotics in the Supreme Court, New York County. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the conviction. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    People v. Martin: Martin was convicted of felonious possession of a narcotic drug with intent to sell in the Supreme Court. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the conviction. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. People v. Santiago: Whether the warrantless search of Santiago’s apartment was justified by reasonable cause based on information from an informant.

    2. People v. Martin: Whether the search of the Edgecomb Avenue apartment was legal, considering the unverified information from the informant and the manner of entry.

    Holding

    1. People v. Santiago: Yes, because the officers had reasonable cause to believe Santiago was committing a felony based on the informant’s information, which was corroborated by their own investigation.

    2. People v. Martin: No, because the informant’s story was not checked against any previous experience with him or against any objective facts, and the evidence was obtained by an illegal and forceful intrusion into the building.

    Court’s Reasoning

    People v. Santiago: The Court of Appeals emphasized that the legality of the search hinged on whether the officers had reasonable cause to believe that Santiago possessed narcotics with intent to sell. The court found that reasonable cause existed because the officers knew Elfman as a narcotics user and seller, knew of Santiago’s reputation as a seller, verified the phone number Elfman provided, and overheard a phone conversation arranging a drug purchase. The court cited People v. Coffey, stating that “Substantiation of information can come either from the informer’s own character and reputation or from the separate, objective checking of the tale he tells.” The court distinguished this case from situations where an informer’s story is the sole basis for reasonable belief, emphasizing the corroborating evidence in this case.

    People v. Martin: The Court of Appeals found the search illegal for two primary reasons. First, the information provided by Void, the informant, was not adequately checked or corroborated. The officers had no prior experience with Void and did not verify his claims before acting on them. Second, the officers gained access to the apartment building through an illegal, forceful intrusion by breaking open a skylight. The court emphasized that such an intrusion into a residential building without a warrant or exigent circumstances is unlawful, citing Johnson v. United States and other cases. The court stated that acting on untested information from a person whose reliability was not otherwise confirmed, combined with the illegal entry, rendered the search unconstitutional.