New York Law Review

Tag: Infancy Defense

  • People v. Santiago, 21 N.Y.3d 901 (2013): Prior Out-of-State Conviction of a Minor and Second Felony Offender Status

    People v. Santiago, 21 N.Y.3d 901 (2013)

    A prior out-of-state conviction cannot be used as a predicate felony for enhanced sentencing in New York if the defendant was under the age of 16 at the time of the out-of-state conviction, and the equivalent New York crime is not one for which a person under 16 can be held criminally responsible.

    Summary

    Carlos Santiago, Jr. was convicted of sexual abuse and unlawful imprisonment. The prosecution sought to sentence him as a second felony offender based on a prior Pennsylvania conviction for third-degree murder when Santiago was 15. Santiago argued that because a 15-year-old could not be prosecuted for the equivalent crime in New York (second-degree manslaughter), the Pennsylvania conviction could not serve as a predicate felony. The Court of Appeals held that the Pennsylvania conviction could not be used for enhanced sentencing because New York law categorically prohibits the prosecution of individuals under 16 for crimes like second-degree manslaughter, making the prior conviction invalid as a predicate felony.

    Facts

    • Carlos Santiago, Jr. was convicted in New York of two counts of first-degree sexual abuse and one count of second-degree unlawful imprisonment on May 23, 2008.
    • At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution sought to sentence Santiago as a second felony offender.
    • This request was based on a prior Pennsylvania conviction from January 1993 for third-degree murder, when Santiago was 15 years old.
    • Defense counsel objected, arguing lack of nexus and that Santiago would have been eligible for youthful offender status in New York.

    Procedural History

    • The County Court adjudicated Santiago a second felony offender and sentenced him accordingly.
    • On appeal, Santiago argued that the Pennsylvania conviction could not serve as a predicate felony because he was 15 when convicted, and New York law prohibits prosecuting 15-year-olds for equivalent crimes like second-degree manslaughter.
    • The Appellate Division concluded that Santiago failed to preserve this argument.
    • The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the issue of the defendant’s age at the time of the prior out-of-state conviction was properly preserved for appellate review.
    2. Whether a prior out-of-state conviction can be used as a predicate felony conviction when the defendant was under 16 at the time of that conviction, and the equivalent crime in New York is not one for which a person under 16 can be held criminally responsible.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the sentence’s illegality was readily discernible from the trial record, falling within an exception to the preservation rule.
    2. No, because New York law categorically prohibits the prosecution of individuals under 16 for crimes like second-degree manslaughter, making the prior conviction invalid as a predicate felony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the case fell within an exception to the preservation rule because the illegality of the sentence was evident from the record. This was due to undisputed facts readily available in the pre-sentencing report and raised by defense counsel. The Court cited People v. Nieves and People v. Samms to support this exception, noting that the relevant dates were in the record and undisputed. The court emphasized that “there was no question as to defendant’s date of birth and the date of his conviction for the Pennsylvania crime, both of which appeared in the presentencing report reviewed by both parties and County Court.”

    The Court applied Penal Law § 30.00(1), which states that a person must be at least 16 years old to be criminally responsible. The Court stated, “So assuming as we must for purposes of this appeal that third-degree murder in Pennsylvania is equivalent to second-degree manslaughter in New York, defendant’s Pennsylvania conviction was not a predicate felony conviction within the meaning of Penal Law § 70.06 (1) (b) (i) because he could not even have been prosecuted for second-degree manslaughter in New York at the age of 15.” This categorical prohibition distinguishes infancy from affirmative defenses or discretionary determinations like youthful offender status.

    The Court highlighted the key feature as “the infancy statute’s categorical nature.” For offenses not listed as exceptions, neither the court nor the prosecution has discretion to prosecute an infant defendant. The Court concluded that because the prior conviction was for an offense for which a sentence to imprisonment was not authorized in New York due to the defendant’s age, it could not serve as a predicate felony.

  • People v. Taylor, 83 N.Y.2d 837 (1994): Infancy Defense and Jurisdiction in Bail Jumping Cases

    People v. Taylor, 83 N.Y.2d 837 (1994)

    The defense of infancy against underlying charges does not automatically divest a court of jurisdiction over a subsequent bail jumping charge, particularly when the defendant misrepresented their age to the court.

