New York Law Review

Tag: Infancy Tolling

  • Matter of the Arbitration between Solkav Solkav and New York City Transit Authority, 58 N.Y.2d 95 (1983): Tolling Provisions for Infancy in Arbitration Confirmation

    Matter of the Arbitration between Solkav Solkav and New York City Transit Authority, 58 N.Y.2d 95 (1983)

    The general tolling provision for infancy under CPLR 208 does not apply to the specific one-year time limit for confirming arbitration awards under CPLR 7510.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the tolling provision for infancy applies to the one-year statute of limitations for confirming an arbitration award. The Court of Appeals held that it does not, reasoning that the specific provisions governing arbitration confirmation in CPLR Article 75 take precedence over the general tolling provisions of CPLR 208. The court emphasized that a guardian ad litem, required for initiating arbitration on behalf of an infant, can ensure timely confirmation of any resulting award, thus mitigating potential hardship.

    Facts

    An infant petitioner was injured on a New York City Transit Authority bus on January 8, 1977. A guardian ad litem was appointed to initiate a no-fault arbitration proceeding on the infant’s behalf. An arbitration award was issued in favor of the infant on May 1, 1979. The guardian ad litem delayed applying to confirm the award until December 1980, which was beyond the one-year period prescribed by CPLR 7510.

    Procedural History

    Special Term denied the application to confirm the arbitration award as time-barred. The Appellate Division reversed, applying the toll for infancy under CPLR 208 and remitting the proceeding to Special Term for a determination on the merits. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and dismissed the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the tolling provision for infancy, as prescribed in CPLR 208, applies to an application to confirm an arbitration award pursuant to CPLR 7510, which requires such application to be made within one year of the award’s delivery.

    Holding

    No, because the specific provisions of CPLR Article 75 governing arbitration confirmations override the general tolling provisions for infancy under CPLR 208.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPLR Article 75 provides a comprehensive framework for arbitration proceedings, including specific time limits for confirming awards. CPLR 7510 mandates that applications to confirm an award be made within one year of its delivery. CPLR 7512 allows for extensions of this time limit in cases of death or incompetency but conspicuously omits any similar provision for infancy. The court applied the principle that specific statutory provisions take precedence over general ones.

    The court further noted the practical considerations: “Inasmuch as the appointment of a guardian ad litem will be required for the institution of the arbitration proceeding, that guardian will be available and authorized to make a timely application to confirm any award which may be made in the infant’s favor.” This suggests that the requirement of a guardian ad litem, who is responsible for protecting the infant’s interests, mitigates any potential hardship resulting from the lack of a specific tolling provision for infancy in CPLR 7510.

    The court, in effect, balanced the policy favoring the prompt resolution of disputes through arbitration against the traditional protections afforded to infants under the law, ultimately concluding that the specific statutory scheme for arbitration took precedence in this instance.

  • Cohen v. Pearl River Union Free School District, 51 N.Y.2d 264 (1980): Tolling Infancy in Notice of Claim

    Cohen v. Pearl River Union Free School District, 51 N.Y.2d 264 (1980)

    The period during which a court may authorize service of a late notice of claim against a public corporation is coextensive with the time limited for commencing an action and is subject to the tolling provisions for infancy.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the infancy toll under CPLR 208 applies to the period in which a court may grant an extension to serve a late notice of claim against a public corporation, as governed by General Municipal Law § 50-e(5). The Court of Appeals held that the time for applying for leave to serve a late notice of claim is tolled during the injured party’s infancy, aligning the extension period with the statute of limitations for commencing an action. This decision clarifies the interplay between notice of claim requirements and the protection afforded to infants under New York law.

    Facts

    Daniel Cohen, an infant, was injured on September 30, 1975, while playing soccer on Pearl River High School grounds due to a protruding object. On December 5, 1977, Cohen’s father applied for judicial leave to serve a late notice of claim on the Pearl River Union Free School District and the Orangetown Central School District. Pearl River School District opposed, citing prejudice due to the delay and the expiration of the time to grant such leave.

    Procedural History

    Special Term initially denied the application but granted it upon reconsideration, citing Matter of Beary v. City of Rye. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the infancy toll did not apply to the limitations period in General Municipal Law § 50-e(5). The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the expanded limitations period contained in the amendments to section 50-e (subd 5) may be applied retroactively to the petitioner’s claim?

    2. Whether the period during which a court may grant an extension of the time within which to serve notice of claim is tolled during the infancy of the claimant in accordance with CPLR 208?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the claim was still viable under the former one-year limitations period when the amendment took effect, and applying the new time provisions would not prejudice the school district.

    2. Yes, because the amended version of section 50-e (subd 5) makes the period during which an extension may be granted coextensive with the Statute of Limitations governing the claim (General Municipal Law, § 50-i, subd 1, par [c]), and thus subject to tolling under CPLR 208.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that since the amendment to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) makes the period for seeking an extension to file a late notice of claim coextensive with the statute of limitations for commencing an action, the tolling provisions of CPLR 208, including the infancy toll, apply. The Court emphasized that the legislature was aware of decisions applying the infancy toll to claims against public corporations when it amended § 50-e(5). By referencing the statute of limitations, the legislature intended to incorporate the tolling provisions. The Court stated, “[t]he extension shall not exceed the time limited for the commencement of an action by the claimant against the public corporation”. The court dismissed the argument that this created an incongruous result, clarifying that incorporating the toll expands the time frame for the court’s discretion, but does not mandate an extension in every case involving a disability. The decision to grant or deny remains discretionary, balancing the interests of the claimant and the public corporation. The Court distinguished this from situations where statutes of limitations are considered conditions precedent, noting that in this instance, the legislature explicitly linked the extension period to the general statute of limitations. Because the Appellate Division erroneously concluded the time for making the application had expired, the case was remitted for the court to exercise its discretion and determine whether an extension should be granted based on the specific facts, including whether the school district had notice of the incident. The Court emphasized that the availability of a toll does not mandate an extension, as the decision to grant or deny remains purely discretionary and subject to fairness concerns for the potentially liable public corporation.