    Summary

    Defendant Taylor, initially indicted for drug possession, pled guilty but misrepresented his age to the court. After being released pending sentencing, he failed to appear, leading to a bail jumping charge. The initial guilty plea was later withdrawn upon discovery of Taylor’s actual age (under 16). Despite this, he pled guilty to bail jumping. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the bail jumping conviction, holding that the infancy defense against the underlying charges did not divest the court of jurisdiction over the bail jumping charge, especially considering Taylor’s initial misrepresentation to the court.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on drug possession charges.
    He misrepresented his name and age (claiming to be 19) to the trial court.
    He was released pending sentencing but failed to appear.
    A bench warrant was issued for his arrest.
    He was over 16 at the time he failed to appear for sentencing.
    His guilty plea to the drug charge was withdrawn after his birth certificate revealed he was under 16 when the alleged possession occurred.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was indicted on drug possession charges and pleaded guilty.
    He was then charged with bail jumping in the first degree after failing to appear for sentencing.
    He withdrew his initial guilty plea to the drug charges.
    He pleaded guilty to bail jumping in the first degree.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the bail jumping conviction.
    A dissenting Justice at the Appellate Division granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court was divested of jurisdiction over the bail jumping charge once the defense of infancy was raised regarding the predicate criminal charges.

    Holding

    No, because the infancy defense is an ordinary defense that must be raised by the defendant, and the defendant misrepresented his age to the court. The court had effective jurisdiction over him when he committed bail jumping.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that infancy is an ordinary defense that must be raised by the defendant (Penal Law § 30.00 [3]). The defendant did not raise the defense initially and, in fact, misrepresented his age. The Court emphasized that the status of pending felony charges does not automatically nullify criminal liability for bail jumping, citing People v. Eiffel, 81 NY2d 480, 483. The Court considered the theoretical and practical effect of infancy on the criminal proceedings. The defendant’s misrepresentation of his age was a key factor in the Court’s decision, suggesting that he should not benefit from his deceit. The Court’s rationale implies a policy consideration against allowing defendants to manipulate the system by initially concealing their age and then claiming infancy to escape subsequent charges related to their failure to appear. There were no dissenting or concurring opinions noted.

  • Matter of Adoption of K. (Anonymous), 39 N.Y.2d 58 (1976): Validity of Irrevocable Adoption Consent by a Minor

    Matter of Adoption of K. (Anonymous), 39 N.Y.2d 58 (1976)

    An irrevocable consent to adoption, executed in accordance with Domestic Relations Law § 115-b, is valid even if the natural mother is under 21 years of age (but over 18) at the time of execution, as the statute makes no provision for the defense of infancy.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether an irrevocable consent to adoption, executed by a natural mother four months before her 21st birthday, could be revoked based on infancy and duress. The Surrogate’s Court found the consent was voluntary and made after full disclosure. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that since the consent was executed as required by statute and the statute lacks a provision for the defense of infancy, the consent was valid and irrevocable. This case clarifies that the statutory requirements for consent under Domestic Relations Law § 115-b supersede common-law defenses of infancy in the context of adoption.

    Facts

    On October 31, 1973, the appellant (natural mother), appeared before a Surrogate’s Court Judge and executed an irrevocable consent to adoption pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 115-b. The appellant was four months shy of her 21st birthday at the time of consent. Approximately five months later, she attempted to revoke her consent, claiming duress and infancy.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate’s Court conducted a hearing to review the procedures followed and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the consent. The Surrogate’s Court found no duress and concluded the consent was voluntary, made after full disclosure, and with full understanding of its legal consequences. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s Court decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an irrevocable consent to adoption, executed by a natural mother who is under 21 years of age but over 18, is valid and irrevocable, notwithstanding the common-law defense of infancy, when the consent was effectuated in the manner required by Domestic Relations Law § 115-b.

    Holding

    Yes, because the consent was effectuated in the manner required by statute, and the statute makes no provision for the defense of infancy. Therefore, the consent was valid and irrevocable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling, emphasizing that the appellant’s consent was effectuated in the manner required by Domestic Relations Law § 115-b. The court highlighted the Surrogate’s thorough explanation to the natural mother regarding the gravity of her consent, as mandated by subdivision 2 of § 115-b. The court also noted that the appellant had received clarification from the adoption clerk and the attorney for the adoptive parents and had consulted with her parents and friends before executing the consent. Because the statute doesn’t provide for the defense of infancy in this context, the court found no basis to disturb the determination that the consent was valid and irrevocable. The court reasoned that the specific statutory framework for adoption consent superseded the general common-law principles related to infancy.